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NEUTRALISM: i ts meaning and 




Neutralism - dissociation from the Cold ',Var - can take 
many forms. 
Ac a doctrine it is to be found in its most comprehensive 
forms in Asia and Africa; and because its chief proponents 
are leaders of their countries, it is a profoundly pragmatic 
and eclectic doctrine. Yet it i s deeply grounded in 
certain widespread hopes and fears , and is usually nourished 
by nationalism. 
Neutralist foreign policies are shaped by, and yet 
have come to shape, the style and scope of Cold War rivalries . 
Six forms of policy neutralism may be distinguished. These 
are: new state neutralism; pioneer neutralism; neutral-
ization; buffer status; traditional neutrality; and erstwhile 
isolationism. Each of these types of policy represents 
different ways in which a state can become neutralist, and 
it is suggested how many- etates fa l l into each of these 
classes. Nearly three quarters of the neutralist states 
in early 1961 are new states which have become independent 
since 1945* Many of them practise policies which are in 
some respects like those of three pioneer neutralists -
India , Yugoslavia and Egypt. 
Since 1945 neutralism has been of growing significance 
internationally. 
T h e study of general contacts and relations and of 
general resemblances and differences i s the only avenue 
to a general perspective without which neither profit 
nor pleasure can be extracted from historical research." 
Polybius, Book I , Chapter 4 . 
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INTRODUCTION 
"Те must therefore use ordinary words. They separate 
us least from the past, which we are trying to understand, 
and from the present, with i ts Babel of tongues, in which 
and to which we must tell what we have understood. But 
let us not imagine that ordinary words are easy to use . 
To split the ism demands clarity of thought and constant 
watchfulness." 
Sir Keith Hancock - Country and Calling. 
"Neutralism is , of course, one of those rather rotund 
words which does not readily admit of def in it ion . " 
Mr. Menzies to the U .N . General Assembly, 
5th October, i 960 . 
Since the end of the Second /orld Vfar the political 
neologism''" 'neutralism* has been used so often by so many 
people, in such different circumstances and with such 
different intentions, that its meaning seems to change, 
chameleon l ike , depending on the context in which it appears. 
Contemporary usage has not produced any real consistency in 
definition, though it iE clear that the word invariably has 
reference to the Cold War struggle between the United States 
and its all ies on the one hand, and the Soviet Union and its 
satellites on the other. I t ' i s the aim of this study to 
try to distinguish what are the main kinde of neutralism, 
by reference to what states do, and what statesmen say, to 
draw attention to their distinguishing features, and to 
assess their importance in contemporary international 
politics . 
As neutralism is по» such a protean term, it i s 
necessary at the outset to clarify its intended use here. 
Neutralism i s taken to mean dissociation from the Cold Уаг. 
This working definition i s sufficiently broad in reference 
to cover such popular phrases as "non-alignment", "active 
and peaceful co-existence", "active policy for peace" , 
"independent policy" , "positive neutrality" , "positive 
neutralism". During the course of the thesis some of the 
1 . I have briefly traced the emergence of this neologism in 
"Neutrality and the Emergence of the Concept of 
Neutralism", Review of Politics . April i960 , pp. 255-268. 
JO 
favourite euphemisms, circumlocutions and synonyms for 
neutralism are indicated where appropriate. Indeed, the 
very looseness v.'ith »vhieh the term neutralism i s used today 
has endowed it with an element of metaphor. But it is 
important to bear in mind all the time the difference 
between the central concern here - which i s to try to describe 
the. main way с in 'hich since 1945 there has been dissociation 
from the Cold -7ar --arm the fact that the label neutralist 
i s used tenderitiously and varyingly, both by Cola War 
protagonists and by self-avowed neutralists. Inevitably, 
the method adopted here necessarily involves controversial 
attribution of the label neutralist to states or persons 
A-here others might deny that this ic a permissible usage. 
It i s hoped that the reasons for such attributions will be 
clear in their context. Obviously, there are many forms 
of dissociation from the Cold ?ar. It ia the task of this 
thesis to try to indicate which have to date been the major 
one8, and why. 
Ihoufh there is much popular confusion between the 
terms 'neutrality ' and 'neutralism 1 , in this study they are 
regarded as quite distinct. By neutrality is meant non-
involvement in war, while by neutralism is meant non-involve-
ment in the Cold <7ar. Though the metaphor of 'Cold' far 
describes the slurring over of the differences between war 
and peace, it is important to remember that it i s quite 
10 Q 
possible for a state to be neutralist in its policy in the 
Cold War while at the same time being neutral with regard 
to a given local hot war. Also, a state can be involved 
in a local hot war while remaining neutralist in the Cold 
War. • And the fact that a state i s neutralist in the Cold 
ffar i s , of course, no guarantee that it would be able to 
be neutral in a global hot war. 
Although as terjis neutralism and nationalism are 
seldom confueed, their important interaction as political 
forces i s one of the main themes of this study. 
over 
The main concerns and aims of this thesis can best be 
indicated byxreference to the contents of the four main 
chapters. The period under consideration is 1945 to early 
1961 , inclusive, and„referencesto events outside these 
limits are mostly incidental. , 
Chapter I outlines the main features and phases of the 
Cold War and thus describes the setting in 'which neutralism 
occurs and i s shaped. The origins of the Cold War struggle, 
the growth of the rival military alliances, the emergence 
of new states,, and the growing strength of neutralist 
currents, are all traced. . As neutralism can only be under-
stood by reference to the Cold War 0struggle, particular 
attention i s paid in thisfchapter to the off icial attitudes 
and policies of the two superpowers to neutralism in general 
end to neutralist states and leadere in particular. 
Äs the Cold War i s , in part at least , an ideological 
as well as a power political struggle, Chapter I I i s соп-з 
cerned with neutralienuas an ideology or 'doctrine. Attention 
i s restricted to the pronouncements, arguments and assumpt-
ions of of f ic ial neutralist leaders responsible for their 
countries' policies in,international relations. This 
chapter endeavours to point out what are the main precepts 
of the leading neutralists , andcwhy; tries to determine 
whether these are novel or time-honoured, and to suggest-
why they are so popular today. • 
Chapters I I I and IV are both concerned with neutralism 
as state policy. Chapter I I I gives an overall view of the 
contemporary inter-state system, distinguishes the neutralist 
from the aligned states, and suggests a six-fold division 
of the types of neutralist policy, indicates how many states 
f a l l into each of these categories, and tries to determine 
what are the distinctive characteristics and neceseary 
conditions for pursuing such policies . The treatment in 
this chapter is necessarily general and comparative. 
Chapter IV examines some particular examples of neutralist 
states in greater detail than was possible in the preceding 
chapter, showing the mutual interaction of neutralist 
diplomacy and pressures of the international environment. 
The ambit of the enquiry i s international society, the 
society of sovereign states, and the approach to the study 
i s basically comparative and evaluative rather than 
particular and descriptive. The aim i s to try to establish 
what has been the significance of neutralism to date, rather 
than to indulge in prognostication. As far as can be 
ascertained, this is the f irst academic attempt to study 
neutralism in this way, comprehensively, and by endeavouring 
to assess the impact of neutralism in international politics . 
The argument i s based entirely on published material, but 
necessarily the method adopted has involved ctitical scrutiny 
I 
and rigorous selection of sources. Surprisingly l ittle 
has been written directly about neutralism as an independent 
faotor in international politics . Analysis of the available 
and useful bibliographical and source data, with some 
indication of the more glaring gaps, i s given in the foot-
notes and bibliography to this study- It is hoped that 
this general and comparative analysis of neutralism in 
international ,politics may be of some use in clarifying 
discussions about the nature of neutralism and in suggesting 
some lines for future enquiry. 
NEUTRALISM, Т1Ш SUPERPOWERS AND THE CObD WAR 
"For Warre consisteth not in Battell onely, or the act 
of fighting; but in a tract of time, wherein the Will 
to contend by Battell iß sufficiently known: and therefore 
the notion of Time i s to be considered in the nature of 
Warre; as it i s in the nature of weather. For as the 
nature of foule weather, lyeth not in a showre or two of 
rain; but in an inclination thereto of many dayes together; 
so the nature of War, consinteth not in actual fighting; 
but in the known disposition thereto, during all the time 
there i s no assurance to the contrary." 
Thomas Hobbes: "Leviathan" ( 1651 ) , 
Chapter 13 . 
V ^ * J 
The roots of the contemporary Cold War go deep. 
Although the rivalry between the Soviet Union and the United 
-*• » 
States did not become intense, openly acknowledged on both 
v < r 
sides, and of world-wide significance until after the Second 
i 
World War, the seeds of their antagonism and rivalry were 
. e . 
sown at the birth of the new Soviet State. 
I 
In Tsarist days oontacts between Russia and the United 
1 
States were few, and were for both countries secondary. * 
In general, the two countries were, as Walter Lippmann 
» i 
reports, "separated by an Ideological gulf and joined by the 
- 1 r 
bridge of national interest . " * Prior to 1917 they had 
never clashed in war and, despite the differences between 
с 1 
Tsarist autocracy and Presidential democracy, each regarded 
4 ' , t ' , i 1 
the other, in effeot , as a potential friend in the rear of 
s J -i . -u J. X 
potential enemies. Then, following the Bolshevik 
I. , _ Ct j 
Revolution in November 1917 , the new Soviet regime, through 
. I , . 
the unoff icial agency of Colonel Robins, sought diplomatic 
л 
recognition and aid from America against Germany. The 
I < 
United States, who had previously made a substantial loan 
X X , . 
1 . See W. Ai1 Williams - American-Russian Relations. 1781-
1947 . (New York, 1 9 5 2 . ) 0 
2. ТЫ? mot i s quoted in Kdward Б." Stettinius, Jun. -
Roosevelt and the Russians (London, 1950) p . 16 ; but the 
illustration of thin point is in chapter 8 of Lippmann*s 
U . S . Foreign Pollоу (London, 1943) , * esp. pp.85-83. 
Ъ»- Lippmann, ib id . p . 83 ; see also pp .89r94 . 
to Kerensky's provisional government, refused both requests. 
Instead, for three years following the separate peace of 
Brest-Litovsk with Germany in March 1918^-••••the Soviets, while 
cherishing vain hopes of world revolution, had to fight for 
survival in the faoe of American and Allied intervention and 
blockade. The view, so precious to Soviet historiography, 
that the intervention had from the very beginning the single 
deliberate motive to "strangle Coamuni'sm at birth" 1в tenable 
only i f one neglects the actual record of allied muddle and 
misunderstanding, of conflicting thoughts and aims, arising 
during the stress and heat of 7/ar.1" It iB , nevertheless, 
true that the im-nediate and lasting effect of intervention 
was to confirm Lenin in everything he had hitherto preached 
( 
about the inevitable hostility of 'Capitalism1 towards 
•Communism'. Wilsonian and Leninist mesoianism thus became 
not complementary, as had seemed possible for a short while 
during 1917, but opposed; and the decision for conflict , 
taken unwillingly in July 1918, prefigured the antagonisms 
of the post-1945 period 1 It was ironic that in 1920 the 
United States was the only truly world" power, and repudiated 
the role; while the Soviets, who so yearned to play such a 
role, lacked the capacity to do so. When each of them 
l.Por a masterly, detailed, study, see George F. Kennan - Soviet 
American Relations, 1917-1920: v o l . 1 , Russia Leaves the War 
(London, 1956 ) ; vo l . 2 , The Decision to Intervene (London, 
1 958 ) . 
became active world powers after 1945» it was as implacable 
rivals . 
.Active participation^!!! the latter half of the First 
World War did not persuade the United States to depart 
f inally from its traditional policy of diplomatic aloofness 
from Europe, and with the end of the war the Senate rejected 
the Versailles Treaty, refused to countenance United States 
membership of the League of Nations, and the country relapsed 
into isolation!em. This return,to what was somewhat 
nostalgically desoribed as "normalcy"-was-not in the 1920s 
so absolute a policy of isolation as it becamc' in the next 
decade. Nor wae hostility towards the Soviet Union 
completely unremitting; I t seems that by the time of the 
Washington Conference-in 1922 the United States had begun 
to, act on the assumption that the territorial* integrity of 
the Soviet Union was an American'national interest.3"* This 
did not" mean that »Bolshevism' was deemed any the less 
» u 
>.• . t 
abhorrent. What it did mean was that the Soviet state j 4 
T » 
should be allowed to exist , but should be treated as a 
pariah. ' Suoh attitudes found ambiguous expression in * , 
» 
economic relations which between 1924 and 1930 produoed 
i x <• t - » 
small but increasing trade, and a diplomatic policy which, 
+ 
— I 
t ' . • • * * 
1 . See Lippmann, op .c it . p . 8 7 , f n . 2 . 
until 1933, was determinedly one of non-recognition.^"* 
Deoiding how, in the words-of Washington's Farewell Address, 
"our interest, guided by justice, shall counsel" in inter-
national matters was no easy taslc, and the strength of 
isolationism suggested that the United States was unprepared 
to assume an active world role. Yet no matter how 
persistently American leaders clung to the national ideal of 
isolationism, * there was no denying that now their country 
had the undoubted capacity of a great power it was d i f f icult , _ * л 
i f not impossible, to remain remote from the mainstreams of 
international politics . Domestic decisions like revaluing 
the dollar and increasing the stringencies of immigration 
* у 
quotas, and domestio events like the Wall Street "crash" of , * 
1929» had their immediate reperoussions everywhere in the 
world. Yet the moral drawn from these demonstrations of 
— — — • f 
t 
1 . See. Louis Fischer - The Soviets in VTorld Affairs , 2 vols. 
(London, 1930) esp. chapters 7 , 8 , 1 7 (pp.560-570) & 31; 
A. Ne*ins - The United States in a Chaotic World, 1918-
1933 (New Haven, 1 950 ) ; & John D . Hicks - Republican 
Ascendancy. 1921-1933 (London, i 9 6 0 ) . 
2 . "Isolationism, the ideology or the body of doctrine 
emanating from the original and deeply rooted bel ie f , not 
really shaken until 1941 , in the geographical remoteness 
and , security of the country, i s the underlying expression 
of American nationalism. Indeed it i s nationalism, and 
like the nationalisms of other countries (or perhaps even 
more) it i s a ooat of many colours. " Richard \V. van 
Alstyne - The American Empire. I t s Historical Pattern 
and Evolution. (Hist . Assoc. pamphlet G .43 , London, i 960 ) 
p . 2 7 . 
world influence was not that isolationism should be 
abandoned for a more actively international role, but the 
reverse. The Great Depression undoubtedly strengthened 
domestic preoccupations and throughout the thirties foreign 
relations were deemed secondary and intrusive. Though the 
loosely worded Roosevelt-Litvinov agreements of November 
1933 1 " ended U . S . non-recognition of the U . S . S . R . , and 
seemed to promise future oo-operation, especially in the 
'Par East, resurgent American isolationism foredoomed all such 
i * 2 Ti t 
expectations. ' American debate about issues of war and 
A , 
peace centred round the succession of Neutrality Acts. There 
i 
was wide agreement as to the desirability of keeping the 
country out of war, what was oontentious was whether or not 
municipal legislation was in itself a sufficient and practical 
way to avoid involvement - a question which received a 
decisive answer with the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour on I 
7 December, 1941 . 
In 1917 the Soviet Union, l ike the United States in the 
* ь .д. IU 
late 18th century, was born of a revolution proclaiming 
Л 
international ideals; but whereas the American revolution 
i . 
was directed against the overseas metropolitan power and soon 
embraced a modest and cautious foreign policy of "no entangle-
1 . Seet Foreign Relations of-the U . S A (Washington, 1933) I I , 
pp .785 , 7 89 , « 790 , 793-4. 
2 . A. Ne /v ins - The New Deal and World Affairs , 1933-1945. 
(New Haven, 1 950 ) , 
ments", the Soviet revolution was aimed not only at over-
throwing the Tsarist dynasty but at sparking off world 
revolution. The Tsars had developed no tradition of 
neutrality comparable with that of the United States, and 
the leaders of the new Bolshevik state had neither the 
Inclination nor the opportunity to adopt either an ideological 
or a diplomatic neutrality towards Europe. Even so, the 
deepest motif of Soviet policies between .1917 and 1941 was 
the preservation of the integrity of Soviet-power within 
Russia . 1 * This was less obvious in the early years after 
1917 while hopes of world revolution still ran high, but it 
beoame clear after Stalin assumed leadership - for the slogan 
о 
"socialism in a single country" was, as Isaac Deutscher 
has remarked, nothing but a doctrine of isolationism 
expressed in Bolshevik idiomJ It was a brand of isolationisn 
very different from that of America: whereas the United 
States was separated from the main conflicts of world politioe 
by two great oceans, Russia 's frontiers lay open to any 
invader. While American isolationism grew out of security 
and self-sufficiency, that of the Soviets grew out of 
insecurity and fear (both.fed by Soviet doctrine as well as 
1 . See Louis Fischer - The Soviets in World Affairs (2 vols. 
London, 1930 ) ; Max Beloff - The Foreign Policy of Soviet 
Russia 1929-1941 (2 vols. London, 1947 & 1949 / ; and G. i<\ 
ülennan -.Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917-1941 (Anvil books, 
New York; i 9 6 0 ) . 
2 . Isaac Deutscher - The Great Contest (London, i 960 ) p . 4 5 . 
by experiences sinoe 1917) and absorption in internal tasks. 
Soviet determination to secure the safety of their frontiers 
resulted in a number of treaties.of non-aggression and 
neutrality with neighbouring states . 1 * These not only had 
the dlreot advantage of relieving pressure on Soviet borders, 
but 'also , by supporting Germany, Turkey, Persia and 
Afghanistan against Western "imperialist" powers, was an 
indirect way of diverting pressure away from the Soviet 
Union too. O f f ic ial Soviet attitudes towards the United 
States were ambivalent. The United States was undoubtedly 
a "capitalist " state and, therefore, a member of the camp 
p 
rivalling the Soviet Union, but American technical J 
1 . "In addition to converting the conception of a neutral 
obligation from a passive one- such as marked 19th century 
neutrality to one of an active and positive character, 
the Soviet Union insisted on giving and receiving speoific 
guarantees of non-aggression and non-interference." M. W._ 
1 Graham, 'The Soviet Security System' quoted, in Max Beloff-
The.Foreign Policy of Soviet Russia, vol. I , 1929-1936 
(London, 1947) p . 1 2 . The-U.S.S.R. concluded neutrality 
treaties with Germany, Turkey, Persia, Afghanistan, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia & Finland' - see Beloff , ib id , 
above, esp. chapter 2. Such treaties may be regarded as 
forerunners of Cold War '.Peaceful Co-existence' treaties . 
(See R. N . Carew-Hunt - A Guide to Communist Jargon 
(London, 1957) pp.26-33 - Coexistence) and below pp. 
2 . Thus Stalin in his Politioal Report to the 14th Party 
Congress of the U . S . S . R . , 18 Dec. 1925 - "Two Dominant 
and Mutually antagonist poles of attraction have oome intc 
existence, so that the world over, sympathies are diverg-
ing towards one pole or the other: the sympathies of the 
bourgeois governments tending towards the British-
American pole, and the sympathies of the workers of the 
West and of the revolutionists of the East tending towarcfe 
the Soviet Union p o l e . " in J . Stalin - Problems of 
Leninisian (London, 1938 e d . ) pp. 369-70. 
efficiency was openly e n v i e d . 1 . Ab early as May 1918, 
Lenin had predicted that America would check the movement 
of Japanese imperialism against Russia, and with the 
realisation of this prediction by 1922 it seemed that the 
chances of direot Soviet-Amerioan clashes were remote. 
Indeed, before 1933 relations between the two oountries were 
virtually non-existent. Even after the Litvinov-Roosevelt 
agreements, and throughout the ensuing years down to the 
involvement of both powers in World V7ar Two, relations 
remained troubled, distant, and devoid of real political 
< p J ь 
content. * [_Т?тот 1933 , with the growth of Fascist power and 
the consequent development of a third bloc in world polit ics , 
the Soviet Union beoanie the most active verbal champion of 
"collective security" and a eneerLng denigrator of the "non-
intervention" and "neutrality" policies of "capitalist" 
s t a t e s . ^ The 1939 edition of the Great Soviet Encyclopaedie 
recorded "that "the position of neutrality within the con-
temporary imperialist system i s , under all conditions, not 
only a dangerous i l lusion which in no way prevents a neutral 
state from being drawn into war, but i s in fact a justific-
ation of aggression, and a contributing factor to the 
1 . ib id . 1954 ed. pp.109-11. 
2 . Max J3eloff, ibid above, vol . I , chapter 10 . 
3 . See J . Stalin, ibid above, 1954 ed. pp.753-4. John Fostei 
Dulles , who always urged his oountrymen to make a close 
study of Problems of Leninism, quotes this passage in his 
War or Peace (London, 1950) РР.24-25. 
unleashing of war. " The" article said further that the 
Soviet Union^regards i ts neutrality paots as "a weapon in 
the struggle for the destruction of the front of Imperialist 
States against the U . S . S . R . " 1 " These points were underlined 
when on 23 August 1939 Molotov signed the German-Soviet Pact 
о 
of N on-Aggression arid Neutrality. * 
Both the.United States and the Soviet Union only entered 
the.Second World War fully and formally as a result of direct 
attack on their own territories . Even so, while both sides 
were of f ic ial ly neutral for some time after the German attack 
on Poland*in September 1939, they both in fact tilted their 
neutrality policies in favour"of one of the belligerents, 
though their-favours were given to opposite camps. Prior to 
the attack on Pearl Harbour,of 7 December 1941 , and despite 
the strength of American isolationism, President Roosevelt's 
3 * ' - 1 
pro-British neutrality * was shown "in such acts as Lend 
J -
Lease and-the transfer of American destroyers to the Royal 
Navy. Ostensibly, the Soviet Union was scrupulously neutral 
, . . . i i 
I I I am indebted for this translation to my colleague; 
Dr.* I lya Neustadt. -
2 . Text in Nazi-Soviet Relations« 1939-1941 (Dept. of State 
Washington D . С . 1948J pp. 76-70. See .also . ib id . pp.105-
107 for text of the further German-Soviet Treaty of .28 " 
September 1939. r » 
3 . See W. L . Langer & G. E . Gleasön - The Undeclared War. 
1940-1941 (London, 1953 ) . 
til l she suffered German invasion in June 1941. 1*7 In fact , I L , . 
she faithfully pursued her collaboration with Germany, as 
entailed in the secret protocols to the agreements of 1939 
Her policies were further narked by successive retreatB in 
< 
the Balkans in face of German advances, by the Neutrality 
last until the Yalta Conference four 
territorial expansion: eastern Poland in September 1939, 
followed by Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia, Besearabia, also 
I X I 
certain parts of Finland, all during 1940.^ These contrast-
ing activities pursued by the two greatest neutrals, ) t ' t V . 
preceding their direct participation in general war, re-
affirmed a lesson taught during the French Revolutionary-•> i , -
Napoleonic and First World Wars:^ that no great power can 
1 . David J. Dallin - Soviet Russia's Foreign Policy. 1939-
1942 (Yale U . P . , 1942) , & George Ginsburgs- "The Soviet 
Union as a Neutral, ' 1939-41n in Soviet Studies (Glasgow) 
July 1958, pp.12-35» i. Ginsburg points out that ,"it i s a 
consistent point of dogma with the Soviets that a 
bourgeois state is incapable of genuine neutrality and 
' that the U.S.S.R' . is infinitely superior in preserving 
bona fide neutrality . " 
2 . For the terms & significance of this treatyj" see F. C. 
Jones - Japan's New Order in East Asia, 1937-45. (London, 
1954) p.214 et seq. £lt is interesting to note what Mao 
l'se-tung was writing in his Yenan retreat at this time: 
"As the conflict between the socialist Soviet Union and 
the imperialist powers beoomes further intensified it is 
inevitable that China must stand either on one side or on 
the other. I s it possible^to incline to neither side? 
Noj this is an illusion. All the countries in the world 
will be swept into one or other, of these two camps, and in 
the world today 'neutrality' i s becoming merely a decept-
ive phrase."- "On New Democracy" (Jan. 1940) in vol .3 of 
Seleoted Works of Mao Tse-tung (London, 1954) p .135 , see 
also p. 125 .J 
2 
Pact with Japan signed on 13 April 
г* 
remain completely outside any prolonged war involving the 
other great powers/ 
From 1941 a common determination to fight the Fascist 
j__powers forged the Grand Alliance. Nevertheless, throughout 
World War I I contaots of all kinds between the Soviet Union 
and her al l ies were strictly regulated by the Soviet govern-
ment. Allied representatives who had to deal with Soviet 
Russia during the war resented the restrictions and lack of 
real cordiality in such r e l a t i o n s . 1 . This essentially 
» 
military alliance between states of such diametrically 
opposed outlooks was dictated by, and limited to, short run 
considerations of mutual advantage. With the defeat of 
Germany in sight, individual political considerations began 
to take precedence over the requirements of a common strategy, 
and the Alliance began to break up. This waE partly masked 
R * 
up to the time of the Yalta Conference, in February 1945 , 
with the continuance of the three great wartime leaders -
Roosevelt, Stalin and Churchill - in power. But by the time 
of the Potsdam Conference, July - August 1945 , - with 
Roosevelt now succeeded by Truman, and with Churchlli super-
seded by Ättlee during the Conference - the r i ft between the 
1 . For the ambiguities in Soviet relations with her major 
a l l i e s , see W. H. McNeil - America, Britain and Russia. 
Their Co-operation and Conflict. R . I . 1 . A . * Survey of 
International Affairs , 1939-46 (London, 1953 ) , esp. 
chapter 1 , section 3 . 
Soviet Union and its former a l l ies became patent , 1 * and 
- •* ' 
reverted to the pre^lS^l oondition of mutual suspicion and 
hostil ity . This situation was appropriately, symbolised in 
• • i 
the deliberately non-committal way in which Stalin was told 
2 
of American possession of the f irst atomic bomb. Now, not 
only were the 19th century prophecies of Alex de Tocqueville, 
i . 
Sir JohnSeeley and Henry Adams soon to be emphatically . • • J > 
realised with the undeniable emergence of the United States 
and Russia as the two Titans of the postwar world, but their 
growing rivalry, under the constant shadow of nuclear weapons, 
ushered in what became widely known as 'the Cold War . ' 
3 
Though the phrase only .became current eifter 1945 , 
neither the idea nor the state of 'Cold War' - intense inter-
national tension in a continual atmosphere of rumours and 
rumbles of war - was new. Indeed, it has been one of . the 
main purposes of the preceding pages to show that.the Soviet 
Union always regards itself , in a state of Cold War with the 
1 . r See Herbert ?eis - Between War and Peace. The Potsdam 
Conference, (London, i 9 6 0 ) . 
2 . I b id . pp.173-178. 
3 . A Soviet writer G. Dadyants - "The Cold War: Past and 
Present" in International Affairs (Moscow) June i 9 6 0 ; pp. 
5-10, says that the phrase was f i rst coined by Mr.Bernard 
Baruch, the American f inancier . Eric P . Goldman - The 
Cruoial Decade & After. America 1945-1960, (New York, 
1 9 6 1 ) , p . 6 0 , confirms this in some detai l . Undoubtedly, 
the phrase was firot popularised by Mr. Walter Lippmann 
during 1947 in a series of 14 articles , originally 
published in the New York Heraid-Tribune, critical of 
Mr . •Kennen 's "сontainment" thesis . " 
"capitalist " world, and that "neutrality" in Soviet theory and 
•* > 
practice i s a device to be used or vil if ied in light of pre-
vailing Soviet needs. Furthermore, such different men as 
Thucydides, Machiavelli, Hobbee, Bismarck'and Hitler all knew « -
and wrote about different versions of Cold*War. What i s 
special about the contemporary Cold Afar i s i t s extent, in 
3 . * 
terms of territory and taotics, for the two ohief adversaries 
and that it i s waged in the presence of nuclear weapons. 
The main vicissitudes of the Cold War can be conveniently 
outlined in terms of four fairly distinct phasesl Each of 
these phases i s characterised by changes: in the most 
intense areas of Cold War conflict , in the fortunes of the 
* 
Cold War alliance systems, in the emergence of new states, 
and in the policies of the superpowers1* towards neutralism. 
It i s in no way the aim here to attempt a ful l narrative 
account, but merely to sketch what appear to be the major 
< i 
developments in the continuing Cold War struggle in relation 
to neutralism. / ^Following Hobbes1 example of metereological 
metaphor, these four main Cold War phases may be described 
as : (1) the great freeze-up (1945-1949), (2) constant cold 
(1949-1953), (3 ) partial thaw (1953-1957), (4 ) variable 
weather '(1957-early 1961) Л 
1 . The term waB the invention of an American scholar, W .T .R . 
Fox, see h is book The Super-lowers (New York, 1 944 ) . ' rTo 
Fox in 1944 it seemed that there would be 3 post-war 
superpowers - the U . S . , the U . S . S . R . & the British 
Commonwealth. 
(1) The Great Freeze-up, 1945-1949 
Ät f irst sight the growth and consolidation of the two 
rival Cold War blocs takes on the delusive appearance of 
inevitabil ity . This view could be sustained by appropriate 
» 
selections from Soviet ' c lassic ' writings, but. a reading of 
f 
the memoirs of such prominent Americana as Senator 
showing the mixture of nostalgia 'and resolution with which 
Americans turned their backs on the national tradition of 
isolationism, the at f i rst faltering but soon unavoidable 
recognition of Soviet expansionist policies , and the gradual 
but*quite determined assumption of leadership to stem 
• » 
Conmunist advances. It i s too often forgotten that these 
immediate post-war years saw a revolution in the conduct of 
American foreign policy, not only by her willingness to 
1". See The Private Papers of Senator Vandenberg (London, 1953) 
Until- Pearl Harbour in 194l Vanaenberg was a symbol & a 
leader of isolationism, or, as he preferred to say, 
"insulationism"; ^ after 1941 he became a firm advocate 
of an international role for the U . S . His papers give, 
as h i s son attests, "a narrative account of the decade 
1941 'to 1951, in which the mass mind of America 
reluctantly foreook its isolationalist traditions and 
accepted the challenge to world leadership . " Herbert 
Agar draws attention to Vandenberg's importance in his 
;brief book - T h e Unquiet Years. U . S . A . 1945-1955. 
(London, 1 957ТГ " . ! i-
2. Баггу S. Truman - vol . 1 , Year of Decisions, 1945. (Londcn 
1955 ) ; v o l . 2 , Years of Trial and Hope, 194b-195T, (London 
1 9 5 6 ) . Truman and Stalin are the two dominant figures 
of the f irst two phases of- the Cold \7ar. 
and President Truman 
2 
conveys a much more confused picture, 
assume a permanent role of leadership in world politics , 
but also, domestically, in the forging of a bi-partisan, or 
non-partisan, foreign policy. Such early American moves, 
between 1945 and 1947 , as the abrupt termination of Lend 
Lease, rapid demobilisation, and the beginnings of a system 
of staged withdrawal of hör troops from overseas, suggested 
to many Europeans ominous parallels with American policies 
after 1919« It was Soviet intransigence 1 , and growing 
American reaction to i t , quickly becoming a process of mutual 
interaction, which soon made these analogies irrelevant. 
Soviet influence, operating from a secure base inside 
Russia, and despite enormous wartime losses in resources and 
manpower, was from 1945 onwards pressing outward in all 
directions. She had three main theatres of operation. These 
» 
were, in ascending order of importance: the Par East, the 
Middle East and Europe. 
1 . Of course, the Soviet view i s different . Dadyants, op .cit 
p . 6 , who divides up the Cold War into four phases,, 
similar to the divisions used in this chapter, writes: 
"The causes of the Cold War should be sought not in the 
alleged desire of the Soviet Union to impose a new order 
of things upon other countries, but in the real desire 
of some Western Powers to impose the old order upon 
peoples who did not want them. The Cold War was caused 
by the reckless plans of the most aggressive circles of 
imperialism which, overestimating their own strength, 
seriously sought to turn back the march of h istory . " For 
another Soviet view, see: M. Belousov - "Who i s 
responsible for the Cold War?" in International Affairs , 
(Moscow) Nov. 1958 , pp.89-94. 
In the Par East the Soviet Union secured, during the 
latter half*of 1343, the Kuriles and South Sakhalin, and her 
[ troops occupied Manchuria. In accordance with the Potsdam 
agreements, she also occupied Korea north-.of the 38th 
parallel ; with U . S . forces to the south.| Towards China 
she pursued right up-to 1949 an equivocal policy of giving 
slight support to the4 ChineseлCommunists, while recognising 
and dealing more fully with the Kuomintang. 1 , In the 
.-Middle East traditional Russian pressure on Turkey and on 
Persia was renewed and^ attempts to embarrass Western 
interests in this area led to the Soviet Union casting the 
f i r s t veto in .the U .U . Security Council. However, Europe 
was the prime area of Soviet concern, and where she made 
her, greatest post-war territorial advances. She regained 
the territories in it ia l ly obtained during the period of 
2 
^Nazi-Soviet alliance . * In addition, she .acquired the 
t • 
province"of Petsamo,with i ts valuable nickel mines,from 
1 Finland; part of Ruthenia from Czechoslovakia; and a piece 
of East Prussia, including the port of Kaliningrad, from 
Germany, Moreover, most of the.countries of Eastern Europe 
f e l l under Soviet sway - whether they were .the ' l iberated ' 
territories of Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Albania and 
^Poland , or the ex'-enemy states of Bulgaria, Hungary, 
f . ' . 
4 "1. "See Hugh Seton-Watson - The Pattern of Communist Revo-
lution (London, 2nd ed. i 9 6 0 ) pp.271-290. 
2 . See above p. «2-4" 
У 
Roumania and Pinland. With the two exceptions of 
Yugoslavia, who was to successfully assert her freedom 
2 
from Cominform control in June 1948, and Finland, * who 
enjoyed a severely circumscribed freedom under the terms of 
the Finno-Soviet treaty of April 1948, all these states 
became Soviet satellites . An interlocking,network of 
treaties developed to bind them to eaoh other and to the 
Soviet Union in particular. Russia 's direct sphere of 
control also included the Soviet sones of occupation in 
Germany and'Austria. In areas outside the sway of Soviet 
armies, especially in Western Europe and South East Asia, 
Communist efforts concentrated on tuilding up the strength of 
local parties and on fomenting internal unrest against 
"bourgeois-capitalist" governments - policies which found 
3 
doctrinal expression in Zhadnov's Bpeecir ' at the founding 
conference of the Cominform in September 1947« * 
Zhadnov re-affirmed the doctrine of "two camps", stressed 
that a world revolutionary situation now existed, and pro-
claimed that all Communist parties had to go over to the 
offensive. Ät the same time a world-wide peace campaign^* 
was launched to provide cover for this aggressive policy. 
1 . See below p. \1°\-\%Ъ- - 2 . See-below p. /35-'^ 
3 . For text, see Documents ( R . I . I . A . ) f o r 1947-8, pp.125 et 
seq. 
4 . For a short Soviet-history of. the Peace Movement, see "Ten 
Years of the World Peace Movement", New Times (Moscow), 
April 1959, pp.27-29. 
J * 
As the U .N . became part of the diplomatic equipment of the 
Cold War, Stalin 's 7/orld Peace Movement^ seemed intended to 
create a l t e r a t i v e international organisations to a U . N . 
dominated by American power. 
As the American reaction to Soviet threats began to 
crystall ise , _after the uncertainties of 1945-6, a pattern 
of bipolarity developed. Off icial American strategy came 
to be based-on taking up positions all along the perimeter of 
the»Soviet world to resist any further Soviet advance. « 
Translated into operational policy terms, such a "containment" 
2 
thesis eventually led the United States to assume commit-
ments over a wide arc stretching from North Cape in Norway, 
through Central arid Southern Europe, North Africa, the Middle 
East, South and South-East Asia,' then northwards through the 
Philippines , the Ryukyu and-Ronin islands, Japan and Korea 
to Alaska. Such long Cold War frontiers beoame fort i f ied , 
though gradually, in response to each Soviet challenge»and 
by such 1actions as seemed diotated by the circumstances. 
Prior to I949 , ffctfk Soviet breakthroughs seemed to be 
most likely in Western зад- So^th-Eastein Europe, and American 
Cold War policies began in these areas with emergency pro-
1 . See iäartin Wight - "The Power Struggle in the U . N . n (Los 
' Angeles, 1957).. 
2 . The author of the containment thesis was George F. Kennan. 
His thesis was f irst made public in Foreign Affairsi July 
1947 under the title "The Sources of Soviet Conduct." Up 
to 1953 Kennan r/as a steady advocate of the primacy of the 
problem of limited war, as h is analysis of Soviet policy 
led him to the view that Stalin would be exceedingly 
cautious about risking major war. . 
grammes of extensive economic and military aid to combat the 
* 
twin dangers of Communist eubversioii and Ruesian military 
pressure. Firstly, to Greece and Turkey, under the "Truman 
Doctrine" of March 1947, then, more comprehensively, under 
the Marshall Plan from June 1947 onwards. Initially, the 
Marshall Plan, which was limited to economic aid, had no 
overt anti-Communist overtones and was ostensibly aimed at 
Increasing inter-European co-operation, peace, order and 
stability. But, subjected to the pressure of political 
controversy, it took on a markedly anti-Communist aspect1* 
and in so doing pioneered a way for a good deal of later 
American foreign economic policies. The Berlin Blockade, 
from early 1948 until May-1949, was the f irst open test"the 
2 
Soviet Union made of American determination and.strength. * 
Not only did this test harden American resolution to carry 
containment through^to completion, it also helped to bring 
about the birth of N .A .Т .О . in April 1 9 4 9 . N . A . T . O . thus I *— 
became the second post-war multilateral security pact in 
1 . In July 1947 the Soviets rejected the application of the 
Marshall Plan within her sphere of control. In Jan. 1949 
Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Roumania & the Soviet 
Union formed a Council for Mutual Economic Assistance as 
a counterweight to the Marhhall Plan; and during 1949 the 
armies of the satellites were rebuilt and re-equipped 
tinder Soviet direction. 
2. See Survey ( R . I . I . A . ) for 1947-8» pp.241 et seq. 
3 . With 12 founder members - Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, 
Ireland, Italy , Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, 
Portugal, the U .K . & the U . S . For details & text, see 
Lord Ismay - N . A . T . O . The First Five Years, 1949-54, 
(Utrecht, 2nd impression 1956J. 
which the U . S . was to play a leading role. The Rio Pact 
of 1947 1 " was the f i r s t , but this was designed for an area 
st i l l outside the main areas of Cold rfar conflict, though it 
was not withoux relevance to Cold .7ar activities , as over a 
third of the original members of the U.N. were Latin-American 
countries and at this time they tended to vote with the U . S . 
on all Cold War matters. 
Direct confrontation between the two main Cold War 
protagonists, apart from encounters at various U .N . meetings, 
was rare. Even more rarely, when they found themselves on 
the same eide (as with the birth of Israel in 1943) their 
mutual embarrassment was obvious. At the inaugural meetings 
of the U .N . there had been a general feeling that the legal 
status of neutrality would be redundant with the institution 
2 
of the U .N . collective security system. * Though two wartime 
3 4 neutrals , Argentina and Turkey, were among the fifty-one 
1 . The Treaty of Rio de Jäniero was signed in September 1947,t 
by all states of the American hemisphere except Nicaragua, 
Ecuador and Canada. For this treaty, see Survey ( R . I . I . A . ' I 
for 1947-3, pp.465-476. 
2 . See Documents of the United Nations Conference on Inter- н 
national Organization~Tsan Francisco, 1945) v o l . V I , p . 459 ; 
v o l . V I I , p . 3 27 . For an analysis of changing legal 
attitudes, see Taubeni'eld, H . J . flnternational Actions and 
Neutrality" , A . J . I . b . vol . 47 (1953) pp.377-396. 
3- S e e The Memoirs of Cordell Hull (London, 1948 ) , v o l . 1 , 
chapters 23-25 and v o l . 2 , chapter 99. 
4 . Soviet pressure on Turkey well illustrates the coincidence 
of Soviet post-war distaote for Second World, War neutrals 
and her shrewd expectations of satisfying territorial 
ambitions at the expense of the compromised neutrals . 
See Lencsowski, op . c i t . pp.147-150. 
5Г 
original members of the U . N . , 1 " there was general agreement 
in ostracising Franco's Spain. As the Cold ffar struggle 
developed and U.N. collective security measures were clearly 
inoperative, not only was the earlier ascumed redundancy of 
legal neutrality seen to be premature but Cold War necessities , 
as seen by the two main protagonists, made the question of 
behaviour during the Second V7orld War lens important than 
present intentions, as each side sought to enlist support and 
gain strength against her chief adversary. Neither the 
United States nor the Soviet Union appeared ready to accept 
the idea of genuine non-attachment to either cause; the only 
essential difference was that the United States could 
distinguish in practice between active and passive a l l i es , 
that i s , between those with whom she concluded treaties and 
those others which were, nevertheless, part of the non-
Corcmunist world. 
1 . Before Dec. 1955 only 9 states gained admission to the 
U .N . following the original 51 . These were Afghanistan, 
Iceland & Sweden (Nov. 1 946 ) ; Thailand (Dec. 1946 ) ; 
Pakistan ft the Yemen (Sept. 1947 ) ; Burma (April 1948 ) ; 
Israel (May 1949 ) ; & Indonesia (Sept. 1950 ) . The f irst 
3 were wartime neutrals, 2 of them became neutralist , 
while Iceland joined N . A . T . O . Thailand, an ex-enemy state 
of Worin War 2 , became ,an ally of the bestem powers. 
Pakistan was neutralist until 1954 and then an American 
al ly . The Yemen, independent but isolationist since 1918, 
became neutralist . The last 3 were new states and all • 
became neutralist , though I s r a e l ' s neutralist took on a 
marked »7estern orientation. All other applications were 
refused. For details , see Y . 'B.U.N. passim. For the 
characteristics of a neutralist policy, see belovv chapter 
3 . • - • 
& 
In Europe neutralism, however vociferous, 1* was the conoem 
* I 
of impotent cliques not o f governments,' and probably had no 
effect at all on policies. States either fell under 
Communist sway, became formal allies of America, or stayed 
' 2 3 
isolated. In this latter class were Ireland, Spain, * 
A ' • ' 5 . 
Sweden and Switzerland, joined by Jugoslavia after i ts 
» 
break with the Cominform in 1948. 
* ' ! 
In Asia ten new states emerged - Israel , Jordan, Syria, 
Lebanon,*** Pakistan, India , Ceylon, Burma, Indonesia and the 
7 
Philippines. All of them at this time were mainly absorbed 
in internal tasks. The governments of Burma, Indonesia and 
the Philippines each faced internal Communist insurrection. 
India - in her efforts to speed Indonesia«independence, and 
in official comments on the situations in Indo-Ohina and 
Malaya - made clear that Indian concern was rather with the 
colonial struggle than with Cold War rivalries. Great Britaa A 
was still the dominant power in^the Middle East and appeared 
as the chief fprotector' , however unv/elcome, in this area. 
1 . See John Marcus - Neutralism and Nationalism in France 
(New York, 1958) ; Marina Salvin - Neutralism in France 
and Germany (New York, 1951) ; & I . William Hartman -^ 
"Neutralism.end/Neutrality in Scandinavia" in Western 
Political Quarterly, vol. 7 (2) June 1954. pp.125-160. 
2 . See below p. 3 . See below p. -f-3 See .belowpp&l-2 
5 . See below pp.2.2./-$ ' , • 
6 . Independence in Jordan, Syria & Lebanon had been declared 
during World War 2 but only became effective after 1945. 
See Lenczowski, op .oit . passim. 
7 . i'he emergence of the Philippines as an independent state 
was accompanied by a complex set of agreements binding hei 
to the U . S . See Fif ield , op .cit . pp.60-65. This is the 
great exception to fk* rule *(riiat new states b e e о к В ^ С й Ш ^ 
The Soviets 1 " openly, regarded a l l the new states - with the 
possible exception at this time of Israel - as "puppets" of 
their foimer colonial masters; while American policy makers 
erred in assuming too readily that i f an Asian state was 
non-Communist it was naturally ready to take part in American 
2 
led anti-Communist measures. " On the whole though, these 
states were not involved in Cold War matters, and the fact 
of their neutralism was not yet a.matter of much international 
significance. 
In the main areas of tCold War concern divisions hardened; 
both Moscow and Washington enlisted partisans and helped to —' - » > s 
seal off frontiers or to resolve civil strife . In Germany, 
east and west became completely cut off from each other (with 
West Berlin a small island in a Communist sea) ; in China, 
the,Communists won a conclusive-victory over the Kuomintang, 
and-Chiang Kai-Shek's forces had to evacuate, mostly to 
Formosa; "in Korea, the Russian dominated north faced the 3 
American occupied south. In Greece, Turkey and Iran , 
Communist pressures were successfully resisted. The only 
1 . See George Ginsburgs - "The Soviet Union, Neutrality and 
Collective Security, 1945-1959" in Osteuropa Recht. Oct. 
1959 , pp.77-93. -This i s an article based on Soviet . 
publications. ' 
2 . See K. S. Latourette - The American Record in the Far 
East . 1945-1951 (New York, 1 952 ) , esp. pp.40-42. 
3 . See benczowski, o p . c i t . pp.181-190, esp. pp.183-9; for 
an account of U .S .-Iranian economic and military agree-
ments. 
overt loss of an aliy suffered by either side during this 
period was Yugoslavia 's defection from the Communist camp; 
Kuomintang China was not formally an a l ly ;o f the West, though 
the victory of the Communists was widely represented as a 
great American d e f e a t . 1 " 
This f i r s t phase of the Cold War was a time of American 
atomic monopoly and of the Soviet Union 's overwhelming 
superiority in conventional armaments. . It i s d i f f icult to 
see what particular diplomatic advantages atomic monopoly 
gave to the United States. Probably it was a restraining 
influence on the Soviets, though Stalin constantly denied 
that there was any special value in the possession of atomic 
2 
bombs.,* - America's exclusive atomic monopoly ended in 
September 1949 with the f i rst explosion of a Soviet bomb, 
though the world had to learn of it through an American 3 
announcement; and this event, coming shortly after the 
signature of the U . A . Т . О . treaty and the conclusive victory 
of the Communists in China, gave dramatio point ,to the idea 
of bipolarity which by now had oome to be the dominant 
pattern of world a f fa i rs . 
1 . See Latourette, i b id , chapter 8 - "The Great American 
Defeat " . In 1949 Mao Tse-tung wrote: "Not only in China 
but also in the world without exception, one either leans 
to the side of imperialism or to the side of socialism. 
Neutrality i s mere camouflage and a third road does not 
e x i s t . " in "On the People 's Democratic Dictatorship" , 
reprinted in A Documentary History of Chinese Communism' 
(Harvard Ü .P . 1952J , pp.453-4. 
2 . , See Henry A. Kissinger - Nuclear Weapons and Foreign 
Policy (New York 1957) pp.362-369. 
3 . I b i d . p . 3 6 9 . 
( 2 ) Constant Cold, 1949-1953 
I f the f irst phase was dominated by events in Europe, 
then the second was equally dominated by developments in 
eastern Asia, and particularly by the Korean / / ar . 1 , China 
had been exempted from the developing bi-partisanship of 
American policy, and though the Korean war began in June 1950 
as a U .N . operation designed to repel a north Korean invasion 
south of the 38th parallel (a l i t t l e earlier Soviet troops 
had withdrawn from north Korea, and American troops from 
south Korea to Japan) , by January 1951 it had become con-
verted, essentially, into a Sino-American conflict , fought 
solely on Korean soil . In .these years American involvement 
in world affairs deepened, while at the same time domestic 
oriticisms, the obvious misgivings of a l l ies and the distrust 
of neutralist nations added to the d i f f icult ies of American 
policy makers. Anglo-American relations were openly strained 
at times, especially over Par Eastern issues, and President 
Truman later revealed that in 1950 the British Prime Minister, 
Mr. Attlee, thought there was a good chance of China becoming 
2 
the Yugoslavia of Asia , * thus breaking with the Soviet bloc. 
In fact , throughout this phase the Soviet Union pursued 
t . 
a far less obviously active international role than did i t s 
1 . See Guy Wint - What Happened in Korea (London, 1 954 ) . 
2 . See Truman's Memoirs, op . c i t . vol . 2 , p.427-
Ц-о 
main Cold War opponent, perhaps because of Stal in ' s pre-
occupation with purging 'Titoism' within the Soviet empire"1"*-
2 
and Sino-Soviet co-operation * seemed to increase rather than 
to suggest strains. Throughout the Korean '.Var, the Soviet 
Union not only claimed all the privileges and immunities of 
an off icially neutral state, but championed similar claims 
for Communist China, even though the latter was implicated 
in the war through the presence of contingents of so-called 
% 
"Chinese volunteers" on the side of the north Koreans^.. * 
Indeed, one consequence of Korea was the growing^ identificati£| 
of Communist China and the Soviet Union, so that for a 
number of years after most Western observers regarded Peking 
as Moscow's most faithful ally . The sense of Communist 
menace, which had been a prime factor in European a f f a i r s , 
right up to 1950, and lingered thereafter as a constant back-
ground threat, did not have the same intensity or effect in 
non-Communist Asia . Europeans feared the U . S . S . R . more than 
Asians feared China. Though in 1950 China began to absorb 
Tibet, this apparently caused less concern to most of the 
1 . See Hugh Set on--.Vat son - The Pattern of Communist 
Revolution, op . c i t . pp.265-6. 
2 . Formally based on the Sino-Soviet agreements of Feb. 1950, 
see Documents ( R . I . I . A . ) for 1949-50« Р . 9 6 , and Survey 
( R . I . I . A . ) for 1949-50, PP.339-543* 
3 . See Ginsburgs- "The Soviet Union, Neutrality and Collect-
ive Security 1945-1959" op . c i t . pp.83-87. The legal 
aspects of the Korean War & the significance of the war in 
relation to neutrality in international law i s dealt with 
exhaustively in Julius Stone - Legal Controls of Inter-
national Conflict (2nd ed. with supplement, London, 1959) 
passim. 
Asian neutralists than did the continuance of the •colonial1 
struggle in Indo-China (and growing identification of French' 
and American interests in this question), while it was 
increasingly felt that American policies were bringing and 
spreading the Cold War into AsiaЛ 
Though ostensibly a U.N. collective security endeavour, 
only fifteen U .N . members1* joined with the U .S . in the 
Korean fighting, and these formed a roughly accurate list of 
the states that were by now America's closest allies . A 
number of neutralist states tried, at f irst , to reconoile 
their faith in the U.N. and their Cold War non-alignment by 
aiding U.N. forces with measures short of becoming active 
2 
combatants. " When, early in October 1950, General . 
MacArthur's troops pushed northwards across the 38th parallel, 
neutralist misgivings about the war increased. When, in 
February 1951, the United States sponsored a U.N. resolution^* 
1 . These were: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Colombia, Ethiopie 
France,' Greece, Great Britain, Luxembourg, Netherlands, 
New Zealand, P h i l i p p i n e - S . A f r i c a , Thailand & Turkey. 
2 . For instance, medical aid was sent by Denmark, India, 
Italy, Norway & Sweden. Here the differences between the 
neutralists & some aligned states were not sharp. A full 
list of aid affered to U .N . forces in Korea is given in 
Y .B .U .N . t 1950. pp.226-8. Goodwin - Britain and the 
United Nations, op .cit . pp.126-154, well conveys the main 
U.N. voting trends on Korea, see esp. pp.138-9, showing 
that in voting matters the differences between the aligned 
& the non-aligned were more pronounced. 
3 . The U .S . resolution was adopted by the General Assembly on 
1 Feb. 1951 by 44 votes to 7 (Soviet bloc, India & Burma) 
with '9 abstentions (Afghanistan, Egypt, Indonesia, 
Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Sweden, Syria, Yemen. & Yugoslavia) 
WL 
condemning CommuniBt China ав an aggressor, most neutralist 
states considered that the war had taken an aggressively 
anti-Chinese turn and many expressed their loud disapproval. 
By 1953 American dominance in U .N . General Assembly matters 
was past its peak, and an Ärab-Äsian bloc, 1 * neutralist in 
Cold War mattere, had begun to cohere. 
Neutralist misgivings about U . S . policies heightened 
as growing American concentration on the Cold War as a quasi-
military operation found expression in increasing emphasis 
2 
on foreigi military aid , * in the.consolidation of her 
existing alliances and in the extension of her commitments 
in the Middle East and the Par East* 
The Mutual Security Act of 1951 made it a prerequisite 
of American assistance that the recipient country should 
unequivocally place itself in support of the U . S . in the 3 
Cold War. In fact , American aid to Yugoslavia, and the 
Indian^-* grain bill of 1952 showed that these were not un-
5 
qualified conditions even i f American preferences'^* for 
formal all ies , rather than 'ambivalent' neutralists, were 
now patently d e a r . t -
1 . See Harry N. Howard --"The Arab-Asian*States in the 
United Nations" in The Middle East Journal, Summer, 1953. 
2 . See table of. U . S . Foreign Aid 1946-1953 in Reitzel, 
Kaplan & Coblenz - United States Foreign Policy, 1945-55 
(Washington, 1956) p . 483 . 
3 . See below pp. I$l~2 • 4 . See below pp./72 ~3. 
5 . American attitudes are brilliantly portrayed.in Eric Fl 
Goldman's - The Crucial Becade - and After. America, 1945 
i960 (Vintage Books, New York, 1961) . For Korea, see 
chapters 8 & 9-
These years saw the heyday of the neutralism of » 
European public opinion. * Ironically , it v/as probably 
American enthusiasm for consolidating H . A . Т . О . as a means of 
• о 
raising European morale * and countering "creeping neutralism^ 
the growth of neutralist feeling , sentiment, and ideas in a 
state whose foreign policy i s not ostensibly or avowedly 
neutralist - that gave European neutralism most succour., * 
In retrospect, neutralism still seems to have been an in-
significant force in Europe and fears of "creeping neutralism" 
exaggerated. In early 1952 Greece and Turkey Joined N . Ä . T . O . , 
thus extending the treaty area of the 'North Atlantic* 
alliance further; and in September 1953 Öpain was linked to 
the U . S . in three bilateral agreements known colleotively as 
the Madrid Pact . 5 * 
1 . See the studies cited in footnote p. 36 above. 
2 . Thus, General Eisenhower in his First Annual Report to the 
Standing Group N . A . T . O . (Paris, 2 April , 1952 / - "There 
was serious question as to the state of public morale 
among the European members of the North Atlantic Treaty 
O r g a n i z a t i o n . . . . It was extremely d i f f icult for the 
average European to see any future in an attempt to build 
defensive forces which might offset this real and 
formidable threat. There seemed to be too much of a lead 
to be overtaken. The doubts of the European peoples gave 
birth to the false but glittering doctrine of neutralism, 
through which they hoped to preserve thevthings they had 
always held dear the cumulative effects of repeated 
failure to make any headway in conferences with the 
Soviets produced an intellectual defeatism, in some 
quarters bordering upon despair . " 
3 . See Documents ( R . I . I . A . ) for 1953« ?>p. 126-132. 
Indeed, it seemed to be more and more the aim of U . S . 
policy to epread the N . A . T . O . pattern of alliances and bases 
around the whole periphery of the Communist bloc. I f this 
were so, only at the extremities of eastern Asia did American 
policies meet with any real success, and even here she con-
cluded only bilateral pacts. The United States pushed througl 
a treaty of peace and reconciliation with Japan, despite 
strong'opposition from behind the Iron Curtain, and from some 
Asian n e u t r a l i s t s . 1 . The Japanese Peace Treaty, signed at 
San Francisco in September 1951 - but, more particularly, the 
simultaneous signing of the U.S.-Japanese Security Treaty -
aroused the fears of several states who were most likely to 
be threatened in the event of renewed'Japanese expansion and 
aggression, and the opposition.of Asian, including Japanese, 
n e u i r a l i s t s . I t was in order to quieten such fears that 
1 
the U . S . entered into the Philippine-American Defence Pact in 
. - " - ч 
August 41951, and the A . K . Z . U . S . treaty with Australia and 
New Zealand in September 1951 . As the French position in 
' • * 1 
Indo-China worsened, American anxiety increased, and American 
relations with Indonesia, as well ав with India and Burma, 
became increasingly distant . The idea pursued in 1951-2 of 
a comprehensive regional pact for the Middle East ( M . E . D . O . ) 
1 . See Survey-(R . I . I . A . ) for 1951. 'PP.376-433« 
2. ' I b i d . - " 
3 . See F i f ie ld , o p . c i t . pp.77-80. 
4 . See Survey ( R . I . I . A . ) for 1951.• pp.384-5, 478-80. 
was sti l lborn . 1 * Although proposals for. this pact were 
Jointly sponsored by the United States and Great Britain, 
Britain here played the leading role. For a number of 
2 
reasons - historical , economic and strategic British 
sensitivity to nationalist and neutralist fears and hopes in 
south and south-east Asia were not paralleled by ä similar 
appreciation of Middle .Eastern nationalism and neutralism. 
3 4 
Br i ta in ' s -conflicts with Iran and Egypt * were sufficient 
at this time to prevent the realisation.of M . E . D . O . However, 5 arrangements were made f o r , U . S . air. bases in Morocco , in 
6 - 7 
Libya j" and in Saudi Arabia. " The May 1950 Tripartite 
Declaration - France, Britain and the UnitediStates - aimed 
at guaranteeing existing Arab-Israeli frontiers and maintain-
ing a balance of forces in the area, had not endeared the 
1 . See Campbell, op .o it . chapters 3 & 4 . 
,2. I b i d . 4 , . 
3 . Lenczowski, op . c i t . pp.192-202. 
4 . See below pp 
5 . In July 1951 the French government announced that the 
U . S . A . was to have use of 7 Moroccan a ir f ie lds . See Survey 
( R . I . I . A . ) for 1951t P . 25 . Morocco became an independent 
state on 2 March 1956 and was admitted to-the U .N . in Nov. 
1956 . See Survey ( R . I . I . A . ) for 1955тб,рр.95-7 & 290-5. 
6 . Libya, an Ital ian colony from 1912 to 1942 , was in effect 
a British protectorate from 1945 until i t s independence in 
Dec. 1951 . She joined the U . N . in Dec. 1955 . Both G .B . 
& the U . S . give extensive economic aid to Libya & in 
return are, permitted to maintain military bases. In July 
1953 G .B . signed a treaty of alliance with Libya promis-
ing financial aid for 20 years. See Survey ( R . I . I . A . ) f o r 
1953« pp .119 , & Daily Telegraph,«14.July i 960 . 
The U . S . agreement for an airfield at Dhahran in Saudi 
Arabia dates from the Second World War. I t was re-
written in 1951 , renewed in 1956,' and"is now due to expire 
in 1962 . See The Times, 18 March 1961. 
Western powers to the Arab states. As it was, this policy 
depended on the condition that these powers could monopolise 
the supply of arms to the Middle East - a condition shattered 
by Egypt's arms deal with the Soviet bloc in 1955» 
The first six or eight months of 1953 saw the closing 
of this Cold War phase and began a series of shifts and 
changes which eventually affected the whole pattern of inter-
national relationships. These changes were symbolised in 
a change of personalities. Firstly, with General 
Eisenhower's4accession to the American Presidency in January 
1953» pledged to end the fighting in Korea, to promote 
"liberation11 in eastern Europe, and to reduoe expenditure 
overseas. Secondly, and more significant, was the death of 
Stalin on 5 March 1953. August 1953 saw the explosion of 
the f irst Soviet H-bomb. The f irst U . S . experimental H-bomb 
had only been exploded in November 1952, and it seemed that 
the gap in nuclear weaponry between the two superpo?/ers was 
rapidly narrowing, in qualitative terms,, at least. 
In the summer of 1953 an armistice was signed to end the 
» , ' . » V 
war in Korea, more than two years after truce talks had 
opened.' The representatives of Sweden and Switzerland, 1*as 
two of the five member commission of neutral nations, found 
i « 
1 . . See Jacques Preymond - "Supervising Agreements. The 
Korean Experience" in Foreign Affairs, April 1959.« PP. 
496-503^ alfc/'Spetd.i^ (Cortux'i Queiti " ,1 в 7u*t ^Si • 
4-7 
themselves in the disagreeable poeition of being cast in 
the role.of "neutralоn on the side of the West, while Poland 
and Czechoolavia wore openly "neutraln on the Communist side« 
Only India , as Chairman of the. commission, seemed able to 
avoid charges of blatant partieeuxehip. As it was, the end 
of the Korean ffar brought no settlement, only military stale-
mate, and did not lead to any political resolution of the 
essential issues at stake. 1* « 
г 
(3) Partial Thaw, 1953-1957 
j Por the greater part of this third phase of the Cold 
ffar there was a marked contrast in apparent Soviet and 
American.priorities, and in most neutralist eyes the,post-
Stalin policies of the Soviet leaders probably were prefer-
able to the Eisenhower-Dulles policies, at f irst deolaredly 
2 3 
•based on "massive retaliation" * and 'brinkmanship.и 
America, aided at times by her chief al l ies , Britain and . 
1 . See Survey ( R . I . I . A . ) for 1953. pp.183-230. 
2 . lir. Dulles f irst propounded the principle of "massive A 
instant retaliation" on 12 Jan. 1954. See Survey ( R . I . 1 4 
1954. p . 9 3 . The author of the 1954 ( R . I . I . A . ) Survey 
* points out (p . 98 ) that American strategy seemed to 
presage "a reversion to the pre-Korean reliance on air-
atomic power, but with differences - the addition of 
tactical atomic weapons, & the eubstitution of the 
hydrogen "for the atomic bomb". See ibid . pp.96-123. 
3 . See ibid . p . 25 . Mr. Dulles f irst mentioned 'brinkmanship' 
in relation to Indo-China. 
Hi 
Prance, seemed determined to extend the range and membership 
of her military allianceо and to give foreign aid only to 
a l l i es , and then mostly for military ригровео. At the same-
time the Soviets, pursuing a *new look' policy, began to try 
openly to encourage the spread of neutralism outside the 
Soviet bloc and to ?/oo several leading neutralist nations 
with .offers of a id , and, in oertain reapeotc, with diplomatic 
support. It seemed that-just an the Americano were offering 
"swords", and then oniy on oondition that a state was, or 
became, a formal a l ly , the Soviets were offering "plough-
shares" to neutralist nations and were asking for no formal 
undertakings in return. These contrasts, dramatised by 
Soviet propaganda, had some foundation in fact - though 
'Soviet bloc arms to Egypt in 11955 were hardly "ploughshares", 
even I f Egypt was not required to join in a military alliance 
with the Soviet bloc. These Soviet-American contrasts 
were softened or obscured т/ith the Suez and Hungary crises 
in the last quarter of 1956 . As it v/as, the neutralist 
nations were growing in питЪегв and self-confidence and were 
becoming increasingly independent factors in international • • 
pol it ics , with consequent effects on the nature of Cold War 
t A 
rivalries . 
The fluctuations and contrasts of this phase con be 
conveniently conveyed in terms of the major developments in : > 
Europo, tho Middle -East, the rest of Asia, in questions of 
foreign aid, and in U»H. mattere. An overall chronological 
treatment would give a better impression of the conjunction 
of certain events but would mako it more difficult to Bhow 
their significance inArelation .to neutralism. -
The first significant sign of changing Soviet policies 
occurred when, at the Berlin Conference of Foreign ainisters 
in January '- .February 1954, Mr.• Molotov*suggested, inter al ia 
bringing into being a re7unified Germany by prohibiting its 
participation in any alliances and coalitions, by striotly 
limiting i ts armaments, by barring all foreign military bases 
from its territory and by withdrawing all foreign troops.1* 
•j • i 
These mcaöuros v?ould, according to lir. Uolotov, provide a 
satisfactory basis for a re-unified, neutralised Germany. 
A similar status.for Austria was advanced by Иг. SSolotov at 
^the same time. However, the Soviet proposals were unaccept-
able to West Germany and .her allies, , and after more than a 
year of diplomatic preparations, Western Germany became the 
fifteenth member of U . A . Т . О . in May 1 9 55 . 2 " The Soviets* 
reply to this further consolidation of S . A . Т . О . was to 
announce the knitting together of pre-exieting bilateral 
arrangements in Eastern Europe in a newly comprehensive 
Warsaw Pact. " w Even во, Soviet abandonment of previous • 
claims that-the German and Austrian problems must be con-
1 . Be e .Survey. (R . I Л .A 1) for Jl954, pp. 131-137. 
2 . Ib id . pp.l37-I4a« & Purvey (НЛЛ. 'А ' : ) for 1955-6. pp.37-
44 , 103-9, 138-147. 
3 . See Survey ( R . I . I . A . ) for 1955-6, pp.48-50, 54 . 
Jo 
sidered together was able to facilitate Austria 's independence 
by neutralisation during 1 9 5 5 . ^ Soviet endeavours to 
stimulate support among west European political opinion in 
favour of military disengagement were shorn not only in the 
parading of 'the Austrian example', but 'aleo in the dramatic 
i 
2 
reconciliation with Yugoslavia, and in the reversion of the 
3 
military base at Porkkala to Finland. * This was the only 
Soviet military base outside the Soviet bloc, and ite 
relinquishment was probably intended to strengthen demands 
if or the withdrawal of American bases from Europe. Certainly, 
Soviet leaders and publicists^* began to give unprecedented 
and seemingly unconditional approval to'neutralism at this 
stage of v/orld affairs . The 1954 edition of the Great 
Soviet Encyclopaedia slightly revised the 1939 oection on 5 
neutrality to read that the Soviet Onion "used the 
institution of neutrality as a means of strengthening its 
own-as well as the world's s e c u r i t y . * The most important 
1 . See below p p 2 2 ^ - 2 3 * 
2 . See below pp ' ^ 2 - ^ 
3 . See'below p. and ibid.1 above pp.126-123. 
4 . See, e . g . Ginsburgs,' op .c it . pp.87-97; also D. Melnikov-
* ^Neutrality and the Current Situation", International 
Affaire (Moscow)•1956, pp.74-81; andiL. Modjoryan -
' "Neutrality" , New Times (Moscow), Feb. 1956. pp.12-15. 
5 . See above pf>-W-3. l • ~ Ь 
6 . I am indebted to my colleague,' Mr. Maurice Hookham, for 
this translation, and for much help in Soviet materials. 
By 1956 the term^'neutralism1 had emerged in Soviet 
vocabulary, & was used synonymously with 'neutrality ' . 
Soviet pronouncement, was Mr.fdtruchchGv's f irst speech at the 
20th Party Congrecs when he adroitly adopted the uncommitted 
countries of Asia as his friends, describing them as part 
of "a peace camp* allied to the "socialist* one, with 
"fraternal Jugoslavia" hovering ambiguously between the two, 
a n d ^ i n l a n d , Austria and other neutral countries distinguished 
from America's a l l i e s . 1 , « 
In fact , the vital , though naturally unpublioised, 
reservation to Soviet approval of neutralism was that it was 
only to bo encouraged outside the Soviet bloc. This had, 
perhaps, been implicit in .the abortive rieing in East Berlin 
in June 1953 and in the carefully qualified "liberal!oation" 
p 
in Poland in the middle, months of 195 6 i * but it was brutally 
demonstrated in October 1956 when Soviet troops crushed the 
attempts of the Hungarians to defect from the year-old 
Warsaw Pact and to \7ork out their own variant.of neutralism^* 
Parallel with events in Hungary, and quite apart from the 
palpable inability of the Western powers to intervene on 
1 . See Survey ( R . I . I . A . ) for 1955-6, pp.222-229, A Soviet 
Hewn Booklet, No. 4 (Feb. 1956 ) . 
2 . See Hugh Seton-Watcon - The Pattern of Communist Revo-
lution, op .cit . pp.357-376, & his Neither War Nor Peace 
(London, i960) pp.338-346. 
3 . See George Mikes - The Hungarian Revolution (London,1957); 
also Imre.Hagy on Communism. In Defence of the New Course 
(London, 1957)- Nagy was the Hungarian Comnunist Prime 
Minister who tried to adopt a neutralist oouree in early 
* Oct. 1956 . This tract was written during his forced 
retirement in 1955-6 & reveals some of his neutralist 
ideas,, see eep. chapter 3 ; eleo Set on-'.Tat son* s intro-
duction to this English translation. 
S3-
behalf of the Hungarians, came the swift cooling of Soviet-
Yugoslav relations and the imponderable but undoubted 
intrusion of China into east European a f fa irs during 1956 . 
After the Hungarian revolution had been quietened, Soviet 
efforts were concentrated on repairing r i f ts in the Communist 
camp. This repair work seemed to be complete by the time 
of the -Moscow meeting of the ruling Communist parties in 
October v1957, which time seemed also to mark the undoubted 
emergence of Mr. K h r u s h c h e v as^the pre-eminent leader in the 
Soviet Union.1*, 
In the Middle East during these years there were four 
dominant trends. Firstly , there was a rapid deterioration 
in British-Egyptian relations, culminating in the British-» * -
л 
French-Israeli attack on Egypt in October 1956. * Secondly, 
there was ,the formation of the Baghdad Pact in 1955 , bringing 
together Britain, Turkey,^Pakistan, Iraq and Iran , though 
leaving the United States in the ambiguous position of silent 
partner and not a formal member.^* In f a c t , this.,develop-
ment re-emphasised pre-existing divisions in the Middle East 
and provoked strenuous responses, especially from Egypt, but 
» " ' " ' . . if -
also from Syria and "Saudi Arabia, as well as from I srael . 
a\ • * 1 * 
1 . See Seton-Watson - The Pattern of Communist Revolution,-
o p . c i t . p . 3 5 9 . 
2 . See Campbell, op . c i t . chapters 4-9, & Full Circle, The 
Memoirs of Sir Anthony Eden (London, i 960 ) book 3 , chapter 
1-9. 
3 . See Campbell, op . c i t . chapter 5 . 
sz 
Thirdly, there was the dramatic renewal of active Soviet 
interest in the region and signs of a growing association 
between the Soviets and Egypt and Syria. 1* Fourthly, 
throughout the years 1954-6,inclusive, American policy tried 
to reconcile the irreconciliable, by seeking'to build up 
Western.^defenoes in the area while at the same time trying 
to cultivate good relations v/ith Arab neutralist states. 
Such a vacillating policy found its nemesis when in January 
1957 the Eisenhower Doctrine - offering military and economic 
assistance to any Middle Eastern state that asked for help 
against "armed aggression from any country controlled by 
international Communism" - met with strong opposition from 
most states, and only tepid enthusiasm from a few, throughout 
л 
the whole region. * 
By contrast, Euch Soviet acts as the retrocession of 
» 3 
Port Arthur to the Chinese in May 1955, and the official 
"visits of friendship"^* by Bulgariin andKitrushchev, in late 
1955, to India, Burma and Afghanistan (the latter marked by 
1 . See Walter Z. Laquetir - The Soviet Union and the Middle 
East (London, 1959) , esp. pp.211-228 & 247-263-
2. See Campbell, op .cit . chapters 4-9 and 17. 
3 . See Survey ( R . I . I . A . ) for 1955-6, pp.53 & 126. 
4 . For ful l texts of the Bulganin & Krushchev speeches in 
f India, Burma & Af ghanistan, see supplement in New Times 
(Moscow) 22 December 1955. 
ГЧ: 
the ceremonious prolongation of the Soviet-Afghan treaty of 
neutrality and non-aggression, which originated in 1926) were 
a l l part and parcel of Moscow's new line of encouraging and 
co-operating with most of the neutralist .nations of the 
world. Support for Afghanistan's irredentist claims against 
P a k i s t a n , 1 , , a n d the Indian position with regard to Kashmir 
2 3 
and Goa, and offers of aid and trade were further 
instances of this new trend. t , 
+ In the rest of Asia , American attempts to build up 
defence,arrangements against possible Communist attack 
further alienated neutralist opinion, and of f ic ial American 
spokesmen openly regarded neutralism with suspioion and dis-
4 
l i k e . The conclusion of the South East Asian Defenoe 
5 
Treaty in September 1954 linked the security interests of 
- * • 
1 . See below * 
2 . See below 
3 . I t i s to be remembered that Soviet trade and/or aid offers" 
were also made about this time to Turkey, Pakistan, 
Iceland, Great Britain , among others. 
4 . Thus, President Eisenhower in his 1954 Christmas message: 
"The times are so critical and the differences between 
these world systems so vital that grave doubt i s cast 
on the validity of neutralistic argument." See also 
the,speech.of American Deputy Under Secretary, Murphy, 
on 16 November"1954, printed in D ^ S . B . , 29 November 1954 , 
pp.799-803; also Survey ( H . I . I . A . ) for 1954 - "The 
Politics of Neutralism", pp.283-289. ' 
5 . For a f u l l account, see Collective Defence' in Southeast 
Asia, A Report by a Chatham House ( R . I . I . A . ) Study Group 
Tlöndon, 1956 ) . . -
r r 
the Philippines, Thailand, Australia and New Zealand (all 
already linked with the United States) with Britain, Prance 
and Pakistan in a comprehensive agreement - S . E . A . T . O . Three 
» of the four successor states of former French Indo-China, 
South"Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia (the fourth was Communist 
North^Vietnam) were declared to be under the^ 'protection' of 
the S . E .A . T .O . treaty members, though they did not become 
fu l l members themselves. The United States' adhesion to 
the treaty was qualified in a protocol which made clear the 
American preoccupation with Communist^ aggression, while 
appearing to regard other fprms of aggression as less re-
prehensible. Formosa was excluded from S . E . Ä . T . O . , but, 
under pressure from Chiang Kai-Shek, the United States felt 
it necessary to conclude a bilateral defence agreement. This 
was signed on 1 December 1 9 5 4 a n d completed the list of 
formal U . S . defence commitments in the Far East. 
In the aftermath of the Korean and Indo-China wars, 
American concentration on military arrangements seemed to be 
frather backward-looking as the Soviets' rapid development of 
trade and aid programmes to neutralist states added a new 
dimension to Cold War rivalries. Previously, the Western 
powers had been the sole, and rather parsimonious, suppliers 
to neutralist nations. The first Soviet loan to a non-
1 . See Survey ( R . I . I . A . ) for 1955-6, pp. 7 & 10-14. 
Communist country was made to Afghanistan in January 1954 
'or the sum of £3 .5 million . In that f irst year, the total 
'aid from the Soviet Union and other Communist countries to 
\ 9
 щ 
non-Communist countries was £10 .6 million. For 1955 it was 
£305 million, for 1956 nearly £1 ,100 million, and for 1957 
over £1 ,900 mi l l ion . 1 ' . In total volume U . S . aid greatly 
exceeded Soviet aid , hut U . S . aid priorities seemed to he 
with I srael , Libya, South Korea, South Vietnam,' Laos and 
Formosa, whereas the main Soviet efforts were concentrated 
9 I 
on Syria, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Ind ia , Egypt, Cambodia, 
2 
Ceylon, Indonesia and Nepal . ' I t i i s notoriously di f f icult 
to compare äse aid programmes even in economic terms, let 'L 
alone assess their political effects , but, certainly, 
r 
. foreign aid f i r s t became a serious matter of Cold War rivalry 
i ' , * • к ' 
in these y e a r s T h e Soviets began with a number of advan-
tages^" over their Western rivals - the novelty of their aid 
programmes, the prevailing Afro-Asian ^anti-imperialist image 
of the U . S . S . В . . the apparent absence of political or military 
^ ' strings ' , the procedural advantages of totalitarian govern- , 
1 . See U . S . Dept."'of .State, The Sino-Soviet Economic' . 
Offensive in the less Developed Countries (Washington. > 
U . S . G . P . O . 1 958 ) . ] . 
2 . See ib id ; & V . K . R . V . Rao - International Aid for Economic 
Development (Leeds, i 9 6 0 ) , esp. pp.11-13; & Joseph S. ~ 
Berliner - Soviet Economic Aid (New York, 1 9 5 3 ) . 
3 . See Berliner, op . c i t . esp. chapters 2 & 4 . 
4 . I b i d . * 
ments in operating foreign aid programmes,1" and the fact 
that Soviet bloc aid was growing at a more rapid annual rate 
than Western aid. 
фригаиаил с^а^^  The 
experience of being actively courted by Communist states 
proffering 'unconditional-' aid was not only attractive in 
itself , to neutralist nations, but it afforded opportunities 
for provoking the United States to increase, or initiate, i ts 
own aid programmes, whatever the misgivings of many Americans 
about such moves. During June and July 1956 U . S . spokesmen 
2 
made a spate of contradictory pronouncements, * approving 
or disapproving of. neutralism in general terms^- including 
Mr. Dulles' notorious phrase that "except under very 
exceptional circumstances" neutrality i s an "immoral and 
shortsighted conception. All these'pronouncements should 
the 
be, seen in/context of the Eisenhower administration's 
1 . E . g . a report in The Times. 4 Jan. 1958, showing the main 
direction of Communist trade & aid, pointed out that 
"the scale of foreign aid is being withheld from the 
Russian people." 
2 . There is a collection of .the major speeches, with comment-
aries, in Foreign Policy Bulletin (New York) for 15 Aug. 
1956, & 15 Feb. 1957» For ful l texts, see D . S . B . 18 June 
195S, pp.999-1004; D . S . B . 25 June 1956. pp.1043-47; & PP. 
1063-65; D . S . B . 16 July, 1956, pp .91 r 5 . See also D . S . B . 
17 Dec. 1956, pp.943-48 & ib id . 9 July 1957. p .49 ; also 
Survey ( R . I . I . A . ) for 1955-6. pp.200-2. For a Soviet 
commcnt on these American pronouncements, see "Washington 
and the Neutrality Problem", New Times (Moscow) July 1956, 
PP.3-7. 
3 . See D . S . B . 18 June. 1956. pp.999-1004. 
d i f f i c u l t i e s in attempting simultaneously to: increase 
American foreign aid programmes in the face of strong 
opposition from neo-isolationists at home,"1" to placate the 
» 
anxiet ies of those a l l i e s who feared a reduction of their 
aid from the United States, and to take increasing account 
T 2 
of the needs of neutralist nations . ' By the middle of 
• j. , 
1957 there was evidence of a f a r more balanced estimate than 
. . . -z 
hitherto in in f luent ial American thought^about neutralism. 
The Afro-Asian Conference held at Bandung, Indonesia , 
4 . * 
in April 1955 7/as a dramatic i l lustration of trends which 
were increasingly cutting across strict Cold War r i v a l r i e s . 
I t was primarily a gathering of Afro-Asian leaders who were 
1 
1 . See Norman Ä. Graebner - The New Isolationism. A Study 
in P o l i t i c s & Foreign Policy since 1950 , (New York, 1956) ; 
also h i s "Foreign Aid and American Policy** in Current 
• History 1956 , pp .212-217 . 
2 . See, The Economist, 16 June 1956 , p . 1 0 7 6 f o r a balanced 
assessment of the'American leaders ' 'predicament . The 
Prime-Minister of Burma, U Nu , made a state v is i t to the 
U . S . in 1955 and Mr. Nehru & "President Sukarno also did 
so during 1956 - these v i s i t s may have had an educative 
effect on American opinion. 
3 . See the analysis of neutralism in the Report on Foreign 
Policy and Mutual Security, House of Representatives 85th; 
Congress, 11 June 1957 (Washington, 1957) esp .pp.56R-6lR. 
4 . See.Survey ( r T i . I . A . ) 1955-6, chapter 5 ; Mary Knatchbull 
Keynes - "The Bandung Conference" in International Re-
lat ions , October 1957 , pp.362-376; ' G. M. Kaliin - The 
Asian-African Conference (New York, 1 9 5 6 ) ; & Triska & 
Koch - "The Asian African Nations & International Organ-
i z a t i o n " , Review of P o l i t i c s , April 1 9 5 9 . • P P . 4 1 7 - 4 5 6 . 
anxious, above a l l , to keep out of Cola War quarrels and 
yet aware, as President.Sukarno said, that "the af fairs of 
the world are our a f fa irs , and our future depends on the 
solution found to a l l international problems, however f ar or 
distant they may seem. 1 " " I t would be wrong to convey the 
impression that the Bandung Conference was wholly a neutralisi 
meeting, for the views of aligned states were fully ventilated 
(with Chou En-lai skilfully plying China's current policy of 
ostensible peace and friendship with Afro-Asian neutral ists ) , 
I 
and anti-colonialism in i t s various manifestations was 
another important theme. However, neutralism was becoming 
a vital strand in the Afro-Asian movement, though by no means 
ful ly synonymous with i t , as neutralists began to shed some 
of their former defensiveness and to move more surely inter-
2 
nationally , encouraged by accords with fellow neutralists . 
I t was probably in such matters as increasing oontacts and 
seeing the advantages of an international platform that 
Bandung v/as most beneficial to neutralists . The conference 
1 . Kahin, o p . c i t . pp.46-7. 
2 . Mrs.-Keynes, o p . o i t . • p . 3 7 5 , says.that there were 9 con-
firmed neutralists at Bandung - Afghanistan, Burma, 
Cambodia, India , Indonesia, Laos, Nepal, Syria & Yemen. 
The positions of Egypt, Ethiopia & Saudi Arabia were not 
fully clear but were at times neutralist . There were 2 
Communist states - China.& North Vietnam, and 15 anti-
Communists - Ceylon, Gold Coast, Iran , Iraq , »Japan, Jordan 
Lebanon, Liberia , Libya, Pakistan, Philippines, Sudan, 
Thailand, Turkey &!South-Vietnam. 
net at a time when Cold Tfar deadlocks had prevented for йоге 
than five years any expansion in the membership of the United 
Nations' - a fact much regretted by all neutralists and 
especially by- the still 'unenfranchised' states. However, 
with the" so-called U .S .-Ü.S .S .R . "horse-trading d e a l " 1 , of 
December 1955» by which the United Nations immediately gained 
sixteen new members, * and became open to further increases 
. • . 3 
in membership, that organisation seemed to gain a new 
relevance and vitality in world affairs , whilst greatly 
augmenting the number of neutralist votes and' voices» 
Though the rivalries between the U .S . and the"U .S .S .R . 
quickened, became "more varied in scope and, on the whole,-
slightly less venomous-in- tlieir verbal interchanges, direct 
contacts between the two superpowers were virtually as rare 
and unproductive as in the Stalin-Truman era. Mr. Dulles 
quickly withdrew the American delegation from participation 
in the 1954 Geneva Conference 'on Indo-China, leaving Mr. Eden 
and Mr. Molotov to attempt a compromise settlement)^' Both 
« ' t 
1 . See Goodwin, op .cit . pp.224-226. f 
2. Theee were Albania, Austria, Bulgaria, Cambodia, Ceylon, 
Finland, Hungary, Ireland, Italy , Jordan, Laos, Libya, 
Nepal, Portugal, • Rounania & Spain. Cambodia, Ceylon, Laos 
& Libya were all new states created since 19£5. 
3 . Sudan, Morocco & Tunisia - all new states - became members 
in Nov. 1956; Japan in Dec. 1956; Ghana, a new state, in 
* Harch'1957; & Malaya, 'another-nev; state,-in Sept. 1957. 
4 . See Survey ( R . I . I . A . ) for 1954, pp.42-73; & The Memoirs of 
Sir Anthony Eden. Full Circle (London, i960 ) chapter 6. 
Eden v/rites (p .123) "This was the first international 
meeting at which I was sharply conscious of the deterrent 
power of the hydrogen bomb. I was grateful for i t . " 
the Geneva Summit Conference of July 1955 1 " arid the follow-
up Conference of Foreign Secretaries in October - November 
2. 
1955 were unproductive, though there was much superficial 
к * 
talk then and for some time afterwards about.a vague but 
new, welcome and all pervasive "Geneva spiritH- As both 
superpov/ers developed their nuclear capacities (and the 
JL 
facts or rumours of other emergent nuclear powers became 
-a. 
publicised) , the need to avoid thermo-nuclear war and agree 
on some form of "peaceful co-existence was recognised on all 
sides. The outstanding problem was to establish a basis 
on which the two Cold War camps could agree to co-exist. 
This problem was no nearer solution than it had ever been 
when the successful launching of the Soviet Sputnik in 
October 1957 encouraged Mr. Krushchev to claim that this 
event had altered the power balance in the world*, In a 
sense, this was.no^ doubt true; but other more gradual 
changes were increasingly affecting the nature of Cold War 
.rivalries. The Soviet Union and the United States were 
stil l predominant, but both thenceforward had to give greater 
attention to independent forces, both within and outside 
their own alliances . 
A 
1 . See Survey (R . I . I . A . ) for 19[55-6т pp. 15 5-160. 
2 . . Ibid . pp.167-174. 
(4 ) Variable Weather, 1957-early 1961 
The chief characteristics of this fourth phase of the 
r 
Cold War, which takes us up to and includes the present, seem 
to be: the developing global character of Cold War struggles 
i 
(as Africa and Latin-America now become areas of active Cold 
War rivalry, too) ; the greater number of direct contacts 
, -
between the U . S . and the U . S . S . R . ; the apparently growing 
г » 
attractions of neutralism, and the increasing attention paid 
< ** *. 
by each of the superpowers towards neutralist states. 
- > 
Following the Soviet success in launching the f i rst earth 
satellite (Sputnik) , it seemed that Soviet leadership had « • 
gained fresh confidence and that the Soviet state, now 
militarily stronger and industrially more powerful than ever 
before, began to extend the scale of i ts international oper-
ations. However much of this was due to the undoubted 
emergence of Mr.KJtrushchev as the f i rst man in Russia , 1 * a 
i " * ' 1 
more important reason probably was that a new state of 
1 
•mutual deterrence' between the two superpowers had been 
ushered in , now that Russian capacity to launch inter-
continental missiles had marked the end of the territorial 
invulnerability of the American homeland. In such a 
situation, the advantages accruing from Communist inspired 
1 . In July 1957 it was reported that Messrs. Molotov, 
Kagahovich»& Malenkov were*expelled from the Praesidium 
of the central committee of the Communist Party of the 
Soviet Union. r Mr. Shepilov was demoted, «too, & these 
changes were widely interpreted as marking the further 
emergence of Mr.Mtrushchev. see Ihe_Jnimes. 4 Julv 1957 . 
local aggression were likely to increase, not only because 
the threat of U . S . nuclear retaliation was less credible as 
a deterrent to local attack on her minor allies , but also 
because further developments in America's ovvn weaponry were 
likely to reduce her dependence on large numbers of fixed 
overseas bases, and might even reduce the military value of 
small, exposed allies in her eyes. This did not, of course, 
reduce the ohances of local wars, and between,October 1957 
and January 1961 there was a succession, of skirmishes and 
л » 
war scares over Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, Laos, Formosa, 
Congoj Cuba and Berlin . 1 * 
Another feature of this post-Sputnik phase is the 
growing number of direct contacts between the citizens and 
2 
leaders of the two superpowers. * ThiB process began 
J. V Л. , J -» 
formally^ with the two year agreement on cultural, technioal 
and educational exchanges, signed in January 1958, though it 
is doubtful if. the superficial cordiality which was becoming 
customary in these new encounters appreciably lessened the 
distrust and mutual irritation.which marked the fundamental 
relations between the two governments. In terms of U.S .-
U . S . S . R . relations, the failure of the Paris summit con-
ference of May i960 was a revealing example of deep-ro<bted 
1 . For details, see The United. States in World Affairs , 
annual volumes for 1957, 1958, 1959 & i960 (Mew York, 
1958, 1959, i960 & 1 9 6 1 ) pas'sim. 
2. Ib id . Mr.Khrushchev1s visit to the U . S . in Sept. 1959 
was the most dramatic of these new contacts. 
rl 
incompatibilities. 
The rivalry between the two superpowers now seemed to 
be increasingly complicated by incipient stresses and strains 
within their respective alliahce systems, as well as by the 
growing number of new states which were emerging and pursuing » r 
neutralist courses. The days when American leaders acted 
as energetic recruiting officers gathering more members for 
military alliances , and when Soviet leaders openly denigrated 
neutralists , had gone. Many neutralists were proselytisers p I 
themselves, now, and the very new neutralist state did not 
» 
find i tsel f in a world where one was expected to apologise 
for one 's neutralist stance, but where one could point to 
many notable exemplars and precedents. A new and looser 
international system, more f lexible and multiläteral, was 
in being, and formal t ies now seemed far less significant 
than hitherto. 
• Stresses.and strains.were certainly evident throughout 
** . . t • 
America's alliances . The defection of . Iraq from the Baghdad 
Pact, following regicide and revolution in July 1958 , called 
* » i •« 
forth a reconstruction of that"alliance with the U . S . assuming 
4L. 
a much more aotive role in what now became called the"Central 
Treaty Organization (C .E .N .T . 0 . ) , l e with fits new headquarters 
v . . . 
1 . For a brief account of the Iraq revolt, see U . S . W . A . 1958, 
pp.201-3, & for C . E . N . Т . О . _ s e e The Daily Telegraph. 24 
May i960 & 26 April 1961 . & The Economist 6 May 1961 , p . 
556 . 
in Turkey. Five months earlier the union .of the two states 
of Egypt and Syria in a single "Uftited Arab Republic" was 
proclaimed in Cairo as a firet step towards the unification 
of ,the Arab peoples.1* It seemed as i f the tide of NasEerite ' < / * 
nationalism and ^neutralism was rising. «Tithin S . E . A . T . O . 
deteriorating situations in the two 'protected' states of 
Laos and South Vietnam revealed a lack of any concerted 
2 
alliance policy; * there were a number of reports that the 
t 
Philippines and Siam were actively seeking other, unspecified * • » 
3 
means of ensuring their security, and in November i960 it 
was announced that Thailand had for the first time accepted 
Soviet offers of economic assistance. 4* In January i960 the 5 
U . S . signed a new ten year defence treaty with Japan, though 
by the following October a prominent member of,the U . S . Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee was warning his fellow members 
of the popular trend towards neutralism in.Japan*** and the 
1 . See U . S . W . A . ' 1 9 5 8 , pp.189-192. 
2 . See annual volumes of U .S .W .A . 1957-60, passim. 
3 . See Daily Telegraph. 8 June 1961; Economist. 1 April 1961 
pp.10-12 & 20 May 1961. pp.791-2; C .S .M . 5 April i960 . & 
New York Times. 4 Sept. i960 . 
4 . See C .S .M . 5 Nov. 1960^ A report from Bangkok mentioned 
America's current balance*-of-payments diff iculties & the 
shook to Thais of hearing about an American mission to 
Bonn "begging for money. . .the image of a shock-proof 
American economy was until this year about as firmly 
lodged in the Asian mind as perhaps the myth of Asian 
military inferiority.to Europe before 1905 . " See The 
Guardian. 21 Dec, i960 . 
5.* See The Guardian, 20 Jan. i960 . - " ' 
6 . See Letter of Transmittal by Senator Mike Mansfield to 
Senate Cttee. on.Foreign Relations, 21 Oct. i960 , p . 7 ; ft 
I . I . M o r r i s - "Japanese Foreign Policy arid Neutralism" in 
International Affairs ( R . I . I . A . ) Jan . i960 , pp.7-20. 
u> 
likelihood that this would increase. In Latin America the 
cumulative effect of the overthrow of, pro-American military 
dictatorships in a number of countries 1*- Peru ( 1956 ) , 
Columbia ( 1957 ) , Venezuela (1958) , Cuba (1959) - and growing 
Russian and Chinese interest .in this region prompted the 
United States to. pay greater attention to Latin American 
a f fa irs , and to.increase economic assistance to Latin America 
countries. Only Cuba, following the accession of Pidel 
2 
Castro to power in January 1959, * .had by early 1961 clearly 
embarked on a neutralist policy; but it was a sign of the 
growing attractiveness of neutralism in Latin America that 
Bolivia , Brazil and -Ecuador each decided to send o f f ic ia l 
3 
observers to the neutralist summit meeting in Belgrade in 
September 1961 . In .early 1961 N . Ä . T . O . , of all America's 
alliances , seemed least threatened by the corrosive effects 
of 'creeping neutralism' from within the alliance, or the 
enticements of already neutralist leaders from without. 
But trade rivalries between member states, the growing self-
confidence of Prance under President de Gaulle (who came to 
pow^r in June 1958) and Soviet pressure (from November 1958 
onwards) on the Western powers to reach a 'permanent 
solution* of the Berlin question^ all added to America's \j 
1 . Por details , see-annual volumes of U . S . W . A . 1Q57-fio, 
passim. • . 
2 . See U . S . W . A . . 1958 . p . 353t 335-7, а1во below p. 
3 . The. Times, 6 May 1961 , 22 & 24 Aug. 1961 . 
и • 
.task of reconciliation and leadership . 1 . 
In some respects the Soviet Union as the leader of the 
Communist bloc seemed to be experiencing similar diff iculties 
to those of its main Cold ЛУаг protagonist. The meeting of 
the lulihg Communist parties in Moscow in November 1957 
marked the definite failure of K&rushchev*s attempts to woo c. 
2 
Yugoslavia back into the Communist camp. * Subsequent to:> 
that Moscow meeting and right'up to the ending of a similar 
meeting, also in Moscow, in November i960 , there was con-
siderable evidence of Sino-Soviet disagreements."** Whatever 
the full reasons for Sino-Soviet tensions in these years,* 
Chinese dissatisfaction with the way that Mr.Khrushchev was 
. ' J J U' .. . • . • * promoting good relations with India and Indonesia, even to. . л 
the extent of neglecting to support China's interests in her 
t y -
quarrels with these two countries, was undoubtedly one of 
the immediate c a u s e s . C e r t a i n l y i n theee years China 
I * 4Г ^ 
showed, a greater militancy and aggreesivencb-s internationally 
. V. - - i - , 
.than did 'the Soviet Union, and the official Chinese attitude 
» . . . » 
5 ' 
to neutralism was, in general, less friendly than that of 
. , * 
1 . See U .S .W .A . , *1957-60 . passim. 
2. See H. Seton-Watson -.Neither War Nor Peace (London, i960) 
РР»357-8. 
3 . See"*.The Sino-Soviet Dispute.0Documents and Analysis by 
G.F.* Hudson, Richard Lowenthal &.Roderick MacFarquhar, 
(published by The„ China Quarterly;, 1961) . 
4 . Ib id , esp. pp. 5 ^ . . 
5 . See A". M. Halpem - "The Chinese Communist Line on 
Neutralism"' in The China Quarterly, Jan-March 1961.pp.90-
115« This article surveys Chinese statements on neutral-
ism between Nov. 1957 & Dec. 196Q.. 
и 
her senior partner , 1 * though both powers preferred to dis-
tinguish between neutralists they approved of and those who, 
2 
for various reasons, met with their disapproval, * 
One of the most striking developments since 1957 has been 
the considerable increase in the number of new' netrtralist 
states, and with their emergence - they are almost all African 
states - sub-tropical Africa has at last become drawn into 
the mainstreams of international politics . Indeed, eighteen 
newly-independent1 states were born, seventeen in Africa , 
between January 1958 and October i960 - all of them professed 
3 
neutralists and all of them becoming members of the U . N . 
1 . In March 1958 a leading Soviet publicist again made clear 
that neutralism was only to be welcomed outside the Soviet 
bloc - "a system of collective security ( i . e . any•Soviet 
alliance) serves as a barrier to aggression and i s , hence, 
a higher form of struggle for peace than the policy of 
neutrality . „That i s why a retreat from collective' 
security in favour of neutrality would be a step backward, 
not forward, in international relations" , quoted from E. 
Korovin - "The Problem of Neutrality Today " in Inter-
national Affairs (Moscow) March 1958, p.6.- The bracketed 
interpretation i s mine, but this meaning i s clear in the 
context of the whole article . „» • t 
2 . In the Nov. i960. Moscow Manifesto the neutralist states 
approved of by the Communist-powers were generally, & thus 
conveniently, styled "independent national democracies." 
See Hudson, Lowenthal & MacFarquhar, p p . c i t . pp.192-6, 
esp. pp.194-5» She statement made clear that to secure 
Communist approval a neutralist must ' f ight ' against a l l 
forms of ' imperialism. ' 
3 . Guinea joined the U .N . in Dec. 1958; Cameroun, Central 
Africen Republic, Chad, Congo (capital Brazzaville ) , Congo 
(capital Leopoldville) , Cyprus, Dahomey, Gabon, Ivory 
Coast, Madagascar, Mali , Niger , Senegal, Somalia, Togo & 
' Upper Volta all Joined the U .N . in Sept. i960 ; & Nigeria 
•joined;in Oct. i 9 6 0 . 1 All these were new states & all but 
* Cyprus were African states. Cameroun, Togo & Somalia 
" " were formerly U . N . trust' territories . 
This large addition to the ranks of the neutralist nations 
not only gave new impetus and strength to neutralist currents, 
I 
but increasingly there are signs of a willingness on the part 
of a large number of neutralist leaders to try to oonoert 
< 
together on iopues of common concern. This latter trend was 
particularly evident in the autumn i960 session of the U .N . • 
General Assembly, * and in the summoning of a neutralist 
2 
•summit' in Belgrade in September 1961, This ie not to 
say that a neutralist 'bloc' has emerged, or even is emerging. 
t 
But the sheer number of neutralist states and the importance 
j. 
of some of the larger ones - India , Yugoslavia, Indonesia, 
Ghana and the United Arab Republic, for example, - has forced 
* .. » <r 
both superpowers to pay increasing attention to them. Mr. 
t, • • • • • 
Kkrushchev's attendance and behaviour (a mixture of bluster 
and blandishments) at the U.U. General Assembly in September 
i960 made clear his interest in 'the. neutralist world 1 . His 
- s 
proposal that most of the important international organisation 
3 
should be re-organised on a 'Troika' basis - i . e . with 
equally weighted Western, Communist and Neutralist represent-
ation - served the dual purpose of forwarding Soviet aims to 
secure a permanent veto in a wider range of international 
organisations than the Security Council, whilst also appearing 
1 . See Tom Little - "Mr.kßrushohev & the Neutrals at the U.N." 
World Today, Pec, i960 . 
2 . See The Times. 21 & 24 Aug. 1961. 
3 . See Alan James - "The Sovjbt Troika Proposals" in World 
Today, Sept. 1961, pp.368-376.. 
to advocate a new importance for neutralist nations. The 
new Kennedy administration, in office since January 1961 , 
has to date been at pains to show that i t , too, i s av/are of 
the needs and prejudices of 'friendly* neutralist nations . 1 * 
The difficulties-of trying to please both al l ies and 
г.. 
• friendly ' neutralists , whilst also pursuing their avn 
interests, are now familiar predicaments, common to both 
superpowers. The results of their endeavours will vary 
with the issues at stake, the attitudes and policies of 
- л 
individual neutralists , and their own expectations and aims. 
1 . In April 1961 the text of a lecture entitled United 
States Policy in Africa , printed for and circulated by 
the United States Information Service, said (on p . 9 ) a 
propos of African neutralism " . . . from the onset of the 
African independence revolution the U .S . has not sought 
membership in or adhesion :to Western military alliances 
of independent African states . " 
2 . See M . S . P . 1961, p. 101, which refers to ' fr iendly ' 
neutral nations. 
„ • i 
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NEUTRALISM AS INTERNATIONAL DOCTRINE 
Г 
"The spread of neutralist doctrine in an ever^ 
widening circle from Bandung outwards is perhaps the 
clearest evidence of a new constellation in international 
affairs . " 
Professor Geoffrey Barraclough in 'Confluence'. \ 
F a l l , 1 9 5 7 . 
"Political thought is very pragmatist. Yet we must 
not leave the other side out of our reckoning. If 
ideas in politics more than elsewhere are the children 
of practical needs, none the less is it true, that the 
actual world is the result of men's thoughts." 
J . N. Figgis. 
Anyone who begins to think about neutralist doctrine 
must regard the words of Professor Barraclough, quoted 
overleap, as being somewhat ironic. For it certainly 
requires some temerity to write of a doctrine which seems 
to have no canonical works, no authoritative exegesis, 
and not yet even a collection of representative neutralist 
pronouncements.1. It may help to understand some of the 
characteristics of such an apparently insubstantial 
T 
doctrine when we remember who the leading neutralist 
'ideologues' usually are, what roles they perform, what 
aims and aspirations they have in common. 
Most people would almost certainly want to'describe 
Mr. Nehru as an exponent of neutralist doctrine, and 
would probably agree to dub him as the world's foremost 
neutralist. It has even been suggested that neutralism 
is a peculiarly Indian invention, and that the spread of 
neutralist doctrine is a process whereby Mr. Nehru's old 
1. There'is, a small collection in the appendices to this 
thesis, with some references to other sources. 
Inevitably this collection is in'many respects un-
satisfactory, as it is limited both by the bpevity of 
this study and by the shortcomings of the compiler's 
knowledge - especially of languages. Nevertheless, 
there is va real scholarly need for a good collection. 
The one offered here is included mainly in order to 
reduce the need for extensive quotation in the text 
and footnotes tö this chapter, and also to provide some 
convenient points of reference for the chapter on 
neutralism as policy. 
arguments become the world's commonplaces, 'but this is 
surely to exaggerate Mr. Nehru's influence and the novelty 
2. 
of his pronouncements. For it has become common to 
consider Nehru, Tito and Nasser together as "the high 3 
priests" of the doctrine of neutralism, and to regard the 
writings and speeches of all three men as significant 
expressions of neutralist holy writ. Though the importance 
of some other figures who oome to mind - President Sukarno, 
U Nu, Prince Sihanouk, the late Solomon Bandaranaike, 
Kwame Nkrumah - might arouse more controversy, there is 
l ittle doubt that the list of prominent and representative 
neutralist 'ideologues' could be added to without great 
difficulty. 
While it would be wrong to discount the uniquely 
4 
personal elements shaping individual expressions of 
neutralist .doctrine, it is more significant for present 
1 . "Neutralism. . . . imparts an aura of high moral purpose; 
i't i s theoretical and Brahiminical. " Economist, 29 
October 1955, p. 377; see also Economist, 21 September 
• 1957, PP. 948-9. 
2. See introduction to Appendix 3 below 
3 . S e e , . e . g . The Times, let leader of 26 October 1959 -
"Neutralism." 
* < 
4 . Brief biographical notes, with further detailed 
references, are prefixed to the-selections of neutralist 
doctrine given in the appendices below. 
purposes that most of the leading neutralist 'ideologues' 
share a wide range of strikingly similar national and 
personal.problems, that they, are facing these problems at 
approximately the same time, and that these similarities 
tend"to give something of a common character, even an 
international aspect'to neutralist doctrine. For most of 
these 'ideologues' are not only prominent figures in inter-
national pol it ics , they nearly all spring from the western-
educated inte l l igents ia 1 ' of their countries." They are a l l , 
in a sense, both producers and consumers of anti-colonial 
and nationalist revolution, and have to act as the chief 
spokesmen - at home and abroad - for their generally new, 
poor, ex-cölonial states. At home they may, or may not , 
be demagogues; they w i l l almost certainly-have to act as 
pedagogues, the prime political educators of "their largely 
i l l iterate populaces: 'Abroad, they need t o ' j u s t i f y ' t h e i r 
policies and to enlist support. And in this self- -
consciously ideological age, with the Cold War touching so " 
many matters to which it does not' seem germane, there i s 
1 . There are valuable discussions of this theme in : 
' Edward Shils - "The Intellectuals in the Political 
Development of the-New States" , World Polit ics , April 196C 
pp. 329-368; „Harry J . Benda - "Non-Western Intelligent-
sias as Political E l i t e s " , Australian Journal of Politics 
and History, November i 960 , pp. 205-21Ö; and Hugh 
Seton-Wat son - Neither War Nor Peace, (London, i 9 6 0 ) , 
chapter 6, especially pp. 182-188. 
7 Г 
much need to fasten on to some generally acceptable 
criteria in terms of which a neutralist case can usually 
be made. 
All neutralists begin by re;jectin3 emphatically the 
notion that they should view the world from.within the 
'confines ' of a Cold War alliance. Thereafter, having 
avoided, in their own view, the prevailing East-West 
stereotypes, they are liable to accept some other 
deceptively simple view(s) of the inter-state system - the 
big versus the small, the old versus the new, the colonialist 
versus the anti-colonialist, the rich versus the poor, are 
four favourites. Suoh dichotomies, which cut across and 
divide Cold War solidarities , can suggest to many n e u t r a l i s t 
a spectrum of common sympathies and antipathies, and these 
become powerful influences shaping their world outlook. 
Even so, ambiguities inevitably arise within various 
versions of the doctrine - mainly from the conjunction of 
influences which are not alwayв similarly and simultaneously 
present - and it i s by remembering these deep emotional 
well-springs that one can begin to see why neutralist 
doctrine reflects such a variety of often contradictory 
views. Why it i s sometimes doctrinaire, and yet more often 
extremely pragmatist. Why i t s exponents sometimes make 
exaggerated claims for the novelty of their proposals. 
7G 
'iky it unmistakably bears the mark of i ts time and 
contains matter v7hich i s wholly ephemeral; Also, why , 
there i s much evidence of ex-parte .etatement - for all 
neutralist doctrine i s , in some respects at least , an essay 
in advocacy adapted to the urgencies .of -Cold Var situations. 
Yet, what i s perhaps most surprising about contemporary 
neutralist doctrine i s not the nationalist colourings and 
the .partisan pleading in which it i s undoubtedly invested, 
but i t s markedly international tinge, and the'degree to 
which it presents, in part at least , an explicitly general 
view of -international relations. • 
Stt Ov€v 
neutralism began to-crystallise as an international doctrine; 
and it is still in Asia and Africa that the most comprehensive 
of writing there has been since 1945 no Latin American 
neutralist •ideologue' of international significance, though 
since 1958 Fidel Castro seems to 'be aspiring to this role. 
1 . See appendices below ^  aoj. I- io. 
2 . For the way in which this Platonic notion is relevant to 
modem nationalism, see Elie Kedourie - Nationalism 
(London, i 960 ) , pp. 49-50. r 
3. See above pp.J+7-Ы-
4 . This i s not ,to subscribe to the belief sometimes pro-
pounded by. Asian and African neutralists .that neutralism 
is ' intrinsically* "and/or distinctively Afro-Äsian. 
For reasons already outlined it is suggested that, in 
any case, emotional aff inities are more important than 
geographical propinquities. 
It is in Africa' and Asia that the leading neutralist"1" 
•» p * 
'philosopher-kings' reside. " For it was in the Afro-Asian 
3 
world, during the third phase of the Cold War, that 
expressions of the doctrine can be found. 
4 
Up to the time 
7 T 
In Europe neutralist doctrine is .generally either not 
strongly couched in international pterins, or i ts proponents 
lack significant political* influence. Even exceptionally 
where off icial neutralist pronouncements chime with those 
from Africa and Asia, this seems to b e ^ o s t l y coincidental, 
as in the case of. some Swedish*statements, or^carefully 
contrived, as. in the case with Yugoslav neutralism. French 
neutralist pronouncements are^also excluded.* For French-
neutralism, though, often-; expressed by men of ^great intellect-
ual distinction and displaying a ,bewildering variety of 
articulate, opinion, has, to .date , lacked effective political 
influence in JPrance, and has never enjoyed an international 
platform. 'Like many French intellectual movements, it i s 
characterised by a defiant .ethnooentrism, i s an a f fa ir of 
coteries, and i s best studied solely as a French phenomenon.1, 
2 
And, for similar reasons, British neutralism " can be 
ignored'here. 
1 . To date, French neutralism has attracted a surprising 
amount of scholarly attention, considering i t s in-
significance internationally. John T. Marcus's book 
Neutralism and Nationalism in France (Ne// York, 1958) 
i s a thorough study of the available sources and has a 
good bibliography. Marcus repeatedly stresses (though 
he i s too immersed in detail to demonstrate this clearly) 
the close connection between neutralism and nationalism 
in France. 
2 . There is^as yet no satisfactory study of British neutral-
ism/ Two partially helpful references are Leon Epstein -
Britain , Uneasy Ally (Chicago, 1954 ) ; & John Strachey -
The Pursuit of Peace (Fabian Tract 329, London, D e c . i 9 6 0 ) 
Constantine Fitzgibbon's novel - When the Kissing had to 
Stop 1 (London", i 9 6 0 ) i s a fable designed to show the 
dangers of British neutralism. 
It i s assumed, then, that f o r present purposes we must 
look not to philosophers but to rulers f o r authoritative, 
influential , expositions of neutralist doctrine; that to 
be 'internationally significant the protagonists of neutralism 
n e e d 4 h e nourishment of political paver; and that neutralist 
doctrine i s more'likely to be learned at the press conference 
or from the public platform than in the study or seminar. 
And i f public forums'are the academies of neutralism, it 
must be expected that neutralist doctrine will at best 
present not a corpus of knowledge, an integrated body of 
theory, but rather a constellation of concepts - and these 
wil l be shrouded in a confusing medfey of supporting argument. 
Yet , despite these d i f f icult ies of interpretation, it 
does seem possible to detect f ive main threads in the 
tangled skein of neutralist argument. These are:-
* » 
(1 ) that Cold War conditions can be mitigated' and perhaps 
removed altogether; 
(2 ) that neutralism ie morally justifiable ; 
( 3 ) that neutralists must pursue an 'independent' foreign 
policy; 
( 4 ) that all forms of colonialism must be eradicated; 
( 5 ) that foreign aid must be given without strings. 
It i s not pretended that all neutralists would will ingly 
subscribe to the above l i s t , nor that any of these proposit-
ions are necessarily exclusive to them. All that i ^ 
claimed is that these five affirmations suggest what are 
the central concerns of virtually all neutralists. In 
actual discourse'all five points habitually run together 
and become enmeshed - certainly? point number (3) should be 
considered as primary, and points (4) and (5)' as common , 
corollaries of i t . They are separated out here in order 
to jprovide some fixed points round which ideas that often 
recur can be examined in'order to show their main supporting 
arguments, the degree of. novelty present, and reveal their 
underlying assumptions, aff inities , and incongruities. 
I . 
Pear of 'hot* war and- irritation at the continuation 
of the Cold War are constant themes in neutralist rhetoric. 
Yet it is not this that distinguishes neutralists, but 
rather the diagnoses, and, especially, the prognoses they 
offer of this, common predicament. Neutralists tend to 
place great stress on the role of fear 1* as a tension-
breeding factor, and with this often goes the implication 
that many fears 'are unwarranted and, hence, removable. 
с 
They maintain that the mutual fears of the Cold War antagon-
Щ 
ists create a war-like atmosphere which discourages any 
1 . E . g . see appendices below.ppХ7/ A "2&3. 
possibility of lessening tension and unfreezing the Cold 
War. I t seems almost as i f the neutralist believes that « 
there i s a Zeitgeist and that .he understands it»better , and 
so canjthink.more purposefully, than can any non-neutralist 
Such a view necessarily, lays \great trust in the therapeutic 
power of neutralist advice and lays stress on the moral 
suasive -power of '^independent' example and 'the healing 
2 3 
touch' jof the man of peace. , » 
The view that general war i s entered into as a deliberate 
act of policy is seldom heard today, and, the classic isolat-
ionist case for non-involvement - that, for the isolationist , 
participation in war can, in fact , be avoided - now represents 
1 . See appendices belowфр 
2. See below, section I I too. These optimistic assumptions, 
& the parallel one that ignoranoe of each other's ways 
greatly aggravates fears and increases tensions, are 
part of the common currency of Anglo-American liberalism, 
& are enshrined in the Preamble to the Constitution of 
U . N . E . S . C . O . In this respect many present day neutral-
ists seem to re-echo Gladstone-and Woodrow Wilso'n. E . g . 
7/oodrow Wilson - "The example of America must be a special 
• example . . . riot merely of peace because it w i l l not f ight , 
but of peace because peace i s the healing and elevating 
influence of*the world and strife i s n o t . " See The Public 
Papers of "foodrow Wilson ed. by Baker & Dodd, v . l . , p . 321 
c . f . particularly, appendices ^ 4 
• - Д , 
3 . It i s a widfcly held view that men from the Hindu-Buddhist 
world ,of .SoÜith & South East .Asia are peculiarly well 
f itted to be neutralists and men of peace. This i s < 
usually maintained by people favourably disposed towards 
neutralists , ft i s a contemporary version of the well 
known maxim "ex 'oriente l u x . " But i t i s notoriously 
d i f f icult to trace definite connections between cultural 
patterns & political behaviour. This theory i s more 
plausible at the level of doctrine than of policy. 
a relatively minor part of neutralist argument. . Though 
the emotional attitudes of present day neutralists and pre-
war isolationists may be similar, the situations faced by 
each are different enough1to elicit quite different responses. 
No neutralist today can confidently assert, as did a leadings 
Canadian isolationist 1 * in the 1920s, that he lives in a -
'fireproof house ' ; he does not ^even claim that his Cold War 
neutralism necessarily means that his own country would not 
become involved in a general 'hot ' war. , The present defence 
of neutralism i s , substantially, that it can help to prevent 
war. 
There are three popular variants of this argument in 
neutralist circles . 
The f i r s t i s that neutralists should play a 'third.' role , < + 
in world a f f a i r s . In i ts strongest form this view sees 
> 1 F J 
neutralists acting together as a 'Third Force ' , holding a 
position that can save the world from self destruction. 
Very few neutralists , however, now see any practical possib-
il ity in the idea of a Third Force, though there are hintB 
л 
f 
1 . Senator Dandurand in 1924 to the League of Nations -
see P . N . S. Mansergh - Survey of British Commonwealth 
Af fa irs , Problems of External Policy 1931-1939, (London. 
1 9 5 2 ) , p . 95. 
ft 
of euch thinking, in their most optimistic expressions.1* 
The weaker," and more common, form 6f this argument is to 
see-neutralists as creators and .'spreaders of areas of dis-
2 
engagements 'from Cold War struggles, "areas of peace" i s 
Mr. Nehru's favourite description of these disengaged 
regions. * • By .themselves refusing to take sidee in the 
Cold War struggle,- neutralists claim to slow down the drift 
..towards a bipolar world, 'in which international tensions 
would be raised to' an intolerable 'pitch and war would become 
an .immediate and ever.present danger. Though neutralists 
• dislike.talking about 'balancing power', .their implicit 
assumption is that a multilateral balance-can be substituted 
1 . Strong neutralist advocacy of Third Force views is 
usually connected with ardent support for.Bome particular 
scheme - the Commonwealth, European Union, the Afro-Asian 
bloc, Pan-Africa, the Asian Socialist Conference, are 
some examples. The past achievements and future 
prospects of«, such schemes are viewed by their proponents 
with greater respect than their actual impact on world 
affairs would seem to warrant, and their common neutral-
ist character is always exaggerated., 
2 . Disengagement is ä term which has already been stretched 
to cover many different plans. Captain .Hinterhoff' s 
encyclopaedic book Disengagement (London, 1959)» though 
devoted mainly to Europe, l ists 174 different projects. 
•Clearly,, one does.not have to be a neutralist to 
advocate disengagement, but if one i s a neutralist, then, 
logically, one must be prepared to include one's own 
country in' some kind of disengagement scheme. 
3 . See below p. 2.7g. 
for the present bi-lateral, or near bi-lateral, balance and 
that this'would make for peace. At the very least, the 
existence of, and the need to woo, unaligned states i s con-
ceived of as 'exercising a form of restraint on the Cold War 
combatants^-
The second Variant concerns "bridgemanship", for 
neutralists often assert that they offer the best remaining 
hope for ultimately bridging the gap between the Communist 
powers and the Western world . 1 . They claim that their 
middle position enables them to provide acceptable channels 
л + ' * л 
• of communication across Cold War barriers. Here again, the 
< . -i * 
neutralist sees his role as one which facilitates under-
standing and breaks down the mutual ignorance Cold War 
I 2 A 
contestants have o f each other's views. * Neutralists 
stress, too, that they can undertake with some hope of succese 
to act as friendly mediators. "Their proposals for the 
settlement of outstanding disputes are (in their view) more 
likely to get a respectful hearing from both Cold War camps I 
than those advanced by'the partisans of a particular side; * 
1 . See, e . g . appendix below p . 3 l 6 
2.- E . g . Иг. Nehru- "The role of India is a sort of catalyst. 
We are the uncommitted people. That i s why we try to 
steer a middle course between two camps, so that both willl 
trust u s . . . we are in a position to break do/m mutual 
prejudice. " Lok Sabha Debs. 17 March 1953, vol . 2, No .7 : 
2147. See also appendix 2. This view necessarily pre-
supposes that the Cold War contestants are willing to 
accept neutralist intermediaries, & this is not always 
the case. Canadian policy since 1945 provides at least 
some refutations of the claim that only neutralist states 
can act as mediators, moderators, purveyors of compromise 
formulae. 
«г 
and in present circumstances.they regard their availability 
for service on .armistice, observation,^and other comparable 
commissions as invaluable.' 'Even though it is admitted that 
such activities are seldom spectacular, it is-.claimed that 
by slow and patient conciliation a firmer base for inter-
national co-operation may eventually be secured. Neutralists 
and non-neutralists alike agree that negotiation and peaceful 
settlement are not panaceas for all the problems of inter-
national "'politics, but neutralists claim that they encourage 
a -greater use than might otherwise be possible of these 
sometimes valuable solvents. The neutralist thus sees 
himself acting as a prophylactic; seeking to prevent tension 
by removing its causes, calming the atmosphere by keeping 
i • * 
calm himself, evoking goodwill by showing it. • 
The third, and most ambitious, variant of the view 
. . , -
that neutralism aidB international peace conceives of the 
neutralist*4 role in even larger terms, and believes that 
neutralism can-make a more effective contribution to the 
> 
• • 4. 
containment of Communist expansion, and the amelioration of 
t - . 
Cold War difficulties, than can any Western sponsored 
. . i 
regional defence arrangement. This argument maintains that 
the neutralists by deliberately adopting a non-aligned 
posture in the face of .Теstem warnings, by .declining to 
f ' . 
join in any measures of a hostile character aimed at 
Communist states and by placing public faith in Communist 
гь 
intentions, have thereby produced earnests of Communist 
good behaviour. I f a Communist power were to attack one 
of the neutralist countries, it would, according to this 
theory, irretrievably destroy its political credit through-
out the uncommitted world. This seems to be the rationale 
underlying most neutralist f a i th in Panch Sheel 1 , type 
agreements. Of course, the whole argument hinges on the 
2 
assumption that Communist .states making such public pledges * 
wi l l go to great lengths to avoid offending neutralist 
opinion, and it seems to exaggerate the extent to which 
1 . Panch Sheel, or "the 5 principles of peaceful co-exist-
ence* were formally enunciated in the preamble to the 
Sino-Indian treaty on trade•& communications with Tibet 
of. 29 April 1954 . The principles are (1) mutual respect 
for each other 's territorial integrity & sovereignty, 
(2) non-aggression, (3 ) non-interference in each.other 's 
internal a f fa irs , (4) equality ft mutual benefit , & (5) 
peaceful.co-existence. Though neutralists in general, & 
' Mr. Nehru in particular, seem to regard these principles 
as being a special contribution to world politics , they 
are not at all original , are repetitious, & really boil 
down to the edict that a state 's independence should not 
be infringed. There seems to be no need to seek deep 
philosophical souroes for such an unremarkable point, but 
such searches persist . See, e . g . Panch Sheel: I t s 
Meaning and History (Lok Sabha Secretariat, New 'Delhi , 
1955) & the discussion reported in The Indian Journal of 
Political Science, Jan . .- March 195b. 
2 . . E . g . Nehru - "It i s not a question of v believing the othei 
party 's word; it is a questionkof creating conditions 
where the other party cannot break its word, or i f I may 
say so, where it f inds it diff icult to break i ts word . " 
I f it did , it was "likely to find itself in a much worse 
quandary." Lok Sabha Debs. 29 Sept. 1954, vol . V I I , 
part 2, col . 3687 . See also cols. 3692-3. 
neutralist states might regard a hostile act against one 
neutralist state as being a hostile act against the whole 
neutralist world^; 
It i s ironic that the practical efficacy of Panch Sheel 
agreements should f irst be called into question seriously 
as a result of rapid deterioration in the relations between 
the two original promoters, India and China. Actually, 
most Panch Sheel agreements between neutralist, and Communist 
states are unlikely to be subject to similar strains, if " 
only because the direct clash of interests i s less likely 
where there i s geographical•separation of the signatory 
states. For it i s important to remember that all the 
foregoing arguments have been concemed with international 
peace,and security rather than national security. . While " it 
does not necessarily follow that without international 
security there .can be no national security, neutralists 
seldom make this distinction openly. Appeals to history -
quite apart from the argument about the^degree of novelty 
inherent tin 4Cold War situations in the presence of thermo-
nuclear weapons - are inevitably inconclusive. For, in 
the past, neither alliance nor neutrality policies have 
proved to be in fal l ible recipes for preventing, or even 
avoiding, war. , 
, One of the most vital elements in neutralist doctrine 
i s the resistance that i s put up to claims that either Cold 
"ffar camp commands an exclusive monopoly of rectitude. 
Neutralist resistance to American policies was probably 
heightened by some of Mr. Dulles ' , more notorious phrases - ' 
"massive retaliation" , "the brink of war" , "neutrality i s 
an immoral and shortsighted conception", "agonising re-
appraisal1!, are some which immediately come to mind. What 
;many neutralists say i s that they themselves have no 
messianic mission, they' do not think in terms of moral 
absolutes and they quite genuinely* do not see everything in 
the Cold War as incidents in a drama where the 'good' .forces 
of. the frestern world wil l confound the ' ev i l ' forces of the 
Communist b l o c . 1 " They refuse to see the East-West struggle 
in terms of a conflict between ' r ight ' and 'wrong ' , and, 
hence, to be drawn into a crusade to extirpate evil on 
either side. This i s an effective counter to some of the 
more' extravagant or hypocritical moral claims advanced by 
« ' 
the committed in the Cold War and i s a pertinent reminder 
i - i 
of the values of humility and sincerity in pol it ics . . 
J- L J —— —— 
1 . E . g . see К. M. Panikkar - Common Sense About India , * 
(London, i960 ) , * p. 1 48 , ' and appendices 
But humility i s not the only moral attitude of 
neutralists . . For some of them assert a moral neutralism, 
an indifference, with regard to the two Cold War camp's 
because they consider that both sides in the Cold SVar. are 
basically at the same moral, level . The extreme negative 
and positive poles of this view are summed up in' the phrases 
"a plague on both your houses" 1* and "I am holier than thou. " 
No matter whether the negative.or the positive variant i s 
dominant in a particular argument, all expressions of moral 
neutralism rest on a loose identification of the' Soviet and 
Western systems with values from which the neutralist feels 
2 
equidistant, and on loose analogies between Soviet and 
Western policies with scant regard„for their vital differ*-
3 . 
ences. , 
The negative attitude of "a plague on both your houses" 
expresses a desire to "think'neutralism" and thus to assert 
t 
1 . Thus Mr.-Nehru - "If there i s a Cold War today, certainly 
we are neutral . It does not matter who i s right and who 
is wrong. We will not join in this exhibition of mutual 
abuse . " Lok Sabha Debs. 12" June .1952 , vol. 2 ( 1 ) , p . 1662 . 
2 . Thus President Sukarno in an unsolicited letter to the 
New Statesman (London) 28 June 1958 , p. 828 - "It i s past 
time for the West, Communist and anti-Communist alike 
. (s ic) to^draw back from the edge of complete.moral 
bankruptcy. . . There can be no question of the West giving 
> moral leadership to Asia. iour moral leadership has, for 
u s , meant f i rst colonialism and now the philosophical, 
moral, political and social bankruptcy of a nuclear arms 
race . " The whole letter is a fascinating statement by 
a leading neutralist . « L . * 
3 . I owe this point to Denis Healey - Neutralism (London, 
1955) t p . 20. 
an impartiality of mind towards the moral issues involved in 
the Cold War. In its most defensive position this negative 
mood f inds refuge in tu qüoque argument - for which, of 
course, in politics there are 'endless opportunities. 
Righteoua indignation at Indian 'appeasement* of Comnunist 
aggression in Tibet, for example, tempts those who are scolded 
to cite the'record of Teheran, *Yalta and Potsdam - the 
attempted 'appeasement' of Soviet dictatorship by the 
•surrender' of the l iberties of Poland and Czechoslovakia. 
Invariably, the Suez and Hungary episodes of 1956 get dragged 
into these inevitably inconclusive arguments. A more 
aggressive defence of this negative moral neutralism is to 
assert that there are no moral issues involved in the Cold 
War struggle. In faict, those who take such a stand are 
driven to adopt, implicitly , a double standard of judgement -
an exacting one for the'parliamentary democracies and a 
complaisant one for the totalitarian dictatorships. 
In a sense, of course, double standards are always 
being applied in international politics ; this is mainly 
because the moral agents in international relations are not 
V -
individuals only but governments, and governments are far 
more intimately concerned with issues that seem to involve 
the national interest, and are often indifferent to others 
that do not . But any responsible moral comparison between 
the two rival Cold War groupings must surely take into 
ql 
account respective responsibilities for the development of 
the .Cold War, and the behaviour of the parties in this 
struggle towards all ies , opponents and neutralists . . I f , 
after such analysis, the neutralist still publicly 1* insists 
that the behaviour of both Cold-War camps is morally 
identical , protagonists of either side in the Cold War would, 
no doubt,^immediately^roply that such a judgement amounts to 
refusing to distinguish between light grey and dark black -
an ironic reply to indefatigable moralists who constantly 
2 
claim to "decide teach issue on i t s .mer its . " 
Furthermore, there i s a persistent tendency for some 
neutralists to act as if verbal pronouncements, without any 
subsequent substantive policy on their., own part, are 
sufficient to 'decide 1 complex issues in international 
politics , without assuming any responsibility for seeing 
that a .verbal 'decision* i s carried out. In fact , for most 
neutralists staying non-aligned must often seem more important 
1 . Privately, i t may be that the neutralist makes use of the 
facile back-handed compliment that he expects higher 
standards of probity ffrom the Western than the Communist 
camp, or admits that people under Communist rule are too 
well oealed off to be open'to much neutralist persuasion. 
2 . Kence,' presumably, the v/orking^ distinction observed by 
most neutralists who'refuse to be anti-Communist in for-
eign policy, though actively anti-Communist in their 
domestic policy. ^Perhaps a useful touchstone of state 
morality i s to see to what extent a distinction i s pre-
served between public policyft private attitude; f o r it is 
arguable that the degree to which a state permits i ts own 
citizens to ' cr i t ic ise government policies i s one rough 
indicator of the probity to be expected from it in i ts . 
international-dealings. There is no common neutralist 
standard here, though. 
than the issues involved in a particular dispute - unless 
theyi.are themselves a conterrd/ng party - because both their 
concept of their own proper role in world affairs and their 
bargaining position depend on remaining non-aligned. 
Though the claim that "I am holier than thou" is rarely 
voiced expl ic it ly , 1 * such claims to moral superiority as are 
implicit in some neutralist rhetoric are immediately open 
to. the objection.mentioned earlier about moral chauvinism. 
For there seems to be no logical reason to deny oneself the 
2 
very humility which ie urged on the Cold v/ar rivals . 
Yet it seems almost customary now for neutralists to 
regard themselves as in some way custodians of-a notional 
'world opinion' (which by means of an unexplained equation 
sometimes seems to become a kind of 'world conscience ' ) , 
and to talk as i f voting^majoritiee in the United nations 3 
General Assembly were proximate expressions of J»vorld 
1 . Though occasionally one comes across such remarks' as -
"Independence is not synonymous with stylishness or pomp. 
There i s no merit in hiding our poverty. I n d i a ' s status 
in the world depends upon her moral supremacy." Mahatma 
Gandhi's Delhi Diary. 22 Jan. 1947 , P. 370 . 
2. There may be powerful historical-emotional reasons, though 
meny of the most prominent contemporary neutralists , while' 
leading 'independence' movements in the days of colonial 
rule, claimed as against their rulers a superior morality. 
They, also, claimed that they had the support of 'the 
people' of their country & that the colonial rulers did 
not. Such attitudes, once adopted, die hard, & probably 
influence thinking in post-independence days. 
3 . See Al ista ir Cooke's instructive article - "A letter from 
The United Nations" , The Listener, 6 Oct. i 9 60 , pp.549-50; 
& Robert Stephens "Neutralists Take the Offensive" , The 
Observer, 2 Oct. i 960 . The attractions of the U .N . for 
neutralists are briefly discussed belowpp.Я1" 
o p i n i o n . ' This view may stem from a vague and implicit 
.1 • * 
populism - some paral lels l i e in : appeals to the people, 
I 
conspiracy theories of history , militant reformism, national-
ism and anti-imperialism 1 '- crudely applied to international 
p o l i t i c s . Just as nat ional ist leadership by i t s nature 
involves an appeal to, o f , at least , a reference to, 'the 
I 
people ' , eo heroic leaders , such as President Sukarno or 
U r . Nehru, can claim not only to Ъе the spokesmen for one-
state in an international organization made up of states , 
but also f o r the whole of their large populations - -and such 
a role may encourage the speaker to remind h i s l i steners of 
I * 
the many 'uncommitted1 people in the world and perhaps to 
quote, with high approval , the opening words of the Preamble 
to the United Nations Charter - Mfie the" Peoples of the • 
United N a t i o n s . . . " Even the neutral ist from a country w ith 
V » 
a small population can derive satisfaction from dramatically 
• I . f 
reminding h i s l i steners that hie country i s part of this 
large neutral ist world . 
Jßx defin'tnj h'i( own pot/hoi* Кг customary oß 
I the Cold U/^nr 'jiOcb-<v/i'$(- if jijh'i (iCcu^tiy m emphaiis 
from bUaAr иси*Л(у tx> (>e cypCcf-еЛ fro,n 4i пеиЫ r,"7 
hme of iva.-. Thi hUilred u/iIi i-е^Л f* sfass l-i>*t- iLarc а я 
1 . Рог the international outlook of populism, see- Shi ls , i b id 
above, & Hugh Set on-.'/at son, ib id above, c . f . ölso Richard 
Hofstadter - The Age of Reform (New York, 1 9 5 5 ) , chapter 
2 , "The Folklore of Populism", esp . section 3 . 
legal right of states to be neutral and' that i f inter-
national law is respected neutrality will be respected. 
The neutralist tends rather to stress that ii is morally 
right for any state to be neutralist, and thatworld opinion 
endorses the Tightness of neutralist policies or wishes. 
The neutral tends to talk of law more than of morality. 
The neutralist tends to talk of morality more than of law. 
Admittedly, this is .only a difference of emphasis, for it is 
not pretended that it is an especially neutralist character-
istic to be neglectful of international law. However, many 
neutralists do feel that whilst the established legal rules 
of international society certainly need strengthening, these 
rules have hitherto been too 'Western' in character and now 
a f 
need to have a larger 'Afro-Asian' content. 1 . Furthermore, 
, t 
it i s often felt that international law favours the status 
quo powers, and whereas pre-1939 neutrals were, generally 
speaking, satisfied etates territorially, the present day 
о 
neutralist often has a piece of 'unfinished business' , the 
completion of which it is thought 'world opinion' may approve 
1. See, for example, Mr. Nehru's speech at the Aeian Legal 
Consultative Uomnittee Meeting quoted in Appendix 3 
below, p. 281-3. 
2." E . g . Mr. Nehru covets G-oa & President Sukarno West 
Irian . Presidents Nasser & Nkrumah seem to have larger 
but less precise 'business' to settle. (But they have 
significantly different views of the permissible methods 
to be employed in the completion of 'Unfinished 
business.* ) 
« к 
of , or at least condone, while existing international law 
may more likely serve as an obstruction. 'World opinion,* 
l ike 'non-intervention', as enshrined in the Panch Sheel 
principles, i s thus regarded as .a permissive or protective, 
never as a prohibitive, force. ^ 
Even if it can be granted that a rough and ready measure 
of 'world opinion' on particular issues i s to be found by 
the size of the majority in favour of the motion in the 
t , Ь X 
U . N . General Assembly - and this is often dubious - it may 
i * 
seem dif f icult to know what moral significance * to attach 
to such political arithmetic. , But this is not a prime 
concern for the student of politics . For there i s no 
necessary and inevitable relationonip betv/een morality and 
the number of votes cast for a resolution, any more than 
there is between morality and the strength, or s ize , or age, 
of a state. Arguments which bring such categories together 
more often serve to confuse than to clarify political 
appraisals. For with states, as with individuals, one 
should not judge behaviour primarily by reference to physical 
attributes but by reference to behaviour. 
1 . This i s not to deny that such votes can have considerable 
political significance. For two penetrating discussions 
of this problem, .see ? . S, Northedge - "The Authority of 
the U .N . General Assembly", International^Relations, Oct. 
'* 1957, pp. 349-361 & 376 ; & Vernon Aspaturian - "The 
Metamorphosis of the U . N . " in Yale Review, Summer, 1957 . 
C](o 
A dominant Btrand in all neutralist assertion is the 
Jclaim to pursue an 'independent* foreign policy. In fact, 
of course, all states seek to conduct an independent foreign 
policy, but the type of independence sought will be strongly 
influenced by past experiences as well as by present pre-
dilections and power considerations. 'Independence' is 
naturally attractive to the newly independent, and as most 
neutralists come from newly independent countries and are 
the heirs of nationalist and anti-colonial revolution, they 
tend to be sensitively aware of their newness 'in international 
society,• suspicious of their former colonial rulers, and 
fearful of the direction great power policies may' take in 
the future. 
Neutralists fear that formal alignment with either Gold 
War bloc would impair their newly acquired independence. 
For most of them the Cold, War .struggle pre-dates their own 
. t i I, 
о 
independence, * and they feel that the issues Involved are 
1 . . Tliese currents are all especially strong in Arab 
neutralism. See below appendix Г 
This may in part be due - as Henry A. Kissinger suggests 
in hie Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy (New York, 
1957) p . 257 - to significantly different experiences 
of colonial rule. 
2 . Of the 99 members of the United Nations in June 1961 
more' than a' third of these have become independent since 
1945, and virtually' all of these pursue neutralist 
• foreign p&licies . See further below cUylCrS 
not-central to their own concerns . 1 . They suspect that i f 
they were to become 'aligned ' they would quickly sink to the 
level^of neglected junio"r partners in a large alliance. 
No longer would they be 'honest brokers ' , « bridges of peace, 
between competing coalitions. • No longer would they be . 
wboed by the great powers. They fear they would be taken 
f o r granted, and instead of taking vital foi«eign policy 
decisions themselves, they feel that these would be decided 
for them by their older, "stronger and richer partners. 
» 2 ,hrty 
^Furthermore, though nationalist ' claims^have helped to 
bring 'independent statehood, ''the nation' 4legitimatising the 
1 . It i s here that the popular analogy between early American 
•isolationists and present day neutralists i s most suggest-
ive. For instance, with very l i t t le alteration many of 
•tHe themes & language of George Washington'в Farewell 
Address of 1796 oould be usefully borrowed by today's 
neutralists . Washington said: "Europe has a set of 
primary interests which to us have none, or a very remote 
r e l a t i o n . . . W h y . . . 'entangle our peace and prosperity in 
the toils of European ambitions, rivalship, interest or 
caprice?" Substitute the Great Powers f o r Europe, & the 
newly freed colonies for the U . S . , and these words might 
well be spoken by Nehru, Nasser or Nkrumah. some other 
themes - the need to clarify the national interest , the 
need for national unity , the dangers of party strife , for 
example - are easily & equally susceptible to similar 
treatment. * 
2 , Thus, President Sukarno - "For us nationalism is every-
thing.- Though nationalism in the,West may.be an out-of-
date doctrine for many, for us in Asia and Africa it i s 
the mainspring of our efforts " , quoted from Appendix£ 
below p.308 
And President Nasser - "Positive neutrality, is in i tself 
ra protection for independence, and independence i s , in 
.its turn, a protection for Arab nationalism." quoted in 
The'Times, 26 Oct. 1959 . 
state, national unity is^ often precarious and its roots 
shallow. National unity thus has to be strengthened and 
consolidated, and it is thought that a truly 'independent* 
foreign policy will facilitate t h i s . 1 . The acquisition of 
statehood brings with it the realisation that state boundaries 
are important points of discontinuity with the rest of the 
world, and that there is a real need to discover, articulate 
and pursue one's own national interest in the world. Two 
crucial touchstones here are: freedom from external control, 
end the desire for status *- for acceptance, as of right, in f 
the eyes of the outside world. Such preoccupations often 
give rise to two common dilemmas. Firstly, whether insistence 
on 'complete' national sovereignty can be reconciled with the 
simultaneous pursuit of a wide range of international friend-
ships, full «intemational co-operation and world peace. 
Secondly, there is an uncertainty whether domestic matters 
should take precedence over foreign policy, or whether 
neutralists, too, should accept Ranke's principle of "the 
primacy of foreign policy." 4 
1. See below appendices ff-W* 
2. Thus, ТЯ. Senghor of Senegal" - "We intend to show our in-
* dependence by claiming all the attributes of sovereignty, 
even if that sovereignty is bound to be partly theoretical" 
quoted in С.S.M. 15 Sept. 1959» * One remembers, too, the 
ringing motto of Pr. Nkrumah's party in the days before 
Ghanaian independence - "Seek ye first the political king-
dom and all else will be added unto you." See Ghana. The 
Autobiography of Kwame Nkrumah (Nelson ed. Edinburgh, 1957] 
p.135. The search for status often becomes confusingly 
mingled with freedom-- individual & national - as Isaiah 
Berlin warns in his Two Concepts of Liberty (Oxford, 1958), 
P P . 3 9 - 4 7 . 
The first dilemma i s often resolved by professions of 
faith in the Önited Nations, and by asserting the need for-
its universality of membership. Nor is it surprising that 
1 г * *1 * ' г 
men who have probably grown up diplomatically with the 
*
 1
 \ 1 • 
United Kations, who regard their state's membership in this 
organization as the most tangible expression of their' 
enfranchisement in international society,'and who see their 
д 1 i 
state enjoying formal equality with the other states partic-
ipating in United Kations activities, should attacfi*great-
г Л •» 
importance to United Nations happenings.* At the very least, 
membership in the United"Nations helps" a state to avoid 
diplomatic isolation without involving th&t attachment to 
power*blocs which, in Mr. Nehru's v i e w , 1 , inhibits national 
T , \ 
freedom and 'is said to be detrimental to the growth of 'true' 
ft . . ~ с * 
democracy on an international plane. While besides 
1 . Nehru - "alignment means regimentation. I object to 
communist regimentation of individuals and 'countries as 
I object equally to non-communist regimentation because 
both are opposed to democracy", reported in the Daily 
Telegraph, 7 July 1956. A common corollary of this view 
i s that the aligned should' show more respect for the 
neutralist position.. Ironically, this plea seldom admits 
a'reciprocal obligation on the part of 'the neutralist to 
respect the position of the aligned. 
2." Not surprisingly each neutralist cherishes his own brand 
of 'democracy', & there is no common neutralist brand. 
Some - Nehru & Bandaranaike, e . g . - hint that their 
concept of democracy embraces a synthesis of what is 
' 'best' in the East and West. See e.g. appendices 3 & 7 , 
pp. xio-i ч 3if'/7.There is a temperate & wise discussion of 
the relations between democracy & Afro-Asian nationalism 
in Rupert Emerson's From Empire to Nation. The Rise to 
Self-Assertion of Asian and African Peoples, (Harvard, 
i 960 ) , esp. part 3 . 
I ст> 
relishing the role, of ,'f loating voter' in United Nations 
assemblies, the neutralist generally regards his membership 
also as important in the pursuit .of the muoh professed 
neutralist ideal of 'equal friendship' 1* with a l l , regardless 
of ideological and political differences. But 'equal 
friendship' is an easy•precept, difficult to practise. In 
reality, no state, nor any individual, i s , or can be, friendly 
with a l l . And too much can be claimed for the mere fact 
of being-formally uninvolved in Cold War alignments. For 
alliances are not the only, nor necessarily the most compell-
ing, way of 'forging diplomatic friendships, and the world 
pattern of diplomatic friendships and enmities at any; 
particular time is not sufficiently explained in terms of 
the aligned and non-aligned. * 
At first glance it may seem that the second dilemma 
i s entirely theoretical. ' For no statesman today can pursue 
either a domestic or foreign policy to the exclusion of the 
/•„ * t 
other. Clearly, the task of statesmanship is .to work out 
one's scale of national priorities and to concert both 
«1 . 1 
foreign and domestic policies. But for a number of 
neutralist leaders, faced with an acute shortage of highly 
1 . President Tito, in particular, strongly professes 'equal 
friendship' with a l l . See below appendix 
2. See-below chapters 3 and 4 . 
trained administrators, diplomats, or technicians, the 
allocation of scarce, skilled manpower resources between the 
competing claims of pressing domestic-end foreign policy 
tasks, may make them talk as if the vital question was one 
of opting for either a foreign or a domestic policy. 
In one mood the.neutralist is inclined to вау that he 
and his compatriots have been conquered, exploited, and 
fought over quite enough in the past, and now they want just 
to be left alone. They do not want to be,fenced in by the 
formal^constrictions of alignment. Theirs are transitionalt 
societies, their cultures are in disarray, 1* their own 
problems are overwhelming, they want only to rebuild in 
peace, to discover.and give expression to their J true 
2 3 
national ' , * or t 4 at most, .their ' c o n t i n e n t a l p e r s o n a l i t i e s . 
1 . An interesting discussion of some of these problems is 
reported by Edward Shils - "Old Societies, New * States", 
in Encounter, March 1959, PP. 32-41. 
t 
2. Some outstanding literary examples of this kind of quest 
are Jawaharlal Nehru - The Discovery of India , (London, 
1946) ; К. M. Panikkar - Asia and Western Dominance, 
(London, ,1953); G. A. Nasser - The Philosophy of the 
Revolution (Economica Books, Buffalo, U . S . A . , 1 9 5 9 ) ; & 
Kwame Nkrumah's Autobiography: Ghana, (London, 1957) . 
3- Pan-continental enthusiasms relate to neutralism only 
to the extent that some neutralists imply that 'the 'true' 
Asian or African character i s neutralist, & because they 
sometimes assert Asian or African Monroe Doctrines. Such 
convictions can contrast sharply with actual developments 
in Asia and/or Africa. See further P. _H. Lyon - "The 
Pan-Continental Movements of "Asia and Africa, 1947-58", 
^ Australian Outlook, June 1959». PP.100-111. The compatib-
ility of nationalism & pan-continentalism was one of 
Mazzini 'B favourite themes. 
In a contrasting mood the neutralist is often inclined 
to escape, temporarily, from seemingly intractable domestic 
problems, where each action has its political price to the 
more dramatic and possibly lessvdemanding task of suggesting 
•solutions' to hitherto intractable world problems - dis-
armament is a favourite theme - where on an international 
tour, or in the congenial atmosphere of some international 
arena, the kind of admirable general principles which so 
often resist easy translation into practice at home, now 
meet with widespread applause and acclamation. Nevertheless, 
this.seeming readiness, on occasions, to abandon a national 
for a world role is more apparent than real. For though 
self-respect may demand the giving of advice as well as the 
taking of aid, even so neutralist statesmen often succeed 
in suggesting some remarkable coincidences between what would 
be globally beneficial to all and yet nationally advantageous 
to themselves; especially stressing the desirability of 
great powers spending less on armaments and giving more 
unconditional aid to the poor and newly independent states, 
or the need for concerted efforts to remove all remaining 
vestigee ofjcolonialism. Thus, the paradox of strengthening 
both 'independence' and ' i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e s i m u l t a n e o u s l y 
is resolved. 
1 . See, for instance,' appendix 8« p. 32-4. 
т 
"We talk about the crisis of our time and many people 
view it in different ways. Probably in the U . S . A . the 
crisis of the time is supposed*to be Communism versus anti-
Communism. It may be so to some extent. But the crisis 
of the time in Asia i s colonialism versus anti-colonialism, 
let us be quite clear about i t . " 1 * 
Most'neutralists would agree with Mr. Nehru that to 
talk of defeating Communism, whatever this may mean,' i s all 
very well , but a prior and*more important task is the ending 
of colonialism * and imperialism - in contemporary polemic 
the words are virtually exact synonyms - in all forms. Just 
as an 'independent' foreign policy is considered to be an 
' essential corollary of national independence, a consequence * r 
of being freed from the shackles of imperial rule, so the 
neutralist deems it obligatory to help' remove the remaining 
3' 
vestiges of colonial power wherever they may be^ * Furthermore, 
1. Mr. Nehru quoted in The Times of India, 27 Äug. 1954. 
Though by 1961 he seemed inclined to stress 'world peace' 
more than 'colonialism' v . lanti-colonialism'. 
2 . The whole debate about colonial rule & self-government is , 
of course, much wider A more complicated than will appear 
from this brief treatment which is concerned only with the 
relation to neutralist argument. John Plamenatz' book 
On Alien Rule and Self-Government (London, i960) ie an 
extraordinarily lucid exposition & criticism of the 
* central arguments in the colonialism debate. See also 
Denis Healey, op .c i t . "pp . 20-28. 
3? By 1961 'African expressions of anti-colonialism were 
generally much stronger than Asian because there were so 
many more 'vestiges' of (Western) 'colonialism' in Africa 
than in Asia. 
this task i s often considered" to Ъе preventative as well as 
curative": an alert eye has to be kept open 'for »neo-
colonialism' which it i s felt may come in more subtle forms 
than did the older colonialism". Besides, to have a common 
external enemy i s one way of 'discovering common internal, 
interests . 
Kot surprisingly, the problem of identifying 'colonialism' 
in 'all* i ts forms' is highly controversial, and - produces a 
spate of tendentious working definitions . In effeot*, the 
colonial problem cuts across Cold'War" issues, mostly to the 
advantage of *the Communist powers. 
• The greater sensitivity of most neutralists to Western 
rather than Communist colonialism i s perhaps surprising in 
view of Communist expansion and the large scale contraction 
of Western colonial empires since 1945* Yet such a bias i s 
• , с 
probably to be explained by the slowness with which certain 
ideas and experiences disappear f r o m m e n ' s minds and others 
take hold. 
For one should not underrate the importance and influence 
in ex-colonialist states of Hobson-Leninist theories of » 
imperialism, even on non-Marxist neutralists . L e n i n ' s notion 
of the imperialist powers keeping -themselves going by milking 
I • 
their overseas territories in order to provide surplus value 
to appease their own proletariats 1 " i s a congenial arid 
1 . See V. I . Lenin - Imperialism. The Highest Stage of Capit-
alism. 1916 (Little Lenin Library, v o l . 1 5 , London, 1 948 ) , 
esp. p. 132 . 
(C>€ 
superficially convincing explanation for Asians and Africans. 
Lenin also disposes of 'capitalist* claims to have granted 
^ t 
former colonial territories political independence by assert-
ing a theory of 'neo-colonialism' which i s often simply 
taken over, by many neutralist leaders without acknowledgement 
Indeed, some version of Marxism * i s almost bound to 
be popular in ex-colonial countries, since it can offer , as 
3 
well as idealism, a rationale jand justification for 
present fears , suspicions end resentments felt towards 
former colonial masters. This often makes possible a 
coincidence of neutralist and Communist demands which i s 
unlikelyr to occur where either emancipation from colonial 
rule is not so recent, or feelings about the nature of the 
1 . I am indebted to Professor J . D . B. Miile'r for this point, 
2 . -This theme is dealt^with in detai l : for" South &-South-
East Asia in Saul Roee -.Socialism in Southern Asia 
(London, 1959 ) ; J* H. Brimmell - Communism in South East 
Asia (London, 1959 ) ; & in Prank N . Trager ( e d . ) - Marxism 
in South East ABia (Stanford, i 9 6 0 ) ; for the Middle East 
by Walter 54. Laquer - Communism & Nationalism in the 
Middle East (London, 1 956 ) ; & for Africa, briefly , by 
Thomas Hodgkin - !»A Note on the Language of African 
M I H ^ K . " i ^ f i . - . a ^ S j c f ^ E f E f ^ ? - ^ б ъ е ^ Р й 
Scalapino - "Neutralism in As ia " , A . P . S . R . March 1954 , 
pp. 49-62,"suggests that Marxism is attractive to 
neutralists both for domestic & international reasons. 
3 . Thus, Harold Laski - Communism (Home University Library, 
London, 1927 ) . - '"Communism has made i ts way by i ts 
idealism and not' i t s realism, by i ts spiritual promise, 
not i ts materialistic prospect . " (p ; 250 ) . ' See also 
J . Nehru 's .'Autobiography (NeW'York, 1 9 3 6 ) , p. 592 . 
loh 
international threat from Communism are more directly 
engaged. Though Americans may talk of the 'free* and 
'unfree' parts of the world, in terms of whether a state has 
a Communist government or not,»the neutralist much prefers 
to distinguish between colonial etatus.and, 'freedom' from it^" 
So, while neutralists have experienced Western rule 
and memories of it are still strong, there seems to be email 
awareness of the extent or finality with which 'Western 
p 
colonialism' has receded, and continues to recede. * The 
3 
facts of-Communist colonialism .may not yet have sunk in 
or appear so immediate.^* It seems that there is still a 
widespread-acceptance of 'the salt water fallacy' about 
colonialism - the supposition that only if salt water l ies 
between the metropolitan power and 'the colony*' can the . 
relationship of colonialism be said to exist. By this 
1 . For some time after 1949 much of neutralist approval for 
Mao 's , as opposed to Chiang-Kai-Shek's, China seems to 
have been based on some such incompletely descriptive 
definition of freedom. See further C. P. Fitzgerald -
Revolution in China (London, 1952) p. 214; also Nasser, 
see below p. lib, -fr^-i • 
2. This view would be strongly repudiated by Arab neutralists 
who would cite Western landings in Egypt 1956, in Jordan 
& Lebanon 1958, & in Kuwait 1961; besides mentioning 
the tenacity with which Britain holds on to her Persian 
Gulf interests, & the Western powers' attempts to safe-
guard their oil interests. 
3 . See Walter Kolarz - Russia and Her Colonies (London 1952) ; 
Geoffrey Wheeler - "Colonialism and the U . S . S . R . w l n 
The Political Quarterly, July-Sept. 1958, pp. 215-223. 
4'. Save, perhaps, since 1957, to the neutralist states 
bordering China - India , Nepal, Bhutan, Burma, Sikkim, 
Laos. / W it 'u wcjThhjh)tf /-к/Л- W л!- p< 
'jjew^sM-t £>risri-Ы fro ^ Sov'tif empire • 
/0-7 
device Western-overseas territories', holdings, bases and 
transmarine allianoes can all be "dubbed as * colonialism', or 
'neo-oolonialism', while the policies of Communist governments 
oan usually escape such opprobrium. ?/he'n neutralists voice 
fears of the re-imposition of Western rule, these fears may -
seem ridiculously exaggerated to Westerners virtuously 
conscious of "their own reformed characters, but this does 
not seem so to neutralists. After all , ' the neutralist view 
of Western alliances and bases in Asia and Africa -(w'hich is , 
not -surprisingly, voiced by the "Comauniete^too) as imperialist 
arrangements is understandable within their frame of reference 
k/UrC 
car. the word 'imperialist' % whl&h-tu..-lLmn- is associated with 
the defence and promotion of-Western interests. For the 
defence and promotion ofiWestem interests is at least one 
of the main purposes of having suoh alliances and bases. 
Of course, from a Western point of view the word 'imperialist' 
has overtones connoting an. active expansionist, probably 
annexationist, policy, and it seems absurd to apply it to 
instruments so clearly»intended to prevent Comnunist 
expanBionismi- However, the identification of Western 
interests overseas with states at loggerheads with their 
• * + 
neutralist neighbours gives the neutralist an added concern. 
• i 
For, not only is it complained that this 'brings the Cold v 
* f 
War* into regions where it has no relevance, but it is* 
/о? 
suspected that Pakistan or Thailand's membership of ' S . E . A . T . O . , 
for example, is not-merely a result of a dedication to anti-
Communist oauses, but is mainly a means of gaining powerful 
support f o r the furtherance of"more immediate, local 
r i v a l r i e s . 1 * 
The notion that Western imperialism is st i l l a strong 
and potentially dangerous force is reinforced.by the tendenoy 
of most Asian and Af rican'-neutralifets not only to identify 
themselves with territories which are stil l Western depend-
encies, but with non-European peoples anywhere in conflict 
with European ones. The revolt against colonial status 1 
thus merges with the revolt against the old European 
ascendancy, and the demand for equality becomes racial' as 
* 2 
well as polit ical , economic' and diplomatic. The West i s 
embarrassed, not only1 by the practices of the past, but by 
the remnants of discrimination that-a good many non-Europeans 
still encounter from Europeans. White Americans, too, share 
in this obloquy, not only by reason of their close political 
and diplomatic ties with Europe - a kind of 'guilt by 
association' - but also because of their own 'Negro problem,' 
1 . See, e . g . appendix S", 
2 . Thus, Mr. Nehru, talking of those who attended the 
Bandung Conference: "The common factor was rather against 
Western domination. Everybody agreed about t h a t . . . They 
were levellers in the ,political sense, as between Europe, 
America, and Asia or Africa . That was the dominant 
fee l ing and most of them were levellers , both patient and 
impatient, in the social sense . " ± in Tibor Mende -
Conversations with Mr. Nehru (London, 1 9 5 6 ) , p . 62. 
and the greater publicity that unsavoury aspects of United . 
States politics receive in the^ world at large by comparison 
with the Soviet Union. so the colour question, too, cuts 
across the Cold War struggle to the propaganda advantage 
of the Communist bloo, in as much as Communist China i s 
non-white and because the Soviet Union has skilfully , and 
with some success, propagated the idea that she i s politically 
and racially ' c o l o u r - b l i n d . , 
Though anti-colonialist clamour today reaches a-larger 
audience and probably commands more support than ever before, 
its'arguments are not novel. For they were oommon currency 
in Western ' l e f t i s t ' circles in the thirties ; indeed, many 
of today's neutralists shaped their views from the public-
ations of European Left Book clubs, from what Louis Fischer 
has aptly described as 'Laskiology ' . * Whatever-the 
significance of these echoes of early education, ""it seems 
undeniable that neutralist identification with anti-
colonialism is apt to have a confusing effect on their 
1 . See Plamenatz, o p . c i t . pp. 186-197. 
2 . In chapter 17 , pp. 220-236,' of The Great Challenge, 
(London, 1947)-
3- There i s much to be said for Richard Lowenthal's 
contention that "the real line of division that emerges 
from a study of the facts i s not between true national-
ists and neo-colonial stooges, or between progressives 
& traditionalists , or even »between revolutionaries & 
reformists - it i s simply one between states that are 
territorially satisfied those with programmes of 
nationalist expansion. " - see Encounter, March 1961 , p .64 . 
H . B . too, Mr.' Nehru 's distinction (see above p./08 ) 
between the patient & the impatient. 
Judgement of what could otherwise be regarded as fairly 
straightforward political or strategic issues - for •jaaecfce'fwcat* 
neutralist opposition to Western pacts and bases in Asia 
and Africa is wholly explicable without the anti-colonialist 
arguments which are persistently dragged into i t . Geography 
and politics have compelled the Western powers to rely on 
methods öf defence which neutralists automatically d is l ike . 
The Communist powers could dispense with formal alliances , 
for they'have f a r more compulsive bonds; the Western a l l ies 
cannot. Again, the geographical remoteness of the United . 
States has made the alliances of which it i s the core 
embarrassingly dependent^oh a system of far-flung bases, 
and on the development of nuclear weapons to counterbalance 
L 
the huge standing armies which the Communist powers could 
quickly deploy in conventional warfare in Europe or Asia . 
г 
And. it i s alliances , foreign bases and nuclear explosions 
that particularly scandalise the neutralists . 
V . 
Another plane of contrasts which the neutralist commonly A 
asserts as being more important than that between the aligned 
and the non-aligned i s that of the ' r i ch ' and the ' poor ' , 
the 'have' and the 'have-nots ' , 1 * the developed and the 
1 . The phrase 'have-not powers' seems to have been f i r s t 
UBed by A. T. Mahan in Some Neglected Aspects of War 
( 1907 ) , PP. 69-70. 
underdeveloped,1* nations. This assertion tends to be 
strengthened rather than weakened by the claim that the anti-
colonial campaign deserves more^attention-than the Cold War 
struggle, as both sets of inequalities are quite often 
2 
attributed to the same _ general-.source - 'colonialism. ' * 
Marxism may seem to have an oblique relevance here, too. 
For even if Marx's prophecy of increasing inequalit ies , . in . 
respect of internal class divisions within states, has not. 
been ful f i l led , it has been unexpectedly realised in the 3 
field of.national divisions between states. Furthermore, 
neutralists seem to see great pertinence in the Leninist 
cliche that economic subordination to a foreign power can 
1 . Thus Sekou Toure of Guinea: "For us the division of the 
world does not consist of two blocks, East and West, but 
of two wholes clearly distinguished by the obvious fact 
that one i s developed and the other underdeveloped." 
quoted in The Guardian, 4 May i960 . 
2 . Thus,Nasser, addressing the Indian Parliament, said that 
the Arabs must be ready to face "the monopoly of science, 
a imperialism's new style . " - quoted in The Times, 1 March 
i960. 
J 
3 . See Emerson, op.cit . p .181 , who describes how Lenin 
•sidled up' to the theory of rich bourgeois nations 
versus poor proletarian nations. Reviewing Emerson, 
Martin Wight writes: "It was by the ex-socialist 
journalist Mussolini that the theory was at last 
espoused, to, become standard Fascist doctrine echoed at 
the Bandung Conference." - see International Affairs 
( R . I . I . A . ) , July 1961, pp. 343-4. One thinks partic-
ularly of Sukarno and Nasser in this connection. . 
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be just as crippling to national independence ae can overt 
political control . 1 * 
Undeniably it i s d i f f icult .Ho avoid all the snares of 
economic control when every neutralist leader wants his 
country to have an industrialized, technically e f f ic ient , 
' r i c h ' , national economy, to augment national power and' 
national welfare . Whatever the real limitations^to such 
national plans are - end, of, course, these d i f fer widely -
it i s .universally believed that much can be done. The 
desired changes and required growth in the national economy-
are not conceived of as aims to be achieved in a remote 
future, 4but as immediate.» goals to be achieved as speedily 
2 
as possible. * With the requirement of urgency comes the. 
realisation, however unwilling, that outside capital and 
technicians are essential if rapid development i s to begin, 
(let alone .to be sustained. Butjkt is insisted that this 
aid must be obtained in .such ways as not to. compromise 
national independence. Hence the common neutralist 
insistence that the way *in which aid i s proffered -is as 
1 . E . g . Mr. Nehru talking of economic control: "They wi l l 
be called self-governing countries, but will in reality 
be under.the control of this small minority from Europe 
or from America . . . Yes, this i s what i s called Latin 
Americanization in South East A s i a . . . but it i s really > 
worse in Africa because of the racialism, the segregation 
and all that" - Tibor Mende - Conversations with Mr. 
Nehru (Lon'don, 1 956 ) , p. 134. , 
2 . See below appendices ff.Z~Z-2.-4r ? ъг-Ъ-Ч -
из 
important as the quality and quantity of the aid i tse l f . 
A wide ran fee1* of opportunist and high-minded appeals are 
produced to buttress the plea for aid without-'strings ' , but, 
basically , four main sets of justifications агё offered, and 
what all four have in common is the"priority which political 
considerations take over economic. Briefly, these pleäs k 
f o r aid use the language of~retribution, common humanity, * 
mutual interest or blackmail. 
The claim^that aid ought to be given in order to expiate 
for past-misdeeds was heard of mostly in the-years before* 
1954-- that i s , before the Communist bloc had embarked on 
foreign aid programmes to neutralists , when the Western 
powers were the sole source that neutralists could appeal to, 
and when,' in faot , the We stein powers were not giving sub-
stantial aid to neutralists . It is certain that such pleas 
did not*move Western governments much, though they may have 
caused"uneaee to some individuals . Even if a government 
were to accept responsibility to pay retribution for 
'colonialist s i n s ' , which ie highly unlikely , the vexed 
question of who has to decide the manner and scale of 
' . у, 
1 . The literature on foreign aid i s already immense & growing 
fast . To my knowledge, there i s no "single study which 
concentrates on neutralism & foreign aid. Three useful 
recent works are: George Liska - The New Statecraft. 
Foreign Aid in American Foreign Policy (Chicago, i 9 6 0 ) ; 
Joseph Berliner - Soviet' Economic Aid (New York, 1958 ) ; & 
F. Benham - Economic Aid to Underdeveloped Countries 
(London, 196177 
retribution remains. However, from 1954 onwards, as 
foreign aid issues became/a matter of Cold War rivalry, 
l i t t le has been heard of the retribution plea and it tends 
to be resurrected only occasionally as a rhetorical reminder 
by a speaker who disclaims its.appropriateness himself.^Г 
l It might be expected that claims for aid on grounds of 
common humanity, in the absence of any political allegiances, 
would consist of appeals to the highmindedness of the 
potential donor, pointing to the obvious needs of the 
neutralist , and asking for aid to be given in a spirit of 
undemanding generosity. It would be wrong to.say that 
appeals of this kind are never made, but it i s more often 
the case that"the neutralist suggests that rich states show 
their disinterested desire to help by channelling more aid 
through international institutions. It i s felt that the 
best interests of the recipient country are more l ikely to 
be served in this way, and even i f international bodies do 
attach conditions to their aid , these seem far more innocuous 
than any strings which may be attached to the bi-lateral aid 
which i s feared as a calculated method of drawing neutralistв 
into Cold War conflicts . I t , 1 apparently, matters less that 
the greater part of international aid comes originally from 
1 . See, e . g . , appendix (?, ^o-3//-/2.. 
Iiг 
American funds than that It i s to be channelled through 
agencies thought to be less directly contaminated by Cold 
War.considerations. Unhappily for neutralists , international 
aid of this sort represents but a*small proportion of foreign 
aid , and there i s very l i t t le prospect of this proportion-
being substantially increased. 
The claim that the granting of foreign aid i s in the 
interest of the donor as well as the recipient neutralist , 
even though the latter i s unwilling to accept any ' s t r i n g s ' , 
rests on some dubious assumptions about the relation of 
prosperity to peace, of. peace being brought nearer by a 
* 
progressive reduction of the gap in the standard of l iving 
of 'have' and 'have-not\ countries 1*- though.it has yet to 
be proved that there i s a necessary.connection between peace 
and prosperity. The simple fact i s that all neutralist 
countries today want material improvement. Some neutralists -
the Indians most notably - try to give, an.earnest of their 
( real priorities by insisting' that the aid they receive shall 
be economic only and not military; but this i 3 by no means 
a widespread urge, for many neutralists regard being aided 
in the procurement of ' essential ' weapons for self-defence 
1 . See Emerson's discussion of this point in Empire to-
Nation, o p . c i t . , especially chapter 9. 
/ 
\\(o 
as important as other forma of a id . Be this as it may, 
it i s doubtful i f there iB any simple oonnection between 
peace and political v iabi l i ty , or economic advance and 
the inoidence of foreign a i d . 1 , All donors would like 
to impose lsome strings though they may not feel it politio 
to insist on this , and a potential donor is not easily 
persuaded that it i s as much in h is inteVest as in the 
neutral ist ' s that he should make aid freely available, 
although no strings are to be attaohed. 
Fourthly, there are quite often hints of blackmail 
in statements about neutralist need of foreign aid , and 
this i s most evident where the neutralist i s obviously 
aware and eager to take advantage of the possibil it ies 
/ 
for playing off one Bide in the Cold War against another. 
Suoh hints oan take many forms. It can be implied that 
i f one bloc were to withdraw, or substantially reduce, 
i t s a id , then the neutralist would thereby lose i ts freedom 
of action - that i s , i t s neutralism - and would, therefore, 
probably end up in the opposite Cold War camp. * I t can 
1 . E . g . the lack of economic advance in Laos, despite 
substantial U . S . aid since 1955 . 
2 . E . g . Prince Sihanauk - " I f the U . S . A . withdraws i ts aid 
as a reaction against Communist a i d . . . our neutrality 
wi l l have to be compromised... but what would the U . S . A . 
gain by seeing our country completely integrated with 
the Communist bloc?" - see Norodom Sihanauk, Analyse de 
la Conference du Prince Norodom Sihanauk a Kampot, 6> 
avrl l , 1956 (Phnom Penh, 1956? ) , pp. 6 & 15 . 
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be said that i f certain kinds of ' essential ' aid , 
particularly military a i d , 1 " are refused by one bloc, then 
the neutralist has no alternative but to seek satisfaction 
from the other side, with all the attendant risks that such 
unbalanced dependence implies. It can be implied that 
2 
unless one bloc gives as much aid as the other bloo, " 
then there i s a real danger that the neutralist wi l l f a l l 
under the undue influence of the more generous. 
The four types of claim outlined above are seldom 
stated in the stark way that they have been sketched here, Ftly 
but one or more i s present/in a muddled or disguised way in 
every neutralist argument about foreign, a id . 
1 . E . g . President Nasser 's justification of his Czech 
arms deal in 1955 was that the Western powers were 
refusing arms to Egypt whilst supplying them to Israels 
see Keith Wheelock - Nasser ' s New Egypt (London, i 9 6 0 ) , 
pp. 228-231. 
2 . A / JWWJWWW of such thinking appeared in a 
speech of President Nkrumah when he claimed that as 
• there were now 3*,000 Ghanaian students studying in 
. Soviet bloo countries, as well as 3 , 0 0 0 already studying 
in the Western world, this was "a practical demonstration 
of the Ghana philosophy of positive neutralism and non-
alignment " quoted in The Daily Graphic (Aocra) 12 Dec. 
i 960 . A more blatant admission was that of President 
Nasser: "Tito i s a great man. He showed me how to 
get help from both sides - without joining e i ther " , 
quoted in New York Times, 3 March 1958 . 
Neutraliets'insistence on aid without strings openly 
draws attention to their thin-skinned censitivity about 
potential enoroachments cn their sovereignty. Yet such 
misgivings are not peculiar to neutralists. All states 
find difficulty today in demonstrating, preserving and 
increasing the traditional attributes of national sovereignty 
at a time when these have shrunk, and when it is certain 
that there are no longer solutions for pressing national 
problems within the confines of isolationism and national 
self-suffioienoy. ' 
It might be appropriate to end this ohapter with an 
excerpt from one of the speeches of the late Prime Minister 
of Ceylon, Mr. Bandaranaike. It веетв appropriate because 
it is a terse and frank statement of neutralist-doctrine: 
"fie have to build up a new sooiety for ourselves, as 
I have Eaid, which best suits the genius of our oountry. 
We should like to get some ideas and some principles from 
this tffide, and some from the other, until a coherent form 
of sooiety is made up that e u i t s o u r own people in the 
context of the changing world of today. That is why we 
do not range out-eelves on the side of this Power-bloc or 
that Powei>-bloo. That ie the philosophy of neutralism. 
" It i s not something dishonest. I t i s not a matter of 
sitting on the fence to see whetherVe"can get the best of 
both worlds. It is a position that i s inexorably thrust 
upon us by the circumstances of the cape. • It i s a 
position that will be of great help in the world situation 
today, for we do provide a bridge over the gulf between the 
two opposing tfactions. 
. It is obvious from 1this statement by a leading 
vneutraliet and, perhaps, from this chapter 's survey of 
some common neutralist assumptions find argument's, 'that 
neutralist doctrine i s not very sophisticated and i s 
frankly pragmatist and-ecleotic. There ;are a number of 
possible reasons for this . An oblique one may be the 
inherent difficiiltу of theorising about international 
pol it ics ' i n v i e w o f the changing multi-dimensional 
complexity of international "politics. Йоге direct reasons 
certainly stem, as was suggested at the beginning of this 
chapter, from the roles played-by leading neutralists . 
For it io not a major aim of active political leaders 
to be profound and «subtle political theorists, 
1 . Addrenr to the U .U . General Assembly 22 Nov. 1956 , 
quoted in The Foreign Policy of Ceylon (Ceylon Govt. 
Press) , p. 5 . 
r < ч * 
2. This theme has been discussed recently with great 
penetration by Martin Wight - "«7hy ie there no 
International Theory?" International Relations, Vol. 2 , 
no. 1 , April i 9 6 0 : pp. 35-48. 
even though triey may often make important pronouncements. 
Certainly, there is-nothing-very original in'neutralist 
ideas. -Kost of Hhem cari toe found earlier in the contro-
versies" of Europe or North America. 
• Considered as international doctririey^ neutralism 
appears'to do little more than invoke pious generalities, 
ill-substantiated assertions and loosely conriec'ted proposit-
ions. It may even be contended that neutralism is in no 
•way an international doctrine and that the only useful 
»exercise is to uncover the distinctive characteristics of 
various versions of neutralist affirmation. Certainly, 
r 
this would be useful and would call for a great deal more 
exploration than' was attempted here', «but 'it would be wrong 
to deny it any international character. l?or, not only does 
neutralist doctrine express the felt needs, the 'apparent 
interests, and the dominant prejudices of its proponents,-
but there seems to be a sufficiently common predicament, 
sufficient similarity in certain "pressing problems to be 
faced, to-elicit similar ways of thinking about the jjold 
War and the problems raised by it , and these similarities 
often encourage neutralists to stress their likenesses 
rather than their differences. I 
Furthermore, to admit that the doctrine is superficial 
in its arguments is not to deny its importance, appeal, or 
influence. Itб importance stems directly from the very 
fact that the leading proponents are nationalist leaders 
articulating and transmitting national hopee and fears to the 
world at large. Their main precepts have widespread appeal 
because they express in slogans some of the dominant fears 
and hopes of large masses of people throughout the world,.and 
particularly in Asia and Africa. Finally, it is not 
paradoxical to suggest that these new national movements are, 
in a sense, international movements, too. For not only can 
1 . у 1 
new national leaders meet together easily and often, should 
they want to, but changes in the means of communication have 
also meant that infeotions of fear, hatred and sympathy can 
pass rapidly across continents to create new and larger areas 
of shared loyalties and enmities. Though the connection 
between neutralist emotions and neutralist policies will 
vary with each particular case, the ideas and feelings that 
men have about events in whioh their lives are engaged are 
a dimension of the events themselves. The things neutralists 
think and feel most, strongly about become ingredients in the 
very Cold War struggle in which they are unwillingly embroiled. 
NEUTRALISM AS STATE POLICY - an overall view 
"The whole question on the ordinary diplomatic plane 
is to decide whether the advantages of non-involvement 
outweigh those of alliance." 
' Raymond Aron. 
There ie a problem in defining the differences between 
* 
the neutralist and the aligned states. At f i rst glance, it 
may seem easy - they are simply those who refrain .from any 
legally binding military attachment to either Cold War camp. 
Thirty-nine arid perhaps forty-seven of the ninety-nine members 
of the Unitod Nationa were, in January 1961, neutralist by 
this d e f i n i t i o n . 1 * Yet thir formal distinction - resting 
as it does on the exirvtenoe of каожг treaty arrangements at 
a-particular time - can reveal l i t t le about the nature and 
significance of neutralism as stnte policy. ?or the factual 
situation, and contemporary reading of it at eny particular 
time, isi of course, much more complicated and controversial 
than the obvious f o m s of alignment -md non-alignment would 
indicate . An ostensibly neutralist state may, in fact , be 
more fettered -than some 'aligned states; and many neutralists , 
even when they 4.0 Atheir best to. achieve freedom from inter-
national entanglements, are so vulnerable to the play of 
international pol it ics , so needful of foreign aid , that they 
cannot help being caught in the very entanglements they seek 
to avoid. furthermore,. the global pattern of alignment end 
non-alignnent changee (as wan ahqwn in Chapter I ) ; a 
• o . ' • ' 
1 . See table below p p . 2 5 5 T h e eight debatable cases 
a m Cuba, Finland, Libya, Malaya, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, 
Senegal & Tunisia , mentioned below pp . (So , 135-$, 144-S Л/бо-2 
neutralist may become aligned (as Pakistan did in 1 9 5 4 ) , or 
r> * 
an aligned state may revoke alliance commitments and adopt 
a neutralist policy instead (as Iraq did a f t e r ' 1 9 5 8 ) . 
I • N t-
Diplomatic conventions are also important. The persistent 
determination of a superpower -tp? treat a state merely as a t 1 • , I 
client or satellite of its rival may have the effect of 
restricting i t , however unwilling'ly, to that ro*le. The 
agreement of a number of neutralist states to recognise, or 
not to recognise, another state as a fellow neutralist can 
be v ital in determining what kind "of 'foreign policy can be 
pursued. 
With all these hazards in mind, six types of neutralist 
<• X ~ -f 
policy may be usefully distinguished. A neutralist policy 
* t 
may be practised by:-
(1 ) a neutralized state, 
f» I *v 
(2)' a traditional neutral , 
(3) a buffer or former buffer, 
(4) an eretwhile isolationist , 
(5) a pioneer neutralist , 
or (6 ) a new state neutralist . 
This classification serves a twofold purpose: i t helps 
to explain why the policies-of certain states have beeil 
singled out . for more detailed attention in the next chapter; I - • 1 
and at the same time it i s a convenient way of drawing 
attention to certain major aspects of neutralism as state 
' X s 
policy and the forces which shape them. These categories 
are not to be regarded as mutually exclusive, though they do 
roughly correspond to some important differences in kind. 
Ever since 1945 it has been widely recognised, both by 
students of neutralism and in diplomatic practice, that no 
member of a Cold War multilateral security pact can be a 
neutralist state. But the fact of having a bilateral pact 
or a military base agreement with one of the Cold V7ar camps, 
which used to preclude neutralism, has ceased since 1957 to 
be a necessary disqualification - certainly in the eyes of 
the leading self-avowed neutralists.« It may .be in the 
future .that it wi l l be possible for aj state to be regarded 
as a f u l l , formal member of a Cold War multilateral security 
pact and yet neutralist . As it i s , the present position 
of a number of Latin American states makes it d i f f icult 
to decide whether or not -the Rio Pact of 1947 can be 
regarded as a Cold War pact' at a l l comparable( in i ts main 
features and functions with, say', u J Ä . T . O . or S . E . A . T . O . 1 * 
For increasingly since 1957 United States policies towards 
Latin 'American states seera to have been shaped very much 
as i f these states were like Asian and African states in 
their need' of economic as well as military aid ; in their 
1 . In terms of direct involvement in Cold War matters, the' 
Rio Pact has certainly played a lesrer role than any of 
the-other American multilateral security treaties . Also, 
the inequality* of military & economic power between the 
U . S . ft all I t s fellow Rio Pact members i s greater than 
i s the U . S . position vis-a-vis all other members of her 
other multilateral systems. 
tab 
poverty; and in their anti-colonialism.1" Undoubtedly, 
striking similarities do exist. Yet, apart from a.brief 
2 
mention of Cuba, Latin American states are excluded from 
this survey. This is a matter of convenience rather than 
of conviction, for there are many analogues for the present . 
policies of Afro-Asian neutralists in the past and present 
policies of Latin American states. Yet, though there are 
bonds of sympathy, actual diplomatic contactsJsetween Äfro-
Äsian and Latin American states have so far been few. 
Furthermore, not only was Latin America outside the area of. 
active Cold War rivalries until 1957 - as illustrated in the 3 
contrast ,between ^American handling of the Guatemalan and 
Cuban affairs in 1954 and 1953» respectively, but Latin 
American leaders .have made радил, official international tours 
than have their Afro-Asian counterparts. , 
. 1 . Four powers - Great Britain, the U . S . , France & Holland -
still control territories in Latin America or off i t s 
shores. Lenin regarded Latin America as exemplifying 
•economic imperialism': " . . . countries which, o f f ic ial ly , 
are politically independent, but which are, in fact , 
enmeshed in the net of financial and diplomatic depend-
ence" - V. I . Lenin - Imperialism. The Highest Stage of 
Capitalism (1916) ; (Ii6ndon, 1946, L ittle Lenin Library, 
vol . 15) p. 104 , see also p. 116. 
2. For Cuba, see b e l o w ч р . N e i t h e r Ecuador nor Nicaragua 
were signatories of the Hiо Pact in 1947 because of 
domestic upheavals - see Survey ( R . I . I . A . ) for 1947-8, pp 
469-471. Both joined the Pact at a later stage. Regard-
ing U . S . security policies in Latin America in i 960 , see 
M . S . P . Fiscal Year 1961, (Dept. of State, Washington, 
March i960 ) pp. 103-110. / _ 
3 . For this contrast ft further details , see Latin .American 
Supplements in The Times, 1 , 8 , 15 , 22, 29 June 1959 & 
10 Aug. 1959. 
(1) Neutralization 
-»t- i 
Before 1955 neutralization the institution of a 
Л * 
status of permanent neutrality had seemed obsolete. I t 
was a device recognised in nineteenth century inte^mational 
law by which great powers brought about a change in the status 
of small states, in an endeavour to remove small but strateg-" 
ically important territories outside the active sphere of 
' * r ' 
international r ivalries . It was also a way of indicating , » 
that the great powers, by making this neutralization agree-
ment, intended to reepect the independence of the neutralized 
state. 1 Both motives were probably at work when the Russians 
* 2. , 
brought about Austria ' s neutralization in 1955 . 
Legally neutralization.requires an international'agree-
ment between* interested great powers and the state concerned, 
whereby the former guarantee individually and/or collectively 
the independence and integrity of the latter , which must 
agree to abstain from any hostile action or any international 
V, , 
connections likely to involve it in hostil ity . There i s no 
marked uniformity of practice here, the terns prescribing 'a 
neutralized status for Switzerland, Belgium and Luxembourg 
were each defined somewhat differently in the nineteenth 
3 . century. 
1 . See Oppenheim-Lauterpacht, op . c i t . vol . 2 , p . 244;' & • 
C.R.M.F.-Crutt'well - A History of Peaceful Change in the 
Modern florid (London, 1 937 ) , pp. 183-192: & below pp.22^23* 
2 . See above pp. Ц-Ч-ГО and belowpp. 
3 . See Cruttwell, ibid . ' pp. 112-116 & 183-192. 
Neutralization definitely involves some form of inter-
national tutelage, and this is probably why states are nore 
ready to recommend it for others than to adopt it themselves. 
At the.Geneva Conference on Laos.in 1961 Prince Norodom 
Sihanauk was recommending "an Austrian style neutrality" for 
L a o s , 1 , though it was Cambodian representatives', at the 
Geneva Conference of 1954, who succeeded by pertinacious 
2 
diplomacy in avoiding the imposition of a neutralized status 
on Cambodia. Contrary to popular opinion, none of the 
successor states of former French Indo-China were formally 
neutralized by the 1954 Geneva agreements. This has been с — 3 
ably demonstrated by J . A. Modelski, though his further 
point that these states are not precluded from full member-
ship in S . E . A . T . O . has, to date, more significanc e legally 
than politically . For none of them has shown a strong 
desire to become ful l members of S . E . A . T . O . , nor have they j. shown a desire to be neutralized. A vital factor in the 
> 
way of a neutralized Laos has been the lack of sufficient 
ГУ ' 
consensus among Laotian leaders to agree on such a status -
quite apart from Soviet, American and Chinese disagreement 
i 
concerning the terms for a neutralized Laos. 
1 . See The Guardian, 17 May, 1961. * 
2. See Fif ield , op .cit . pp. 370-4; A Ellen J . Hammer - The 
Struggle for Indo China Continues. Geneva to Bandung, 
(Stanford, 1955 ) , esp. p. 8 . " 
3 . J . A. ModelskJB - "Indochina and S . E . A . T . O . " in Australian 
Outlook, March 1959, PP. 27-54. 
The successful maintenance of neutralization depends 
on the continuance of the balance of power which produced i t , 
and/or the determination and ability of the neutralized state 
»i 
to resist encroachments on i ts status. To enumerate these 
i ' * * « 
conditions i s to^reveal, that neutralization i s far from 
being a universal panacea. In Cola \7ar conditions it i s 
t * 
perhaps best seen ав an alternative to occupation and 
partition . I t i s only in-this-restricted sense that one 
- 4 1 
should speak of the "'Austrian example' . * 
- о 
(2) Traditional Neutrality 
Sweden,and Switzerland are together a class apart. 
i • о 
They are^ distinguished from all other non-aligned states in 
two ways. They are the only states to have successfully 
practised from the nineteenth century to today policies of 
complete abstention from .military alliances, neutrality in A . " ^ I R 
wartime, and non-alignment in the Cold War. Their policies 
- • . o> , ' 
reflect standards of success and prosperity which may be 
envied or admired but are widely recogiised as d ist inctive . 
However attractive Swiss or Swedish 'models' may seem to 
other countries, their own nationals rightly regard their 
neutrality as national traditions which cannot be trans-i 
planted abroad, nor could they be easily restored once lost . 
. 1 
i ——————— 
1 . See below pj? 
Much of the history of neutrality, right up to i ts 
absorption in the contemporary Cold War, i s reflected in the 
contrasting historical experiences of these two states. 
The study below1* i s an analysis of problems arising within 
* < 
two different national traditions of non-attachment, showing 
how these traditions fare in changing situations. 
(3) Buffer or Former Buffer Status 
In international politics a buffer is a small state 
interposed between two or more greater states. . Buffer states 
can be roughly^divided into neutrals and protectorates. 
Neutral buffer states are^states without-an active foreign 
policy at a l l ; a buffer protectorate i s a state whose foreign 
2 
policy is, in f act , controlled by another power. * 
territorially satisfied power usually prefers to surround 
i ts frontiers with neutral buffers or a l l i e s . A territorially 
expansionist power usually prefers to surround its frontiers 
with buffer protectorates or satell ites . 
Neutral buffer status i s best preserved where a small, 
landlocked state is .kept in being by the reciprocal enmities 
of two or more roughly equal powers around i t s frontiers . A 
1 . ^See -belowpp. 2//.-'2Zfr 
2 . Russo-Brixish imperial rivalries in Southern-Central Asia , 
during the latter half of the 19th century, produced 
. classic examples of the creation and preservation of 
buffer states in the interests of great powers. See the 
excellent article - "Buffer States. Their Historic 
Service to Peace" in Round Table, vol . XLV, pp. 334-34-5. 
multi-balance of power i s more beneficial to the buffer than 
i s a bi-lateral"balance, as the latter always contains the 
threat of one of the two powers securing hegemony and turning 
the neutral 'buffer into a protectorate or even a satellite . 
Alternatively, they might agree together to dismember the 
intermediary state - 'as has been Poland's fate at least three 
1 . 
times in the past. Switzerland was more secure from invasion 
between 1815 and 1871 when she was the stil l centre of a 
multi-b&larice of power system, than she was in the eighteenth 
century when Prance was the preponderant neighbour. In the 
nineteenth.century neutral protectorates, though~subordinate 
internationally to the 'protecting' power, maintained and 
valued highly their internal freedom, and this was the main 
2 
principle.secured by the buffer concept in practice. * 
Because of the geographical separation of the Soviet 
Union and the United States, arid the American adoption of a 
•containment' thesis , Cold War buffers have hitherto existed 
only along the frontiers of the Sino-Soviet bloc. There 
are other buffer states - Outer Mongolia i s one obvious one -
but it i s only where the Soviet and American alliance systems 
» j 
meet, or nearly meet, that buffer status has so f a r been of 
i \ significance in Cold War terms. I • • , 
1 . See further below pp 
2 . See Round Table, vol . 45 , ib id . pp. 344-5. 
Afghanistan i s the oldest of the Asian buffers. When 
the -term was first adopted into international politics at 
the end of the nineteenth century, 1 ' buffers were required 
between British power in India and an expanding Tsarist 
2 
Russia. Until 1919 Afghanistan was under British tutelage, 
-and .for exactly one hundred and .ten years British policy h a d 
vacillated between treating her as a neutral or a'protected' 
buffer. After 1919, followingtregicide and war with Britain, 
.Afghanistan began to develop her own foreign relations, 
-_coneentrating on building up friendly terms .with neighbouring 
(states and, on; the . whole, leaning more heavily towards t 3 
Russia than towards Britain.- * Neutral throughout the 
Second World . War,^* as she had been throughout the First 
EWorld War, she became, a member of the United Nations in 
November 1946. Since 1946 she has endeavoured to carefully 
balance much needed trade and diplomatic friendships, not 
only with the superpowers, but also with those close neighbours 
with whom she has historical ties . This has been a diff icult 
policy to practise and was especially so during the third 
Vj> 
1 . See Round ..Таhip., vol. 45, i b id , p. 334; & Lenczowski, op. 
, c i t . p p . -207-9. 
2 . In 1840 a Captain Arthur Connolly described Anglo-Russian 
rivalries, especially around Afghanistan, as "the Great 
Game." See The Guardian,-28 & 29 June, & 4 July i960 . . * 
3 # See Afghanis-tarn—киГёГёиое Division. - Central Office of 
Information (London, April, i 9 6 0 ) . See esp. p .11 regarding 
' . Russo-Afghan' pacts of 'neutrality and non-aggression' of ' 
1926 and 1931. 
4 . See Lenczowski, op .c it . pp. 219-221. 
phase of the Cold War. In 1955 Afghanistan rejected Turkey's 
invitation to join the Baghdad Pact and welcomed soviet 
endorsement of her irredentist claims against Pakistan - the 
• -± 
во-oalled 'Pakhtunistan'. issue . Geography and the desire 
to modernise what i s st i l l one of the most backward of all 
the United Nations ' members impose salutary ohecks on 
Afghanistan. With no trade outletsi save through Pakistan 
or through Hiissia, and with the need to seek foreign a id , non-
alignment i s the only tenable international posture. By 
i960 Soviet economic aid probably exceeded Western aid in the 2 
country. No doubt, Afghan leaders intend their country to 
stay independent. The vital question i s whether she can 
avoid slipping into the Soviet orbit in ' v iew of the opportun-
i t i e s for inf i ltrat ion afforded by the multifarious Soviet 
act iv it ies within her territory. After a l l , Afghanistan i s 
as 
geographically to the Soviet Union \tiwrt Шех1со i s to the 
United States. 
Concern with the creation and preservation of buffer 
protectorates"is not restricted to the 'committed' powers in 
the Cold War. India has inherited and carried on, however 
unwillingly , B r i t a i n ' s buffer state system along her Himalayan 
1 . See Peter G. Franck - Afghanistan, between East and West. 
The Economic в of Competitive Coexistence (National Planning 
Association, Washington, B . C . , May i 9 6 0 ) . 
2 . See Afghanistan, C . O . I . , i b i d , above, pp. 13-14. Soviet 
aid to neutralist states began with a small agreement with 
Afghanistan in 1954 : 
frontiers . A dynamic situation only developed after 1950 
with Chinese Communist occupation of Tibet. Subsequently, 
the Himalayan rivalry of India and China has been shaped by 
political and strategic, and perhaps ideological, consider-
ations, most of them of long standing. It i s in Nepal that 
we can see^the af f l ict ions that . / the age of the common man* is 
bringing to. the rulers of a buffer state.. King Mahendra has 
a d i f f icult taek in trying to secure material.improvements 
f or an independent Nepal, especially as the'country. had 
suffered under the Rana oligarchy until the popular revolt 
of 1 9 5 0 , a n d st i l l has to recognise I n d i a ' s frankly expressed 
2 
'protective*^interest in Nepal. No ministry since 1950 
has brought internal stability to the country; though there. 
•5 
i s no . lack of political parties . * The d i f f iculty i s that 
even i f the neighbouring powers, of India and China avoid 
interfering in internal a f fa i rs , Nepalese politicians actively 
espouse one side or the other. Membership of the United 
Nations, secured in December 1955 , has been an encouragement 
to develop a more active international role ,^* and so Indian 
•protection' , must necessarily be tactful . 
1 . See Prank Moraes - Jawaharlal Nehru (New York, 1956 ) pp. 
462-5« 
2 . I b i d . 
3 . See Saul Rose - Socialism in Southern Asia (London, 1959) 
chapter 5 - Nepal , pp. 70-81. 
4'. * See Werner Levi - "Nepal in World Pol i t ics " in Pacific 
A f fa i rs , Summer 1957 . 
ns 
The roles of Bhutan and' Sikkim'are, to date, a l i t t le 
less complicated. Bhutan, 'legally ran independent state, i s 
obliged-by a 'treaty of August'1949 to accept Indian -'"guidance' 
in foreign a f fa irs , including defence. Sikkim, a more open 
and better known country, formerly-a-British protectorate, 
was declared an Indian-protectorate in June - 1 9 4 9 . T h o u g h 
both are too rsmall to apply for United Nations^membership, 
as-long'as Sino-Indian ftensions persist 'there i s l i t t l e » 
chance of either sinking into-'the internationally incon-
sequential role of vestigial buffer states - Asianscounter-
• - л 2 
parts of Andorra, Monaco, San Marino and -Liechtenstein. * 
* -Since 1945 -Finland has been a buffer protectorate of the 
Soviet Union in a double "sense. Her continued independence 
i s generally believed to be a means of 'keeping Sweden4out 
of -N.Ä .T .O . , and 'the Soviets" also regard Finnish neutrality 
as a form of re-insurance 'for themselves against future 
German attack. I t i s widely believed that i f Finland was 
- ' Ъ 
absorbed as a Soviet satellite , Sweden would join N . A . T . O . 
A further vital condition of Finland 's precarious independence 
i s the unwavering hostility^ of Finns to Soviet encroachments, 
i . 
Г., See Werner Levi - »Bhutan and Sikkim: Two Buffer States" 
in World Today, December 1959 , PP. 492-500. 
2 . For these four European Lilliputian, states, see Martin 
Wight -.The World in March, 1959,. o p . c i t . p. 152 , f n . 1 . 
3 . See below p. 27-f 
ав two Finno-Soviet wars between 1939 and 1944 sh'owäd.1 , 
The legal basis of Finland 's circumscribed brand of neutrality 
is'^a tsingle phrase in the preamble to the Defence Treaty 
signed with Russia in April 1948 . 'This mentions^Finland*s 
wish "to remain outside the conflict of interests of the 
3 ' 
Great"Powers.fp* Ironically enough,-the Treaty immediately 
goes fon to destroy that"neutrality, at least in the event of 
war affectingtFinland 's territory. * For under Article 1 , 
Finland ' i s bound to oppose Germany, 'or any ally of Germany, t J 4 J • 
attacking either Finland, or Russia'through Finland, "with 
the assistance in case of necessity of the Soviet Union . " 
jln 1955 the Soviet Union secured a twenty year extension of 
this 1948 agreement, in return for handing back.to Finland 
the Soviet-occupied Porkkala base. And though the bilateral 
defence pact" st i l l binds-Finland to Moscow in a hot war, 
since 1955 ..Soviet spokesmen have abandoned their reticence 
, , 
1 . After Finland 's second- capitulation in 1944 Russia took 
1 / 1 2 of her territory, on which about l / 1 0 t h of her 
population lived (these all emigrated to what was l e f t of 
Finland rather than accept Soviet rule) and imposed repar-
ations which the Finns could meet only with dollar aid 
from-the U . S . See further. Anatole G. Mazour - Finland 
between East and West (New York, 1 956 ) . 
2 . The common Finnish word f o r neutrality-is puoluettomuus, 
^which translates l iterally as " impartiality . " 
3 . See U . N . Treaty Series, vol . 48 , pp. 149-61. A Finnish 
statesman who helped to negotiate- the original Moscow 
•agreement later told a Br it ish reporter (see Daily Tele-
graph,, 2 July .1959) that the then Soviet-Foreign Minister , 
Vyshinslcy, objected violently to even this watery legal 
recognition of Finnish neutrality. . Though he was f inal ly 
talked down on this," it was not unti l after 1955 that 
Soviet spokesmen referred .publicly to F inland ' s ' neutral i i 
У-' 
about Finno-Soviet relations and have widely advertised the 
1 1 
Paasikivi line " as a model of what relations between the 
Soviet Union and a neutral state could and should be. In 
f a c t , since 1955 Soviet policy has been characterised by , I 
alternate use of 'the carrot and the stick ' - the carrot in 
such measures as permitting F in land ' s . fu l l membership of the 
Nordic Council and, after much hard bargaining, agreeing .to 2 her associate status with E . F . T . A . in March 1961. " The, 
stick was much used in 1958 when by withdrawing the Soviet 
1 1 " ' 3 
ambassador, by suspending, purchases from Finland, and by 
4 5 
other pressures, she secured a ohange of government" and 
1 . The 'Paasikivi l ine ' - so called after i t s late author, the 
Prime Minister (1944-6) & President (1946-56) of Finland -
assumes that her'independence depends on maintaining good 
relations with the U . S . S . R . , by keeping outside the con-
f l i c t s between, the great powers, & . by avoiding suspicion 
in any quarter. See further Allan A. Kuusisto - "The 
Paasikivi line in Finland 's ,Foreign Policy" in Western 
Political Quarterly," March 1959 , part 1 , pp. 37-49. For a 
Soviet view, see the review article of Paas ik iv i ' s publish-
ed speeches by P. Krynov & E . Lavnov - "The Paasikivi 
^ Pol icy " , International Affairs (Moscow), Sept .1957 :160-4. 
2 . See The Guardian, 28 March 1961 . 
—•——— 1—— I 
3 ; Only 20?4 of F inland ' s foreign trade i s with Russia. Her 
principal trading partner i s Britain, & her biggest 
supplier of manufactured goods i s W. Germany; but she i s 
dependent for all her basic imports - c o a l , steel , fert i l-
isers , cereals, cotton & crude oil - on Russia, & th is 
• dependence i s buttressed by a most-favoured-nation-clause 
in the Soviet-Finnish tradetreaty-
4 . See Kent 'Forster - "The * Finnish- Soviet CrisiB of 1958-9" , 
International Journal, Spring i960 , pp. 147-150. 
5."1 The'conventions & inevitable manoeuvrings of F in land ' s 
multi-party system provide opportunities f o r Russian inter-j 
vention to further her interests . By July 1961 Finland had 
had 46 cabinets in 43 years of independence. For internal 
Finnish pol it ics , see A. Kuusisto - "Parliamentary Crises 
euid Presidial Governments in Finland" in Parliamentary 
A f f a i r s , Summer, 1958 . 
its replacement by a cabinet more acceptable to Moscow. 
Finland i s neither a Communist state nor a Soviet satellite, 
• * R ' 9 
but there is no doubt that all major foreign policy'^moves 
must secure at least"tacit Soviet approval. 
It seems that buffer status is'becoming less arid less « ' r . 1 
possible or popular in this atomic and Cold War age. There 
are two main reasons for this. Firstly, buffer status was 
a device more clearly appropriate to an age'when fighting 
had to be by close contact. Today, small buffer states are 
I < Л less able to act as barriers separating combatants when 
hostile powers can wage war using high speed aircraft,^rockets 
. i . . - - * 
and missiles, and the so-called büffer can now be easily 
overflown, or overshot, if not overrun. Secondly, while 
the term buffer state"1 suggests something inert and passive, 
> - n 
compared with the powers adjoining i t , passivity has now gone. 
Neutralist"doctrine now( seems to be the natural creed of the 
former buffer. Certainly, their neutralist• leaders are 
nowadays numbered among the world's assiduous travellers and 
seekers of foreign aid and trade. T 
' (4) Erstwhile Isolationism 
Isolationism as a state policy rests essentially on two 
conditions: the determination of those in charge of-their 
* -
country's affairs to eschew an active involvement in inter-
national affairs , and geographical or military conditions 
favourable to ensure tliis. The history of isolationism 
has been one of the progressive undermining of both of tliese 
'conditions in the face of an increasingly -interwoven network 
of international contacts, end developing military technology. 
Strictly,-isolationism implies no foreign policy at 
all , but in general it has been regarded much more loosely 
and'rrelatively. Both China and Japan successfully practised 
strict -isolationism from the seventeenth to the nineteenth 
centuries. 1* The prime reason for their failure to'maintain 
this was the superior military strength of Western powers 
determined to have dealings with them. Neither American 
isolationism, 2* nor Britain 's "so-called "nsplendid^isolation11-
. 3 • 
or "policy of the 'free hand" - was ever a policy of complete 
4 • 
-abstention from all international affairs . * And though 
the avoidance of permanent military commitmentsrwas a 
1 . A minor qualification to this picture of complete isolat-
• 1 ion i s necessary in each case. China permitted a 
restricted foreign trade through Canton; while, similarly, 
Japan permitted a limited trade through the single port 
of Nagasaki. See G. 5*. Hudson - The Par East in World 
Affairs. (London, 1 9 3 9 ) , chapter 2, pp. 12-26. 
2. ,See above ff- П-1°|- See also Molotov's.& Cordell 
Hull ' s mutual badinage, at the Moscow Conference in 1943, 
about, th'e ending of-their respective country's isolation-
ism, in The Memoirs of Cordell Hull (London, 1948 ) , vol . 
2, pp. 1297 & 1 3 Ю . 
3 . See description in British Security. A Heport by a 
Chatham"House Study Group (London, 1946) ch. 3 ,pp . 37-46. 
4 . Indeed, both are more accurately designated by'the term 
"unilateralism" - but this is not an established usage 
in this context. 
persistent and popular tradition in both countries, though 
obviously in different ways and for different reasons, both 
have abandoned this in the post-1945 world. 
4 Apart from the freedom for independent manoeuvre 
cherished by the large isolationist power, many small states 
have»in the past sought in isolationism security through 
self-effacement, or complete non-involvement in international 
patters . Switzerland long practised this policy successfully, 
though^her.military reputation and mountainous topography 
probably counted for more than diplomatic skil l ; today she 
i s bestHregarded as a traditional or unique n e u t r a l . T h e 
fate of Tibet since 1950 ' shows that mere willingness to 
remain inactive internationally i s not sufficient to ensure 
isolationi sm^ 
Because isolationism implies aloofness or indifference 
to.world a f fa irs and a reluctance to.engage^in widespread 
diplomatic relations, it is an unpopular term today, thought 
to describe a policy incompatibleVith membership in the 
United. Nations and to be an admission of national backwardness 
diplomatically. Five states in particular - Ethiopia , 
L iberia , Saudi Arabia, the Yemen and Ireland - illustrate 
different ways in which erstwhile isolationists can evolve 
into neutralist states. 
1 . See below р(?2-П , 
2 . See Frank Moraes - The Revolt in Tibet (New York/1 i 9 6 0 ) . 
'Ethiopia *and Liberia'were- two of the four independent 
states of Africa in 1945 --the'Union of South Africa/land 
Egypt were the other two*. Of all the five states briefly 
-considered -here, Liberia has done least to modify her former 
isoliationism. 'Though she has-been »independent for one hundrec 
'arid 'fourteen years, and was an original member of both the 
LeagueTof Nations and the United Nations, she ' is still , 
notorious for her general backwardness. • Described by one 
historian as "that .'poor and'neglected African step-child of 
the United States , " 1 * she allowed the United States to 
:construct airports on her soil during the Second World War, 
^though all American forces left after ttie war. Cold War 
issues have so far left Liberia untouched. It is only^since 
'the emergence of three new states - Guinea,' Ivory Coast and 
'Sierre Leone - -around her land frontiers, as successors to 
French colonial poy/er, that she has begun to show significant 
signs of active interest- in ,the world outside her borders. 
She acted as host. to. a conferences* of 'moderate1 independent 
African states in June 1961, though it was reported that her 
r"prestige 'in African eyes might have remained greater had the 
realities of Liberia 's domestic situation not been brought 
3 
'home to so many African leaders." 
-1. See F. P. -Walters - Ä History of the League of Nations 
(London, 1952) , p. 568. See esp. pp. 563-571. • 
2. See "The Monrovia Conference" in The British Survey, June 
1. 1961 (Main Series', No. 147) pp. 20-22. 
3 . See Hella Pick - "L iberia*spoor Showing Among Africans" 
in The Guardian, 28 June 1961. 
Ethiopia 1 " has the longest record of independence of 
any African state in modem times; and, apart from Ital ian 
occupation from 1936 to 1941 , has not otherwise been under 
foreign domination throughout her known history. For almost 
three thousand years prior to the Italian air , sea and land 
invasion in 1935 , Ethiopia was too inaccessible, too 
mountainous and impregnable to -.1 arge scale attack. Indeed, 
the.Ethiopian defeat of Italian forces at *Adowa in 1895. was 
as important an event in African history as Japan's defeat 
of .Russia in 1905 was in Asian annals, and Mussolini vowed 
revenge for this Italian 'national ' humiliation, just as in 
1945 Stalin claimed retribution for the defeat of 1905 . 
Ethiopia i s a benevolent despotism, ruled by«Emperor.Haile 
Selassie ever since 1930. I t , i s Haile Selassie who has 
clOEely identified Ethiopia with other African and Asian 
neutralist states since 1955 . The country lias perhaps the 
highest economic^, potential , and yet has so f a r achieved 
proportionately.the least actual development of potential , 
in the whole of Africa . But in attempts to speed up develop-
ment,. Haile Selassie has been an assiduous world traveller 
on behalf of his country's-interests; paying state v i s i t s 
to the United States and to most West'European countries, 
including Yugoslavia in 1954, ' and v is i t ing Moscow in June 1959 
1 . See Edward Ullendorff - The Ethiopians ( O . U . P . , London, 
i 9 6 0 ) ; & "Ethiopia" The British Survey, June 1961 (Main 
Series, No. 147 ) , PP. 1-19. 
whence he returned hone with promises of substantial Soviet 
> л « 
aid . India , Sweden and Israel each provide technicians 
and teachers to forward the Emperor's development plans . 
The Americans have a radio and monitoring station at Radio 
Marina, Asmara, in Eritrea*, 1 ' and provide various forms of 
technical a id , including equipment and training for 
2 
Ethiopia 's armed forces. ' Not only did Ethiopia send а 
delegation to-the Bandung Conference in 1955» but her capital 
city , Addis Ababa, has been the venue for several' all-Äfrica ^ 
conferences' recently and'- has become the permanent headquarters 
• r • + 4 » f 
of the U . N . Economic Commission for Africa , founded in i960 . 
With Sudan becoming independent in 1956 , with the emergence 
of a new republic of Somalia in i960 keen to promote 
irredentist claims against Ethiopia, , and with Kenya to become 
an independent state in4 due course, Ethiopia w i l l soon have 
> f + 4 1 
entirely new nation-states in place of her former 'imperialist 1 
neighbours. By early 1961 Ethiopia had clearly moved from 
an apparently pro-Western position, "held at the time of her 
participation in the Korean War, to a position of undoubted 
moderate neutralism 'internationally. 
i . • 
1 . The former . Italian colony of Eritrea became in 1952 "an 
autonomous state federated with Ethiopia" , and consequent-
ially Ethiopia acquired a sea-board. See G .K .N . . Trevaskis 
Eritrea . A-Colony in Transition. 1941-52. ( O . U . F . , 
London, i 9 6 0 ) . 
2 . See M : S . P . 1961 t o p . c i t . p . 80 . 
№ 
Ethiopia ' s two near neighbours across the Red Sea, the 
1 2 
Yemen * and „Saudi Arabia, ' are both states which are now 
to-be numbered among the neutralists . Both were isolationist 
states prior to .the Second World War, though the Yemen even 
more so than Saudi Arabia. - They were two of the four^* 
independent states of the inter-war period who never applied 
for membership of the Д»еague of Rat ions . Both are st i l l 
feudal monarchies, st i l l mostly absorbed in Arab quarrels 
and parochial concerns, but now less determined and less 
able to insulate their countries- from outside influences. 
Both have sought to come to terms with Nasser 's Egypt and , 
/to stay neutralist in the Cold War, though they have 
attempted to do-this in different ways. 
Saudi>Arabia-has*had close ties with the United States -
unoff ic ial ly ; through the'American oil-companies' development 
of Saudi Arabian o i l f ie lds since the 1930s , and, o f f i c i a l l y , 
since the Second World War with the establishment of a large 
» 
U . S . a ir base at Dhahrari. This a ir base agreement has been 
renewed roughly every f ive years eince the war, but in March 
1961^* Saudi Arabia notified .Washington that she would not 
t 
1 . See Lenczowski, o p . c i t . ch. 13 , pp. 455-466; The Middle 
.East, op . c i t . pp. 94-102; & Campbell, op .c it . passim. 
2. See Lenczowski, o p . c i t . ch. 12 , pp. 431-454; The Middle 
East, o p . c i t . pp. 75-94; & Campbell, op .c it . passim. 
3 . The other two were the U . S . A . and Nepal. 
4 . See The Times, 18.'»larch 1961; & Daily Telegraph, 20 March 
1961 . 
renewtthe agreement^hen it "expires "on Ist April , 1962 , -
^probably Ьесаивё 'o f .national ist 'pressures within >the Arab 
bworld. -Saudi' relations twith the Communist powers'have 
Tbeen virtually non-existent, euidUrelations'With Egypt ""have 
jf liictuat'ed considerably -.-reaching their lov/est point i n r^-
tMarchО.95в when "King Saud was implicated iri abortive attempts 
etorstäge "a military coup in г Syria," secure'theImurder.'of 
jfasser^ and prise ДаразН «the new-Unit'ed- Arab Republic. t*Her ' 
relations ^with Britain have beenrstrained p .particularly since 
1952,'1 „over the disputed Buraimi Oasis, . 'on the bordör between 
^Muscat and' Trdcial Oman: ' Yemen's-foreign^policy i & 
dominatedSby'the quest to realise irredentist claims against 
JAden, "though otherwise ränd Jeven ibeförei.she "effected her 
ipurely nominal ^'.union' iwith the^iUnited Arab Republic a n 1958 , 
p 
she had followed 'the .Egyptian l ine in<her ' foreigntpolicy . 
Iri April- 1956 she concluded a tripartite agreement V i t h -
'Egypt (who had' already "agreed to supply1 ^aircraft, ?guns ana 
rtänks) and with .Saudi Arabia., ''The 1927 Treaty of-"Friendship 
l?7ith?the U . S . S . R T expired in 1954i .but in 1955 ; ; it was . -
decided to renew it and to strengthen economic relations 
" * t- . T -• T-
with*the-U ;S .S .R . China began aid programmes-to Yemen in-^. 
• Л к . ' » • v » . . . . 
1958.-'- Both tSaudi Arabia arid- the Yemen rare f i n d i n g it ' « *' ' ' 1' 
increasingly d i f f i c u l t to square the circle of token support 
r 
f o r radical Arab nationalism outside their frontiers while 
yet preserving mildly progressive, feudal monarchical systems 
at home. 
I t i s strange to have to irlclude Ireland among the. 
erstwhile ^-isolationists because-for at least ten years after 
becoming an independent state in 1921 she proclaimed policies 1 * 
I 
which were in their anti-colonialism, championship of the 
rights of small nations, expressions of pride in her member-
ship of the League of Nations, insistence on the need for 
economic development, and obsessive irredentist claims 
(against the six •lost',, counties of Ulster ) , very like the 
avowed policies of so many new state neutralists, today. Then, 
from 1935 to 1936 - that i s , from the time of the I tal ian 
conquest of Ethiopia, and the Anglo-Irish treaty of 1936 
whereby Britain evacuated her treaty ports in South West 
I .. . -
Ireland - she relapsed into isolationism. This was. 
intensified by her neutrality throughout the Second World 
p 
War, •* and this isolationism, in effect , lasted until she, 
gained admission to the United Nations in December 1955 -
because the Soviet Union vetoed her application for United 
Nations membership in 1945 . I re land ' s active involvement 
in a wide range of international issues since joining the 
1 . See Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs : Problems of 
Nationality , 191B - 1936 by W. K. Hancock ( O . U . P . , London, 
1 9 3 7 ) , cs. 3 & 6; and Problems of External Policy . 1931-
1939 by Nicholas Mansergh ( O . U i P . , London, 1952) ch. 8 , 
and pp. 400-407. 
2 . See The War and the Neutrals, op . c i t . pp'. 230-256. 
United Nations 1*- she-sent troops to serve in the United 
Nations observer corps in Lebanon in 1956 and a large 
' - » » 
contingent to the Congo in i 960 , she has supported Indian 
j x - z 
moves to consider the admission of Communist China to the 
United Nations, and has proposed disengagement schemes for 
central Europe - i s a dramatic example of how United Nations 
* Л 1 1 
membership can lead to a radical alteration in the policies 
of an erstwhile isolationist . 
7/hile it has been the aim here to indicate different 
ways in which some states have come to modify their former » ^ j, 
isolationism, it is not , of course, implied that all erstwhile 
, . i - t 
isolationist states become neutralist . Spain, isolationist 
о • r i » с 
at least from 1937 to 1953 . ended her isolationism by 
allying with the United States; and it i s arguable that the 
policiec of such small island states as Iceland and Haiti 
t * 
are st i l l fundamentally isolationist , despite their Cold War 
• - , * .. 
alignments and United Nations membership, and even i f less 
г 1 
so than formerly. * • 
1 . There i s , as yet, no survey of I reland ' s post 1945 foreign 
' policy comparable with those of Hancock and Mansergh f o r 
the inter-7/ar period. All the important speeches 
delivered by I r i s h delegates at U .N . meetings are collected 
& published annually as pamphlets by Dha Scill ing a Luach. 
See also I r i sh Parliamentary Debates (Dail Eireann) , esp. 
vol . 164 (no. 8 ) 28 Nov. 1957 , columns 1167-1260; vol . 167 
(nos. 2 ft 3 ) 16 & 17 April 1958 , columns 251-312 & 313-15; 
& vol . 176 (nos. 4 & 5) 2 8t 7 July 1959 , columns 490-520, 
554-586, 587 , 601-716. 
- чч* 
(5 ) Pioneer Neutralism 
- 1 
The reason for considering India , Yugoslavia and the 
i 
United Arab Republic together and apart from other neutralist 
, - , ! t 
states i s that they are the three leading neutralist states 
today, and each of l4hem has initiated certain policies which 
*are now widely regarded as being neutralist ' in character. 
* 
In asserting that these states have been pioneers it i s not 
necessarily claimed that many other neutralist sta'tes Have 
v » I 
become neutralist by deliberately imitating them - indeed, 
» „ о 
this 1b unlikely . What i s claimed i s that these three 
• j r 1 . 
states were, in their different ways, the f i r s t to practise 
r ' • 
in Cold War conditions certain policies which many neutralist 
states now practise, or seek to practise. 
J » * e 
India spread, by advocacy and example, the idea that 
neutralism could be a respectable and responsible policy, 
and that a neutralist state could usefully act as a mediator 
in international disputes - and she did this^ at a time when 
: л • с ' ' 
all forms of neutralism were regarded with great suspicion 
by* both Cold War camps. Indian leaders stressed that their 
preoccupations in managing a newly independent state were 
- i 
with preserving and consolidating national independence, 
with industrial is ing , or at least 'modernising' , the state, 
and in staying out of avoidable 'international confl ict . 
. Yugoslavia showed that a neutralist state could resist 
1. • 
strong pressures from one superpower without having to 
become a-formal member'of the other Cold War camp. She 
also showed that it was possible to receive aid"from both of 
the Cold War camps without becoming beholden to either. 
Egypt (in the years before 'she joined with Syria in the 
United Arab Republic) showed that* it was possible to persuade 
a Western power to evacuate!an important military base, arid 
also led the way'in pursuing an 'active* neutralist-policy 
ofisimultaneous dalliance with both Cold War camps. In so 
doing,1 Egypt showed that an 'active''neutralist policy' 
requires very qüick~reäctions to the moves of the superpowers; 
positions held too long can become compromising if a wholesale 
dependence on one Cold War camp seems to be developing. She 
has shown that this policy, if it«-is to succeed, must exhibit 
qualities of flexibility, some would^say inconsistency, 
similar to those for which --"-in rather different clrcum-
stancesb-- 'Perfidious Albion' became notorious from the time 
of-Cardinal Wolsey*onwards. 
These points are illustrated in their context in Chapter 
IV. • There are other ways in which these three states are 
of significance in the history of neutralism, but these, too, 
, I t 
are mentioned in the-oase-study. 
Two.other states - Cuba and Iraq - can be conveniently 
mentioned -here. > To-date they are the only two^states to 
1. See below ppi 
become neutralist by defecting from multilateral Western 
1 2 
alliances - Cuba * from the Rio Pact, and Iraq -from the 
former Baghdad Pact. Both of them did so by means of, 
revolutions which overthrew strongly pro-Western regimes, 
and installed the dominant revolutionary leader in power -
Castro in Cuba, and Kassem in Iraq - in the name of social 
reform and national independence. Both states have become 
•pioneers' just by defecting from Western alliances, but it 
is doubtful i f either of them will themselves acquire a 
sizeable following of fellow neutralist states in their own 
respective regions. For it is unlikely that such large 
Latin American states as Argentina or Brazil will be led to 
line up behind Cuba.~ This i s not to' say that such countries 
will not become more neutralist for other reasons. It 
remains to be seen i f Iraq ?/ill wrest the leading role in 
the Arab world from,Egypt, 'or whether in defecting from a 
Western alliance she has set a precedent for her neighbours, 
1 . Following Fidel Castro's accession to power in January 
1959. Castro's policy since 1959 has been one of seeking 
armaments & diplomatic support from the Soviet bloc, 
sequestrating U . S . property in Cuba while refraining from 
attacking''the U . S . naval base at Guantanamo in Cuba, & 
of identifying Cuba with the neutralist states. See The 
Times. 2 June i960; 18 July i960; 9 Aug. i960 & 5 Sept. 
1960. ' 
2. The Iraqi Prime Minister .announced in March 1959 that Iraq 
had withdrawn from the Baghdad Pact, thus formalizing a 
situation which had existed in effect sirtce the Iratgf 
revolution of July 1958. (Both Cuba & Iraq sent ful l 
delegations to the Belgrade Neutralist Summit in Sept. 
1 961 ) . See The Times, 16 & 17 Dec. 1958; & The Observer. 
24 May 1959. 
Perolft'and Turkey. The only other two possible alternatives 
are that she could continue with her present shaky independence, 
or become a Soviet^satellite. - ThiB latter fate i s probably 
avoidable as long as C . E . N . Т .О . i s in being, i f only because 
the territories of Turkey mid.^P*ei*sia separate Iraq from the 
Soviet Union. 
( 6 ) New State Neutralism 
i — — — — — — — — — — — — 
In January 1961 thirty-two of the neutralist states were 4 I » 
p 
newly independent states. * That i s to say that they had 
\j 
all acquired their independence since 1945» and none of them 
was a member of a Cold tfar multilateral all iance , though I 
they were all members of the United Natione. Of course, 
3 . 1 
newness and age are relative concepts and any attempt to 
1 . The attractions of neutralism for Persians are disouseed 
in L . P. Klwell-Sutton - "Nationalism and Neutralism in 
I ran " in The Middle Eastern Journal; Winter 1955. p .20-32. 
2. See table below, pp, 2.5T-^ Only India of the post 1945 
'new' states has been deliberately excluded from this 
category of new state neutralists . She i s more appropriat-
ely considered as a pioneer neutralist - see above p./4-8. 
3 . I t i s arguable that some states, formally independent 
before 1945» become new, ae it were, by coup d 'etat or by 
revolution. For instance, Egypt after 1952 , Iraty after 
, 1958 , or Cuba after 1959» could all be cited in support 
of this argument. But euoh claims raise many contro-
versial issues about the degree of continuity and dis-
continuity in foreign policy after a coup or revolution. 
Under the heading of new state-neutralists we are here 
concerned only with those former colonies or mandated 
territories which have sinoe 1945 gained, or after a 
longish period regained, sovereign status internationally , 
and become U .N . members. 
diBCuss neutralist policies by reference to the quality of 
•newness"'"* i s helpful only'•if its relative arbitrariness is 
recognised. -Yet the very fact that' so many of the present 
day neutralist states are new' sovereignties internationally 
i s too important a coincidence to be neglected, though, 
admittedly, new states born into Cold War conditions have 
many problems similar to those of other neutralist states. 
But-precisely because' they are new states, they face all 
their problems at once and right from-the moment of * 
independence. 
2 
Many of the factors already mentioned * which persuade 
other states to adopt a neutralist-policy - moet notably, 
the impracticability of isolation, the quest for material 
improvement, and the desire to keep free of Cold War ties -
all converge to impel new states along a neutralist ^course. 
SVhät the leaders of all new neutralist Btates want, above 
a l l , is to show their new states1 independence internationally 
-and to convince their nationals that the new state i s truly 
independent. ^ Here, forms may be as important as realities . 
Four points, all connected, must be mentioned again as 
they are especially important in under standing new state 
1 . For discussions of the quality of newness, see Akzin, op. 
c it . & Emerson - From Empire to Nation, ibid. ch. 20, pp. 
397-419. ч 
2 . See above pp. 
neutralism. F i r s t , i s the concern with national unity . 
Second, is- the importance of membership in the United Nations. 
!Fhird ;is tHe diminishing significance of foreign military 
bases as a necessary disqualification of neutralist status. 
Arid fourthjis the relevance of economic factors in shaping 
ä neutralist course. 
National self-determination,* ' with all i ts ambiguous 
power, has been the principle for justifying the*existence of 
a l l the new-states, irrespective of whether or not a broadly 
based national movement preceded the achievement of independent 
statehood, and regardless of whether or not national unity 
i s at all" attainable. National unity i s thus the overriding 
and unavoidable concern of all nationalistx.leaders in new 
states. Yet it i s not a measurable commodity, i t . i s more 
'often-noticeable for its absence than assessable by i t s 
presence. In all the new states an awareness that national 
unity is either non-existent or precarious has been a powerful 
influence keeping the state out of Cold \7ar all iances . Two 
factors seem especially relevant. Firstly , the neutralist 
state has one«important advantage over the aligned state in 
1 . I t should be remembered that some version of national 
j g ' self-determination has been a battlecry of L i b e r a l , 
Communist or Fascist movements. See Alfred Cobban -
National Self-De termination (London, O . U . P . f o r E . I . I . A . , -
1945 ) ; E l i e Kedourie - Nationalism, o p . c i t . ch. 5 ; & 
Emerson - From Empire to Nation, o p . c i t . pp. 295-359. 
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that i ts interests and, hence, i ts efforts can be almost 
wholly local and limited, it does not have to strive to concert 
i tself closely and continually with the policies"of i ts 
alliance partners. 1 The leaders of a nev7 state can thus stress 
the independence of action en'joyed in virtue of 4not being a 
member of an all iance , and can insist that the national 
interest i s their dominant concern, whereas membership in an 
alliance would involve at least some compromise in the 
interests of coalition diplomacy, and may even involve sub-
ordination to the stronger powers. Secondly, any obvious 
military alignment with a foreign power inevitable becomes a 
move in domestic politics too, and the government thus runs 
the risk 'of losing the leadership of the national movement 
i f i t s opponents" can plausibly represent it' 'as »selling* the 
new and cherished independence to a foreign power.4 
Soon after i ts inception the f i rst government of 
independent Burma had to face a' succession of rebellions and 
armed threats - from the Karens? Arakanese, Kuomintang 
Chinese, Y/hite and Red Flag Communists.1* The survival of 
ü Nu*s government and öf Burma within i ts present boundaries 
in these early post independent y e a r s V a s possible only because 
1 . See Hugh Tinker - The Union of Burma (2nd e d . , London, 1959) 
* ch. 2 "The background of Civil War 1948-55, " & John F. 
. Cady - A History of Modem Burma (Cornell U . P . , 1 9 5 8 ) , 
ch. 17 - "Rebellion and Recovery. " ч fiff^Ju^ S У л о . . 
irr 
it в opponents were separate groups of rebels, unwilling or 
unable to combine.with each other, and the government 
continued to speak in,.the name of the majority of the nation 
and of the national independence movement. Alliance with 
a foreign power would have jeopardised its position by 
offering a vulnerable target for its opponents to attack. 
Even small but vital military aid from India in these years 
had to be given and accepted very discreetly. 1*. Indonesia 
has faced similar difficulties . The fact that this new 
state . is an archipelago of more than three thousand islands 
has certainly added to the task of welding an Indonesia** 
2 
national unity. The diff iculties of Burma and Indonesia 
in trying to secure national unity can"be roughly paralleled 
in the .experiences c>f most of the new states. » , 
One of the most effective arguments neutralist' leaders 
have been able to use against indigenous Communists is that 
they give their primary allegiance to a foreign power and 
are thus subversive of national unity. Irredentism, too, 
may be one way of trying to solidify the national movement 
behind the leadership; though in as much as a neutralist 
state seeks the support of other states in the furtherance 
1 . See Tinker, ibid . p. 355. 
2. See G. M. Kahin - Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia 
(pornell UyP . , 1952);, * ftlo W<rw. 
of i ts irredentist claims, most г o f t h e m have had to rely on 
fellow neutralists or on Communist powers, as the .satisfaction 
of such claims must nearly always be at the expense of a 
Western or We stern-aligned power.^ Even so, it i s to be . 
remembered,thatлirredentist claims are made in the name of 
•the nation* and a distinction between new state neutralists 
in terms of 'moderate' and 'militant ' nationalism i s likely 
to be more profitable than one in terms of whether they are 
pro-Westem or pro-Communist. 
The i n i t i a l direction of a new state .neutral ist ' s course 
w i l l be »strongly-influenced by the way-in which the new 
state breaks with the metropolitan«power. • Where the 
parting i s amicable, as with Ceylon and all the French West 
African territories , except Guinea, the new state 's neutralism 
i s l ikely to show, in i t ia l ly at least $ a markedly pro-Western 
bent. ^When the severing of colonial ties i s less smooth, 
as in the cases of Indonesia and Guinea , * ' the new state 's 
neutralist course i s almost inevitably anti-Western and 
militant in support of national claims. 
The political complexion of a neutralist regime does 
not seem to be a decisive factor shaping its neutralist, 
^course. Where leadership i s conspicuously strong the absence 
of national unity or social cohesion appears to be less 
i . See Harold Silver - "Guinea Red and Black" in The 
Listener , 20 July 1961 , pp. 81-3. 
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important. One of the striking differences between Cambodia 
and Laos since 1954 has been the presence of a single 
•undoubted leader, Prince Sihanouk, in Cambodia and the lack 
of any similar dominating personality in Laos. Similarly, 
Nigeria has no one man who has attained a pre-eminence 
comparable with that of Dr. Nkrumah in Ghana. Strong and 
undoubted leadership gives a purpose and a direction to a 
country's foreign policy'. Leaders l ike Nehru, Nasser and 
Tito not only seem to personify their nations, but because 
of their pre-eminence" they become the embodiment of their 
country's neutralism to the outside world. 
of 
The•overriding importance of nationalism, and[national 
leadership in particular , i s clearly apparent throughout 
Africa where new- states are arising on the basis of admin-
istrative units established by the colonial.powers. Virtually 
a l l these' new states are not unified nations but .congeries 
of tribes end parts of tribes . It remains to be seen if 
these states w i l l eventually create nations, though it seems 
certain that they need nationalism, in the sense of a 
community of feel ing and will roughly coincidental with the 
etate, if they are to weld together into working unitB the 
diverse elements of which they are composed. All these 
new African states are formally non-aligned i n the Cold War, 
though their neutralism, l ike their nationalism, i s st i l l 
immature and unsettled. The neutralist policies of these 
states often closely reflect substantial differences between 
those 'moderate* nationalist leaders who seem content to 
< 
work largely within their inherited boundaries, and those 
'militants ' - Tresident Nkrumah of Ghana 1 , is the most 
notable example - who claim to regard their new state as 
merely a springboard in the creation of larger political 
un i ts . Although the attractive force of pan-African ideas , 
at least among some of the African leaders, has been shown 
in a number of symbolic (so f a r , none of- them could be said 
p 
to be at all substantive) unions, ' the vital question 
remains - who i s to head- these new and larger unions? As 
yet , the "African nation" eeems even less ripe for a take-
over than does the "Arab n a t i o n . " • 
Membership in the United Nations is valued by all new 
state neutralists as perhaps the most important symbol of ' 
recognition* and enfranchisement in international society. 
Membership enables the neutralist to avoid the discomforts of 
isolation and encourages the making of a wide range of inter-
> «• •> 
national contacts, many of which would otherwise be d i f f icult 
1 . See appendix 10 below,^p. 
2 . The Union of Ghana and Guinea proclaimed in May 1959 does 
not seem to have progressed much further than this pro-
clamation; the union of Senegal and Soudan (now known 
as Mal i ) lasted only two months - June-July 1960#- o^fCw/ 
for an uncommitted state. Nevertheless, the obligations " 
of United Nations membership can encourage a confusing • 
mingling of precept and practice, of neutralist doctrine^'and 
This is perU*fS tM*<x*>oid&t>lC laß-ct^ ея. иЫ. y^frvJel*-
policy g ittfi с mudh-ac^ja new state has to vote and adopt at 
least declaratory policies on a ?/ide range of international 
questions, many of them remote from immediate national ' 
concerns, arid at a time when 
substantive policies 
are often inchoate and groping. The pattern 
of a neutralist state 's voting behaviour i s one rough indication of i ts international orientation. By this test 
2 • -
one survey, " published in i 960 , suggested that, at that time, 
- i * 
three Afro-Asian neutralists - Laos, Liberia and Malaya -
consistently adopted an anti-Communist l ine ; eleven of them -
Afghanistan, Burma, Ceylon, Ghana, Guinea, I nd ia , Indonesia, 
Iraq , Sudan, United Arab Republic and Temen - constituted a 
'hard-core' neutralist vote; while nine - Ethiopia, Cambodia, 
Jordan, Lebanon, Libya , Morocco, Nepal, Saudi Arabia, 
» 3 . 
Tunisia - were left as ' f loating ' votes. 
1 . Many of the ambiguities in neutralist doctrine, discussed 
in chapter I I above, are reflected in neutralist p o l i c i e s , , 
& much of what was said in that chapter about independence, t 
foreign aid , etc . has a direct relevance here. 
2 . See G. Goodwin.- "The Expanding United Nations - I й in 
International Affairs ( R . I . I . A . ) April i 9 6 0 , pp. 174-187. 
He warns that "voting figures merely record arithmetical 
totals . They cannot indicate the intensity of f e e l i n g of 
the majority - or minority; or the extent to which nation-
al interests are directly involved; or the degree of 
actual power rather than voting power which the majority 
commands relative to that of the minority . " (p. 1 8 5 ) . 
3 . I b i d . p. 181 . 
>/6t> 
Рог .some new .states it has been a virtual condition of 
achieving independence that they, should grant or permit the 
continuance of military bases or^facilities to the departing 
metropolitan power and/or its all ies . Before 1957 the 
possession of such bases by an independent state was generally 
regarded as disqualifying it for neutralist status - no-one 
• * Л • 
seemed to regard Morocco, .Tunietfand Libya as neutralist states 
then, nor was Ceylon regarded as neutralist until the^ e 
* J 
evacuation of the British bases at Trincomalee and Katunayake 
shortly after Mr. Bandaranaike*s electoral victory in 1956 .** 
Since 1957, with the increasing numbers and growing self-
confidence of neutralist states, there seems to be a growing и ' и ' •• • " 1 
opinion amongst them that the presence of foreign military 
bases within the boundaries of an otherwise independent state 
does not necessarily preclude neutralist status. Even so, 
it seems that a state becomes 'more neutral ist ' , as it were, 
if it is able to f ix a terminal date for the final evacuation 
of such bases as it has on its soil , or if it imposes more 
stringent conditions upon the power enjoying such fac i l i t ies . 
After negotiations begun in 1957, Morocco had by Septembe: 
i960 persuaded Prance to evacuate her bases from Morocco by 
the end of 1963. Further negotiations led to a supplementary 
1 . See W. С. B. Tunstqll - The Commonwealth and Regional 
Defence (London, 1959)*, pp. 54-55j ^ 'iXdxn^-
agreement • that all these-Ъавев would be evacuated by October 
1961^ two years ahead of the previously agreed schedule. 1" 
Intermittent negotiations have also been held for the 
2 
evacuation of the three main United States bases. * .Tunisia 
has been ne gotiating with Prance since 1958 to secure the 
withdrawal of French forces from Bizerta, though in-euch a 
moderate manner that in the eyes of many •militant' neutralists 
she is-probably regarded as being far too pro-Western^" in 
orientation. Malaya has consistently Bought to give a 
restrictive interpretation of British military rights on her 
soil ; and«both Malayan and Singaporean'leaders have said 
that-in the event of a union-between Malaya and Singapore, 
now'being explored, Britain 's most important overseas base' 
of Singapore would not be available for the use of S . E . A . T . O . ^ 
By adroit, stubborn and prolonged negotiation when the terms 
of independence for Cyprus were being worked out, Archbishop 
Makarios whittled down the areas for Britain 's 'sovereign' 
1 . See The Times, 6 March 1961. 
2 . See i b i d . , also M . S . P . 1961, o p . c i t . , p. 78 . 
3 . Senegal which harbours French military bases, and Nigeria 
which has signed a defence pact with B r i ^ ^ w & i ^ d ^ И 6 0 
probably be included in a similar i n c f r c t V ^ 'l?or Tunis, 
see M .S .P . 1961, op .c it . p7^| 
4 . See John L o w e - "The 'Malayan Experiment" Fabian society 
Research Series 213, March i960 , евр. pp. 32-3 & 41; 
also Lennox Mills - Malaya. A Political & Economic 
Appraisal (London, O . U . P . 1958) , pp. 148-9« 
bases in independent Cyprus, closely defined the conditions 
by^which they were to be occupied and used, and insisted/» • 
that the agreements should be subject to review after five 
years.** Even Libya, who has the largest of America's 
overseas bases on her soil , i s attempting to increase "the 
rental" paid by the Americans and is in other ways identifying 
herself with the militant neutralists of. the Casablanca. 
2. 
powers. 
. All the new neutralist states consider .themselves to 
have underdeveloped economies. The only way they could 
insulate themselves from outside economic pressures would be 
to give up cherished industrial aspirations and remain peasant 
economies. f A s they are all unwilling to do this , they have 
to seek trade with and aid from other states, and this makes 
them susceptible to economic pressures. In general, all A 
a 
neutralists regard/wide pattern of economic relations, \ 
preferably with both of*the Cold War blocs, as being the 
beet way-to avoid the snares of economic control, though 
N 
1 . See Cmnd. 1093 (H .M t S . O . , 1§60) ; & The Economist, 28 Feb. 
• 1959, PP. 7 5 3 - 4 & 7 6 7 ; valso The Guardian, 16 Jan. i960 . 
2. See Roger Owen - Libya^ A Brief Political and Economic 
S u r v e y ' ( H . I - A . Memoranda, May 1961) ; M .S .P . 1961 , op. 
c i t . , pp. 77-8 - "The very discouraging long range.outlook 
for Libya*в economy changed dramatically in 1959 on the 
discovery of large oil d e p o s i t s . . . . the government should 
then ( i . e . by 1965 or 1966) become independent of foreign 
assistance to finance normal governmental operations and 
its development programme." 
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obviously their opportunities to achieve suoh aims vary 
considerably- It i s a striking feature of the Cold War 
that neutralist vulnerability to outside economic pressures 
is probably less now that there are chances of obtaining aid 
from both Cold War camps, whereas before 1954 neutralists 
were wholly dependent on Western aid and trade. As the 
number of .potential donors and markets has increased and 
has-come to involve both Cold War camps, the possibilities 
for neutralist statee to gain .economic advantages from 
playing off rival powers have increased considerably,1* as, 
in general, neither Cold War camp appears anxious to see a 
neutralist state become an economic, and then perhaps a 
-political, dependency of its rival. 
In fact, some of the new and ostensibly neutralist 
* 2 
states'are .almost wholly dependent on Western aid - Jordan * 
1 . Cambodia has hitherto been a very successful practitioner 
of this art. See Pifield , op . c i t . , pp. 366-393. See 
also The Economist, 11 May 1957, p. 508; The Observer, 
16 June 1957 ft 3 July i960; & The Times, 20 June i960 & 
31 Dec . i960 . 
2 . This was certainly true of Jordan from 1948-57, see The 
Middle East, op .cit . ch. 7 , esp. pp. 345-349; see also 
M .S .P . 19bl, op .cit . p. 84 - "Jordan i s not a viable 
economic unit , yet preservation of its stability remains 
vital to preservation of peace in the area. Therefore 
the United States, and to a lesser degree the United 
Kingdom, contribute substantial direct support for 
Jordan1в national budget." 
and I srael 1 * are notable examples for their economic 
I * , t 
v iab i l i ty . To date, no neutralist state has lost i t s 
• Г 1 ' 4 
political independence" as "a result of Soviet economic pressure. 
2 
Probably the nearest example was Syria " in the two or three 
years before it joined with 'Egypt ' in the United Arab Republic, 
but even here other factors - especially the pan-Arabism of 
Syria ' s Baathist leaders - need to be adduced also in order 
to explain fully why she joined with Egypt in February 1958 . 
Finally , there are two marked exceptions to the general 
tendency that new states become neutralist . These are the 
Philippines and Pakistan. The close alignment of the 
Phil ippines with the United States stems not only from the 
1 . See The Middle East, o p . c i t . pp. 312-14; see also speoial 
Economist survey on I srael , 16 May 1959 , pp. 1-24 -
"Israel gets f inancial help from the U . S . ; credits , jets 
& sympathy from.France; reparations on the generous side 
fibm West Germany; warships from Britain . All this i s 
welcome.- and necessary - but does not alter the fact of 
I s r a e l ' s basic isolation" p.- 7 . The survey does, however, 
suggest that Israel i s reducing this isolation by develop-
ing friendships with such neutralist states ae Yugoslavia, 
Burma & Ghana. Even so, I s r a e l ' s policy i s generally 
regarded as pro-Westem despite the lock of formal t i e s . 
Neutralism i s thought of as a possible 'new l i n e ' , not as 
descriptive of present pol icies , see W. Z. Laqueitr-
JJIsrael's Great Foreign Policy Debate" in Commentaryt 
August 1955 , p . 1 1 0 . . . . < 
2 . See Walter Z. Laqueur - The Soviet Union and the Middle 
East (London, 1 9 5 9 ) , esp. pp. 247-280; & George Kirk -
"The Syrian Crisis of 1957 ; Fact and Fiction" in 
International A f fa irs ( R . I . I , A . ) Jan, i 9 60 , pp. 58-61, 
agreements made on the eve of independence*' in 1946, but 
also from her unique status and experience as America's only 
Asian 'colony' before 1945. Certainly, Filipino-American 
relations seem to reflect a mutuality of interests which have 
2 
continued with surprisingly few strains since 1946. * This is 
not to say that the Philippines could not become a neutralist 
state, it is to say that neutralism has, so far , seemed to be 3 
an insignificant force in Filipino politics. Pakistan is 
a less strong exception to the rule than i s the Philippines. 
She was without formal commitments to either Cold War camp 
л 
prior to 1954. Then at least five factors helped to bring 
about an abandonment of non-alignment. These were: the 
patent failure of attempts to put Pakistan at the head of an 
association of Islamic states, or even to establish cordial 
relations with most Arab states; worsening relations both 
1 . See Fif ield , op .c it . pp. 60-66. 
2 . See F i f i e l d , i b i d . pp. 60-107; & Hahn, Peters & Rosenthal -
"The United States and the Philippines" in American-Asian 
Tensions, ed. by Strausz-Hupe, Cottrell & Dougherty (New 
York, 1956) , pp. 123-146. 
3 . See Keith Callard - Pakistan. A Political Study (Allen & 
Unwin, London, 1957 ) , esp. oh. 10, "Pakistan and the 
World . " 
4 . See Callard, i b i d . ; & Jamee W. Spain - "Military Assistance 
for Pakistan" in A . P . S . R . , Sept. 1953, PP. 738-751. 
with Afghanistan and with India ; a real sense of vulnerability 
especially strong in a state divided into two parts and 
separated by more than a thousand miles of territory occupied • 
by an unfriendly neighbour; famine in 1953 in what had 
hitherto been a grain surplus produoing country; and 
Г » У 
American enthusiasm - at that time - f o r making aid agreements 
mostly with formal military a l l i e s . Together these were 
powerful enough influences to pull Pakistan into an all iance . 
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NEUTRALISM AS STATE POLICY some case studies. 
"There i s room for a more detailed analysis of the logic 
of s ituations . " 
Karl Popper. 
" I n d i a , Yugoslavia and the United Arab 
Republic - three pioneer neutralists . 
India , Yugoslavia and the United Arab Republic1* are 
the contemporary neutralist states par excellence. Each of 
them has pioneered policies which are^now, in some respects 
at least , generally regarded as being typically neutralist . 
All three of them provide articulate, even vehement, spokesmen 
for anti-colonial causes; t a l l three seek foreign aid to 
forward their ambitious plans for national development; and 
all three are ' revisionist ' rather than ' status quo' powers, 
IX , 
though the quality of their revisionism d i f fers . Awareness 
of their a f f i n i t i e s , and the currents of contemporary inter-
* T 
national pol it ics , has encouraged them to develop diplomatic 
о 
contacts wixn each other. Together their three leaders, 
Mr. Nehru, President Tito and President Nasser, make up a 
formidable triumvirate, each coming from a different continent 
i . ' ^ • 
and each aspiring to play an influential part in world 
t 
a f f a i r s . None of these leaders regards a neutralist foreign 
policy merely as a way of keeping out of Cold War quarrels . 
On. the contrary, thejr each aspire to a position of importance 
and of leadership in international a f f a i r s . Both the Cold 
War struggle and the emergence of new state neutralism have с 
The United Arab Republic came into being by the union of 
Egypt and Syria in Feb.- 1958 . Here we are concerned 
almost exclusively, with the Egyptian half of the United 
Arab Republic, and with Egypt from 1945 to 1958 . 
КЗ 
enabled them to realise these ambitions, though in different 
ways , ' to the extent that in 1961 India , Yugoslavia .and Egypt 
are the leading neutralist states in the world. • Here the 




For maiy people I n d i a ' s foreign policy i s the paradigm 
' I i ' - f ' 
of a neutralist foreign policy. For not only i s India the 
f i r s t , the largest and perhaps the most predictable of the' 
• f* ' * 
new state neutralists of the Cold V/ar (and occupying a 
^n J * 
pivotal position in As ia ) , but in the quality of her leader-
•r . - . , . , « 
ship and the scrupulousness of her diplomacy she i s perhaps 
- t • 
the most convincingly independent of the new state neutralists . 
_ . - 1 
Any analysis of I n d i a ' s neutralist policy must begin by 
* Л 4 
acknowledging4he paramount role and importance of the man 
who continuously since 1947 has been both Prime Minister and 
* * 1 
Foreign Minister of independent Ind ia . ' But Mr. Nehru ' s * 
t y. 
great influence goes back f u r t h e r 4 h a n 1947 , to his work and 
influence in the Congress Party from the 1920s onwards and я „ 
to h i s intimate association with Gandhi. Mr. Nehru 's habit , - » 
of public comment on the outstanding .international issues of 
the day c\Aso cia(etl-fc>m the 1920s , f o r he has always conceived 
. 1 . The'two best of the many'studies of Nehru are by Frank 
Moraes - Jawaharlal Nehru (New York, 1956) & by Michael 
Brecher1- Nehru. A Political Biography (London, 1 9 5 9 ) . 
ПО 
of India being able to play an important role in world 
politics in harmony with the promotion'of I n d i a ' s immediate 
* ч 
interests . Though it would be wrong to say that the precise 
course of I n d i a ' s foreign policy was charted before 1947 , it 
would -be right to say that many of her post-1947 preoccupat-
ions - concern with world peacej sympathy for anti-colonialist 
and anti-racialist causes, a conception of I n d i a ' s importance 
in world a f fa irs - were prefigured in Mr. Nehru 's writings 
and speeches before she emerged as an independent state. 
This preceding period of verbal formulation of I n d i a ' s policy, 
and Mr. Nehru 's insistence from the 1920s onwards that the 
Congress Party must have an international outlook, has a 
threefold relevance today. Firstly , it helped to create an 
f * ' 
impression from the earliest days of Indian independent)ec-
« 1 
that I n d i a ' s favourite foreign policy methods * were generally , . 4 
well thought out and related to a general pattern of policy. 
Secondly, it goes a long way towards explaining why Indians 
v . . 
themselves seem to place such importance on 'correct thinking ' 
r 
and 'the intrinsic power of i d e a s . ' Thirdly, and most 
1 . These have been well_ summarised by Professor Appadorai as: 
"To keep the peace, by peaceful means - negotiation, 
inquiry, mediation, conciliation and arbitration; l isten 
to the viewpoint of both parties to a dispute expressed 
by their duly constituted representatives; hesitate to 
condemn either party as an aggressor, u n t i l facts proved 
by international enquiry indisputably testify to aggress-
ion;. believe the bona f ides of both unt i l proof to the 
contrary; and explore ful ly the. poss ib i l i t ies of negotiat-
ion and at least localize war - this i s I n d i a ' s view" , 
^ quoted in Benjamin Akzin - New States and International 
' Organisations (Paris , 1 9 5 5 ) , p . 174 . 
relevant to neutralism generally,^it indicates why it was that 
India , through the person of Mr. Nehru, was able to pioneer 
the notion thatj neutralism could be a carefully thought out, 
intell igible and respectable policy. Not only was he the 
f irst internationally influential exponent of neutralist 
doctrine , 1 * but $he showed that he could translate his ideas 
•into practice with some considerable success, even though 
* -F 
Indian policy had to be alert to the vicissitudes of the Cold 
War. While i t is probably true to say that .the intentions 
of India*s ,policy makers have remained broadly the same sinoe 
1947 , "the actual-course of I n d i a ' s neutralist policy has gone 
through three stages.» 
Between 1947 and 1950 India was preoccupied with 
immediate tasks flowing from the newly achieved independence 
following the partition o f t Brit ish India . Domestic and 
foreign policy tasks were.closely linked, f o r not only was the 
promotion and consolidation of national unity essential , but 
Nehru clearly saw that popular support for foreign policy 
could, become an.important cement of national unity . Great 
stress, too, was laid on I n d i a ' s need to . industrial ise . I t 
was perhaps inevitable that Indo-Pakistan relations should 
be strained from the start, considering the circumstances of . 
2 
their mutual origin , but the unresolved fate of Kashmir * 
1 . See,Independence and After. A collection of the more 
important.speeches of Jawaharlal Nehru from September 1946 
to May 1949 (Delhi , 1949 ) , esp. pp. 199-338, & appendix 5 
below, pp. 2 7 4 - 2 , ^ 3 -
2 . See Moraes, op . c i t . pp. 385-399. 
ГТ> 
undoubtedly magnified mutual animosities. I n d i a ' s continuing 
close relationship, with Great Britain should be seen, there-
fore , not only in terms of a large legacy of goodwill, 
expressed especially in good, relations with the 'Attlee govern-
ment and in ,olose economic ties , but also as a means of. pre-
venting Pakistan developing exclusive relations with Britain 
to the detriment of Ind ia . Apart.from the Kashmir issue , 
India's^championship of Indonesian independence was her most 
active international concern in these y e a r s . Ä t this time 
Indian neutralism seemed to have a pro-Western orientation. 
This was partly shewn in India* s xsuccess in being the f i rst 
» * I 
Asian state to reconcile independent status with Commonwealth 
membership, though her relations with the United States were 
merely correct and tepid, as Mr. N e h r u ' s . v i s i t to that country 
2 
in 1949 * seemed to underline. More significantly , this 
apparent pro-Western inclination was the unavoidable con-
sequence "of Soviet propaganda, and of the Asian Communist 
parties ' persistence in portraying India as not , in f a c t , 
independent at a l l , but as st i l l tied to the ' i m p e r i a l i s t s . ' 
Prom 1951 to 1956 India pursued a fa irly active mediator-
i a l role and moved from a Western orientated neutralism 
towards a more strictly middle-of-the-road position. The 
, * r. strengths and limitations of Indian neutralist diplomacy were 
1 . For deta i ls , seen P . Karunakaran - India' in Wo r i d Affairs, 
1947-50 (Bombay, 1 9 5 2 ) . . 
2 . See Brecher, o p . c i t . pp. 419-20. 
shown by her behaviour towards such issues as thelKorean, 
Indo-Chinese and Suez wars and the "Hungarian Revolution.**-
It was a period during which Indian relations with Russia 
generally improved, while those with the.United States deter-
iorated, and those with Britain showed some considerable • 
f luctuations . Two working assumptions of Indian diplomacy, 
always there? but particularly.evident i n p t h i s phase, are that 
Asian affairs-should be decided by Asians and that all remaining 
2 
vestiges of "colonialism" must be removed. . In effect , the 
policies flowing,from these assumptions tended to improve 
Indian relations with the Communist powers? and in particular 
ъ 
with-Communist China, and to embarras or put strain, on her 
relationstwith the Western powers. -During these years Indian 
leaders tended to*stress China's.Asian,- rather than her* 
Communist, character; and to hint that she was a potential 
neutralist , perhaps an Asian Titoist . Certainly, both during 
the Korean and the Indo-China war, India cast herself in the 
role of intermediary between the Communist powers and the 
• w * * * * * , Л 
West, showedtgreat solicitude for Chinese feel ings , great 
suspicion of American aggressiveness, and worked hard to < 
t * - • » » • 
secure satisfactory compromisestand"peaceful settlement. An 
1 . For details , see K . T P . Karunakaran - India in World Affairs* 
1950-53 (Bombay, 1 9 5 8 ) , & Brecher, op . c i t . ' chapter 19 . 
—————• t 
2 . See Moraes, o p . c i t . chapter 26 - " India and A s i a . " 
u 1 • « / 
3 . See Brecher, o p . c i t . pp. 583-592. 
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undramatic yet significant aspect of I n d i a ' s diplomacy on 
these occasions was her close continuing contacts and, at 
times, working co-operation with Great Britain . Commonwealth 
t ies here probably aide'd co-operation-where no conflicting 
interests were involved. .By contrast, British and, more 
importantly, Pakistani adhesion to the Baghdad Pact and to < 
S . E . A . T . O . called forth much.criticism of Britain , both from 
I n d i a ' s o f f ic ial leadership and ^Indian opinion at large . 
Bulganin andKforushchev, when they paid austate visit to India 
in 1955» received such an apparently enthusiastic welcome 
that widespread alarms were expressed in many Western countriei 
These probably exaggerated the diplomatic implications of 
I n d i a ' s reception-of these two Communist leaders, for it i s 
f a r more l ikely that such a reception was compounded of 
public curiosity , genuine hospitality , and relief on the part 
of the o f f i c ia l leadership now that Soviet policies towards 
India had changed.for the better. * 
1 . See M. S. Rajan - "Stresses and Strains in Indo-British 
Relations, 1954-6" in International Studies ( D e l h i ) , 
October, i 960 , pp. 153-189.J* 1454-MeA^v, f W ho tafce c*cho* hreshti* 
ik\aia^ ( frov* .tfy/ьхА to occuLpu fae ptvb^^tit £-*->&iÄud <и l^iicx or 
2. See Geoffrey Tyson - ^India ana 'the Russian V i s i t o r s " , 
Tniomptinnni Affairs ( R . I . I . A . ) April 1956 , pp. 173-180. 
It was Tyson's view (p. 1 80 ) that "Mr. Nehru 's polit ical 
neutralism'has now been extended to the economic sphere, 
where i ts practical application-means that India w i l l 
Consider herself free ..to accept assistance of every kind rora the Communist world-without prejudice to her relat-
ions with the WeBt." ["Än Economist -survey of 26.March i960 
pp.1263-1285, ' showed that 90У> of foreign aid to India came 
from Western sources & •only 10% from the Soviet bloc, see 
esp. p . 1281 . * .another Economist appraisal of the Indian 
economy, 28 Jan. 1961 , t pp .342-350 , concluded that " India 
will not f ind economic independence in the next decade."^ 
< * From'1951 onwards India had assiduously striven to build 
up close relations with" a number of fellow neutralist states, 
and fras widely regarded as the leader of the "so-called Ärab-
Äsian" b l o c 1 , in the United Nations. With the rapid expansion 
of Asian and African membership of the United Nations, this 
bloc grew correspondingly, became known as the Afro-Asian 
2 « 
bloc^ ^became more unwieldy", and I n d i a ' s undisputed leadership 
began to diminish, though between''1954 and the f iret?half 'of 
1956 India seemed to be-developing especially" close diplomatic 
3 , 
t ies with Egypt "and Yugoslavia. With the eruption of the 
Suez and Hungarian crises in 1956 , I n d i a ' s neutralist policies 
were less effective than-during the Korean and Indo-China wars. 
With" Britain a belligerent in. the Suez war (and with Hungary 
part of-the Soviet 'empire) , it was* not possible to resume *' 
Indö-British compromise procedures as had worked at the time 
of the Korean and Indo-China wars. Though in the Suez 
question India approved of the active mediatorial role of her 
fellow Commonwealth member,.Canada, she"herself came to 
support her neutralist f r iend , Egypt, with whose plight she 
had a great deal of sympathy- Mr. Nehru ' s i n i t ia l public 
1 . Early Arab-Asian co-operation i s discussed in Egypt and 
1the United Nations (New York, 1 9 5 7 ) , pp. 73-75. 
2 . See Triska and Koch - "The Asian-African Nations and 
• International Organization'" in Review of Pol i t ics . April 
1959 , PP. 417-456. 
3 . See Economist, 1'4 July 1956 , p . I l l ; the Scotsman, 19 July 
1956; & Time and Tide, ,21 July 1956 . 
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reaction to the? Hungarian Revolution was vacillating and then 
rather evasive. This caused great annoyance in the Western 
world and among a sizeable segment of Indian opinion, and he 
was accused of applying double standards, either as between 
the Suez and Hungary questions, or as between Asian and 
European questions. His own explanation about his early 
reaction to Hungarian events was that it was ,diff icult^to 
f ind out, exactly what was happening, and this may have been 
true i f , as was l i k e l y h e was relying on-President Tito as 
h i s prime source for information*'- for T i to ' s reaction to 
2. 
the Hungarian Revolution.was equally equivocal. ^ Another 
factor influencing the course of Indian neutralism was the 
development of Soviet aid programmes from 1954 onwards. 
Prom a neutralist point of view, th is had the political ad-
vantage of removing a wholesale dependence on the Western 
powers for vital foreign aid to f u l f i l ' t h e goals of her five-
year plans, and also eventually stimulated increased offers of 
aid from the Western powers. By the end of 1956 India had 
evolved a neutralist foreign policy recognised by both Cold 
War camps as independent, and, i f only by contrast with the 
years 1947-51, it seemed slightly inclined in favour of the 
Soviet b l o c . 3 * 
Л 4 , 
1 . I owe this point to Richard Lowenthal - " T i t o ' s Gamble" in 
Enoourite'r,«October, 1958 , p. $ 1 . 
2 . See belowpp. 
3 . See Brecher, o p . c i t . pp. 582-8. 
Since 1957 India has tended to be content with a rather 
quieter role internationally than hitherto; by. contrast 
with, say, either Egypt or Yugoslavia, to be more moderate, 
less radical and revisionist , even on anti-colonial issues . 
These.contrasts have been particularly evident in the policies 
of these three states towards the problems arising from the 
civil-war in the former Belgian Congo . 1 , This generally 
quieter, moderate r o l e ' i s not only to be explained in terms 
of .the free inclinations of India 's , leaders - their distaste 
for belligerent methods and their preference for trying to 
reconcile'-."anti-colonial"'with "repentant colonial" states -
but, also , because India has felt the need to devote, more 
energy than hitherto to pressing foreign policy tasks nearer 
home.. -Furthermore, the hitherto, broadly based national unity 
about I n d i a ' s neutralist -foreign policy has shown some signs 
2 
of weakening. * The dispute with China over Tibet and the 
1". See Daily Telegraph, 16 Dec. i 9 6 0 , & Observer. 5 March 1961 
2. See two articles by Cyril Dunn in the Observer. 10 & 17 
April i 9 6 0 . The most tel l ing arguments have not been 
'directed against the fact of I n d i a ' s neutralism - this 
i s st i l l broadly accepted as right - but whether the 
methods adopted are best designed to secure I n d i a ' s 
interests . Less attention to world problems and more 
'attention to Indian problems i s what i s wanted, say 
Nehru 's c r i t i c s . One of the ablest of these i s Acharya 
Kripalani (leader of the .Praja Socialist Party) , see his 
article - "For a Principled Neutral ity " , Foreign Affairs . 
Oct. 1959» pp. 46-60. The Indian interests most referred 
to by cr it ics are Kashmir and Goa, and relations with 
China, Pakistan and Ceylon. 
rf« 
Indian border 1 ' i s the most dramatio of these concerns, but 
the growing demands of l inguistic nationalism - or even 
separatism, as in the case of the Nagas - and the continuance 
of bad relations with a now militarily stronger Pakistan, • 
are further reasons for Indian disquiet. These recent trends 
have provoked Mr* Nehru to strongly re-affirm the essential 
2 ' 
Tightness of Indian neutralism " in face, of such d i f f i c u l t i e s . 
i • 
Yet the paradox of I n d i a ' s position remains. Though., 
territorially large and with a large population, she i s 
neither mil itarily nor economically strong. She i s neither 
a small state, nor a world power. As the leading neutralist 
power, the more successful her foreign policy i s , the more 
influential she becomes, the greater are the temptations to 
take on tasks which divert resources and energies from 
domestic tasks and from the safeguarding of her frontiers . 
1 . See Cyril Dunn - "The Double Policy of Mr. Nehru" in the 
Observer, 13 Sept. 1959 . The 'double policy ' i s one of 
• simultaneously fortifying I n d i a ' s Himalayan frontiers 
while trying to settle all border disputes w i t h Communist 
China by negotiation. See also William Kirk - . "The 
Sino-Indian Frontier Dispute" in The Scottish Geographical 
Magazine, i 960 , pp. 3-13. 
2 . See, for example, speeches reported in The Guardian, 2 
Nov. 1959 ; & The Times, 11 Nov.. 1959 . 
Yugo slavia 
Yugoslavia 's neutralist policy originated with her ex-
communication from the Cominform in June 1948 . I t sprang 
from Tito ' s determination to resist , and*Stal in ' s determin-
г V 
ation to impose, a strict . ideological and political conformity 
on Yugoslavia under Soviet leadership.** The seeds of the 
clash, and the most powerful reasons for T i to ' s successful 
resistance, lay in the,unique Second World War,experiences 
2 
of Yugoslavia among the eventual eaet European satellites 
of the Soviet Union. Altogether three factors were most 
important: ( 1 ) Yugoslavia was the only east European f ighting 
* . • ? » 
ally of both the Soviet Union and the Allied powers simul-
taneously; ( 2 ) Yugoslavia was not subjected to Soviet 
SO *2 f , 
occupation andjthe Yugoslav Communist leadership was not 
\ . ' t ' , ' 
beholden to the Red Army for i t s power; (3) Geographically, 
is the largest Balkan state and i s , except for Albania, 
at the remotest c o m e r of the Soviet 's European satellite 
system. . I t i s probable that Soviet pressures on Yugoslavia, 
especially between 1947 and 1949, did much to consolidate 
1 . For an account of the dispute, see H. F. Armstrong - Tito 
and Goliath, (London, 1951 ) , esp. chapters 2-11; & Adam 
B. Ulam - Titoism and*the Cominform (Cambridge, Mass .1952) 
2*. See Hugh Set on-Wat son - The East European Revolution (2nd 
ed . .London, 1952) pp. 118-131, 157-161, 219-225; & 
Vladimir Dedijer - Tito Speaks, (London, 1 9 5 3 ) , part 2, 
* pp. 95-248. 
iSo 
T i to ' s regime in power and perhaps to forge a greater sense 
of Yugoslav national unity than hitherto. This latter point 
i s admittedly conjectural, but Soviet bloc pressure in these 
years was the f i rst time that a substantial external threat 
seemed to work against the whole, and not a part of .the mosaic 
of n a t i o n a l i t i e s 1 , which make up Yugoslavia. Though the 
Soviet-Yugoslav dispute inevitably took on the appearance of 
an ideological struggle, * i t s real substance centred upon 
Yugoslav insistence upon maintaining the independence of their 
state and T i to ' s Шъ&вХconcerning Communism in the Balkans. 
Yugoslavia 's success in resisting Soviet pressures was the 
f i r s t dramatic instance of the ability of a non-aligned state 
to resist considerable great power pressure in Cold 47ar 
conditions, while remaining formally uncommitted to the other 
Cold War camp. Since June 1948 Yugoslavia 's neutralist 
policy has varied with the fluctuations in Soviet-Yugoslav 
relations , and correspondingly these have reflected f a i r l y 
closely the major vicissitudes of the Cold War. 
1 . For a fascinating pre-war picture of this d iversity , see 
Rebecca West 's Black Lamb and Grey Falcon (2 vols . London, 
1 942 ) . For some more recent discussions of the signific-
ance of Yugoslavia 's multi-national composition, see 
J . Frankel - "Federalism in Yugoslavia" in A . P . S . R . 1955 . 
pp. 416-430, & Richard Goold-Adams - "Yugoslavia Between 
Two Worlds" in The Listener,- 12 July, 1956 , pp.41-2. 
•2. The published correspondence at the time of the 'Yugoslav 
break with the • Cominform i s collected and edited in 
Soviet-Jugoslav Dispute ( R . I . I . A . , London, 1 9 4 8 ) . 
3 . See Vladimir Dedijer - Tito Speaks, o p . c i t . part 3 , pp. 
249-384. 
The ''years from'1948 to 1953 were narked by the unrelenting 
hostility of- al l Communist states towards Jugoslavia , against 
wtiom they imposed a complete boycott and blockade. For more 
than a year after she" left *.the Cominform Yugoslavia was 
completely isolated. For "as ar-Communist state she was 
regarded'with suspicion by all the Western powers (and, in 
particular , she was at loggerheads'with Italy ove> Trieste, 
and-with fGreece',because",3of Yugoslav aid to Greek-Communists), 
and having seceded, from the Soviet*bloc*in the name' of the 
sovereign independence of small states, she was under a 
polit ical 'necessity not to enter subserviently a rival bloc. 
Then she* began, of necessity , to work for "a detente7 with the 
B e s t e m powers.1*» Tito needed economic^aid to counteract 
the Cominform'a blockade and to 'forward^his economic plans, 
and he needed military aid to deter or, i f necessary, to 
. , . , . 2 . 
repel Soviet attacks. 'He got-both, and - of great-signific-
ance in the history of neutralism - he got them on terms he 
could accept without endangering his standing in h i s own 
country. In effect , the unremitting hostility of the Soviet 
. A ' О 
bloc and such a c t s ^ i n addition to taking Western a id ) as the 
' ' . . 3 . - ' 
verbal condemnation of North Korean aggression, the conclusion 
ч 
1 . Foi- "details, see Survey for 1949-50 ( R . I . I . A . ) pp. 258-281. 
2 . For deta i ls , see Survey for 1951 ( R . I . I . A . J T pp. 240-254. 
3." This was a d i f f icult „decision for the Yugoslav leadership . 
After more than 2, months* vacil lation , * she declared i n Sept 
1950 that North Korea was the aggreseor, though she excused 
herself*even-a symbolic part in the military action by 
maintaining that as she was threateüed herself-her best 
service to the cause of peace would be to'concentrate her 
forces on the protection of her own frontiers , 
,of a treaty of friendship and co-operation with two U .A .Т .О . 
powers - Greece and Turkey in February . 1 9 5 3 , a n d Tito 's 
state visit to Britain in.March 1953, all..gave a strong 
impression of a pro-Western orientation. Yet Tito was 
constantly at pains to stress Yugoslav independence of either 
Cold War camp, to insist that Western aid was "without strings^ 
to-criticise either camp whenever he saw f i t a n d to develop 
2 
•an ideological intermediacy distinguishing Yugoslavia.from 
either "capitalism" or "Stalinism" in the name of "true" 
Marxist-Leninism. i <• . J 
Following the death of Stalin in.March 1953, a gradual 
Soviet/Yugoslav^detente began to unfold.with gestures of 
conciliation and; at times, even of contrition being made by 
Soviet leaders, though these were, .at f i rst , regarded with 
some scepticism or, at least, coolness by President Tito. * 
The first half of 1955 .saw a definite broadening in Yugoslav 
policy. Though one aspect of this was the growing rapproche-
ment with the Soviet bloc, this renewed amity was restrained, 
1 . In fact , this Balkan alliance - the Ankara Pact, as it i s 
sometimes called - fe l l into abeyance soon after i ts in-
auguration as the .Cyprus dispute divided Greece & Turkey. 
After the Cyprus settlement Yugoslavia was too far commit-
ted to neutralism to wish to be reminded.of her links with 
military blocs. I t s demise was officially announced in 
June i960 . "See The Times, 25 June, i960 . 
2 . This did not emerge clearly until the 6th Yugoslav Commun-
ist Party. Congress in Nov. 1952, see R. Barry^Farrell -
Jugoslavia and the Soviet Union, 1948-1956. An Analysis 
with Documents (Yale U .P . 1957) esp. pp.125-141 & 146-160. 
3 . See Ernst Halperin - The Triumphant Heretic. T ito 's 
* Struggle Against Stalin (London. 1958) pp. 2b0-277. 
not only by the legacy of past years of enmity', but also 
because Tito in h is journeyings in Asia between 17th December, 
1954 aha 11th February, 1955 , was developing contacts with 
Asian neutralist states, * and-1 giving h is hitherto proclaimed 
policy of independence of the two Cold'War blocs a moire 
positive cbnfent."4 Hitherto, Yugoslav neutralism had been 
mainly 0rather negative, concerned to'show-that Yugoslavia-was 
not subservient to either Cold War camp, now I t was to be 
shown that she had"friends and influence among other un-
committed states. Thls*v£as ä shrewd (or, at least , fortunate) 
anticipation of developing trend's, for not only did it open 
the way for future Yugoslav identification and co-operation^ 
with 'the Bandung neutralists' ; but in- so doing it gave her a 
lead"1 over rthe Soviets when they, too, began, to develop friendly 
relations with Asian and"African neutralists , 
, p 
The reconciliation between- the Soviets and Yugoslavia 
Ъ developed f i rst by'improving economic relations , and 
consummated with Khrushchev's public apology in Belgrade in 
May 1955 , when he admitted that the previous policy"of the 
a .. — 
1 . See Survey ( R . I . I . A . ) for 1955-6, pp. 54-6. The authors. 
* suggest that as a result of this tour T ito •s policy 
. "acquired the essentijal points d 'appul which i t had hither-
to lacked . " Though Tito repeatedly opposed the oreation 
of a third bloc, he identified Yugoslavia 's policy closely 
with I n d i a ' s , both of them being "neither 'neutral ity ' nor 
•neutralism' and therefore p a s s i v i t y . . . b u t . . . a positive , 
active and constructive policy seeking to lead to 
collective peace . " ( ib id . p . 5 5 ) . 
2 . I b i d . pp. 133-138 and 268-272. 
Soviet Union towards Yugoslavia had been raistaken, and blamed 
these mistakes on the executed Beria. The of f ic ial Yugoslav 
reaction to .this visit was to re-affirm her determination to 
continue, to pursue an independent,policy internationally, to 
express-satisfaction i.at improving relations with the Soviet 
Union, while, emphasising that, the rapprochement was between 
the ctwo states not between two Communist parties . Though 
during the next twelve months Tito came to agree to the 
restoration of, amicable party 'contacts and to endorse Soviet 
stands on a number of major international issues1*-, especially 
Germany - he continued to emphasise h is determination to 
belong to neither Cold War camp. His problem was, in f a c t , 
to establish and .maintain good relations with a l l three 'groups 
in world pol it ics - the Western powers, the Soviet bloc, and 
the.uncommitted c o u n t r i e s ^ while avoiding the danger  4(alvrays 
a veal one Nongovernments in intermediate positions) of being 
thought a nuisance by all three. Improved relations with 
the Soviet bloc reduced h is reliance on the Western powers for 
help and increased his freedom for manoeuvre. Between 1954 
ctrtJ 1957 Tito sought to discover how far Soviet-Yugoslav co-
operation could go, short of Yugoslav subservience to the 
Soviet Union. Good relations with fellow neutralist states 
here enhanced T i to ' s bargaining power inasmuch as the Soviets 
1 . I b i d . p. 135 f n . 3 & p . 270. 
seemed to regard reconciliation with Yugoslavia^ as an 
essential part of the Soviet 'new line* of wooing the 
neutralist states. С 
Kay 1955 to June 1956 saw the steady development of- this 
new Soviet-Yugoslav cordiality. ^Thereafter relations were 
subject to dramatic fluctuations, probably depending on events 
inside the Soviet bloc - and particularly on Sino-Soviet 
relations, as China came to be the most powerfully implacable 
^opponent of 'JTitoism'. May 1955 was the time of Krushchev 's 
journey of reconciliation- to Belgrade. In February 1956, at 
the Soviet 20th Party Congress,Khrushchev spoke of Stalin 's 
"shameful role" in the conflict with Yugoslavia. Shortly 
afterwards Rajk^ and other victims of various earlier anti-
// 
Titoist trials were^ rehabilitated. Molotov, a symbol, of the 
Stalinist line towards Yugoslavia, was removed from the post 
of Soviet Foreign Minister; and the Cominform, instrument of 
« 
Yugoslavia's earlier expulsion from the Soviet camp, was 
• * } * * 
dissolved. In June 1956 Tito wasKibrushchev's honoured guest 
in Mo scov/. 
Thereafter there was a deterioration in Soviet-Yugoslav 
relations. Biots in Poznan, Poland, soon after T ito ' s v isit 
to Moscow, led* to strong Soviet hints that they were opposed 
to any spread o f ' T i t ^ s t " influences inside the Communist camp. 
Yugoslav policies between'June 1956 and November 1957, when 
she refused to rejoin the Soviet camp, are shrouded in 
ambiguity and their significance has been a subject of 
considerable controversy among ".Testern scholars , 1 " though it 
seems that Tito was endeavouring'to encourage 'de-Stalinisation' 
without dismembering the Communist camp. Yugoslav moves in 
thie period, some idea of their confusing meanderings, can be 
conveniently portrayed by means of a short chronological 
table:-
1956 
June Tito v i s i t s Moscow (deliberately avoiding Hungarian 
territory en route) . 
Riots in Poland. Gomulka - the Polish Titoist -
becomes Poland 's Prime Minister. 
July Brioni talks between Nehru, Nasser and Tito. 
A. U . S . aid to Yugoslavia severely cut. 
August New Soviet-Yugoslav trade agreement signed. 
Aug. - Tito supports Nasser in Suez c r i s i s . 
Feb. 1957 
27 Sept. - Tito in Crimea f o r discussions with Krushchev , 
5 Oct. reportedly to reach agreement concerning Hungary. 
15-23 Oct. Delegation from Central Committee of Hungarian 
Workers' Party visited Yugoslavia (this delegation 
had been immediately preceded by I t a l i a n , Polish 
arid Bulgarian delegations, and% was followed by a 
Roumanian one - signs that Belgrade might become a 
focal point for a new Balkan Communist a l l i a n c e . ) 
1 . c . f . Fitzroy Maclean - Disputed Barricade. !ghe L i f e and 
Times of Josip Broz-Tito (London, 1957J pp. 457-460; R. 
Lowenthal - " T i t o ' s Gamble" in Encounter, Oct. 195Q« pp.56-
65; Bromke. & Drachkovitch - "Poland and Yugoslavia: The 
Abortive All iance" in Problems of Communism, March-April 
1961 , pp.26-33; Ä. Barcan - "Yugoslavia and the Hungarian 
Revolution" in Australian QutlookT Ар/iL 1Й60. ?f> 30-24 
tfl 
1956 (contd. ) 
3 
23 Oct, Fighting broke out in Budapest, capital of Hungary. 
24 'Oct . Nagy, a known sympathiser with T ito , ' took over 
the Hungarian Premiership. 
L. ' f ' 
Geroe invited in Soviet troops, though he i s him-
self succeeded as head of Hungarian Communist A ! Party by Kadar the next day. 
28 Oct. The question of holding a debate on Hungarian, 
гс 
crisis was discussed in U . U . Security Council. « „ > • « 
The Yugoslav delegate said that it might only 
aggravate the:'situation and Yugoslavia would 
normally have opposed i t . As, however, .his govern-
4 ^ «. t - - - t, QU 
ment was opposed to .the use of foreign troops on 
the territory of other countries, he would abstain 
from voting. 
I Nov. Nagy government renounced the Warsaw Pact, declared 
Hungary's neutrality and asked f o r Pour Power 
с * 
guarantees and for the question of Hungary to be » r 
placed before the United Nations. 
1-23 Nov. Nagy and seventeen others took refuge in Yugoslav 
embassy in Budapest. When they l e f t , following 
' guarantees of security by Kadar, they were 
immediately taken into custody by the Soviet 
authorities . 
I I Nov. Tito, i n a speech at Pula, justified the second 
» 
Soviet intervention as necessary to crush counter-
* revolution, but blamed the f i r s t intervention for 
having prevented (acceptable reforms. 
1957 
February Soviets cancel aid agreement with Yugoslavia. _ 
1 9 5 7 ( c o n t d . ) 
April Tito, in a speech from Brioni, plays down sign-
ificance of Soviet/Yugoslav tensions. 
August jcfcrushchev and Tito meet for talks in Roumania. 
The cancelled Soviet/Jugoslav economic aid agree-
ments revived. Tito publicly subscribes to Soviet 
formula of "proletarian internationalism" as a 
guide to foreign policy. 
September Gomulka visits Yugoslavia. Tito supports Polish 
л 
claims to permanent"recognition of Oder-Neisse 
frontier. 
Tito grants[diplomatic recognition to eastern 
Germany - the first neutralist state to do so -
thus breaking off diplomatic relations with western 
Germany. 
November Yugoslav delegates refuse to sign the Moscow 
declaration of twelve ruling Communist parties, 
which faced them with the implicit choice of un-
conditionally joining the »Yarsaw Pact, or being 
attacked as 'revisionists''and"kept outside the 
Communist family. 
Since November 1957 Yugoslavia's foreign policy has aptly 
reflected what are perhaps the three most important facts to 
remember in an appreciation of her international position: 
that she is a state which is Communist, experiencing rapid 
economic growth, and is neutralist. 
Though she is clearly outside the Communist camp and her 
» » 
relations with members of the camp are subject to considerable 
fluctuations, this does not preclude extensive Yugoslav agree-
merit with1 Soviet views, on a wide range of current international 
issues . 1 * Rather,* this is to be expected from the very fact 
that' she i s a Communist state. And though she is politically 
a. pariah from the Communist camp, she continues to trade, 
though somewhat haphazardly and strictly on a bilateral basis, 
with a number of Soviet bloc countries. 
2 
•Secondly, Yugoslavia's.economy is developing rapidly, -
and .the uncertainties of economic relations with....the Soviet 
bloc seem' to have'persuaded her' to t u m primarily, towards the 
•3 
Western powers, *• i f only'in economic matters. 
1 . For example, T ito ' s speech, enthusiastically applauded by 
fCfcrushchev, at the '15th session of the U .N . General Assembly 
when he dealt at length with Western colonialism, called 
for the admission of China to the U.1T., expressed anxiety 
about German militarism, criticised U .N . work in the Congo, 
supported Russian disarmament proposals.and questioned the 
good fa ith of-the West in disarmament negotiations. See 
The Times, 23 Sept. i960 . 
2 . "industrial production has increased' fivefold since 1946 
(when admittedly it was very low). The national income, 
which between 1948 & 1952 was increasing at an annual rate 
of 1.9/>, has for the past 4 years been rising, they claim, 
by nearly 13$ a year. This year. they are embarking upon 
,their fourth five-year plan, at xhe end of which they . 
confidently predict that Yugoslavia wil l have become a 
developed country," quoted from The Economist, 7 Jan. 1961, 
p . 20. For details , see Yugoslav Survey. A Record of 
Facts ana Information (Belgrade), April i960 , et seq. 
quarterly, passim. 
3 . In i960 Yugoslav requests for permanent observer status 
on the Communist Council for Mutual Economic Aid were 
turned down; subsequently she sought to strengthen existing 
links with O . E . E . C . (reconstituted in 1961 as O . E . C . D . ) , 
to become a ful l member of G . A . T . T . , and to undertake 
currency reform in order to improve trading relations with 
Western powers. See C . S . M . , 9 Jan. 1961; & Economist. 
7 Jan. 1961, pp. 19-20. 
Finally , as a neutralist state, Yugoslavia has not only 
avoided diplomatic isolation but has gained considerable 
prestige and influence by strengthening and increasing 
friendly relations with ä number of fellov/ neutralist states. 
This has been done not only by T i to ' s international tours 1* 
and by taking part in various neutralist meetings - of which 
the neutralist summit in Belgrade in September 1961 i s äAtfwost' 
dramatic instance - but also by developing Yugoslav trade 
2 
and aid with neutralist<states in Asia and Africa . . Thus, 
by-the beginning'of 1961 Yugoslavia had become one of the 
leading neutralists of the world, and was acting as a mentor 
to other neutralist states. 
1 . Tito made a 10 week tour, of Asien end Middle'-Eastern 
neutralist countries between Deo. 1958 and March 1959 . 
Speaking of this tour, before hi's departure Tito stressed 
that he wanted to see neutralist nations more engaged in 
influencing events. See The Tines, 24 Nov. 1958 , & i b i d . 
2 Dec. 1958 . 
2 . " In 1959 and . i960 Yugoslavia granted credits of more than 
$125 ran» to African and Asian countries so they could 
buy capital goods and other products from Y u g o s l a v i a . . . 
The biggest credit , JS40 mn. went to I n d i a . . . Other credits 
have gone to Ghana, Sudan, Pakistan and the United Arab 
Republic . " See C . S . M . , 20 July, 1961 . 
'Ill 
^Egypt's neutralist policy has no obvious starting point 
comparable with Yugoslavia's break with the Cominform or 
India ' 8 achievement-of independence. For an Egyptian it t 
might be,dated from the onset of the Cold War, or from the 
July Revolution of 1952, or from the conclusion of the Änglo-
Egyptian agreement-ofAOctober 1954 regarding the British 
evacuation of the Suez base, or from the actual departure of 
the*last of, the British troops from Suez in 1956 -»a few weeks 
before Nasser announced the nationalisation of the.Suez Canal 
• „ ч. ••• J 
Company. Be this as it may, Egyptian neutralism has always 
reflected the volatility of„Egyptian nationalism and the 
tensions-between specifically Egyptian and pan-Arab interests. 
Indeed, it mayjbejthought idle to search for the starting 
point of Egyptian neutralism, and be maintained instead that 
Egyptians,are neutralists by nature, j On this view Egyptian 
policies merely translate into action such widespread and 
deep-rooted attitudes as: chronic suspicion of great power 
policies, the desire for an untrammelled^ national'independence 
and for recognition and respect in the eyes of the outside 
world, a willingness to play off great powers against each 
other,»and anjurge to promote Arab u n i t y . C e r t a i n l y , these 
1 . See Jean & Simonne Lacouture r Egypt in Transition (trans-
lated by Francis Scarfe (London",. 195Ö) , pp. 221-222; & the 
Economist, 27 July 1957 - "Neutralism was not invented by 
President Nasser and the Syrian socialists. I t is almost 
as old as Arab nationalism i t s e l f . " p. 313 . 
IIA 
attitudes are as old as Egyptian nationalism and are all 
part-and parcel of radical Arab nationalism (perhaps all 
contemporary radical nationalisms) today. By 1961 Egypt 's 
leaders were" practising a form of neutralism frankly opportun-
ist and eclectic , propagandist and proselytist , friendly to 
virulent anti-Western and truculent nationalist movements 
in the Arab lands'and in Africa; a policy whicli haid placed 
Egypt among the leading neutralist« states of the world. 
Situated at the junction of .Africa arid Asia , midway 
between Morocco and I raq , with her cultural tradition , 
relatively large population, and historic sense of identity, 
Egypt seems-to be marked out for "leadership in the Arab world. 
Yet before the July Revolution this seems to have been a role 
which Egyptian leaders were-unwilling or unable to perform. 1* 
Indeed, right up to 1954 Egyptian leaders were preoccupied 
with'winnowing down and removing'all traces of Brit ish power 
and privilege within Egypt, as speedily as possible. Since 
1882 Egypt had been occupied by" Great Britain following the 
coincidence of an army revolt in Egypt and a revolt in Sudan 
against Egyptian rule . Formally neutral in both world wars, 
Egypt had, in fact , served as an important operational base 
for Britain in' both wars. 'Declared formally independent by 
the British in 1922 , Egypt had to wait until the Änglo-
1 . See Änwar G. Chejne - "Egyptian Attitudes Toward Pan-
Arabism" in Middle East Af fa irs , Summer 1957 , pp. 253-268. 
И З 
Egyptian treaty of 1936 before achieving any measure of 
control . in her foreign relations, and even this was circum-
scribed tby the requirement - that Britoih should be able to 
maintain a permanent military base in the vSuez Canal' zone -
though with provision for negotiation on -the terms of Britain 's 
occupancy'after twenty years . 1 " . 
Egypt emerged from the Second World War determined to 
• revise the 1936 ' treaty ; in particular, to secure the removal 
of. British troops/from her . so i l , and to end British control 
over the Sudan in the expectation of joining-Egypt and the 
Sudan in the *"Unity, of, the Ni le V a l l e y Z " 2 , I ronically , it 
was Great Britain who brought Egypt actively into Arab 
pol it ics and persuaded her leaders to take a leading role in 
the Arab League, * founded in <1945* 'fhe creation" of the state 
of Israel i n 1948 igave the Arab League a common enemy,, and .*. 
added an immediate and -lasting sore to Egyptian and, indeed, 
to Arab,; hatred and .distrust of • grea.t power pol ic ies . The 
humiliation, suffered by,- the Arab, and especially the Egyptian, 
armies in the Palestine war against Israel was a potent factor 
1 . For detai ls , see The Middle East, op . c i t . pp. 183-190; & 
Lenczowski, op'.cit. pp. 393-406. [Eventual Sudanese in-
dependence in 1956 was a rebuff to1"Egyptian hopes of an 
Egyptian/Sudanese u n i o n ( 
2. For deta i ls , see Lenezowski, o p . c i t . pp. 406-414. 
3 . See J . S. Raleigh "Ten Years>of the Arab League" in 
Middle East Af fa irs , March 1955 , PP. 65-77. 
making for the creation of the Arab Collective Security Pact 
of 1 9 5 0 , a n d in paving the way for the eventual overthrow 
2 
of Egyptian monarchy in 1952 . * 
While it i s true that prior.:to the overthrow of the 
monarchy in July, 1952 Egyptian leaders failed to secure the 
eviction of British troops from Suez and- the new settlement 
•3 
of Sudan's status, they nevertheless had endeavoured to 
^demonstrate Egypt's neutralism in the Cold War and dissatis-
faction with the continuance of formal ties with Britain by . 
such acts as: concluding trade agreements with the Soviet 
4 
Union in February 1948 and-July 1 9 5 1 , : ' by refusing to 
contribute forces,to the United Nations contingent in Korea . 
1 . See Keith Wheelock - Nasser ' s New Egypt (London, i 9 6 0 ) , p. 
207. I t i s this pact which Nasser later referred to as 
"the best possible system to defend our part of the world 
against any possible aggression. " See below appendix Sp2Y{ 
2 . Detailed accounts of the background and course of 'the 
revolution' have been written by two of the main partic-
ipants — see Anwar el Sadat - Revolt on the N i l e , trans-
lated by Thomas Graham (London, 1957),* & Mohammed Neguib -
Egypt 's Destiny (London, 1 955 ) . Gamal Nasser ' s tract -
The Philosophy of the Revolution, written about 1953, 
(Economica books,- Buffalo, 1959 ) has only cursory referen-
ces to the revolution and i s , as Neguib suggests (Egypt 's 
Destiny, ib id . p. 215) better regarded as giving the 
psychology of the revolutionaries. 
3 . Though the Sidki-Bevin agreement of 1946 proposed terms 
concerning the Suez Canal Zone quite acceptable to the 
Egyptians, they eventually refused to ratify the agree-
ment on account of the Sudanese question. See Lenczowski, 
op . c i t . pp. 410-12. 
4 . See Lenczowski, o p . c i t . p. 416 . 
as a protest against British "occupation";1* and by unilater-
ally repudiating both the Anglo-Egyptian treaty of 1936 and 
the Änglo-Egyptian agreement on the Sudan of 1899, just two 
days after the receipt of arproposal that Egypt -should join 
with other Middle Eastern1 states and with Western 'powers in 
2 
a Middle East Defence Organisation, in October 1951. 
In its first' two years" of power the new revolutionary 
htOi cU-. ff-C^ 
regime, and Nasser in particular, not only consolidated its 
3 . 
power, and inaugurated -internal reforms, * but it secured an 
agreement with Britain concerning the future of the' Sudan and 
another one laying down conditions for the evacuation of the 
Suea Canal bäse.^* liiere 'was hiard bargaining,. domestic 
opposition, and some give and take on both sides. Though at 
one stage an-Egyptian spokesman "hinted strongly..4, that 
Egypt Would* align'herself with the neutralist bloc of Asian / Г 
nations in an effort to' end Britain 's 'imperialist* 
M 
6 * • 1 
occupation of the Suez Canal Zone," * on the whole, Egypt 
» 
1 . Ibid . p . 418. India, Yugoslavia & Egypt were all sitting 
as non-permanent members of the Security Council when the 
Korean War began. See Eric F . Goldman - The Crucial* Deoadg 
And After, 1945-1960 (New York, 1961) , pp. 150-161. 4 
2. See Campbell, op .oit . pp. 39-46. 
3 . For details , see Wheelock, op .c it . chapters 4 - 7 , PP. 209* 
218. . , 
4 . See Wheelock, ib id . pp. 209-218. 
5 . Official representatives of 12 Afro-Asian countries con-
vening in Cairo on 23 Dec. 1952 held the f irst meeting of 
its kind outside,the U.N. • » 
6. Quoted in Wheelock, ibid above, p. 215. 
eeeaod > to be assuming a markedly pro-Weotern orientation, i f 
only in, expectation of eubetantial economic arid military aid 
from thOpTTeet,1* and Egyptian-Israeli relatione were probably 
2 
jleos tence than at any previous time since 1948 . 
The time between the signature of the Anglo-Egyptian. 
agreements on Suez in October 1954 , and the nationalisation 
of the^Suez Canal Company in July 1956 , was seminal in the 
shaping of Наввег'п neutralist policy, and it was during this 
period that i ts general charactor^began to unfold . 
Until 1954 Naoper had been content to speak for Egypt, 
henceforward he assumed,the role of chief spokesman and - * , j. , 
4 
ohampion of the. 'Arab People*, [t 5b.e Israeli commando 
attaok on Egyptian territory in Gaza at the end of February 
1955,brought about a swift deterioration in Egyption/Icraeli 
Prelatione^" and heightened Egypt's quest for orcio and 
1 . Ruch expectations did not preolude the: expression of such 
sentiments as "Th& eo-called »free world ' , particularly 
the United States, proclaim they are helping to attain 
self-determination andtare helping underdeveloped countrisi 
to advance. We consider such talk as opium administered 
by the '»free world* to enslaved peoples eo that they may 
remain under i t о domination and not seek l iberat ion . " -
fi&eeer, 27 Bov. 1953 , quoted in Whcelock, op .o it . p . 215 . 
2 . See J . & S. Lacouture - Egypt in Tran sition, o p . c i t . p p . 
203-9* 1 J"° 
3 . Hasser 1 в working assumption from 1954 onwards see-ns to be 
that all Arabs, all 'true* nationalists in Afro-Aoia, are 
naturally neutralisteJ^ I f ' A f r i c a n or Asian states are not 
neutralist this i e due, on this view, to the pervereities 
o f governments, not the desires of their subjects. Since 
1954 Egypt hao become a home in exile for discontented 
Arab nationalists ft for many other dissident nationalists . 
"The dependent peoples, in particular, come (to Cairo) to 
voice their grievances. Cairo i s the capital of mal-
£ 8 Ü ? n p ? « i ^ r g f i Ä ^ K ^ K S J S ? Й 8 ? * S - b e c o u t u r e , 
4 . Servibid- r.bnvf*. т>. 911. 
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diplomatic"* support. In the following September Nasser 
announced the purchase 'of a substantial Tamount of arms from 
Czechoslovakia, forced on Egypt, he said, because "the West 
. ' •> л • - • » 1 ; 
refuses us the means of defending our' existence." ' simul-
taneous bargaining with both Cold War camps was becoming one 
1
 * - ' . 
of Nasser's favourite tactics, and perhaps his most novel and 
* -Y» t 
influential contribution to neutralist diplomacy. • Certainly, 
Nasser was the*first significant neutralist to pursue a policy 
» 2 1 t 
of active dalliance with both camps, taking the initiative 
himself, in attempts to elicit aid. "We have^invented 
r . 3 . K * ' 
positive neutralism," claimed Mohammed Husanain Haykal, one 
of Nasser's chief spokesmen"', the day after the Soviets » 
offered to build Egypt an atomic power Btation and immediately 
я 4 
following the West's f irst offer to finance the Aswan High 
л л 4 , 
Dam. Tito may have led the way in Bhowing that aid could 
be obtained without sacrificing one's independence, but Nasser 
1 / In October 1954 an Egyptian government spokesman had ad-
. mitted that.Nasser had renounced American military aid — 
because '"the conditions imposed" were "incompatible with 
respect for our national . s o v e r e i g n t y . i b i d . p. .215« 
4 
2. This i s the application in Cold War terms of what the 
Lacoutures describe as Nasser 's principal diplomatic tactic 
• leverage. "Means: a lever. Objective: to smash one" by 
one the shackles on Egyptian independence. He made 
excellent use of the American lever against the B r i t i s h . . . 
Against the Americans he "Used" the Soviet l ever . " i b id .p . 224 
3 . Ibid . p. 244. . , . T ч 
4 . For the. significance of the Aswan'Dam in Nasser 's schemes, 
see ibid . pp. 338 et seq. , also Keith Wheelock - Nasser 's 
New Egypt, op .cit . chapter 8 . 
I'IS' 
was the f irst neutralist to actively exploit the opportunities 
latent in the 'situation created by the new Soviet l ine 1 *- of 
offering aid and diplomatic support to certain neutralist 
nations - by pitting Soviet and -American offers against each 
other. Whereas Tito had accepted offerB of aid , though after 
close scrutiny, Nasser was soliciting for rival tenders.-
One other significant aspeot of Egypt's neutralist policy 
took shape during 1955 . This was Egypt ' s undoubted emergence 
not only among the ranks of the neutralist states, but among 
the leaders. The year began with Nasser calling on Tito in 
Yugoslavia and ended with Tito repaying the visit in' Cairo. 
2 
In between times, Nasser attended the Bandung Conference, 
where he was accorded a leading role, secured Chinese support 
for the Arabs' case against Israel , and had several long 
consultations with Nehru. Apart from both being'Afro-Äsian 
neutralists , Nehru and Nasser were at this time facing a 
1 . See above pp - M- 7- S~7. 
2 . On his return from Bandung, Nasser said, during a speech 
to a Cairo crowd: "I went to Bandung to announce that 
Egypt has been liberated, and that it speaks for"the 
cause of self-determination and freedom of the nations, 
the* suppression of imperialism, and the independence of 
all states . " reported in New York Times, 3 May 1955 . Many 
commentators date Nasser ' s popularity in Egypt & through-
out, the Arab world from the time of his return from Bandung 
For the significance öä Bandung for Nasser, see Georgina 
Stevens - "Arab Neutralism and Bandung" iri Middle East 
Journal, spring 1957 , PP. 139-152; Keith Wheelock, op .oit . 
pp. 225; & "Nasser Imports Bandoengism" in The Economist, 
24 March, 1956 , p . 649. 
common problem: both were opposed to the newly created Baghdad 
Pact. -Whatever *the intensity of. their opposition to 'Cold. 
War moves' near to their own (frontiers, this was undoubtedly. * 
heightened,for Nehru by the fact that Pakistan .was.associated 
with t.he scheme, and for .Nasser because' of I r a q ' s membership 
of the*Pact.\ Egyptian opposition was .a contributory f a c t o r V ^ 
in «limiting'4the membership
1 , and future operations ;of 'the Pact -
just as,- similarly,) Indian .opposition helped to limit the 
membership.and restrict the operation^ of S . E .A . T .Ov ; .but• 
whereas-Nehru attempted no military-diplomatic countermove, 
Nasser '8 opposition led to the conclusion of two military , 
agreements, with Syria and .with Saudi Arabia,- both during 
October 1958 / each of which placed, the signatories' armed 
2 
forces under a joint command headed by Egyptian generals. * 
As well as these military measures, Nasser continued to 
try 'to strengthen h is diplomatic friendships with fellow 
neutralists , especially with India and with Yugoslavia.', 
Indeed, Nasser, accompanied by Nehru, 'had just left Yugoslavia 
where-he had1 been in 'conclave with Tito and Nehru, when1 
Dulles abruptly announced the withdrawal of the American, offer 
to-provide aid i n the building of the Aswan High Dam. -It к 
1. . This applies mostly to Jordan. See Economist. 20. April « 
1957., pp . /200-2; also Sir John Olubb - A Soldier with the 
. Arabs (London, 1 9 5 7 ) .pp. 3 7 8 , '422, 425-6; & The Middle 
. E a s t , op .c it . p . 31 , for contrasting views. 
2 . See Lenczoweki, op .c it? p . 429;-& Economist, 24'March 1956, 
p . ' 649. 
was one of the ironies of this withdrawal that Dulles* success 
in wresting aid for Yugoslavia"from an unwilling Congress had 
reduced the chances of giving financial assistance to Egypt.1* 
Already the same week had brought Nasser two diplomatic set-
backs; for the Soviet Union had^concluded a sizeable oil 
deal with Israel.which dealt a severe blow to the Arab 
economic boycott, and Tito and Nehru "did not subscribe fully 
2 
to Nasser's views on Algeria, Israel and east Africa. * It 
seemed that Nasser's prestige and projects were irretrievably 
deflated. 
The nationalisation of the Suez Canal Company, the Suez 
•3 
War, and their aftermath, restored Nasser's prestige and 
showed the wide sympathy and diplomatic support that a * 
neutralist state could secure in repelling what i s widely 
believed, or said, to be „'imperialist* pressures. The Soviet 
Union quickly showed that any neutralist state at loggerheads 
with Western powers can count on Soviet support, and there 
began a period of close Egyptian/Soviet accord. By contrast, 
equivocal American attempts, under the shadow, of impending 
Presidential elections, to reconcile the antagonists only 
v 
estranged her from both sides. Subsequently, Egypt abstained 
1 . See Wheelock, op .cit . pp. 195-6; & J . & S. Lacouture,*op. 
cit . p. 419. 
2 ; See Wheelock, ibid . pp. 195, 257, 253." 
5 . For details , see Wheelock, ibid, passim; & Guy Wint & 
Peter'Calvocoressi - Middle East Crisis (Penguin books, 
1957 ) . ' -- v 
on all*ten U.W. General Assembly resolutions criticising 
Soviet aggression on Hungary.1* 
Widespread, i f somewhat ephemeral, sympathy throughout 
Asia and Africa 'for the Egyptian?cause during the Suez crisis 
seemed to encourage Egypt to revive and.revitalise ideas of 
Afro-Asian solidarity, which had languished somewhat since 
the Bandung Conference. By the end of 1957 Cairo had'become 
the headquarters of the permanent non-govemmental Afro-Asian 
2 
movement, ' and Egypt and the Sino-Soviet bloc seemed to be 
- • ' 3 
working in close harness. 
The identification of Egypt and the Communist powers in 
the so-called »Afro-Asian People's Movement* - though uneasy 
and necessarily temporary - v/as not unnatural. For contin-
ental imperialism*' of the types'represented by international 
Communism and Nasser's brand of pan-Arab nationalism can work 
5 
together" so long as there is rough agreement about a common 
1. Later Nasser explained that these abstentions were "because 
the Soviet Union was the only country in the Security 
Council that supported us In our dispute over Suez. We 
abstained out of gratitude." See interview reported in 
Daily Express. 11 June 1957. 
2. See P. H. Lyon - "The Pan-Continental Movements of Asia 
and Africa, 1947-50" in Australian Outlook, June 1959, PP. 
100-111. 
3 . See Wheelock, op .cit . pp. 254-5, 266-70; & W. Z. Laqueur--
The Soviet Union and the Middle East (London, 1959) PP. 
307-311. 
4 . See Hannah Arendt - The« Burden of Our Time (London, 1951) 
chapter 8 - "Continental imperialisms the Pan-Movements." 
5. This i s the main theme of the study by W. Z. Laqueur - The 
, •Soviet Union and the Middle East (London, 1959) . See esp. 
pp. 316-347. 
enemy - in thia caee 'imperialism* - and before there i s any 
cerlous argument aa to who ohould be marter and arrange the 
division of cpoilc. Conrnuniets end Kaeeerite nationalists 
each believe thnt ',the people' arc on their side, even i f 
governments are not; that political boundaries are 'inherently 
temporary and must', in any cape, be re-drawn. Eoth are sclf-
conociouoly proletarian, movements;1* end Moecow radio io 
roughly paralleled by Cairo radio, Com^niet magazines by 
Arab nationaliet magazines} Cormuniet party sealots .by Egypt 's 
2 
expatriate, teachers. The analogy must not bo pushed too 
far but there are sufficient a f f i n i t i o s to explain why a 
temporary coincidence of. Soviet and Egyptian aims need not be 
seen as wholly fortuitous. 
This apparent Egyptian/Soviet aocord lasted until the 
inauguration of the United Arab Republic "in February 1958 . 
Indeed, Egypt, no well ae Syria, -seemed to be/becoming 
increasingly dependent economically on the Soviet bloo during 
these yearn, an the Wentem powers generally boycotted Egypt 
and Syria. There arc indications that .Uascer woe disturbed 
1» Though Corrnuniote by doctrine & pan-Arab nationalietc more 
* by feel ing . "The national movements in Afrioa and Aria , 
aud thoro in the Middle East moot of a l l , remind one more 
. and more of proletarian aoeociationo. They have the same 
harchnooß und energy oaueed by long.years of waiting and a 
lasting cense of frustration.- The Arabs as a whole are. 
** people who nil complain in the eame 'language of the вате 
humiliation, tHe name h u n g e r . " J . & S. Laoouture ,op .oit .p . 
5 13 . - 1 1 
2 . See The Timet?, 8 Й 9 Oct. 1958 - "African 'War of Words"; ft' 
The Kconomiot. 27 April 1957 , pp.289-90 - "Egypt's Empire-
Build ore " , which shows that Egypt 's prime Instrumente of 
propaganda are Cairo radio, illustrated weekly magazines & 
the exnnrt of teachfucfu 
vt£5; 
by this growing dependence on the S o v i e t s , 1 , but such gestures 
as h i s October 1957-decree ordering all branches of the • 
government and the press to present' Egypt as a striotly 
neutralist ' c o u n t r y a n d his Treported will ingness to substitute 
the terra ^positive n e u t r a l i t y " , with i t s unfavourable con-
notat ions . in the West, for the more euphemistic term "non-
alignment" , were not sufficient to bring about an appreciable 
2 
detente with the West. ' Egyptian tirades-against1" Western 
interests and -pro-Westem elements throughout the Middle East 
and Africa continued unabated throughout 1957 . 
. In f a c t , Nasser restored a great deal of his freedom of 
manoeuvre between'East and West, following the union of Egypt 
and Syria i n February 1958 . Though the^init iative came- from 
A . 1 » • . .. » ( I 
Syria, within a year-the overwhelming dominance of Egyptian 
leadership in th is new'United Arab Republic was patent, though 
3 . * 
the Union was showing signs of strain . ^ Furthermore, 
л 1 л ' 
relations with the Soviet Union now became considerably 
* • i i « 
cooler, no doubt because Soviet influenoe in Syria had been 
. } - t . V 
n u l l i f i e d , and .Nasser 'was achieving a detente with the United 
1 . See. L a q u e u r , ' i b i d , chapter 5 - "Soviet Trade x& Economic 
Aid : .1954-1958" . 
2 . See Wheelock, i b i d . p . 256; h Daily Telegraph, 10 Oct . 
1957 . . 
3 . . See Wheelock, i b i d . pp. 271-4 & 282-3; also The Spectator. 
27 .Nov . 1959 , p . 7 57 . W h e union of the-U.A .H . with the-
Yemen, proclaimed as the 4 United Arab States in "March 1958 , 
remained merely, a paper union . Egyptian' support for 
Yemen's i rredentist .c la ims on Aden was obtainable without 
union . 
яо Г 
States. 1* C e r t a i n l y f r o m mid-1958 onvards Nasser made 
clear his preference for political connections with neutralist'5 
/ i i 
rather than Communist states, and. he began to pursue an active• 
t w .. . 
line in the Pan-Äfrican movement-: to the exclusion, of the 
Soviet Union. [L 
Throughout -1959-60 it was clear, that the Soviet Union 
Ол. • 
.was as unwilling to see Nasser as the uncontested leader of «. i ~ Д. 
the Arab w o r W as were Great Britain, Prance and the United 
* * 
•5 
States between 1954 and 1956 . * Following the revolution in 
к» • • fl i. 
Iraq of July 1958, Soviet interest in the United Arab Republic 
v* Л. • 
appeared to lessen, probably because the former,seemed to be 
i«- » s * 
a more profitable area. Even so, Soviet moves had to be 
— ^ > • I 
l.i. See Wheelock, .ibid. p£. (261-2 & 275-6; & The Observer. 18 
May 1958. On 16 May 1958 Nasser said in a speech in Cairo; 
1 'U. feel (.that «.this policy, for the maintenance of which we 
have struggled, this independent policy of positive 
. neutralism and non-alignment,-has finally triumphed, havirij 
been recognised by the two strongest powers in the whole 
i • ,-world, the Soviet Union and .the .United States.'" See 
Wheelock, p . 262. 
2. 'In *May 1958 Nasser paid" "a visit to Moscow where he was 
careful to present himself as ,a neutralist and to stress 
'his friendship for Tito, despite an intensification of 
Soviet bloc tirades against Yugoslavia during his stay. 
It i s reported that before leaving for Moscow Nasser called 
'for the complete f i l e of Nehru's speeches during the 
letter ' s recent Russian tour. See The Observer, 18'May, 
3 11958. By early 1961 Nasser was acting with the radical 
revisionist.rAfrican states.of the so-callediCasablanoa 
grouping and was sponsoring the projected neutralist • 
summit itо be held in Belgrade. 
3 . See Geoffrey W h e e l e r . " R u s s i a and the.Arab World" in The 
World-Today, July 1961, pp. 307-18. l ike Nehru, Nasser 
has con si stent ly,jft<f"more rut hies sly^ taken a i strong line , 
against Communists at home. .Many neutralists seem to 
agree with Nasser in attributing the strength of •domestic' 
Communism to the continuance of 'imperialism* & the non-
fulfilment of nationalist demands. See below appendix S"» 
circumspect and her preferences not too., favourable to one, in 
view of continuing Egyptian/Iraqi r ivalry . 1 * Since 1958 ' 
Soviet/Egyptian ties have loosened, their different interests 
have become more obvious, but"Soviet aid has continued. 
'Positive neutrality ' as practised by Hasser since 1955 
seems to be a policy which, despite i ts name, has been sus-
tained by two powerful negative themes - anti-Westernism and 
anti-imperialism - and by radical Arab nationalism. I t 
i * 
demands the right to be left alone but does not leave other 
states alone. It seeks to proselytise, yet it lacks a 
2 
distinctive creed of i t s own. * | It embodies a radical , resent-
f u l , l inguistic nationalism, operating across state boundaries i 
believed to be art i f ic ia l and temporary; yet it appears to 
lack any precise plans for what has to succeed what i s to be 
overthrown - perhaps because 'anti-imperialism' masks a 'neo-
imperialism'. . By great tactical skill and f lex ib i l i ty it 
has raised Egypt 's diplomatic standing; it has not produced С * « 
any substantial measure of pan-Arab unity . Though it has 
1 . See - P . Seale - "The United Arab Republic and the Iraqi 
Challenge" in The World Today, July i960 , pp. 296-305. 
2 . Nasser: " . . . as f a r as ideologies go we s t i l l have no 
f ina l position. We are still at the formative stage. We 
haven't really made anr choice between liberalism and 
controls in matters of economics and pol it ics . Our 
decisions will be taken according to specific problems and 
needs . " - quoted in J . & S. Lacouture , /op .c it , p. 465 . 
For similar statements, see Wheelock, op . c i t . pp. 216, 227 
236, 263. 
initiated a number of long overdue domestic reforms,1* it 
has not so far brought about any appreciable increase in the 
standard of living of Egyptians. 
Commenting on the July 1956 Brioni talks between Tito, 
Nehru and Nasser, a journalist wrote: "Their juxtaposition 
i s a product of the СоЫ War, which all three condemn; an 
accurate image may be that of the three men on an ice-floe, 
congratulating each other on the speed with which the warmth 
x 1 . .. 1 
of their bodies is thawing it and yet not fully aware that 
they owe both their eminence and their close association to 
I * p 
the ice-floes continued existence." * 
This suggestive but rather condescending image has some 
truth .in i t . But the ,roles of these three men must not be 
seen only in terms of similar personal inclinations or without 
an appreciation of which of the currently popular aspects of 
neutralism they have each pioneered. For their policies 
stem not only from the contrasting personalities of their I < 
formulators, but also from the basic forces which impelled 
them to be neutralist . 
1 . Consideration of Nasser 's domestic policies is.outside the 
scope of this short study but it. i s probable that in the 
eyes of the great majority of Egyptians his. regime is 
preferable to that of his predecessors. Nasseres 
domestic policies are analysed in some detail in.both 
'.Vheelock's and the Lacoutures' studies. 
2. In The Economist, 14 July 195В, p. I l l , editorial entitled 
"Three men on the ice-floe. " 
Nehru began to shape I n d i a ' s neutralist policies at a 
time, when the Cold War seemed to be essentially a European 
a f fa ir , though-an admitted non-alignment anywhere was soon 
regarded with suspicion ,and hostility by the Cold 7»'ar pro-
tagonists. Nehru provided neutralist policies v/ith respect-
able arguments and, a^l ittle later, popularised the idea that 
neutralist states were eminently suited to act as moderators 
aid .conciliators. He invested neutralism v/ith an. a i r of 
moral grandeur, and of aloofness from Cold War squabbles. 
Studied moderation in language and action i s Nehru 's especial 
contribution to neutralism. India i s the f i rst and foremost 
of-the new state neutralists , and Nehru stands for a peaceful, 
moderate neutralism. V ^ t. 
Tito was forced to adopt a neutralist course for 
Yugoslavia originally because of Yugoslavia 's expulsion from 
the Soviet bloc. She became a neutralist state because it 
seemed the only way her leadership could retain their indep-
endent sway to shape Yugoslav Communism themselves. Her 
i n i t i a l survival as a neutralist state was due to her willing-
ness to shoulder a very heavy defence burden, to strongly 
resist Soviet bloc pressures, .and to the tacit support of 
the ?festein powers. Yugoslavia showed that it was possible 
for a small state to resist great power pressures without 
becoming a^formal member of a Cold War camp. Though some-
thing of a pariah in,Europe, Yugoslavia, by viriue of skilful 
identification of her interests with such different states as 
Egypt» India , Burma, Ghana, Indonesia end Israel , has sub-
sequently become an honorary Afro-Asian state, thus avoiding 
diplomatic isolation. And"as well as her unique position as 
the sole defector from the Soviet camp, will ing to eduoate 
fellow neutralists about Marxism and the Communist world, she 
i s a striking example of a state which has successfully gained 
considerable aid from both Cold War camps and has herself 
Bhown remarkable economic development. Ker achievements to 
date thus chime* with the aspirations of many newer neutralist 
states. Tito stands for a progressive, independent, Marxist 
neutralism. 1 
Hasser pioneered two currently popular"aspects of 
neutralist policies . * Firstly*, he successfully negotiated 
the evacuation of the large British military base in Suez, and 
in thus ridding the »national*soil ' of a foreign base achieved 
what many neutralists have since done or aspire to do. 
Secondly, ho was the f i r s t neutralist leader to actively and 
blatantly exploit Cold ,Var r ivalries , taking advantage of the 
new situation created when the Communist powers began' to 
develop foreign trade and aid programmes to neutralist statee. 
r I f , 
Another facet of Nasser ' s neutralism i s of especial interest . 
By deliberately casting himself in the role of pupil of Nehru 
and of Tito, he was ^ е г е Ъ у able to imply that there v/as no 
need f o r him to produce his own distinctive 'doctrine or 
justif ication for his policies , h is neutralism was l ike that 
го т 
of hie associates - even i f his methods were more ' pos i t ive ' . 
Nasser-was thus the f i rst of the frankly opportunist, uncon-
cernedly undoctrinaire neutralists - many African neutralist 
leaders of the^post-1957 period are l ike this now, their 
strength and wealaiesses,- like those of Nasser, depending very 
much on the nationalist movement they lead. Nasser has 
become leading champion of radical , resentful, revisionist 
nationalism the kind of nationalism distinguished by the 
over-estimation of one 's own nation and the denigration of 
others, and by the tendency to attribute anything wrong with 
one 's nation to the evil-doing of others. Nasser stands 
for a belligerently nationalist neutralism. 
There are some striking, contrasts in the policies which 
i t 1 :„ 
these three'men practise. T i to ' s domestic Communism con-
trasts with Nehru 's and Nasser 's proscription of their 
domestic Communists. Nehru 's consistent appeasement - though 
in the technical, not in the pejorative sense - of China 
contrasts with Nasser ' s continual state of war with I s r a e l . 
To avert war anywhere, and especially with China or Pakistan, 
has been a constant principle of Nehru 's policy; permanent 
war with Israel has been Nasser 's constant theme. Tito and 
Nasser are fundamentally anti-Western in their sympathies 
and suspicions, and, f a r , f ar more so than Nehru. Tito and 
Nasser are radical revisionists - though Nasser more so, in 
f a c t , than Tito - while Nehru i s a meliorist. This l ist of 
г\о 
contrasts could be extended, but we must come back to the 
fact of their association. 'tt/AebUef fortuitous or deliberated 
in i ts origins , it has now acquired a certain logic of i t s 
own. For while there have been several reports, and at 
different times , 1 " of r i fts and strains in the relations 
between those three men, their consultations are likely to 
continue, i f only because each i s now widely recognised as 
a prominent leader in the neutralist world, and because they 
all feel they are fellow-travelling neutralists and not 
fellow-travellers for either Moscow or 7ashington. 
1 . Sec, % e . g . Keith У/heelock, op. c i t . pp. 237 & 253; The 
Guardian, 14 July, 1956 & 30 March, i960 ; & The Observer, 
24 Jflay, 1959 . 
Switzerland and Sweden - the traditional neutrals 
Switzerland and»Sweden are.neutraliat states, in the 
• • - * -
eenee that they are not-raembern of any Cold. War all iance , 
because such a policy io consistent with their national 
traditions • of non-involvement in peacetimevond of neutrality 
Ln tine of 'warV Tiiey can conveniently be considered 
together because in important respects Л е у resemble each 
other arid no other states. 
— A ^ 
Both states take pride in a great military past. * Both have now < 
avoided active involvement in vor for more than 140 years, while both 
have restrained, adapted and canalised their traditional skills into 
national policies of an alert, armed, but purely defensive, neutrality. 
Neither of them have colonial possessions, nor do they lay claim to any 
irredenta. Spiritual neutrality has never been demanded of their 
citizens or of their press. 
Yet it would be wrong to assume that it is merely a long series of » 
2 
lucky accidents " that has brought about their present prosperity and 
1. .Both1states illustrate Toyribee's principle of the transmigration of 
the martial spirit. See - A Study of History (London) vol. 9, pp. 
493-4. Switzerland (strictly 'the Old Confederation') was at the 
height of its power between 1315-1515. See С. V. C. Oman - The Art 
of_War in the Middle A^es. Revised and edited by John H. Beckcr 
(New York, 1953) pp. 93-И6, and 160-172. Sweden's Great Power period 
was from 1611 to 1709. See Ingvar Andersson - A History of Sweden 
(Hew York, 1956). 
2. Though this is a common contention, especially among the nationals of 
these countries; and it is interesting to note that a bost selling 
Swedish novel of 1952,- "Paradise for Us" - argued that Sweden's 
successful neutrality in the Second World War was entirely a matter 
of luck. Later it was discovered that the pseudonymous author was 
- Gunnar Hagglof - one of the most brilliant younger Swedish diplomats. 
See also below p, '2D-0 fit • 
nuch envied neutrality* For SwediBh, but more especially Swiss, national 
history is not only a quiet record of commercial progress but is full of 
narrow escapes from invasion J or at least involvement in war, and there 
is plenty of evidence that their statesmen have invariably eippreciated 
that national survival depends on defensive "strength and a constantly 
varying approximation of the desirable to the practicable. But a policy 
which survives through the years, which generations of statesmen practise 
and modify, gradually begins to take on the 'aspect of a dogma and to 
become independent of the' purposes for which it was first devised. To 
a groat extent this is now true of both Swiss and Swedish neutrality 
policies • Public explanations and Justifications of present policies 
have to be placed within the cherished tradition; and so a study of 
Swiss and Swedish neutrality' in the Cold War rcust first try to make clear 
the reasons for, and remember the continuing and powerful influence of, 
these "distinct traditions. 
The notion of Swiss neutrality is older than the" notion of a Swiss 
nation. For a'country - one of the smallest in Europe - which contains 
three official "languages and two religions, and tfi ose unity ie achieved 
only by due respect'for all theoe" different elements,1* neutrality was 
as" much a necessary condition of internal stability as of external security. 
Swiss concepts of nationality are primarily territorial and to maintain 
- v. .. '3, 
1.. The total population at the 1950 census was 4,714,922, made up of 
German speaking 72.1$; French speaking 20.3%i Italian speaking 
5*9%* See Annuaire Statistique de la Suis so 1959 (Bäle i960). 
Racial, religious, linguistic and territorial boundaries do not -
correspond. This, is very important, because fchere people are dis-
united by ethnic background they are often brought together by common 
' religion - see C . J , Hughes - The Federal. Constitution of Switzerland 
(Oxford 1954) РР* 88-89 and 128. 
unity between Catholic and Protestant, between Germanic, French and 
Italian speaking citizens, it has been vital to • avoid dividing the 
national territory either' by civil strife or by foreign "invasion, 
4 . 
Swiss history shows that this has been for from easy. Religion in the 
17th century, when the policy of neutrality was *first developed in the 
Confederation, was as disruptive as political ideology today. The 
Swiss could only retain'their identity and their freedom ia diversity 
by a policy which accommodated theological differences within the 
A 
Confederation * but forbade an active bias towards'one's co-religionists 
'abroad/ - Externally, much depended on the" ability of her larger neigh-
bours to balance, and so nullify, each other's designs on Swiss territory. 
Further deterrents were the mountainous topography, the absence of 
natural resources to""capture'and the military reputation'of Swiss soldiers. 
The defeat at Marignano" in 1515 terminated Swiss pre-eminence in 
the Italian wars» * Thereafter the Confederation sank into the modest' 
role of a buffer between France, Austria, and the Spanish power in Italy; 
and developed a*policy of neutrality which was proclaimed as a principle 
in 167Л at the beginning of the General Wars of 1672 - 1713, but as a 
policy developed only'slowly and organically from the old Swiss policy 
of "confederacy. The hope of the confederacy to keep its entire 
territory out of war by following a restrained foreign policy^ was. 
1. William Martin - Histoire" de lä Suisse (Lausanne, 1943); Edgar Bonjour-
Swiss Neutrality, translated by' Mary Hottingen (London, 1946), and 
W. E. Rappard - Collective Security in Swiss Experience. (London, 1948). 
2. The religious settlement of the Old Confederation followed the 
principle cujus regio, ejus religio of the Peace of Augsburg, 1555. 
The religious "boundaries therefore coincided with the political' 
boundaries, and the religious map of the present day is a patchwork 
which reproduces the sovereignty-structure of the Old Confederation. 
See C. J . Hughes op.clt. pp. 61-64. 
realizable only if its neutrality was. armed. Fearing that the adoption 
of International guarantees might be detrimental to its neutrality and 
lead to foreign entanglements, the confederacy continually refused to 
adopt such binding obligations. Even so, in these early years the 
Confederation's success as a neutral buffer probably owed much to the 
implicit support of France,1* though this point is not stressed by Swiss 
historians. From 1713 to 1789 the policy of Swiss neutrality was ^ 
exposed to the reactions created by changes in the European equilibrium, 
and in the midst of these changes it required all the experienced 
diplomatic art of the old sovereigns to preserve the territorial integrity 
of the confederacy. Eventually, Franco became the first despoiler, 
after being the initial protector of Swiss neutrality. For it was 
during the French Revolutionary-Napoleonic wars that the most substantial 
violations of Swiss neutrality occurred: first, when, following the 
t • 
2 
collapse of 1798, the whole of the country was for a time engulfed in 
the Napoleonic Empire; and, second, when her neutrality wasdisregarded 
by the Coalition. Powers in 1814« At the eiid of these wars, the independence 
and territorial integrity of Switzerland was guaranteed by the Great . 
Powers in the "declaration of Vienna" in 1815, and for the first time the 
permanent neutrality of a small state became part of the law of nations. 
1. Buffer status usually carries with it the duplication that the region 
is in some "sense a protectorate. See further', above p.f3o-/3S, 
2. V/, E. Rappard op.cit. pp. 74-9./, . ' 
3. С. K. Webster - Congress of Vienna (London? 194-5) p. 134» Technically, 
this process amounted to neutralization. For which see below p. 
et seq. In Switzerland today neutrality is part of the material, though 
not part of the formal, constitution and the "Assembly declares ' 
neutrality rather as other nations declare war" C. J. Hughes, op.cit. 
p. "441 see also 169-71. СВу contrast, in Sweden neutrality is not deeply 
imbedded in constitutional practices.'} What was implied by this 
neutralization was important: - for it"suggested that Switzerland had 
ceased to be a keypoint in the European order; and this moderates the 
. * point illustrated in the following footnote. 
Whether or not the confederacy vould possess sufficient strength 
to transfer into political actuality these proclaimed principles and 
whether the Great^Powers would observe their solenn assurances 
remained to be seen« In fact, though the confederacy was subjected 
to certain restrictions by tho Holy Alliance and was subsequently 
endangered on several occasions, Swiss neutrality survived1* unimpaired 
2 • 
throughout the 19th centuiy.and the First World War. * At the end 
3 
of the war the Swiss cantons and people, by a narrow majority, 
voted^in favour of Switzerland's entzy into th© League of Nations} 
Geneva became the seat of the nev international organization,^* but 
Switzerland's spocial status as a permanently neutral stato was 
5 
recognized by a League Council resolution of 13th Februazy 1920 
which exempted her from the.military obligations contained in the 
League Covenant« <. > 
1. Somewhat precariously in 1847, when the seven R.C. cantons 
"unsuccessfully tried to secede from the Confederation, see Jean 
Halperin "The Transformation of Switzerland," in - The Opening of 
an Era; 1848, ed. by Francois Pojto (London 1948) pp. 50-66} and 
determinedly in the 1830s and 1856, 1859, 1860, 1866 and 1870, when 
• th*e threat was rather from.outside. See W. E. Rappard, op.cit. p.' 
143 et seq. ъ 
2. Luigi Albertini - The Origins, of the War, translated by Isabella M. 
Massey (O.U.P. 3 vols. 1952-7). In vol. 3 Albertini discusses: 
the neutrality of Switzerland, p. 685; f Swiss pro-German sentiment, 
p. 685}.. the.'Two Colonels' espionago scandal, p. 689. 
3. See Andre" Siegfried - Switzerland (London, 1950) pp. 181-2; see 
also C. J.' Hughes, op.cit. p. 94 and George Soloveytchik -
Switzerland in Perspective (London, 1954) pp. 230-236. 
4. Article 7 of the League Covenant.' -
5. See A. J. Toynbee - The World After the Peace Conference (R.I.I.A. 
1925) pp. 37-8; and David Hunter Miller - The Drafting of the 
Covenant. 2 vols. (New York, 1928) pp. 437-8. See also Article 21 
of the League Covenant and Article 435 of the Treaty of Versailles. 
Sweden, the third largest state in Europe territorially,*' 
with a nationally homogeneous population, and situated on the fringes 
of the, traditional European battlefields, achieved her position as 
2 
a »traditional1 neutral * without suffering the process of neutral-
ization, and so evolved a tradition of neutrality more voluntarily 
and more gradually than Switzerland. 
. Enjoying its Great Power period nearly a century after the waning 
of Switzerland Is period of eminence, Sweden played a great part in the 
wars of Europe in the 17th and early 18th centuries. With the death 
of Charles XII in 1718, Swedish power was past its zenith, the resources 
of the nation had been over-taxed, and the last quarter of the 18th' 3 century was full of domestic unrest» Despite these acute internal 
1.' Excluding European Russia. The two largest are France and Spain. 
The population of Sweden is approximately 7 million. 
Ingvar Anders son - A History of Sweden (New York, 1956). 
2» The Swedes have never shown a marked liking for the terms -•neutral' 
or 'neutrality1 to be applied to their own country's policy. 
Today they prefer the term "non-alliance", while during the 19th 
century "the word neutrality tended in the popular vooabulary 
to become synonymous with a peace policy, or a peace loving policy. 
In reality, however, neutrality had never during those 100 years 
been a consistent password for Swedish foreign policy" - quoted-
i from Sweden and the United Nations (Swedish Institute of Inter-
national Affairs) (New York, 1956) p, 20. 
* The Swiss seem largely indifferent to the actual label given, to 
their foreign policy, as long as .the uniqueness of the Swiss 
position is duly recognized. 
troubles, and her membership of the anti-British Armed Neutrality League 
between 1778 and 1780, Sweden joined Pitt'в Third Coalition against France 
in 1805; and, until 1814» she was an active participant in the struggle 
against Napoleon. The Congress of Vienna recognised and confirmed the 
I 
fortunes of war with respect to Scandinavia. Russia received Finland, 
f . 
which for 550 years had been united with Sweden. VJhile, Ту way of 
compensation, Sweden obtained Norway - though Castlereagh had to put 
pressure on Norway before she gave way.** Neutrality as a national 
•I • . • • . i 
tradition only evolved after 1815, and then not because of any strong 
< « ' • I 
sense of the need for retirement from international politics, but because 
realistic appraisals of national strength always moderated any initial 
impulse to adopt an adventurous foreign policy. Between 1815 and 1914. 
Sweden was not in fact involved in war, though on several occasions her 
2 
participation seemed imminent *- attracted each time by Scandinavian 
interests. Despite intense hostility to Russia and strong tendencies 
< 
toward alliance with Germany by her governing and military classes, 
« < ' . 3 
Sweden declared her neutrality on 4 August 1914. Henceforward she 
consistently espoused a neutral policy and was instrumental in the 
unsuccessful attempt to secure respect for neutral rights^* by co-
operative neutral endeavour. At the end of the war, Sweden was one of 5 
the thirteen neutral states which became original members of the League. 
1. С. K. Webster - The Foreign Policy of Castlereagh (London, 1950), vol. 
1, pp. 306-9. . . . 
2. Herbert Tingsten - "Issues in Swedish Foreign Policy", Foreign Affairs 
April 1959. refers to Swedish activist movements in 1854-6» 1864; 1905; 
1914; 1921; 1939. There was also an activist movement in I848 in 
favour of intervention.in Denmark. See F. Tegner - "The Events of 
. 1848 in Scandinavia", in Francois Fejto, op. cit, pp. 167-179. 
3. Albertini, op. cit. vol. 3, pp. 662; 669-72. 
4. Orvik, op. cit. » t o s * pp. 89-108. 
5. Resolutions to Join the League passed by 86 votes to 47 in the Upper 
Chamber and 152 votes to 67 in the Lower. See Sweden and the United 
Rations (New York, 1956) pp. 17-19. 
Far from happy with her new commitments, despite her special 
status as a League member, Switzerland's League policy was highly 
individual and somewhat temporizing.1. Obliged to impose economic 
sanctions if necessary, the Swiss did not insist that this was consistent 
with the traditional policy nor were" they preoccupied with the principle 
of; neutrality qua principle. Their predominant concern was to ensure 
, , , * 2 
that the Swiss version of neutrality was recognised and respected. 
Nevertheless, so long as the League of Nations looked like working, the 
Swiss were prepared to 'differentiate' their neutrality. • But when 
Gerraany and Italy left the League and soon laid bare the weaknesses of 
the League system, the Swiss Government became convinced that their 
only'hope öf escaping involvement in a general war was for Switzerland 
to revert to her old policy of absolute^neutrality. This she did in 
1938.^* League"recognition of this avowal" of complete impartiality 
again illustrated Switzerland's remarkable success in securing'inter-' 
* *  
national recognition for her peculiar status. The attitude of Hitler's 
Germany towards' Switzerland from 1933 onwards was not characterised by 
ca comparable degree of respect.^* 
1. See the critical account of F. P. Walters -.A History of tho League of 
^ • Nations (London, 1952) pp. 92-3, 123 , 136, 184, 198, 765; a Swiss 
account by Jacqueline Belin - La Suisse et les Nations Unies (New York 
1956) pps. 39-58; and G. Soloveytchik - "The League of Nations and 
- Motta's era" in Switzerland in Perspective (London 195Л) PP* 227-250; 
Walter R. Zahlen""Switzerland & the League of Nations" A.P.S.R.-Aug.1936, 
2. This is the characteristic Swiss attitude. See Happard, op. cit. p. 149; 
and below, Appendix 1, especially pp. -216?, 
3. Orvik op. cit. p. 182; Hans J. Morgenthafcw- "The End,of Switzerland's 
^Differential Neutrality", A.g.I.L. 1938. , 
Elizabeth Wiskemann - Undeclared War (London, 1939) pp. 280-309; and 
Edvard Hambro'a exposition and.rebuttal of National Socialist doctrines 
concerning neutrality. See "Ideological Neutrality41 in Nordisk tIdsskri 
- for interp^-i,™^! rett 'Acta Scandinavica juris »gentium, £t_ 
1939 (vol. 10, n. 2-3) pp. 109-117. 
г\°\ 
- -Sweden's League policy was distinguished not* so much Ъу obsessive 
fears that her security and material well-being might be compromised 
by the obligations of League membership,-Ü>5*ty ah adroit and faithful1* 
о 
use'Of the facilities of the new international organization * to safeguard 
traditional interests. A judicious blend of internationalism with the 
long established policy of friendly relations with Germany was evinced 
in Swedish policy towards the Ruhr occupation problem in 1923, and over 
the question of Germany's admission to the League in 1926.- By January 
1938, in the face of the obvious collapse of the League collective 
security system, Sweden was first of the European neutrals to announce, 
in effect, its complete lack of confidence In the League system of 
security and its determination to rely on the sauve-qui-peut of re-
armament» . * . ^ . . •#4* . . . 
Throughout the Second World War both Switzerland and Sweden preserved 
their neutrality, though precariously, and not without some infringements.^* 
From the politico-strategic point of view, the weakest point in. both hik&fZ 
countries' boundaries was^theVbordeiyfaeß^ Germany. German invasion^ 
of Switzerland, which seemed certain on two occasions at least between 
1940 and 1945, was thwarted by a mixture of economic appeasement and' 
military threats. The latter included plans for the destruction of 
1. See Aaland Islands question. Walters, op. cit. pp. 103-5. . 
2. H. Tingsten - The Debate on the Foreign Policy of Sweden 1919-1939 
(London, 1949)} The Diplomats 1919-1939« ed. by Gordon A. Craig & , 
Felix Gilbert (New York, 1953) c.3 Sweden, "The Diplomacy of Osten 
. Unden": Erik Lonnroth, pp. 87-99. 
3. Orvik, 'op.1 cit. pp. 79-80} Hans-J. Morgenthau - "The Resurrection of 
• Neutrality in Europe", A.P.S.R. June 1939, pp. 473-486. • 
4. W. N. Medlicott - The Economic Blockade. 2 vols. (London 1952 and 1959) 
.vol. 1, es U, 5 (3), 17, 19} and vol. 2, cs 6, 7, 16, 17. 
all the tunnels through the Alps, a scorched earth policy in the 
»r - -
industrial areas of the north, and the military defence of the fortified 
1 2 
Redoubt^in the central mountains. * Sweden's policy, even more than 
Switzerland's, shifted like a weathervane pointing the fortunes of war. 
let she sought, not always successfully, to reconcile a strict neutrality 
with the active policy of giving generous help to other Scandinavian 
countries - her considerable aid to Finland amounting to non-belligerent 
intervention» During the war both countries provided humanitarian and 
diplomatic services, as well as valuable war material to both sides. 
Since the Second World War both Switzerland and Sweden have been 
left much .worse off strategically than they were after the First World 
War - this greater vulnerability has been publicly acknowledged by leading 
spokesmen in each country. * In.part, of course, given the power, and 
range of,modern weapons, this is a predicament common to all states, but 
for the two traditional neutrals their security now seems more precarious „ 
than hitherto because of the eolipse of the European power balance which 
was one of the principal prerequisites of their success as free, neutral 
1 . See the memoirs of the British Minister in Berne, Sir David Kelly -
yho Ruling Few (London 1953) с 13/esp» pp." 275-80 and 285; Constance 
. Howard - "Switzerland 1939-46" in .The War and the Neutrals, ed. by 
"A . & V. M. Toynbee, R.I .I .A. (London 1956). : , 
2. Agnes H. Hicks - "Sweden" in The'War and the Neutrals, ibid. pp. 171-199; 
Annette Baker Fox - The Power of Small States. Diplomacy in World 
War II . Chapter 5 - "Sweden: Armed Neutral" (London, 1959); and 
Gunnar Hagglof - «a Test of Neutrality; Sweden in the Second World 
War." - ^International Affairs' (R.I.I.A. ) April i960, pp.* 153-167. iZrc, 
SoviU- Cfit-.-ÄUJe Of HcuzaloHs'tUhcll Sec A Pociodl" —%Ht^fltot!s 
5'Uo^ f- neo^cry "|U W A tfrU*, (r^osc^j J ЬАгг^ъ /4&С /у . 
3. In Switzerland, for example, by M. Petitpierre, Head of Swiss Dept. 
of Political Affairs, see New York Times 20 March 1953. Christian 
14 Science Monitor 18 April 1953 and Times 27 March 1958. See also 
•4 Professor Rappard reported in Manchester Guardian 22 December 1952. 
In Sweden by Foreign Minister, Osten Unden, see Documents on Swedish 
• Foreign Policy 1950-51 (Stockholm, 1957) p. 15. 
i n -
states. In the dimensions of world politics, Western'Europe-has become 
as central, exposed and almost as small as Switzerland,^compared with ~ 
the old European Powers.- And, as-the Cold -War alignments took shape, 
'Switzerland, instead'of being the' stiib centre "of a European system*bf 
.delicately balanced antagonisms", has found herself surrounded - with* the 
I sole exception , of .post-1955rAustria - by states4 allied with America. 
;For Sweden,' too the situation is radically changedj Russialias gained 
^control, of almost the entire coaöt of the Baltic'and instead of Germany 
balancing Russia, Germany'is divided and the principal military bases 
in the Baltic are Tinder the control of one Power. The*1 semi-encirclement 
of Sweden was 3 completed with Russian bases at Petsämo' and Murmansk in'the 
far northj^* while/ since 19A9 (when Norway and^Demark joined N.A.T.O.), 
the .chance that ehe .will'be able. to.keep out of a future third world war 
seems greatly reduced. 
The neutrality .policies .of/these two »countries in the . postwar world 
9 W • - . . . . . . . 
show strongly, the influence of their national traditions .and experience. 
They have broadly similar defence and foreign economic.policies but, in V '• • w * • - ' • 
other respects, Sweden's neutral stand has been less rigorous and more " • 
'•ч v •". ' -
pragmatic than that of Switzerland - .this last point is раЛУ*>и1яя1у£рИу 
illustrated in their different "approaches to participation in the United 
Nations. 
For both countries; neutrality means • ah "armed "defensive neutrality.* - ' . " " - . - - tb ' • . «Т * I . .1 
But the problems of defence in the,atomic age seem almost insuperahlej -
1. See Walter Kolarz - Russia and Her Colonies (London, 1952) pp. 88-95 
for a brief discussion of „the historical significance of Petsaao and 
Murmansk in Suedo-Russian relations. 
and, as. in other western democracies, the heavy expenditure required 
for modern systems (quite* apart from the vexed question of their depend-
ability) arouses public controversy. Military leaders in both countries, 
' • j ,. 
true to their profession, have voiced their disquiet about the efficacy 
of the old methods} and in Sweden, though not in"Switzerland, some have 
advocated membership in, or at least association with, the N.A'.T.O. powers. 
However, both countries still rely on long established conscript systems 
and not on standing armies, and pridei themselves on the speed irith which 
* * 1 
a large national army can be raised in this way within forty eight hours -
with each man specially trained to fight on his national territory* 
» * "* * 
Both countries have built up their air strength considerably since 1945, 
• 2 
particularly since the Korean War and the advent of nuclear weapons. * 
* M* 
Switzerland, naturally, has no navy, while Sweden has shown that hers is 
« . . . 
an 'active* form of non-alliance policy by allowing her navy, on occasions, 
f * 4 . . J « " " " 3-
to conduct manoeuvres with units of the fleets of the N.A.T.O. powers. 
* * 
Basically, both countries follow a strategy of deterrence - aimed 
at convincing a would-be aggressor that the cost of aggression would be. 
disproportionate to any likely gains. "As it is often argued that the 
only way to deter a nuclear aggressor is to possess nuclear weapons oneself 
1 
1 . See The Swedish Army (London. 1955) and Economist Supplement on Sweden 
29 Oct. 1955. Sweden makes nearly all her purchases of arms in Britain. 
See E. Wiakemann - "The State of Switzerland in 19561 International 
Affairs. R . I . I .A . Oct. 1956, pp. 436-445, The Times Supplement on 
Switzerland, 5 Oct. 1959» and Christopher ^ Hughes, ep. cit. p. 13--19. 
2 . The growth can be traced in the annual volumes of "June'в All tho 
World's Aircraft." Both countries have modern jet fighters. In 1955 
Sweden had the fourth largest air force in the world with a front line 
strength of 1200 planes. The Swiss bought 100 British Hunter jet 
- * fighters in 1958. 
3 . Documents on Sweden's Foreign Policy 1950-51 (Stockholm, 1957) p. 27. 
c£ Z~du* wUose (аАл/у cbt^ducWd fhcu\oCuv\rts а* /Ъчмл ujoHXS иntU 
' tieeK of tclioiA) C o i ^ e ^ b c v z . 
Iho^U, c^urtot^sLj, (лггыг 3rth<ü*\ kctpc <л uuvuej aM-acUt oj- P. 
(the opposite argument la that the mere possession of such weapons ensures 
r . _ 
that an aggressor must nullify that nuclear capability at the outbreak 
i u>tcle*\ елл^д й Ii wit /1л fu/ift V/tcaJl eJ?ouir 
of war), there has been much debate in[Jb<Hdi/oeamtriea> whether they 
Should equip themselves with nuclear weapons. At the time of writing, 
both countries have postponed taking a decision on this matter. Quite 
apart from the enormous'cost of manufacturing these weapons, while the 
•v •<' w . 
present nuclear Powers are reputedly unwilling to sell, (and for 
* r * , ~ » -
Switzerland, particularly, there would be difficulties in testing all 
but' the smallest weapons) it may be that both countries have been influenced, 
*" * • , . . - .. 
while officially repudiating, the Soviet Union's oft repeated contention 
that possession jof nuclear weapons is incompatible with neutrality. 
• - . 
In both countries civil defence is regarded as an integral and important 
part of their country's defence, and is given far more attention than in 
< 2 • 1 
most countries within N.A.T.O. * 
loh^ 
In the/argument between'the two main schools of Swiss military 
к 4 I» . « * 
strategy, cold war conditions seem to have favoured, for psychological 
as well as'purely military reasons, the advocates of a flexible defence 
of the frontier. For it is this policy which has gained official 
approval since 1945, as against the alternative policy of retirement 
. * 1 О V * 
to 'the alpine redout.'^* 
1. For Soviet attitudes, see 0. Afanasyera - "Switzerland. Neutrality 
• Armed with the hydrogen Bomb," International Affairs (Moscow), 
October 1958,'pp.'92-93J and D. Melnikov - "Scandinavia Today: 
Sweden" op. cit.'December 1958, pp. 53-57. 
2 . For Swedish civil defence,^ see Philip Noel Baker - The Arms Race 
(London, 1958), pp. 168-9. For Swiss civil defence; see The Times. 
9th October 1959. 1 ' . . . 
3 . - See the speech of the Chief of the Swiss General Staff, Colonel 
Annasohn, reported, in The Guardian. 3rd December 1959. 
For Sweden the American project to create N.A.T.O. compelled her to 
re-examine her neutrality policy, to reappraise her relations with her 
* ч 
immediate neighbours, and it touched off a domestic debate of great 
importance and complexity.** Swedish array leaders, who in effect argued 
that the military basie of Sweden's neutrality was now virtually untenable, 
were in favour of joining N.A.T.O. But the government leaders replied 
that their concern was with the political as well as the militaiy aspects 
of the problem, +that Sweden's policy of neutrality did much to allay 
Russian suspicions, and Russian hostility would be too,high a price for 
the limited military assistance they were likely to receive on joining 
N.A.T.O. The position and importance of Finland weighed heavily in the 
a^d tspeeta-Uif » 
arguments of both sides; Bw in Swedish appraisals of Soviet policy, fzfaT 
2 
in the political as well as the military sense, Finland * is Sweden's 
'alarm clock.' There was never any strong probability that Sweden would 
join N.A.T.O. and when the Swedish government's alternative proposal for 3 
- a Ten Tear Neutral Nordic Defence Union was rejected by Denmark and 
г л 
Norway (mainly because their experiences of neutrality had been less happy 
than Sweden, and the economic sacrifices involved were considered too great),* 
i ... 
Sweden immediately devoted attention to the strengthening of the airforce 
v » , • , 
and to the provision of defences against submarines and mines in the Baltic. 
1 . "See Harald Wigforss - "Sweden and*tho Atlantic Pact" International 
Organization, August 1949» pp. 434-443; and I . William Zartman -
1 "Neutralism and Neutrality in Scandinavia" Western Political' Quarterly, 
June 195Л, pp. 143-160. ^ 
'2. For Finland, see above pp. l35"-£ 4 
3. .Conflicting conceptions of national interest had again shown the 
flinsiness of pan-Scandinavianism. Sweden has remained attached, however, 
to all non-railitary forms of co-operation with her Scandinavian neigh-
" bours. "See Raymond E. Lindgren - "International Co-operation in 
Scandinavia." Y.B.W.A. 1959* pp. 95-114. » , „ , 
4. Furthermore, Sweden was economically and militarily the strongest of the 
• three, and it is also noticeable that both Norway and Denmark are North 
Atlantic powers, whereas Sweden is wholly a Baltic state, For Danist-. л 
Noywtyi*4* Yit*blrcdisn\ £ee JZ^bwin-^pf>p ft-5"-144*. 
In both Switzerland and Sweden military leaders have said that in 
the event of their territory being attacked their aim would be to hold off 
the aggressor until they could secure help from the N.A.T.O. powers. The 
diplomatic implications of this are important and tend to contradict, or 
diiiM tu&i*- cla.u«4 of- self y-eho^ee a^uJ ho*- Coнтл^'ЬеаыМ-
at least Ytt duet* military co-oporation 
cannot, as the Belgians found in 1940, bo built up overnight; though 
unloss actual invasion is thought of as highly likely, it can hardly be 
maintained that the soldiers1 diplomatic indiscretions prove the anachronistic -
nature of their military policy. 
In their foreign economic policies Sweden and Switzerland are directly 
dependent on foreign trade for their national prosperity, and so indirectly 
dependent on trade for the continuance of their neutrality policies which 
presuppose the need for both a high defence capability and the preservation 
of a high standard of living for their nationals. The greatest problem 
in this- connection is a pressing shortage of certain raw materials. Sweden 
regularly imports coal, iron, oil and petroleum products and textile fibres. 
Switzerland normally imports nine-tenths of her raw materials, particularly 
oil, coal and iron. Both countries usually have an adverse trading 
balance of imports against exports on their cvirrent accounts, though 
Switzerland much more so than Sweden. Receipts from her mercantile 
.л . » . 
shipping enable Sweden to more than offset her trading deficit, while 
overseas investments, banking, insurance and the tourist industry enable 
Switzerland to achieve a favourable overall balance of payments position. 
Since 1945 both countries have increased their trade with each of the 
Superpowers, though trade with the Soviet Union is still relatively small. 
Both countries feel a greater dependence on the United States than their 
trading figures indicate, for they fear that their own prosperity is 
inextricably linked with the continuance'of American prosperity, an 
American'recession could mean a Swiss or Swedish depression.1. Because 
both'countries favour liberalisation and multilateralism in'-trade and 
avoid associations which they feel might* compromise their neutrality, 
they'both* have joined tha 'Outer Seven* of the European Free-Trade-
Association, rather than the 'Six' of the European Common Market. It is 
typical that Sweden is taking a leading part-in the formation'of the 4 
'Seven'1 and in the4 efforts at 'bridge-building' with"the ' 'S ix 'while 
Switzerland plays a~very q u i e t ' r o l e . > 
This contrast in "styles is even more marked if one compares their 
policies'"' in" regard to international organization. Sweden became a 
member of the United Nations in 1%£, though' warily and without much 
enthusiasm, and her policy inside the organization is characterized by 
a careful, mediatory, form of co-operation which serves as the basis of' 
all Swedish international action beyond the scope of immediate' Swedish 
1. For details on the above points see the annual volumes of the U.N. Year-
book ojt International Trade Statistics. Specifically, see "Switzerland. 
Oasis of Free.Enterprise" by Blair Bolles in Foreign Policy Reports. 
New York, 15 January 1950, and G. Soloveytchik - "Switzerland Copes with 
Prosperity", Lloyds Bank Review, July 1957. Economist supplement on 
Sweden. 29 October 1955. In 1946 Switzerland and U.S.S.R. resumed 
diplomatic and commercial relations after a break of 22 years. In 1946 
Sweden signed a highly controversial Trade & Credit Agreement with the 
U.S.S.R., and a far less controversial trade pact in January 1959. 
2. See The observerT loth May 1Q5Q and The Economist, 27th February i960, 
pp. 819-822: A Nfij*-:,,^fl^c ft^cpg^ fore TraAe ЫЯ/ Tu> 
**7i.«i.jJ>y ft.-e.cb ., J ^ t i a o ^ , H S - e ) . . 1 7 
3. See "Sixes and Sevens" in The Times Supplement,, 5th October 1959, p. vii 
t and Henri Stanner - Neutralite Suisse et Solidarite Europeene (Lausanne 
1959) vho points out that two-thirds of Svlss foreign trade is with 
Western Europe and argues for Swiss association with the Common Market. 
1 f 
interests • ' Switzerland has not joined the United Nations and there 
has never-been a" thorough public discussion of this question,2'.though 
no doubt memories of her'difficulties as a member of the League and the 
intention of giving executive authority'to the Security Council were 
sufficient deterrents in 1945. ' Nevertheless, the Swiss; just as much 
as the Swedes, are.conscious that,their neutrality is more likely to be, 
respected if,<as well as benefitting themselves, it can be used to provide 
international services. And while both Powers are at pains "to ensure 
that if .war breaks out their neutrality will not be violated, they both * 
realize that prevention of war is the prior concern arid endeavour to 
contribute towards this task, Sweden here makes use .of the opportunities 
3 
afforded by her membership of the United Nations. Switzerland shows 
that hers is not.a completely introverted neutrality, by such acts as 
serving with Sweden on the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission on Korea;^ 
by representing British and French interests in Egypt after the break of 
19565 and, above all, encouraging the use of her national territory for 5 
international conferences and for the headquarters' of international 
• ts.." . % " • — — — . , 
1. See Sweden and the United Nations f report by the Swedish Institute of 
International Affairs (Hew York,. 1956). 
2. See Jacqueline Belin - La Suisse et lea Nations Unies (New York, 1956); 
and W. E. Rappard - "Switzerland and the United Nations" (A.A.A.P.S.S. 
3.» Apart from her membership of-the Neutral Kations Commission in Korea; 
one remembers the"military contingent contributed to the U.N. emergency 
JJ0 force in Sinai in 1957/.and the efforts of her official representative, 
"и Jarring,"in his capacity of President of the Security Council, over the 
. Kashmir question. See' also Appendix 2 below, especially pp. 3 
4. Both the Swiss and the Swedes found thist^s a disagreeable task - see 
Jacques Freymond - "Supervising Agreements. The Korean Experience." 
Foreign Affairs f April 1959. pp. 496-503. 
5. Typical was her,unsuccessful^ effort to convene a 'summit' conference in 
the autumn of 1956 to discuss Middle Eastern problems. The list of 
important conferences held on Swiss soil is extremely long; one need 
only mention the Geneva Conferences of 1954 and 1955 as examples. 
1. • ' 
organisations. * The tension between neutrality and international 
solidarity is thus eased by the twin conceptions of international' 
services and humanitarian mission, the most cherished expression of 
which is the International Red Cross with its headquarters 1л Geneva 
and a directing personnel recruited only among Swiss citizens. 
There io no doubt that the sympathies of the vast majority of Swiss 
and Swedish citizens lie with the N.A.T.O. Powers in the struggle with 
4the Soviet Onion and its satellites. Yet, more emphatically, the 
traditional policies of neutrality have a tine-tested secredness, almost 
a talismanic quality. - In Sweden this is evinced by the fact that public 
discussion of foreign policy concentrates almost exclusively on defining 
and justifying Sweden's "alliance-free" policy,.* and in Switzerland the 
Swiss remain true to their national custom of not discussing among 
themselves why they are neutral while assuring other people that Swiss 
neutrality is unique and not susceptible of being duplicated on the 
* . » -
international plane. It is _inconceivable that^either country will easily 
abandon its neutrality; and, whatever the dangers of 'magic charm* , 
neutrality may be, it remains true that the actual policies of both 
powers are singularly free from illusions. 
1. In Geneva alone there were 142 international organizations in 1959» 
See The Times Supplement. 5th October"1959, p. XVI. t v 
2. See I . William Zartman, op.* cit. pp. 143-157; and Sweden and.the 
United Kations, op'.1 cit. pp. 157-160, for brief discussions of the 
public debate about the kind of neutrality Sweden should pursue. • 
Austria - a Neutralised State 
Prior to 1955, neutralization**- the institution of a status of 
permanent neutrality - had seemed to be кп obsolete 19th century 
practice. The neutralization of Austria in that^yeor revived public 
interest in the device of neutralization and led to much, rather loose} 
talk about "tjie Austrian example.11, let it is doubtful if the success 
of Austria in achieving some degree of immunisation from the struggles 
of the*Cold War can provide a truly heartening example for other states. 
After all, it took nine years of occupation and the cumbersome method 
of four Power control to restore the sovereignty of a small country 
with a population of only 7 million people; and, even so, the progress 
of the negotiations for Austrian independence were extremely hazardous 
and influenced at all stages by the general climate of east-west 
relations. Austria's new status, which involved shouldering some 
onerous burdens,"sprang almost entirely from her insignificance as a 
military "factor; and, more specifically, from a coincidence of Russian 
• • J p 
strategic re-assessments and propaganda aims in the context of 1955* * 
1, Neutralization requires an international treaty between the Great 
Powers and the State concerned, whereby the former guarantee 
collectively the independence and integrity of the latter, which 
must agree to abstain from any hostile action or any international 
agreement likely to involve it in hostilities. In the past neutralization 
has been applied only to small, weak states and to situations where a 
- rough balance of power prevails.' See Fred Greene - "Neutralization and 
the Balance of Power", APSK. vol. 47, 1953; 1041-1057, and C. R. M, F. 
Cruttwell - A History of Peaceful Change in the Modem World (London 
1937) pp. 183-192, and Oppenheim - Lauterpacht. vol. 2» p.244# 
From the above requirements it is clear, despite some assertions to 
the contrary, that Cambodia, Laos and South Vietnam were not neutralized 
by the Geneva agreements of 1954» For further discussion of this point, 
see J. A. Modelski"Indochina and S.E.A.T.O." in Australian Outlook 
13 (1) March 1 959.; 27-54, see also above p. №7-4. 
2. See above pp. and below p. 2 3 
Indeed, Austria's strategic position, her experiences since 1918, 
and, того particularly, the power constellations of the Cold War, воет 
to havo confirmed her position as the new cross-roads of Europe, in 
placo of Switzerland* »Bounded to the north-west by the Federal Republic 
of Germany, with its north-castorn frontiers merging into part of the 
Iron Curtain, with Switzerland and Italy to its west end south-veot, and 
Yugoslavia on its southern frontier, the Austrian Federal Republic has 
common frontiers with six dates. Her newly found unity and prosperity 
stand in relief with tho declining years of Habsburg rule even more 
morkodly with the divisions, poverty end_ignominy of the interwar period; 
and her present independence contrasts sharply with tho occupation of 
1945 to 1955. 
For more than a hundrod years political leaders in Austria, whether 
Imperialists or Republicans, have had to face tho twin problems of how 
to find a satisfactory "state idea," and how to come to terms with tho 
inpulsoo of nationalism» While thore may be good reason for "doubting 
a popular assertion "that the last effectivo Habsburg ruler, Francis Joseph 
(18ДЕ-1916), played off one nationality against another within hie Empiro 
and that 'Divide et Impera' was his guiding political principle, it is 
nevertheless doubtful if that monarch's actual maxim of government, 
"Viribus U nit is", was more happily designed for his ago.** Though it 
i 
is true that Francis Joseph's personal rule was in dofionco of a 'solution' 
1 . See A. F. Pribram - Auotria-Hungary and Groat Britain 1908*1914» 
translated by Ien D. F. Morrow (London 1951), p.6l. Tho tensions 
caused by nationalism within the I labs burg Empire ere examined by 
R. A. Kann - The Multinational Empire (London. 2 vols. 1950); and 
"Tho Fall of Habsburg Austria" in The Т1дез Literary Supplement, 
2Q_July_1951, pp. 445-7, is a penetrating esscy on Austrian failures 
to find a 'state idea' during the oaao period. 
to tho nationalities problem of the Habsburg lands, it is also true 
that tho truncated rump of that polyglot empire - constituted the 
t. i 
Republic of Austria, by the peacemakers in 1919, es a state comprising 
* щ 
mostly of German speaking peoples - lackcd either the will or tho 
moans to existence, end between the vars it scarcely had an active 
foreign policy. The original wish of most Gorman speaking Austrians 
was for an Anschluss with Germany, but this va3 forbidden by tho 
Allies,^* The state was only kept in being during its first years 
ty means of substantial League of Nations reconstruction loans} 
while аз early аз 1927 tho final overthrow of Austrian liberties and 
f* ' . - V 
tho dostruction of national independence was prefigured in tho bloody 
15th July - one of the four fateful days (st? ovU^) 
1 . The name "Gernan-Aimtria? used at first by tho now Republic, was 
forbidden by the Allies, and the name Austria accepted. The Austrian 
Ropiblic comprises nine provinces - Vienna, Lower Äustria, Upper 
Austria, Salaburg, Tyrol, Vorarlberg, Carinthia, Styria and 
Burgenland. See further Jcme3 Viscount Bryco - International 
Relations (London 1922), p. 44. 
2. See S, V?. Gould "Austrian Attitudes toward Anschluss, Octobcr 1918 -
September 1919." J . M. H. Sept. 1950» pp. 220-231. 
3 . In Articlo 80 of tho Treaty of Versailles} but under this clause 
Austria could bo united to Germany "with tho consent of the Council 
of the Leaguo of Nations cf. also Article 88 of the Troaty of 
St. Germain* 
for Austrian libortioa.** The difficulties of adaptation froa being 
the ccntro of tho vast iJanubion Enpiro of tho Haboburgo to ploying tho 
part of a email autonomous etato (burdened by a now over-largo capital 
city) among the fiercely nationalistic successor etatcc, wore oagnifiod 
by tho great do press ion. The Austriaca were easily persuaded by 
National Socialist propaganda that their stato was not economically 
viablo, that a high proportion of unemployed was theroforo inevitable, 
and that tho only »Solution1 lay in union with Germany. Though Italian 
and French opposition was sufficient to etiflo at birth tho Austro-
» K 
German" customs union of March 1931, in March 193S Hitler'с Germany 
forced through the Anschluss without encountering much opposition from 
л 
either the League Powers or the Auotrian people 
Ironically, it vac the German end subsequently the four fowor 
occupations which helped to forge a eensq of national unity and to lay 
some of the economic foundations of Austria'a present prosperity» 
Certainly, the experience of foreign occupation since 1933 cocm to 
have induccd a greater national solidarity than previously. For 
vhercas in the interwar period cntagonlca between the Austrian Clericals 
end Socialists was so great thot civil war broke out between then in 
1934, their successors have combined to fora a coalition which eince 
1 , The other three being the suppression of Parliament by Dollfuao in 
March 1933 and the two lÄthe of Pobruary - that of the Counter 
Revolution of 1934, and that of the Berchtesgaden meeting of 1938, 
which through tho Gcrrenn invosioa and JJazi revolution brought tho 
Schuqnigg regino to on fend just one month Inter on 11 March 1938. 
See G. R. Godyo - Fallen Baatlcno (London 1939) p* 35. 
2. Frank Borkenaи - Austria and After (London 1938) J Kurt von Schuschnigg -
Farewell Austria (London 1938) and Austrian Requiem (London, 1947)• 
SchUGchnigg vm Chancellor of tho Austrian Federal Republic July 1934 
to March 1938. See G. E. R. Gere's assessment of Schuochnigg -
Fallen Bastions, op.cit. с 12» 
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1945 has governed «го country without a najor split,1* Furthornoro, 
It was during tho occupations that the Goroans prospcctod fürther oil 
fields In Lower Austria and tho Russians developed and worked then, 
/•fter 1945, vith Russia determined to troat Austria es a dofoated 
nation and to wring as ouch reparation as possible, Austrian loaders 
could only turn to tho Western Powers for the foreign aid noceuaaiy to 
economic recovery. It was thoir considerable cchiovonont that Austria 
bccaao a amber of the Marsholl Plan organization and of the European 
Payments Union without driving tho Soviot authorities to bolicvo that 
Austria was bound irretrievably to tho Western camp. 
I 
Indeed, in many rcspocto tho period of four power occupation 
appears со a trying and oxtrcaely difficult training for tho post-1955 
role of permanent diplomatic neutrality. Fron 1945 until 19552" Austria, 
though dividedJ into four occupation zones, had a govomaont whose 
i • 
authority was «cognised throughout the country and ty all four occupying 
3 ч 4 
Powers. ' If the evacuation of all foreign forces was to bo achieved -
for in the heyday of thoir co-operation the Allied Foworo hod stated, 
in tho Moscow Declaration of 1 Kcrvonbor 1943» that they wishes "to eoo 
ro-cstabliohed a freo end independent Austria" - Austrian bona fides 
bad to bo accoptablc to both of tho cold war canpe. 
1« Though Inevitably there havo boon frictions, Geo Gordon Shopherd -
Tho Austrian Odyssey (London 1957) j 0. W. Kitzinger - "Tho Electoral 
Syotea in Austria". Farllspsntary Affairs, Autumn 1959« 
2. Thoro is no completely satisfactory history of those nino years. But 
see Cozy Travero Grayson, Jr. - .Austria's International Position, 
1938-53 (Geneva 1953) $ R* Hiscocko - The Rebirth of Austria (London 
1953) J Philip Mosoly - "Tho Treaty with Austria", International 
Organization, vol. 4 1950t 219-35} D. C. Watt - "Some Rofloctiona on 
Austrian Foreign Policy 1945-1955", .International Rolatlono, vol. 1 
(6) Oct. 19561 259-269. 
3 . Ey the Prussians equally, despite the constant electoral resistance 
of the Austrians to Сонлип1вп. 
This tour do force veto achieved, despite tho nina years of 
occupation and tho trials of cavor«1 hundred Great Power mcotings 
before the conclusion of tho Austrian State Treaty* Tho.end to tho 
deadlock sprang entirely from a drcoatic reversal of Soviot policy.1* 
The process bogan vith Mr. Kolotov'a speoch to the Suprcao Soviet ot 
tho beginning of Horch 1955, whoa ho declared that delay in concluding 
on Austrian State Treaty ves unjustified but that guarantees must be 
found against another Anschluss and against Austria's participation 
in any allianco before tho treaty could bo signed. , Later he amplified 
these remarks to Austria's ambassador in Moscow, making it dear that 
agreement between the powers about Gornsry. vs3 no longer regarded ty 
the Soviot govorraent as an indispensable prerequisite to any sottlo-
nont of Austria's status. At tho end of March tho Austrian Federal 
Chancollor vas invited to Moscow and an Austrian delegation duly 
arrived there on 12 April where, after tvo days' negotiations, a 
( ' 2 ' 
oeoorandua *• vas Dignod on 15 April ty t&Lch Austria: agreed to oako 
a declaration "in a form imposing upon Austria, an international 
obligation, that Austria will maintain permanent neutrality of tho 
1 . SeetiSdvard Crtmkchev'e argument that tho Soviot revereal vas due 
to propaganda requirements - tho poot-Stalin »nov-look', tho 
dotento vith Tito, the yooing of Anion neutralists - end to 
otratogic ro-asooe^gte.. See The observer, 20 September 1959, 
P* 13, Soo а1во^ШП^ел1й^гэ of Sir Anthony Edon/London i960) 
? . Я90. , T!-£yZtVfö&TMiU)^^ It^ fc~(ЬшЛ 
у 1 ('Угрх N y!) /Juiirreü 
He • • э 
2* Toxt, in English translation, printed in New Tinos (Moscow) Ho. 22 
May 20, 1 9 5 5 S u p p l e m e n t of Documenta, pp. 5-7. 
2.Ъ? 
seme type os that maintained by Switzerland" j** egrcod to delivery 
of goods to the U.3.S.R. in payment of the value of the Soviet enter-
prises in Austria to bo transferred in accordance with tho Austrian 
2 
S t a t e Treaty; * acre od that Austria ehculd pay (1 million tons of 
crudo oil Annually for ten years) for the transfer of oil properties 
belonging to the U.S.S.R. i n Austria, end in United Statos dollars 
for tho transfer of the assets of the Soviet held Danube Shipping 
Соарацу in oastorn Austria; and, agreed that tho two countries should 
conclude trade, barter mid payments agreements to last, in the first 
instance, for five years. Exactly one month later the Foreign Ministers 
of the four occupying Powers signed in Vionna the Austrian State Trci.ty^* 
providing for tho establishment of a sovereign and democratic Austria 
within tho frontiers of 1938.^* An Anschluss vas forbidden and tho 
I 5m rights of псп-Сзтаап minorities were guaranteed. Austria was allowed 
1. Mr. Molotav's oft-repeated comparison of Austria's position with 
Switzerland was inexact. Switzerland suffers no constitutional or 
international limitation on the kind of armoaento it can possess, as 
Austria doos in Article 13 of the Stato Treaty. Cut such a limitation 
hca not, traditionally, boon regarded ca incompatible with neutrolizat^c 
In 1914 Luxembourg was forbidden to keep a standing arcy. It io ' 
interesting to note that two years later Kr. Mikpyon was rocomending 
to Austrian leaders that thoy should follow the model of Finnish 
neutrality, stressing that whenever he referred to Austrian neutrality 
he no ant "a neutrality without cry reservations whatever ,R Dally 
Telegraph, 23 April 1957. On Finland, seo Ы ш FP- J35"-$. 
2 . See detailed list in Articlo 22 of Stato Treaty. The Russians 
obtained compensation worth ^ 150 n . for these assets (Woetern 
estimates placed their value at only $ 40 a . ) 
3 . For toxt, вес British Treaty series no. 5&, 1957 cad. 214. The 
treaty bears вацу narks of hasty drafting and the neod to gloss 
over doctrinal differences. For criticism on this score, soe 
Janko Kusulin - "Austria after tho Hungarian Rising", International 
Affairs. April 1957s 133-Д2. ч ^ 
4 . State Treaty, Articlos 1 and 5. 
5. Ibid. Articles 4 end 7 . 
lib 
to koop on ercy of whatever else It wished, bat atomic and othor 
special woapons wore forbidden."'"* Thero were to be no reparations., 
but the oaoroa teres of tho Moscow Memorandum wore to be fulfilled 
2 . 
fcy Austria. . 
These two Instruments* together with tho Constitutional Law of 
neutrality of 26 Octobor 1955^" - which case into force and ves civen 
international publicity on 5 November 1955 - regulate Austria's new 
* 4 
international status. Conoral international recognition of this, new 
status was soon forthcoming,1 and in December 1955 Austria was one of 
sixteen states odedttod to* the United Nations tinder tho Sast^Jcst 
peckago deal. On a strict reeding of tho Charter, and one that 
prevailed at the Can Francisco Conference in 1945,^' neutrality and 
United Nations membership ore incompatible} but a ooro flexible -. 5 
interpretation allows that the Charter admits neutrality implication. 
In Uno with this letter vlow a leading Austrian International lawyer^* 
1. Article 13-
2. Articles 21 and 22. 
3. Tho neutrality declaration which booame an Integral part of the 
Constitution on 5 Hovcnber 1955 contained tho following passage: 
"With tho object of tho lasting end perpotual aäintonanco of its 
independence....Austria declares of its own free will its perpetual 
neutrality end will naintoia and defend it with all tho means at 
its disposal, Austria will navor join a military alliance nor allow 
the establishment of military bases of foroign states on its torritoiy, 
. New York Tines. 7 November 1955. 
4. Documenta of the United Kations Conference on International 
..Organisation (San Francisco, 1945), vol. 6 , p. 459| vol. 7 , p. 327. 
5. In Articlos 43 (3) aai 48 (1) vhorc шаЬег states nny be colled 
upon to act for tho maintenance of international peoco and security 
, as the Socurity Council глу. determine j it is arguable that in 
certain circumstances a state asy be excluded from these provisions. 
6 . Alfred Vcrdross - "Austria's Permanent Keutrality and tho U.K." 
A.J.I .L. Jcn.^1956» pp. 61-68. 
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baa argued, plausibly, th.*t ty tho tine Austria wso adnittod to tho 
United Nations her neutrality had already received almost universal 
recognition and that, in consocfuonco members aro obliged to rospoct this 
status if sanctions aro invoked. The thon Austrian State Secretary for 
Foroiga Affairs, Dr. Bruno Kroiaky,1* defined tho official Austrian con-
ception of neutrality in an article he vroto for a leading American journal 
"Actually it in not accurate to speak of neutrality in jssneotino, 
^ t . . . . . 
bocaußo what tho torn посла la non-participation in war. An attitude of 
t * 
indlfforenco toward tho ideological struggle , has noro properly boon called 
ncutrallom. (aa opposed to neutrality). But thic should not be takon to 
noen that neutrality docs not inpooo cry obligations w h a t e v e r upon a 
country in pcacotino. Such obligations can bo oieranrlsod as follows i 
(1) A noutral country cannot join a military alliance in time of poaco 
because in so doing It would des trey its ability to remain neutral in 
tiao of var. . • 
(2) Siailnrly, a noutral country must bar .foreign military bases Гга-ч 
' V 
its territory, sincc „thoy would diminish its forcer freedom of action -
л 
or rather non-action - in timo of war. 
(3) A neutral country oust not accept any obligations - political, 
economic or other - which would tend to impair ita neutrality In wurtimc? 
1. Dr. Krolaky, at ono timo a c a r e e r diplomat (before hie rapid rlso in 
tho Austrian Socialist party), cucceoded Dr. Leopold Figl'as Austrian 
Foreign Minister in July 1959» "and for tho first tirao tha Foreign. 
Minister woe permitted to ba independent head of his Minlntjy, now 
, freed from the Federal Chancollor'o office. , It in interesting to 
noto that Dr. Kreiaby spent tho entire war years in Swoden and that 
• ho has a Svodieh vifo. 
2 . Bruno Krcisky - "Austria Draws tho BalanceForeign Affairs» Jan. 
195?» PP. 269-281* This in in part а регарЬгазо of tho Austrian 
Constitutional Fedora). Statute of 26 Octobor 1955 which expressly 
mentions theoo three duties. Sea fürther Josef L. Кип» - »Austria's 
Permanent Neutrality." A.J.I.L. April 1956, p. 413. 
Dr. Kreisky maintainod that Austria's pormramt neutrality van 
a question of Hobe on'з choioo if Austria vss to become independent; 
"To venture out into tho open without having sought shelter with one 
of tho blocs seemed frcught with grave consequences. Whatever tho 
merit of this argument* it had the flaw of pre-cupposing a choice which 
in fact did not exist. At the very best, wo could choose betweon 
neutrality and tho status quo. At no time could wo chooso between 
neutrality and alignment with a bloc. And in fact what did tho statue 
V 
quo, amount to? V/as it not itself a fore of passive neutralisation -
neutralization ty occupation? Under tho circumstances, what alternative 
was open to a nation which longed to bo master once again of its own 
destity?"1' 
Kevortholess, tho Ausiriana have shown groat skill in making a 
friend of necessity and in evolving a forts of dipLcrtitiCj which la, 
* 2 
perhaps surprisingly, more like that of Swodon than of their Western 
о 
neighbour, Switzerland. By Joining tho Council of Europe, like 
Sweden and unlike Switzerland, Austria openly demonstrated its affinities 
1 . Krelshy» ibid. p. 273. 
2 . Writing before tho Stato Troaty, both Elizabeth Wlskoaann - Undeclared 
War (London, 1939) p. 5» and Oscar Halecki - The Limits and Divisions 
of European History (London, 1950) pp. 13V-5> mention the rolevance of 
tho Swiss comnplo for Austria. But E. Wickcnzmn "Resurgent Austria" 
Contemporary Review, Ко. 1099» July 1957* p. 8, write» "Austria hos 
developed a new kind of neutralism. Something loss negative and 
more actively European in spirit than tho neutrality of Switzerland." 
3* When Austria joined the Council of Europe - a purely edvisory, non-
nilltary organisation - .the Austrian Foreign Minister wan reported 
as saying "We ore a militarily neutral state, but there is no 
neutralise.n ' Kew York Times» 22 Feb. 1956. cf. Professor Wiskoaann's 
opinion, in the preceding footnote. 
23*7 
vith tho Wost. However, as a vital condition of hor continued 
independence, oho has boon scrupulous in the aalntonance of her oilitary 
and diplomatic neutrality botvoen both blocs i providing a neutral stage 
* i 
for international conferences of all political complexions;* expolling 
the Secretariat of the Communist VJorld Federation of Trade Unions froa 
2 
Austrian soil; * performing neutral good officco during and after tho 
Hungarian Revolution, despite strained relations vith neighbouring 
3' 
Communist states; and protesting strongly at tho violation of Austrian 
air space by American military transport planes on route southwards 
during the crisis in Jordan end Lebanon in the cummer of 1958«^* 
In doaling vith these difficulties, Austrian leaders have shown 
considerable diploaatic skill, a skill which is equally evident in the 
woy Austria manages to keep on generally favourable terms with both Super-
powers. Since 1945» relations with tho"United States have been con-
sistently amicable. In addition to vital American economic aid, given 
д. < • • , • . 
during tho nine years of occupation, subsequently the United States 
Export-Import Bonk has advanced substantial loans for developing Austria's 
iron industry. Only two relatively minor, end related, issues have 
threatened to impair relations. These were the question of the settlement • • j * I ^. . 
V r ' 
of the claims of American oil companies whose properties wore confiscated 
by Hitler's Oormasy iß 1938* end the question of tho release of 2,000 
million schillings in counterpart funds hold in a blocked account to tho 
i 
1 . "Burdons of Neutrality" The Times« 23 April 1959. 
2 . "Austriaca Interpret Koutrality." Ecohoalst 3 March 1956, pp. 611-12. 
3 . "Unintimldated", Manchester Guardian« 4 March 19571 "Austria Scores 
Budapest Stops". Nov York Птоз, 4 Horch 1957, & "Austria Neutral 
Neighbour". Economist. 17 Kovember 1956, pp. 611-12. 
4 . Tho ТДдез. 27 August 1958. 
TM о 
credit of tho United States.. Doth of these Issues ucro cot tied,, 
virtually, ty the end of 1959.1*J Equally, .'and in sharp contrast to 
tho pro-1955 period, fthere has been narked evidence sinco 1955 of official 
Austro-Ruseian cordiality.. The visit of Mr. Kikoyan in April 1957 vas 
on undoubted cuccoss end produced a Soviet promise that Austrian deliveries 
of oil'to Russia would ho reduced, provided trade in general between the 
two countries continued to rioo. In tho following year the Russians 
agreed to reduce ty one half Austrian oil delivery obligations under tho 
3 
State Treaty; * .The Russians, vhohsd never had vital need of Austrian 
crude oll» now secaod more interested In stimulating Daiasblan trade and 
in underlining the power of »the Austrian example.'^* Tho Austrians . 
wisoly realise that it is In their every interest to agree with tho 
Soviet claims that pcacoful and profitable relations can bo maintainod, 
between a 'bourgeois' find a 'socialist' state, .. 
Most states, and'especially small states, have scao difficulties 
with their neighbours.. Austria is no exception* Only relations with 
Switzerland com entirely trouble-free • • Her relations with neighbouring 
1 . Kew York Tines, 17 Eoveaber 1959^ Д I4-3W \ W • 
2 . The desire to stimulate Dasubien trade is the probable explanation cf 
tho curiously roundabout method chosen by the Soviet leaders to effect 
this reduction (Austria to continue to deliver 1 cn. tons of crude oil. 
to Russia for tho next 7 years as stipulated ty tho treaty, but froa 
1959 Russia to compensate hor ty delivering half that amount of her 
own oil f*oo Eaku to Austria via the Danubo - ceo Tho Tinos, 27 August 
1958») Tho, tacit» quid pro quo зоодз to have been that Austria would 
join - as she did in April 1959 - with tho Coaaunist poworo who wore 
parties to tho 1947 Belgrade Convention on ths navigation of tho Damiboj 
tho Russians said frankly that they hoped tho Föderal Republic of 
Germany would also adhere to the Convention, Ho doubt the revival of 
the old tradition of expanding trcdo down the Danube is 'seen ty волю 
Austrian^ аз a full away from tb<* strong economic ties with Western 
Germany. • > 
3. See, for example, S. OkKanfcpCV "An Examplo of Peaceful Cooxicteneo 
International Affairs (Moscow)» Sept. 195Ö* ВЗ-бфЬгапйьгНег example see 
/K.H*rWo* ""Auihrlv* rteulvpJUti, - Pirstye*«" N<**T(Moicx,^ 
Ocjb»bi< Hits *r,<X-il. J ^ ^ 
Cooounist states nro invariably uneasy, not loast boccnso of tho" refugees 
who cook refugo in Austria - strained relations with Hungary during and 
öfter tho Hungarian Revolution wore thus, in a core с, cn unusually sovoro 
eruption of a general problem. With Italy,-tho only contimext sourco 
of tension is the question of the treatoont of tho Cornan speaking 
pojwlation in tho Italian province of Alto Adigo.1* This icsuo hos a 
long history but to date thoro is no sign of it becoming a dominating 
dotntShc 
factor in Austrian^politico, Another constant, though minor, ccurco of 
irritation is Yugoslavia's ^'claim on Austria's Slovene and Croatian 
minorities in her south-eastern provinces of Corinthia and Styrin. 1 -
Undoubtedly, bowovor, ooanomic tics and sontimcnt, as well as 1огц; 
intertwined histories, nalro Western Gornany tho most important of Austria's 
neighbours. tho Austrian State Treaty, tho chief ' charter' of neutralised 
Austria, expressly forbids "all agreements having tho effect, either 
directly or indirectly, of promoting political or eoonoaic union with 
Gemary."^' As -thesajority of Austrian industrialists aro grossdoutscii 
by tradition and interest^*, and as Gornany is the moat important customer 
and supplier in Austria's close overall links vith tho sis European Comon 
5 
Market countries» it coons that tho government's reason for joining the» 
'Outer Soven' of tho European Froc Xrado Association «го based not so much 
1 . Known to the Austrians as South Tyrol. For a briaf account of the 
history of this dieputo, oeo Jenas Viscount Eryco. op.cit. pp. 46-47. 
Seo further "Tensions in South Tyrol". World todayT Jcnunry 1958 iife fr.« t 
2 . Hugh Soton-l/atscn - Tho East European Rovolutlon (Lenden 1950), pp. 369-71 
3 . In Article 4 pars. 2 . ^ - -
4« Seo E. Viokcaann op. cit; and Gordon Shepherd's argument that Austria 
will be forced into the German orbit by sheer economic proseuro - рае 
tocjtrißnjQdy^esy (London, 1957). 
* 
5. In 1959 50% of Austria's exports went to Cosaon Harkot countries j and 
between 50 & 60% of hor imports conoJCroa thsso countries. 26% of her 
OXDartS went to Wootem Gerwmnr. 
Vkt. 
on economic considerations, but rather beoause of a strict regard for 
Austria's neutral status.*' 
If non^Conannlst Europe is roolly to congeal into two separate 
economic blocs, thon Austria, like Switzerland, will find herself 
separated froa her taain markets, And in terns of the Cold Vor ss voll 
as of Western European rivalries, the political and economic factors 
converge to emphasize that Austria« more then Switzerland, is at tho 
blocked cross-roads of Europe: "The eastern frontier of the ccaaaon 
market Just like the western frontier of the Soviet block, cuts есгосз 
tho natural trado routos of central Europe. Sincc those are political 
as well as oconoaic frontiers, they loavo no room for a stable position 
for a country placed as Austria is. Austria's problem of association 
i 
probably cannot bo really settled until tho relationships between western 
and о as tern Europo changes, and t&at usod to bo central Europo can, in 
some form, cooe into existence again. Until thon, tho Austrian» ban 
2 . 1 
only improvise." This situation is a powerful inducement to tho 
kind of economic ' bridge-building' Austria is now attcapting^ 
here jher 1 octivo' ^ фрл^ diplomacy reminds one more of Sweden than of 
Switzerland. 
1« Tho government's view of neutrality was expressed ty Professor Alfred 
• Verdross in theso terms: "A pernanently neutral state cannot join a 
multinational economic group such ш the С canon Harkot bcceuse (such 
an organisation) aims at fusion of the national economies concornsd, 
and to this end it doputec authority to a central organ to follow а 
united oconoaic policy which is binding on tho кеаЬег statesVerdross 
farther argues that in case of war Austria must be able to fro о itself 
from restrictions on the course of its trado which night hooper it in 
the protootion of its physical indopendonco. See "Austria's European 
Choice", Economist ,30 January i960« pp. 437-8* [ 
2 . The Economist. 13, February i960« p. 593. 
fuck cJ&Jroi^ c e u r t i n p w - v y j Ä » ; Ц р л ^ Ь н у 
o f orU*%*-Ariott &re as о 14 /ы-tUe t'UcA of A^sfrl** * 
'U* j. HtStmc+l Cja>$t*fUy *f Bu^opt, Sroo - jj&j. 
COjcML M 1 4 J fpaiA. 131. 
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Though analogies between Austria and Germany are often made, 
/thoro ого папу 
reasons why »the Austrian example? of neutralization is for from suggesting 
a clear precedont for Germany,1, despito tho attractions of thio idea for 
2 
some Germans. * As long as Germany is divided; the fact of division is 
likely to deter increases in tho strengte of tho old Alldeutsch impulses 
within Austria towards a now Anschluss - though Professor Wiskemann 
maintains that thore are signs that such sentiments are still present in 
the Tyrol, Salzburg and in Styria.^* Their influence in Austria's 
political life so far ееетз small» The Austrian two party coalition, as 
wall as preventing the civil strife of inter-war years, may bo a guarantee 
of independence in another sense - at least as long as there is strong 
one party rule in the Federal Republic of Germany. For between tho wars, 
and especially in 1931 and 1933 when Germany and Austria had roughly 
similar regimes among the Gersaan Austrians separatism was never very 
strong. Actual experience of the consequences of union with Germany may 
now have made indopendence seem more attractive than it did bo two en 1918 
1. Tho most compelling differences are that Austria has a population of 7 mn. 
while there would bo over 70 mn. in a neutral Germany, made up of the« two 
Germanys of today} Austria's is an armed neutrality with no limit on, tho 
size of her arty - a freedom hardly likely to bo granted to a 'neutralized1 
.Germany. Moreover, Germany cannot be compared to a small, non-aggressive 
state with no revisionist demands or ability to impose its will on others. 
Even if Germany stayed aloof from Cold War entanglements, its neighbours 
would be concerned over its foreign policy to an extent which would moke 
neutralization an essentially unreal status. > 
2 . See Terence Frittie - nThe Impact of tho Austrian Treaty on Germany41, 
The Listener, 16 June 1955. pp. 1057-5S,. 
3 . E. Wiskemann - "Resurgent Austria.", op.cit. p. 10. 
4 . Б. Wiskomami - "Austria in 1959м, World today 15 ( U ) Kov. 59, p.492 »Tho 
ill-fated Weimar Republic had been governed by coalitionsj~it is at any 
. rato curious to observe how Austria and Germany have reversed their pre-
war attitudes towards political coalition; today it is the Germans who 
keep their Socialist party in opposition.!*- Scolalso Peter Matthews -
European Balance (London, 1945) P* 144» 
1 2 
und 193Ö. For tho non-Gorman minorities of tho 'nov1 Austria, 
separatism soeas to bo a negligible forco, though in ordor to fortify 
"tho Austrian idoa" new and inexpensive books on Austrian history сто 
being published end generously circulated undor govormont sponsorship. 
Few would 'now dispute tho contention of Borr Raab, tho Austrian 
Chancellor, who during his visit to Moscow in July 195& said that "the 
overwhelming majority of Austrians today favour this neutrality, and it 
is increasingly realised that wo took tho right decision for cur future."^* 
It may be that tho old tog of Imperial days - "Felix Austria" - has again 
bocorao appropriate. Less than five years after the Austrian State 
Treaty the internal aspect soosa аз propitious as her external relations 
But both aro delicatoly poised. Tho example of Switzerland and Sweden 
suggests that a successful noutral needs, as voll es restraint and care 
in hor external relations» national unity end stability in internal ' 
t 
politics, undoubted viability in economic lifo and military strength 
sufficient to deter a vould-bo aggressor froa achieving oasy conquest. 
1 . Tho "Handbook "of tho Austrian national and Fodoral Assemblies? for 
1959 shovod that 92 of the Rational Asecobly's 165 members vera in 
prisons or concentration camps of Hitler's Germany or in prisons of 
pro-Uasi authoritarian regimes in Anatrla. Quoted in Kov York Tinos, 
10 Мозг 1959. fViVd* c#wp tne**dib<4>i Ы « 
2 . At the 1951 census these were only 2% of the total population, and 
were mostly Slovene in Carinthia. 
3 . A.J.P. Taylor - who io rather scoptical about a 'distinctively' 
Austrian idea, insisting, with some reason, that so much depends on 
the larger neighbour Germany - has traced somo of the pest vicissitudes 
and ambiguities of 'tho Austrian idea' in his book "The llabsburg Monarchy 
1809-1918" (2nd ed. 194$)» see сэр. tho epilogue, pp. 252-261. The 
political significance of national history has boon clearly appreciated, 
and so rewritten, by oach 20th century Austrian regime in turn. Seo 
R. John Rath - "History of Citizenship Training - An Austrian Example", 
J.M.I?. Sect. 19Л9. pp. 227-238. 
Д. Quotod in The Tinea, 27 Auflust 195S. 
5. This was a recognition of diplomatic finesse, as opposed to araod might. 
For Austria was once known as Felix Austria becauso tho Habsburg Monarchy 
-acquired on empire fcy marriage corrects rather than ty conquest, "Bolla 
gerant alii, tu follx Austria, nubo." 
To dato, Austrian loaders have amply shorn their diplomatic skills, bat 
it is too early to be confident of tho country's national unity or its 
economic strength, and its puny defences have already caused its military 
leaders much diequiet.** 
The "failure end downfall" of the Austrian Empire was duo to its 
2 
"efforts to span two worlds," * and one remembers the misfortunes of 
Luxembourg end Belgium in 1914 following the collapse of tho balance of 
power which had initially enabled their neutralisation* It would bo 
rash to assert that tho post-1955 neutralism of the Austrian Federal 
Republic is deeply entrenched. So far, it has not been severely tested. 
1« Tho visit of the Austrian Defence Minister and senior arty officers 
to inspect Soviot military installations,during October 1958, seoacd 
an auspicious start to tho campaign to obtain a revision of tho , 
present nilitnry clauses of the Austrian Stato Treaty which, according 
to tho Auatricns, prevent an effective protection of neutrality. 
"At present the Austrlcns possess threo modern fightor aircraft bought 
in England oarly this year. Their ain is to build up a strung 
protective fighter unit and also to obtain the revision of dense 13 
of tho Austrian Treaty which prohibits tho possossion of anti-aircraft 
missiles. If Russin agrees to that, it is unlikely that the other 
Powers will-object." Lajcs Lcderer - "Austria's Arns Talks vith 
-Russia," Observer, 12 October 1953. Tho ciao of tho Austrian arqy 
In 1956 van only 30,000 men. "Burdens of neutrality,8 The Times, 
23 April 1959. 




It has not been an aim of this study to make an anthology 
of verbal definitions and equivalents of the term neutralism, 
nor to end up with a single terse definition . Indeed, it 
i s believed that it i s a mistake and a d'islyrcuCHon of political 
* i * . • » h 
enquiry from i ts proper concerns to seek for a quintessential 
neutralism. The term neutralism at least connotes certain 
definite states and statesmen, with their similarities and 
V 
differences , influenced by and influencing the character of 
v. 
the Cold War. The f i rst reaction to the use of the term 
should be: whose neutralism i s referred to and what forms 
does it take, how general or particular are these forms? 
For fru it ful generalisations about the significsnce of r 
neutralism in international politics should be generalisations' 
about the actual policies of states and the attitudes and 
opinions of statesmen, and are to be justified by reference 
to and debate about particular instances and examples. 
All the new states of the postwar world have become 
neutralist save two, the Philippines and Pakistan. And all 
these are African or Asian states apart from Cyprus. These 
new state neutralists were thirty-two of the forty-efeyen 
neutralist states in a total United Nations membership in 
Z4-S 
January 1961 of ninety-nine. In the conjunction of new t к 
statehood and non-alignment Н е е the main key to an under-
standing of the nature end significance of neutralism in 
contemporary international polit ics . Being neutralist has 
become a well nigh inevitable consequence of new statehood 
in the postwar world. There are at least f ive other avenues 
by which a state has become neutralist , and these have sorae-
times intersected, but, so f a r , the transition from dependency 
to new statehood has been the main highway. v I * \ fin ^ I ^  - \ 1 . V-rr - - I - r'f • —b-"-*-«» 
Of the other f ive avenues to policy neutralism, that of 
three pioneer neutralists - India , Yugoslavia and Egypt -
i s the most important, as these three states have initiated • V 
certain policies which are now widely recognised as being 
neutral ist , and which new states have copied, or at least 
come to practise themselves. These three states have shown 
ways for translating_ceiitain_widespread~.urges--^especially 
about m i l i t a r y ^ р а с t s , _ _ b a s e o r e i g n ald ,_^lmperialiem' and 
national independenc e - into^ policy forms, and in so doing 
they have attained pqsitions^oij^eaders 
world. 
Of the four remaining categories, three - neutralization , 
buffer status, traditional neutrality - are survivals, or 
revivals , of nineteenth century practices, while the fourth , < -
category - the erstwhile isolationists - illustrates the 
growing Impracticability of isolationist policiee today. 
There is only one currently neutralized state - Austria - and 
it is unlikely that 'there will be many more. Buffer Btatus 
is now generally unpopular, and the conditions which created 
buffer states in the nineteenth century do not obtain today. 
The traditional neutrals - Sweden and Switzerland - are a' 
class apart," because of their proeperity and the fact that 
they are the only states to have successfully practised a 
non-alignment policy from the nineteenth century right up to 
r 
the present day. 
* « 
The dismantling of Western colonial empires has proceeded 
* so rapidly in recent years that the creation of new states 
by this means will probably soon come to a halt. Even on 
» • * . . 5 v 
the assumption that all the remaining Western overseas 
i •T> 
territories seoure their' independence," it ie unlikely that 
more than a'dozen new states remain to be created in this way 
and most of these will be African states. It may well be 
that anti-VYeetem anti-imperialiem will thus become a fading 
force, though the fact of Communist expansion since 1945 
shows that the age of empires i s not yet over. 
I Hitherto, the steady growth in the number of neutralist 
states has given an impression of growing momentum and has 
caused the superpowers to take increasing account of factors 
I outside their opposed alliance systems. The d i f f icult ies 
\ of trying simultaneously to forge friendly relations with 
2Го 
neutralist nations while presejreln^ 
and morale within their own alliance systems are now_prob1ems 
сонспоп to both superpowers. * * <. 
' The most dramatic example-, of .„the„growin^ 
neut ral i s t - s t a t e s j t e s J b e e n , shown „ in t he increa sing neut ral ist 
membership of the UnitecUNat ions.».; especially _since December 
.JL955, and the greater attention paid in that organization to 
neutralist themes and interests as a consequence of the 
changing pattern of membership. 
Even so, it would be wrong^o_lay„great „stress on the 
sol^i^ritу_or agreement^of _'neutrail st state B among ^themselve в, 
for they represent a wide, ran 'ge^^di^Jfer^t^^and sometimes 
сonflicting interests . Although there has been much talk 
about the notion of an-association bringing together a l l 
neutralist states in a neutralist bloc, this has not material-
ised so f a r , nor does this seem l ikely . ' Indeed,- some 
neutralists regard a^bloc of the non-aligned as a'contra-
diction in terms. However, there have been and w i l l , no 
. doubt, continue to be ad hoc groupings of some neutralist 
states bent on pursuing certain specific ends in common. 
I t i s probably in the expressigtajof neutralist doctrine, 
rather than the practices of neutralist^ states, that^neutralist 
leaders-seem-to be most^jin accord. For words can unite 
where actions may divide . All neutralists are agreed on 
the truth of theirj2entjral^ propositions -jthe need to abate 
ST 
the Cold War rivalries, the iniquities of colonialism, the 
need of poor countries for ^ecpnomip^id »^he^Jroirors of 
nuclear weapons. Indeed, such propositions now meet»with 
such general verbal assent that-, in this loose sense, it i s 
possible to say that, "we .are all-neutralists now." But 
the significant fact is that neutralist doctrine in^its 
broader forms seems most convincingly* a philosophy of state 
practice in Africa and Asia, where it is nourished by new r 
nationalisms. 
Afro-Asian neutralist doctrine, rather paradoxically, 
expresses-,; both- highly, sensitive -suspicion .of all foreign 
influences and more or less tolerance for all mode in^, political 
doctrines regarded as useful^tо neutralists. it is a 
highly.eclectic and pragmatic doctrine, not least because 
its most influential proponents are leaders of neutralist 
states. Its arguments are not novel but this does not mean 
that they lack appeal, rather the reverse. For neutralist 
d qc t rin е_сдп„р г о vid e^a^rat ipnal e and sense of direct ioiLjfor 
new nationalisms seeking expression in a world_where . 
increasingly there are pressures forcing each state to adopt 
at least declaratory polio ie s- on - a-whole-ho gt-of- int emati onal 
problems, and where national isolation.is^a»virtual imposs-
ibility . Ät the root of most Afro-Asian neutralist attitudess 
to the Cold War lie widely popular demands for national 
independence, national equality, and for augmenting national 
power and welfare^ Throughout the greater part of Asia 
• — * 
end Africa the effective choioe of political attitudes ie 
not a choice between Co'miunism and anti-Communism, but between 
various shades of anti-Western neutrali et-nationalieta and 
varioue degrees of conoern about local and regional problems. 
In retrospectthree popular beliefs about neutralism 
as1 a state policy s'eem to have been mistaken. 
Firstly, there has been a prevalent- assumption that if 
neutralist^Vtates oppose the Soviet bloc on certain issues, 
they must therefore eupport Western policies instead, or • 
vice versa. Yet opposition to a particular p"01iey of one 
of the Cold War camps does not necessarily mean approval of 
the other. In fact, neither Cold War camp can rely on the 
* j 
majority of neutralists to consistently take their side in 
Cold War disputes. Although Cold War protagonists will 
persist in trying to see to which of the camps particular 
neutralists are'inclined, it ie important to remember that 
neutralist loaders are virtually all genuinely ooncerned to 
stay non-aligned, for it is their fundamental conviction 
that the benefits of non-alignment outweigh any advantages 
that' commitment could bring/"1 
Secondly, American fears of4 "creeping neutralism", the 
growth of neutralist feeling and sentiment within hef 
alliances, resulting'in the defection of some of the members, 
seem, so far, to have been exaggerated. Of course, it is 
ДоГЗ 
arguable that the actual voicing of theee fears and warnings 
helped torprevent their realisation , . though this i s a 
dubious'contention. Japanese, French and British neutralist 
movements, however vocal, have so far been without inter-
national ^significance as they, have not engendered sufficient 
strength to take command of the state,, Effective neutralism 
must be an attribute of statehood, the state, being i t s 
measure and mould. The orily states which have so f a r 
become neutralist as a result of defeoting from a Western . 
alliance are Iraq and Cuba. It should be borne in mind, 
however, that these defections have both occurred sinoe 1958 . 
I t remains to be seen i f there wil l be further arrivals in 
the ranks of neutralists from the Western alliance systems. 
Thirdly, there seems to be l i t t l e justification to date 
for the view that neutralism i s a f i rst step to Communism. 
Americans have feared this and Communists may have believed 
i t , but so f ar no neutralist state has become Communist -
though one Communist state has become neutral ist . This view 
was widely held in both parts of the committed world because 
of the necessarily anti-Western character of nationalism 
in Western colonial territories . In f a c t , Afro-Asian 
national leaders see their neutralism as a natural expression 
of their s tate ' s sovereign independence in international 
po l i t ics . I ronically , although the neutralist nations could 
not hope to survive a global Communist victory, their barbs 
are directed mostly^against the v/estern powers. 
Neutral!sai should be seen not as a degeneration of the 
< 
- £ ... О 
prinoiples of nineteenth century neutrality, but primarily 
» 
as the expression.of new sovereignties and new nationalisms 
i 
in prevailing Cold War conditions. 
i r r 
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1.- 2. 4 . 
Haiti 1945 Rio Pact 
Honduras 1945 Rio Pact 
Hungary 1955 Warsaw Pact 
Iceland 1946 NATO 
India 1945 1947 pioneer 
Indonesia 1950 1949 new state 
Iran 1945 CKNTO 







Israel 1949 1948 new otate 
Italy 1955^ RÄTO 
Ivory Coast i 960 i 9 60 new state 
Japan 1956 bilateral paot 
with U . S . 
У 
Jordan 1955 1946 new state 
Laos 1955 1954 new state 
Lebanon 1945 1941 /6 new state 
i 
L iberia 1945 cx-ifiolation-
iot 
Libya 1955 1951 U . S . bases new state 
Luxembourg 1945 NATO 
Madagascar i 960 i960 new state 
Malaya 1957 1957 pact w ith U . K . new state 
Mali i960 1960 new state 
Mexioo 1945 Rio Pact 






New Zealand 1945 
Nicaragua 1945 
Niger i 960 
Nigeria i960 









Saudi Arabia 1945 
Senegal i960 
Somalia i960 
South Africa 1945 
Spain 1955 
Sudan 1956 
1956 U . S . & Prenoh 
bases 
NATO 


















with U . K . 
b i lateral pact 


















1 9 4 - 6 
2. 
1946 > 
i 960 i 960 
1956 г 1956u 
1945 
Ukrainian S . S . R * a 945 . 
U . S . S . R . * 1945 
United Arab 1945 
Republic 
United ilingdom 1945 
















NATO ft CENTO 
Soviet satellite 
Warsaw Pact etc . 
НАТО, 'SEATO & 
ÖENTO 
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1 . In 1953 Egypt and Syria , original-members of the U.IT.-wore 
united in a single state, the United Arab Republic. 
2 . Switzerland (traditional neutral ) , Bhutan & Sikkim (buffer 
state») are the only neutralist, states not members of the ' 
U . N . 
3 . India i s here counted as a pioneer neutralist end hence not 
an a new state neutralist , though she only became 
independent in 1947 . 
Select Bibliography 
It would not be helpful to others'simply to l i st a l l 
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abbreviations are not re-listed here, 1 as my-debts to-them 
wil l be mostly obvious from the citations in my footnotes. 
Nor does it seem necessary to l ist 'standard works. 
1 . Some general surveys of neutralism ares-




Henry A. Kissinger 
Ä. Lewis 
.Stanley Mayes 
Hans J . Morgenthau 
Robert A. Scalapino 
"Neutrality: Varying Tunes', " in 
* Foreign Affairs , October 1956 , pp. 
57-83. 
"Neutralism11 in European Integration, 
edited by C. Grove Haines (John 
• Hopkins Ргевв, Baltimore,-, 1957) pp. 
'196-214. 
Neutralism (Bellman Books, no . 4 , 
Ampersand, London, 1 9 5 5 ) . 1 
?The Roots of Neutralism in Southern 
Asia" in International Journal, 
Toronto, vol . 13 ( 1 ) , Winter 1957-8, 
pp. 30-40. 
"The New Cult of Neutralism" in The 
Reporter, 24 November i 9 6 0 , pp. 26-9. 
"Neutralism in Africa" in The 
Reporter, 10 November'i960, pp. 31-3. 
" 'Neutralism' in South East A s i a i n 
The Listener , 25 June 1959 , pp. 
Д093-Ю94 . " 
"Neutrality and Neu trail sm ,in 
Dilemmas"of Polit ics (University of 
Chicago Press, 1958) pp". 185-209. 
"Neutralism in Asia" in The American 
Political Science Review, March 1954 , 
rPP. 49-62. * 
2 . Some more specialised analyses of neutralism are:-
i 
John T. Marcus "Neutralism in Prance" in The Review 
of Polit ics , July 1955, PP. 295-328. 
I . I . Morris 
Marina Salvin 
John H. Wuorinen 
I . William Zartman 
Neutralism and nationalism in Prance 
(^Bookman Associates, New York, 1 958 ) . 
"Japanese Foreign Policy and Neutralist 
in International Affairs , R . I . I . A . , 
London, January i960 , pp. 7-20. 
! 
Neutralism in France and Germany, ' 
(New York, Carnegie Endowment for " 
International Peace, 1951)* 
"Neutralism in Scandinavia" in 
Current History, 1956 , pp.-276-280. 
"Neutralism and Neutrality in 
Scandinavia" in The Western Political 
Quarterly. June 1954 , pp. 125-160. 
3 . Some aspects of Communism and neutralism are dealt w i t h ' 
in:-
George Ginsburgs 
A. M. Halpern 
E. Korovin-
D . Melnikov 
L . Modjoryan 
"The Soviet Union, Neutrality and 
Collective Security, 1945-1959" i n ' 
Osteuropa Recht, October 1959 , PP. 77-
98. -
"The Chinese Communist Line on 
Neutralism" in The China Quarterly, 
January-March, 1961 , pp. 90-115. 
"The Problem of Neutrality Today" in 
International Affairs ( M o s c o w ) M a r c h 
1958, pp. 36-40. 
"Neutrality and the Current Situation" 
in International Affairs (Moscow), 
February, 1956 , pp. 74-81. 
"Neutrality" in New Times (Moscow), 
February 1956 , pp. 15-18. 
4 . On •classical* neutrality , see:-
Phil ip S. Jessup ( e d . ) 
N i l s Orvik 
Neutrality: i t s History, Economics 
and Law, 4 vols . (New York. 1935-6) . 
The Decline of Neutrality , 1914-41. 
(Tanum, Oslo, 1 9 5 3 ) . 
%(oZ. 
Nicolas Politis Neutrality and Peace (Washington, 
Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace, 1935 ) . 
5 . On nationalism, see especiallys-





The Price of Revolution (Hamish 
Hamilton, London, ,1951) , especially 
pp. 103-127. 
Prom Empire to Nation. The Rise to 
Self-Assertion of Asian and African 
Peoples (Harvard University Press, 
i960). 
Nationalism in Colonial Africa 
(Mailer, London, 1956) . 1 
Nationalism (Hutchinson*s, London, 
i 9 6 0 ) . ~ 
6. On the Cold Ш т and contemporary politics generally, 
' see especiallyr-
Raymond Aron 
Arnold Wolfers ( ed . ) 
The Century of Total War (translated 
from the French by "E. »7. Dickes and 
0. S. Griff iths ) , Derek Ve'rschoyle, 
London, 1954. 
On War. Atomic Weapons and Global 
Diplomacy (translated by Terence 
Kilmartin) , Seeker ok V7arburg, 1958 . 
Alliance Policy in the Cold War, 
(John Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1959) 
'2.&3' 
Appendix 1. 
Swiss Neutrality". An Official* 
Statement. 
I owe the discovery and translation of the following document to ny 
colleague', Mr. Christopher Hughes. The prefatory note is his, too. 
This document, dated 195Л, has recently been published as the 
first entry in the annual series (always now several years in arrear) 
of Administrative Decisions .of ,the Federal Authorities.- Most of these 
decisions are in that part of Federal Administrative Law where the 
administrative (as opposed,to the judicial) authority is competent to 
decide. Thus, most of them wear a semi-judicial character. By the 
nature of things, however, the deoisions of the Swiss Foreign Office 
(the Political Department) are more administrative or even political 
in character. The present document must be taken as publication of 
an instruction circulated within the service. It is not addressed to 
the general public, but to Swiss officials at home and abroad. 
The picture of neutrality given is affected by this. It is 
proper for the Swiss people to consider neutrality as a political ideal 
rather than a political expedient. The present document is, no doubt, 
consistent with this: officials are paid to represent the national 
interests, not ideals. That there is not the least trace of idealism 
visible (at first reading) in the document is only evidence for the 
official, within-the-service, attitude. It is not evidence for any 
popular cynicism. Indeed, within some spheres, the Swiss people 
rather than Swiss officials prevail, but the broad general trend is to 
throw legislation open to democracy, and to confine administration to 
the administrators. 
So this statement does not represent the national ideal. It is 
tempting to go to the other extreme, and insert tho words "Swiss Foreign 
Policy" - the power politics of a small power - instead of the words 
"the duty of a permanently neutral state." But this would probably 
also be a distortion. The mere description of tho policy by the 
general word "neutrality" (even though it is perfectly understood that 
of this particular sort of neutrality Switzerland will always be the 
unique example) makes a certain implicit idealism nevertheless 
unavoidable. Somewhere between these two interpretations is the right 
frame of mind to read this remarkably frank, official instruction to 
Swiss officials and diplomats. 
Source: Verwaltungsentschelde der Bundesbehoerden. Jurisprudence des 
autorites administratives de la Confederation. Heft - Fascicule - 24.1954. 
En vent au bureau des imprimes de la Chancellerie föderale. 
1. Beziehungen zum Ausland: Relations avec l'etranger. (l) Begriff der 
Neutralitaet: .Notion de la neutralite. (p. 9-13) 
The complete document, as published, is printed here, (Published 1959)* 
Translation, The document is in German only. One might guess from 
the style of the original that it is the work of several hands. For 
example, in s.lll. no. (1), paragraph one, might well have been originally 
drafted in French, while paragraph two is cast in one mould as a sentence 
which might well have been thought out "in German. (The present Minister 
for the Political Department speaks French as mother-tongue, while the 
Ilead of the"Judicial Division of the Department speaks German.) 
The words "oblige" and "obligation" represent.the German 
"verpflichten, Verpflichtung", which carry the meaning .of pfllcht. duty, 
and not of.purely external force. The word vorwirkuhg is difficult to 
render: "pre-effect" translates the two components: it is therefore 
left in German. 
The sentences in (parentheses) are in the original. Those.in 
((double brackets)) are the translator's insertions. 
The Concept of Neutrality 
The Political'Department summarised the ruling doctrine under 
the following heads: 
I . 
A distinction must be made between "ordinary" and ."permanent" 
neutrality. 
> Ordinary neutrality denotes the legal status of a state which 
does not take part in a war "which has broken out between<other .states. 
Therefore its presuppositions are: 
v. r » ' , 
1. ' A war, as understood ty the Law of Nations. 
2. Non-participation of a state in the hostilities. 
Permanent neutrality consists in a state, taking upon itself the 
obligation to be permanently neutroli-; This may be combined with the ' 
((Verpflichtung)) express obligation taken Ту other states to respect. . 
that neutrality. Hence, the distinction must be made between one-sided 
permanent neutrality, and permanent neutrality arising out of treaties. 
Both these may be combined, as in the case of Switzerland. 
I I . 
Ordinary neutrality creates no rights and duties in time of peace. 
Only for a permanently neutral state do rights and duties arise even in 
time of.peace. These may be described as: 
i <4 , i . 
1. The duly to begin "no war. 
The duty to defend neutrality or independence,' as the case may be. 
3 . The so-called secondary duties of permanent neutrality, (vorwirkungen). 
These may be comprehensively summarised,.'in tho phrase,' that a 
permanently neutral state must do everything to stop itself being 
involved in a war, and nothing which could get it drawn into a war. 
That is to say, it must, in general, avoid taking sides in a conflict 
between third-party states. 4 'It is obliged to follow a Neutralitaetspolitik. 
The carrying into effect of this polity of neutrality is a matter for 
its own judgment. ' * " 
No furthor explanation is needed of the two chief duties Udescribed 
above)) of a permanfcntly neutral state in time of peace. But investigation 
is needed concerning the so-called vorwirkungen. What political^ 
military and economic duties are.implicit in them? 
1. Political neutrality can be described as the obligation of the 
neutral state so to conduct its foreign policy that'it can be drawn into 
no war. In particular, it should conclude no treaty that could lead to 
zU 
its being obliged to wage war, e.g. offensive alliances, defensive 
leagues with reciprocal effect, treaties of guarantee, collective • 
security agreements. The obligation is, like all others, to be 
construed restrictively, and can only apply to foreign-policy acts 
properly so-called, and in any case not to other actions of the state 
(e.g. humanitarian activities in favour of the inhabitants of 
particular states, governmental explanations of the political situation 
to its own people, intra-state organisation and arrangements, etc.) 
It need not be said that there is no obligation to a so-called moral 
neutrality. The individual is not a subject of duties of neutrality 
under the Law of Nations. (Hence, in principle, neutrality demands 
no restriction of the liberty of,the Press). 
As regards participation in international conferences and , 
organisations, the distinction must be made between whether theyndisplay 
a predominantly political or a predominantly economic, cultural or 
technical aspect. If it is a conference or organisation of a political 
character, then the only possible question of participation arises if 
it displays a certain universality. The principal representatives of 
the political groupings in question must participate, and in particular 
both parties of a possible conflict. • Here also Switzerland has to * 
avoid taking sides. 
As against this, neutral states have the right to offer "good 
services" or "mediation11 - even during any hostilities; exercise of 
this right.can never be understood by one of the conflicting parties 
as an unfriendly action (Art. 3 of the Hague Agreement for Peaceful 
Settlement of International Disputes, of 18 Oct. 1907). 
• ~ ' * , 
2 . Concerning military neutrality, all one can say is that the 
permanently neutral state should in general conclude no military 
agreements with other states. The same applies as under No. 1 above. 
3» There is only economic neutrality insofar as the permanently' „ 
neutral state should. conclude no customs or economic union with another 
state, through which it might affect In greater or.loss'degree its 
independence in a political context also. This1only applies when the 
neutral state is the weaker party and thereby falls into dependence on 
its stronger partner; in such a case even the legal possibility of 
discharge of the contract of union or a special war clause would make 
no difference. 
Apart from this, there is no such thing as economic neutrality, 
unless the neutral state expressly and intentionally supportsv ((either)) 
the armament arming or politically motivated economic measures of other 
states, directed "against their adversary - so that the attitude of the 
neutral state would' be pre-judged in a war and doubt arise as to its 
attitude. 
In genoral the • point must be made that the permanently neutral 
state should enter upon no ties with other states which in case of war 
would oblige it to un-neutral attitudes, i .e . to an attitude in conflict 
with the provisions of the ordinary law of neutrality (which applies only 
in war). ' 
IV. 
When war breaks out, the duties of an ordinary neutral according 
to the general law of neutrality come to apply to the duties of a * 
permanently neutral state. 
In principle, the latter ((the duties of a permanently neutral 
state)) prescribe that the neutral should not intervene in war to the 
advantage of one .party (prohibition of intervention, including political 
(or economic measures). By the side of this tho principle of equality 
of treatment prevails; but positive law contains numerous exceptions 
.from this rule. 
' Neutrality ends for the neutral when a state of war starte (but 
not with the rebuttal by force of a breach of neutralitys Art. 10 of 
the Fifth Hague Convention.) 
Political and military obligations of neutrality can hardly be 
separated. • In short, the following are involved: 1 
1. Prohibition of hostilities against a belligerent. 
2. Prohibition againet sending troops. 
3. Prohibition against handing over rights of sovereignty by the 
neutral state to a belligerent. 11 • 
Duty to maintain the inviolability ofчthe territory of a neutral 
state. 
In particular the following are to" be prevented: acts of war, \ 
vpassage of troops or convoys of food and munitions, handing over neutral 
territory as basis of operations, erection of agencies to encourage 
recruitment or for enlistment, maintenance of wireless stations, 
passage of aircraft over the territory. 
These duties are to be fulfilled according to the measure of the 
means at the disposal of the neutral state. (Even if the Fifth Hague 
Agreement Concerning Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons 
in Event of War on land does not contain any stipulation to this effect, 
such as Articles 3, 8 and 25 of the Thirteenth Agreement on the Rights 
and Duties of Neutral Powers in the Event of a War at Sea, nevertheless 
it is quite clear that a general principle of law is concerned here.) 
Economic neutrality can only be spoken of insofar as the neutral 
state ,is obliged to afford.the belligerents no financial support.(by 
this is meant, of course, 1оапз and financial payraonts'intended for 
direct изе for the conduct of tho var: it does not exclude credits for 
trade-political purposes, more especially credits for the maintenance 
of normal' trade relations) or to deliver weapons and munitions to them, 
and not even to do so if both parties are treated alike (absolute duly). 
As against this, it is not obliged to forbid private persons the export 
or transit of weapons/munitions and other war material. If, however, 
such prohibitions are issued, then the neutral must apply them equally 
to all belligerents. , . 
Beyond this there is.no economic neutrality. On the contrary, 
the neutral state has a right.to trade with the belligerents. Switzerland 
has always represented this point of view (cf. Message of the Federal 
Council of Д August 1919 concerning the entry of Switzerland into the 
League of Nations.) The neutral state must only "put up .with" certain 
infringements' on the part'of belligerents (e.g. prohibition Of contraband, 
blockade, etc.). „ The principles of courant normal and equal contribution 
in trade followed by the Confederation in the last war are principles of 
trade policy chosen by the Confederation herself. 
Nevertheless, it follows from the general duty of non-intervention 
in hostilities, that an exceptional and especially significant economic 
favouring of one party constitutes an Infringement of neutrality. 
V. 
In principle, all duties arising out' of neutrality are to be 
interpreted restrictively, as being limitations upon sovereignty. 
If a neutral state, and especially Switzerland, does more than 
the duties of permanent or ordinary neutrality demand, then this is 
done not in performance of a legal duty, but from political calculations, 
with the intent that the confidence of the belligerents in the maintenance 
of neutrality shall be strengthened. 
(Political Department, 26 November 1954) 
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In contrast to tho preceding document, which is a professional 
directive, the following excerpt is intended to represent Switzerland's 
'public voice'. It is from the Message of the Federal Council to the 
Federal Assembly on 20 August 1948, about Swiss adherence to the newly 
formed Organization for European Economic Co-operation (OESC): 
""Being situated in the heart of Europe, -our country dare not allow 
itself to be economically isolated,, nor ignore what goes on outside its 
borders. Within the limits of its power, vhich is not great, our 
country must join in the efforts that are now under way to attempt the 
reconstruction of the continent and to set up for this task a regime 
of mutual understanding,- a condition of stability and peace. . Our 
status as neutrals forbids us - indeed the sense of solidarity which 
is the natural counterpart of this, same neutrality compels us - to 
take part in the economic reconstruction'of Europe. As has been 
justly remarked, "Switzerland seems almost as if fated by its . ' 
geographical situation, as well as prepared ty its history, to fulfil 
the international duties closest to the root idea of neutrality, and 
to strip: off the character of selfish privilege which is usually 
imputed to her by her neighbours when at war." (Bonjour). 
(Cited from tho New York Times, 21 August 1948.) 
Appendix 2. 
Swedish Neutrality 
The following statements of the Swedish viewpoint are all taken 
from speeches of Osten Unden, who has been the Foreign Minister and 
the chief architect of Sweden's postwar neutrality policy ever since 
194-5. No doubt linden's background in international law serves to 
explain his constant attempt to define clearly the whole scope of 
Swedish foreign policy. Unden, who was born in 1886, joined the 
newly formed Social Democratic Party while an undergraduate at Lund 
University. In 1917 he was appointed to the Chair of Civil Law at 
the University of Uppsala. ' When the first Social Democrat government 
was formed in 1920, Unden became Minister of Justice. From 1921 to 
1924 he worked for the Swedish Foreign Office as an expert on inter-
national law. From 1924 to 1926 he was Minister of Foreign Affairs 
in the Branting and Sandler cabinets. Unden, who had expressed his 
hatred of Hitler's Germany with-more frankness than most Swedish . . 
parliamentarians during the war, became Foreign Minister again in 1945» 
Despite some criticism of his "legalisms" there is little doubt that 
his conception of Swedish neutrality commands the support of(the vast 
majority of the Swedish people. 
1, •'Statement to the Riksdag on Foreign Policy in the First Chamber 
by the Prime Minister, in the Second Chamber by Osten Unden, both 
. on 22nd March 1950 (see Documents on Swedish Foreign Policy 1950-51, 
>published by The Royal Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Stockholm, 
.1957, pp.1,13-27).' - ' , 
"The allegation sometimes made in our public debate that we are 
pursuing an isolationist policy is a mere catchword of propaganda. 
Swedish foreign policy is no more a policy of isolation than it was 
during the inter-war period. This country is keeping outside military * 
blocs, but that we have done previously during the present century, and\ 
long before that, without being called isolationist. 
"The idea of a coming world war cannot be allowed to dominate our 
minds to such an extent as to make us neglect the interests that present 
themselves in peacetime. We do not wish to pursue a foreign polity 
that might help to make our corner of the world a centre of unrest and 
a cause of friction between East and West. 
^ 
"If Sweden were to join a military Great Power bloc, this would 
not appreciably affect either the general policy of the leading'states , 
or tho balance of power between them. Nor do we imagine that we are 
able to play any part in bridging the gap that exists between the groups 
of Great Powers. On the other hand, we are not over-presumptuous if we 
believe that it may be useful also from, an international point of view 
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if we make our aim gradually to evolve a type of society that Implies 
both political and economic democracy...,. It is ty no means unimportant 
that'the view should be countered that the world is moving inevitably 
toward a.division into a capitalist and a communist bloc which are 
bound ultimately to come to grips in a final struggle for world 
hegemony. This catastrophe theory in' an international version is most 
likely to be deprived of it3 grip on people's minds if the actual development 
lends support to the possibility of a state of affairs in which 
political democracies do in fact conform to the idea of a welfare state, 
such as we in this country, for instance, are trying to realize. 
Such a development can hardly fail in the long run to influence ideas, 
even in countries under the dictatorship of the proletariat in which 
it has up till now been an article of faith that the rebuilding of 
tho economic structure of the community for which those countries are 
striving is not possible under a system of genuine political democracy. 
"The foreign policy which Sweden desires to continue in the 
future is designed to make neutrality possible should a general conflict 
nevertheless break out. We are aware that a policy of neutrality has 
prospects of succeeding' only under such external conditions that our 
neutrality is not found to be irreconcilable vith the vital interests 
of tho belligerents. 
"Were Sweden a military Great Power and, moreover, situated at 
a great distance from the war fronts, her policy of neutrality might 
conceivably be replaced by the more arbitrary policy of a non-
belligerent. But our experience from two world wars should have, 
taught ua how very little freedom of choice, during untoward conditions, 
a neutral country may have between different lines of action within 
the framework, of preserved neutrality. No responsible government can 
take upon itself in peacetime to define in detail the neutrality policy 
that a future government may be able to pursue, under conditions аз 
yet unknown." 
2. Speech by Osten Unden at an inter-Scandinavian Congress held1at 
Karlstad of the Social Democratic Youth League on 6th June 1954. 
(see Documents on Swedish Foreign Policy 1954, Stockholm, 1957, 
pp. 39-43)• 
Reflections on the failure of Swedish proposals for"a Scandinavian 
defence pact in 1949. 
"I would only venture to say that a Scandinavian group outside 
the Great Power blocs would, in ®y opinion, have had a greater mission 
to perform in international politics than can now be carried out by 
the three countries. It may be very well to talk disparagingly 
of neutrality as an obsolete practice. It is natural to appeal to 
the solidarity amongst Western nations as a natural sense of community 
between nations who have the same concepts of democracy and human rights. 
The indivisible character of peace mayt also be propagated. All 
these arguments carried great weight amongst our neighbours,'with 
their experience of the last world war. But there are also other 
aspects to be taken into account in dealing with international politics, 
aspects which have been considered more Important in Sweden. Is it 
in the interest of peace, we may ask, that all states should take 
sides and, as it were, be assembled in two great military camps? 
Is it of service to peace that, owing to the military alliances, real 
power is being concentrated more and more in a few large states 
directing the course of world affairs on the strength of their ; 
dominating position within their respective alliances?n * 
' • » ( 
3. 1 Speech by, Osten Unden in Oslo on 20th November 1955 - The 
Philosophy of Collective Security (see Documents on Swedish 
Foreign Policy, 1955, Stockholm, 1957, pp.55). 
v "The fact that Sweden has not relinquished her position outside 
tho allied blocs but is carrying on her traditional foreign policy 
in spite of the emergence of the United Nations is in itself an 
expression of the view that in its essence the international 
constellation is the same as before the League and the United Nations. 
There has been no profound change in international politics. They 
still spell the formula of balance of power as their most characteristic 
theme. Collective security remains a distant ideal. States are 
not associated in a standing institution for peace, an international 
body of a higher order than the national states. • The military forces 
of the Western Powers and their allies are not an instrument of 
international policy, capable of holding disturbers of peace under 
control. The design of world organisation drawn up so attractively 
in the United Nations Charter, remains for the present Utopian. The 
Great Powers who laid down the provisions of tho Charter were also 
aware of the fact that it carried no guarantee for the realization 
of their attractive programme within any near future. Their right 
of veto in the Security Council is a realistic memento of their 
retaining their freedom of action as national states. None of them 
have been ready to enter a supra-national federation." 
4. "Freedom from Alliances gives increased responsibility." 
(Article by Osten Unden in Swedish paper Morgon Tidningen, 
30 December 1956, reproduced in Acta Scandinavica juris 
gentium, vol. 26, 1956, d.52). 
"The path of neutrality which Sweden has chosen in her foreign 
policy enjoys general support in the Riksdag. ..But questions of the 
application of that policy have not infrequently led to severe 
differences of opinion. This may sometimes imply a departure from 
the generally accepted path..." Unden goes on to argue that this 
is not so. 
гИ 
"Sweden's neutrality policy is not so marked as that, for 
example, of Switzerland. ,Our,membership of the United Nations 
involves restrictions on neutrality. ' Л: member of the United Nations 
has to ехргезз itself and take a standpoint on all international 
questions from the platform which the organization constitutes. 
The.fact that Sweden is not'bound to"аду group of states by alliances 
to some extent facilitates the taking up of an objective position. 
From another point of view, this freer position entails increased 
responsibilities. ' During the past few years Sweden has tried to 
maintain her position of-freedom, .'Sometimes it has been complained 
that we have shown too much caution by. abstaining from voting on 
certain occasions. In ny opinion this criticism is not justified. • 
Has the United States of America shown excessive caution in abstaining 
from voting on certain questions concerning "colonialism."? 
"The permanent factors vhich have determined our foreign policy 
objectives remain unchanged." 
5. From "Our Foreign Policy", a pamphlet issued by the Minister 
for Foreign Affairs, being.the text," with certain additions, 
of an address by Osten Unden on 5th June 1952 to the Social 
Democratic Party Congress. ~ \ 
'"There is much to indicate that the leaders of the Soviet Union, 
on their "part, base their policy upon fear of the Western Powers. 
"Ideologically, Communism is a fanatical creed to which tolerance 
Is utterly foreign. To this there is no counterpart on the other ^ 
side, no uniform philosophy'with aggressive tendencies." 
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Appendix 3. 
Javaharlal Nehru of India 
."We receive you not only in your capacity as the Prime Minister »of 
India hut'also as the political educator of all Asia."1* These words 
were spoken by the Syrian Foreign Minister, Salah el Bitar/vhen welcoming 
Mr. Nehru to Damascus; and even when due allowance is^made for the 
customary eulogy that greets the arrival of any leading statesman in 
another country, his words do contain a kernel of truth. Mr. Nehru has • 
been Prime Minister, and Minister of External Affairs ever since,India 
achieved independence in 1947 and, on his own admission, he has been 
largely, responsible for making Indians think of other countries, of 2*. 
world affairs generally, since he became chief spokesman on questions of 
foreign affairs for the Congress.Party in the 1920s. -
: • .. • i ' 
let Nehru's influence is not confined within India. For, without 
doubt, he is the world's most articulate, most influential, and.best known 
neutralist. , It has been decided here to give only three quotations from 
the vast number of Nehru's speeches and writings, to allow the first tv'o 
to be fairly long, and to take.the excerpts from the most recent collection 
of Nehru's speeches.3. This has been done because it is not.pretended 
that the passages quoted. in these appendices are anything iaore than 
representative selections of fairly common neutralist expressions; because 
it is felt that only lengthy quotation can convey any worthwhile impression 
of the rambling nature of Nehru's mellow expositions concerning international 
politics; and because Nehru, in his statements of general principles, in 
his theorizing about the essence of all foreign policy, has stressed that 
his enunciations of ideal precepts, even his broad practical recommendations, 
often do not have reference merely to Indian policies but have a wider 
application.' 
Furthermore, it is .only in the context of such events as the Korean 
War, the' Sino-Indian agreement on Tibet which gave birth to the Fanchsheel 
principles, the settlement over Indo-China at Geneva, the inauguration 
of SEATO, and.tho Bandung Conference that Nehru's international con-
ceptions seem to have finally congealed.4» Certainly, it is against 
the background of such events - where Indian interests have been 
directly involved - that critics of Nehru have been able to compare 
profession and practice, and some of them have made the gibe that Nehru 
1. The Hindu, 22 June 1956." 
2. Tibor Mende - Conversations with Mr. Nehru (London, 1956) p. 126. 
3. Jawaharlal Nehru'з Speeches (vol. 3» March 1953 to August 1957) Delhi 
1958. . .. . . , . 
4. The evolution of Nehru's political beliefs can be traced in the most 
important of his works - An Autobiography (London 1936)£ The Discovery 
of India (London 1946);in the 3 postwar volumes of his'public speeches; 
and,in the recent biography by Michael Brecher - Nehru. A Political 
Biography. (London, 1959Л " 
conducts a foreign policy which appears to help solve all international 
problems except India's own. Of course, it may be rash to suggest that 
no new dramatic events - especially developments in Sino-Indian relations 
could induce a revision of Nehru's international doctrino, especially 
as his mind is practical rather than speculative and he is a politician 
rather than an ideologue. But Mr. Nehru was 65 years old in 1954, and 
men in.their middle sixties do not easily revise their world view. 
And, when that world view is as broad and generalised as Mr. Nehru's 
is today, it can accommodate all but the most cataclysmic changes. 
Finally, Nehru, for all his unique qualities, is in e. certain 
sense a type. In Asia and Africa among the nationalist, especially 
the western educated,1* leaders, there are many Nehrus - Nehrus without 
India, Nehrus without Gandhi, Nehrus of right and left, with and without 
power. They are a response to the broad forces which have played upon 
them and their societies, especially if they are leading a 'new' state 
in international society. And to the extent that the interaction of 
these forces create similar national and personal problems, it creates 
also tendencies toward similar approaches. This is why such different 
men as the late S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike of Ceylon, President Nasser, 
U Nu, Prince Norodom Sihanouk, and Kwame Hkrumah can each, with some 
measure of truth, acknowledge the Influence of-Nehru in the shaping 
of their own international conceptions... 
(a) ' Speech in Lok Sabha during a debate on the President's Address, 
February 25, 1955. Nehru's Speeches, vol. 3, pp. 280-287.' 
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"I au a little afraid that this House in its enthusiasm might регЬарэ 
imagine that we are doing more than we are really doing. ' I am referring 
particularly to the international sphere, because some hon. Members in 
their speeches seemed to make out that India was playing a very important 
role, almost a dominating role, in regard to some world problems. Let 
us have a more correct perspective. 
"I believe that we have helped, occasionally, in regard to the 
solution of some problems, and in the relaxation or lessening of tension. 
We might take due dredit for that, but let us not go beyond that. 
After all a country's capacity to influence events is determined by 
various factors. You will find that India is lacking in most of those 
factors. If we have been successful in some measure, the success has 
been due not obviously to any kind of military strength or financial 
1. One remembers Nehru's poignant words, written of himself in February 
1935» while in prison: nI have become a queer mixture of the East 
and West, out of place everywhere at home nowhere... I cannot get 
rid of either that past inheritance or щу recent acquisitions. They 
are both part of me, and, though they help me in both the East and 
West, they also create.in me a feeling of spiritual loneliness not 
only in public activities but in life itself. I am a stranger and 
alien in the West. I cannot be of it. But in my own country also, 
sometimes, I have on exile's feeling." AntoMogrwnhv-, pt». 597-8. 
powev, but because wo took a correct view of events. If I may soy so 
in all modesty, wo understood them more correctly than others, because 
we were more in tune with" the spirit of the age. Wo do not have the -
strength' to threaten anybody;" nor do we want to. 
"We feel, in so far äs international policy'is concerned, that* ' 
right or wrong counts. But it is not the rightnessof a proposition 
that "makes it listened to but rather the person or the country which 
says so and the strength behind that country. ' The "international" pälicy 
of a country depends ultimately.on the domestic .state of affairs in that 
country; the'two have to be in line and they cannot be isolated from 
each other. ' 'Indeed it is the internal" state of affairs of a country 
that.enables it to speak with 'some strength, force ;and authority in the 
international sphere. I do not wish to indulge in invidious comparisons. 
But hon. Members can look at 'our, country as it is today and a number of 
other countries and decide for themselves how far India has progressed 
in the last'six or Beven years compared with most other countries. It 
i3 indeed due to this feeling that India is marching forward, that -India 
is a country which is firmly established and is dynamic, that people 
in the rest of the'world'look upon us with a measuro of respect. 
"One hears frequently about pacts and military alliances in Europe, 
in the Middle East, in South-East Asia and elsewhere. There are in 
the world today two mighty Powers,.the.United States of America and the 
Soviet Union. There are some other great Powers also, the United 
Kingdom and one or two others, who are also big in varying degree. I 
can understand, although I would not approve, military alliancos, between 
great Powers. That would have some meaning. But I do not understand 
military pacts and alliances between a huge giant of a power.and a 
little pigmy of a country. It has no moaning in a military sense to me. 
In this nuclear age the only countries that count, from the nuclear war 
point of view, are those great countries which are, unfortunately, in 
a position to use these bombs. ± But to attach small countries to them-
selves in alliance really means - and I say so with all respect to those 
countries - that they are becoming very much dependent on these countries. 
Such associates do not add .to their defensive power, for they have little 
or no military value,." Perhaps such alliances have some psychological 
value. I wish to refrain from saying anything which might militate 
against others. -But in this nuclear age, to think of war itself is 
insanity. Any person who has given thought to it - many generals, 
in England, France, U.S.A. and the Soviet Union have done so - would 
realize that war today is unthinkable, because a war is.fought to achieve 
certain results, not to bring ruin on oneself. War, today, will bring 
ruin to every country involved, not only one. All the great countries 
appear to be clear about it and are absolutely certain that there is no 
country in the world which wants war. To talk about warmongers and 
the rest is completely wrong. There may be some individuals who might 
want war,.but no country wants it.' If that is so, what is the value 
of this policy of military alliances and armaments? It does not 
logically, follow from the first assumption. The development of the 
thermonuclear bomb has changed the whole picture .of fighting today. 
What might have been good a few years ago is no longer good. 
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"The fact that one country has a few more bombs than the other Is 
of no great relevance, -, The point' is that even the country that has 
less, has reached the saturation point, that is, it has enough to cause 
infinite damage to the other country. There is no real defence against 
nuclear weapons; you can at best damage or ruinrbhe other country. When 
you have arrived at the saturation point, yöu have arrived at the stage 
of mutual extermination. Then the only way out is to'prevent war, to 
avöid it. There is no other way. All talk"of reduction'of armaments, 
good as it is, does not help much. That is the first point we should 
remember. ' 
"Secondly, we rcugt consider what use alliances'and'pacts really 
have in this age of nuclear warfare. As I said earlier, they do not, 
help in a military sense, though psychologically, they may. I am not 
asking these countries to disband their armies or their air forces. 
The only effect of these pacts and alliances, it appears to me, is to 
hold a kind of threat. These threats are being thrown about by both the 
Power blocs. .But even .this Ъиз1пезо of threatening through military 
pactD has become obsolete in this nuclear age. You cannot threaten a 
big fower which has nuclear weapons, for;it is not likely to be frightened. 
You can at best threaten small countries. -
. As things are today, we have reached a Certain balance - it may be 
a very unstable balance, but it ,is still come kind of'balance - when any 
kind of major aggression is likely'to'lead to a world war. That itself 
is a restraining factor. Whether aggression takes place in a small 
country or a big one, it tends to upset the unstable balance in the 
world and is therefore likely to lead to war. It is because of this * 
that in the Geneva Conference there was so much argument about the Indo-
China States. _ Either of the major parties was afraid that if any of 
these States linked up with or was coerced into joining one group, it 
would be to the disadvantage of the other. For instance, suppose 
countries like Laos and Cambodia were overwhelmed and drawn into the 
sphere of China, the countries'on the other side would naturally be 
frightened. On the other hand, if Laos and Cambodia became hostile' 
to China and could be used as bases for an attack on China, naturally 
China would object to it very strongly. What is the way out of the 
difficulty? Either you have war to decide who is stronger, or you 
place Laos, Cambodia and all the Indo-China States more or.less outside 
the spheres of influence, outside the alignments, and outside.the military 
pacts of the two groups, so that both could feel, at least to some extent, 
secure , in the knowledge that these Indo-China States were not going to be 
used against them. " There is no other way out. So at Geneva, they 
wisely decided, more or less, though not in clear language, that the. 
Indo-China States should keep out of military pacts or alliances on 
either side, or, in other world, remain neutralized. .' 
"If you extend the argument, you will see that the only way to avoid 
conflicts is to accept things more or less as they are. No doubt'many 
thing3 require to be changed, but you must not think of bhanging them by 
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vor. "'.War does not do.what you want to doj it does something much 
worse. Further,' by enlarging the area of peace, that is, of countries 
which are not aligned to thisvgroup or that, but which are friendly to 
both, you reduce the chanco of war. 
* * i 
• ''As the House knows,the policy adopted by India and followed 
consistently during the.last few years has been-appreciated by талу • ' 
countries; * Some other countries of>Asia, not Ьесаизо of из, but because 
of their own reasons, have followed a similar policy. • Even countries 
which have not followed it have begun to appreciate our policy. • We are 
following it because we are convinced that it is the right policy/ We 
would follow it' even if there was no other country in the world that * t 
followed it. It is not a question, as some hon. Members seem to" imagine, 
of balancing the considerations and sitting on the fence. " Ours'is :a 
positive policy and we follow it with conviction and faith; 
it "The House knows of some countries which are our good friends in 
As la/dike Burma and Indonesia who have been following a similar policy in 
international affairs. jRecently, when the President of tho Federal ' 
Republic of Yugoslavia had come here, , he and I issued a statement in which , 
reference was made to Panchsheel, the Five Principles. That Indicates 
how the idea is spreading. I can assure this House that even though талу 
Governments may not publicly approve of Fanch3heel, people in many countries 
have been attracted tb it more and more. 
ÜAmong:the many schools of. thought and action in international affairs 
today is the school of strong action, as it calls itself.' I suppose it 
is a relic of the old day« when a warship or cruiser was sent down to < 
frighten,into submission any small country vhich. misbehaved. . Strong 
action might bring results when a very big country shows the.mailed fist 
to a small country, hit. strong action doos not go very far .when the 
other country has also got a big fist. Then there is the school which 
talks about' negotiation through strength. It is true that nobody will 
li3ten,to you. if you are weak. . But, as you develop your strength to 
negotiate, unfortunately the other party also goes on developing its 
strength. 
"Then there is the school of - shall I say - learned confusion. • 
It talks very learnedly about international affairs, delivers speeches, 
writes.articles, but never gets out of a confused state of mind. There 
is:a fourth school, equally prominent, of ignorant confusion. So that, 
between all these various schools it is a little difficult to get to know 
whore we are and what we are, more especially when the problem relates 
to Asia, because most of tho currents of thought today in international 
£ffairs come from .Europe and America. They are great .countries, to be 
respected, but the greatness of. a country doc3 not necessarily endow it 
with greater understanding of some other country; and the fact that Asia 
has changed and is changing has not wholly been grasped by many people 
in other continents. . Therefore their confusion is the greater when 
thinking of Asia. , 
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.'"The world seems to be divided into two mighty camps,'the communist 
and the anti^ommnist,'.and either party cannot understand how anyone 
can be foolish enough not to line up with itself. That just shows how 
little understanding these people have of the"mind of Asia. Talking 
of India only, and not of all Asia, we have fairly clear , ideas about 
our political and economic structure. We function in this country 
under a constitution which may be described as .a parliamentary democracy. 
It,has not been imposed upon us. „We propose to continue with it»' We 
do not intend changing it. Wo intend to function on the economic plane, 
too,*"in our own way.' With all respect to some hon. Members opposite, 
we have no Intention to turn communists.* At the same time, we have no * 
intention,of being dragooned in aiy other direction. Putting.it simply, 
we*mean no ill'to anybody. Every country has a.right to choose'its 
own path and go along'it. We have chosen our path and we propose to go 
along it, and to vary it as and when we choose, not at somebody's, . 
dictate or pressure; and we are not afraid of any other country imposing 
its will upon us ty military methods or any other methods. The only ' 
way for us is „to build up our own strength, which we intend doing. 
Meanwhile we want to be friendly,with other countries. Our thinking 
„and our approach do not fit in with this great crusade of.communism or 
crusade of anti-comninisra/ 
^ "Many people in those countries do not understand this approach of* 
ours. And yet many'countries of Asia have inevitably to follow this 
policy, unless they are much too weak to stand on their own feet. ' When 
they seek shelter and help it is because they cannot rely upon themselves. 
There is a typo of help which countries take in friendship, which we 
are willing to take, of course, but there is another type of help which 
countries'take because .they are too v/eak to stand on their own legs«. 
Well, that help does hot help at all, because it weakens. And hence, 
we have been careful in this matter to make it clear always that our 
policies cannot be affected by and there must be no strings attached to 
any kind of help that we get, and that we would rather struggle through 
ourselves without any help than have our policies affected in any way 
by outside pressure. 
"I was mentioning just now'the change in Asia which is taking many 
forms. Presently, in the course of.about seven weeks, there is going 
to be a conference at Bandung in Indonesia - an Asian-African conference 
it is called - to which a number of independent countries of Asia" and 
Africa have been invited. So far as I know, every country that has 
been invited is likely to attend. I am not quite.sure that all the 
replies have come, but I think they will all attend. What this , 
Conference is ..going to do is not up to me or even the sponsoring countries 
to say. It is the conference.which will draw up its own agenda and' 
decide.'" I was therefore a little surprised when the hon. Member, Shri 
Asoka Mehta, said something about the conference drawing up a vast . 
programme for the liberation of suppressed countries. We are all for 
the liberation of suppressed countries, but .the idea of associating the 
conference with a programme of tfctis type seems to me completely to 
misunderstand its purpose. The House will remember it will be an 
official-level conference in vihich Governments will be represented. 
In fact, Prime Ministers will be attending it, from countries with 
'completely different ideologies and political and economic structures. 
There will be countries in this Conference which are aligned to this or 
that great Power bloc, and there are countries like India and Burma and 
Indonesia which are not aligned with any. This assortment of countries 
of Asia and Africa will therefore have much in common, and also much 
not in common. It is going to be an extraordinary meetingä ' The mere 
fact of our meeting is of the highest significance. It is the first 
jtime that such a meeting is taking place. It represents, rather 
unconsciously, subconsciously, Asia and Africa coming to the forefront. 
I do not know whether this idea was present wholly in the mind of the 
original sponsor,of- this conference, but because the proposal was made 
at.the right time, it accorded with the spirit of the times. 
'"By its very nature, a conference of this type is hardly likely to 
discuse controversial issues as between"the countries represented there. 
Also, if I may express try own opinion, I hope it will not function as 
if it was setting up a group in rivalry to the others. It is essentially 
an experiment in coexistence, for the countries of Asia and Africa - золе 
of which are inclined this way, and some the other .way, in regard to the 
Power blocs - are meeting together in a friendly way and trying to "find 
what common ground there is for cooperation in the economic, cultural 
and political fields. Therefore, it is a development of great 
importance from the point of view not only .of Asiabut of the world.. 
"The hon. Member, Shrimati Renu Chakravartty, did me the honour 
of quoting at some length from one of my own books about'democracy. 
I have looked up the passage, and I may tell her that by and large I 
agree with what I had written twenty-two years ago, although I hope I 
have developed very much since then. What I then said - if I might 
repeat it - was that democracy, if it is confined to political democracy, 
and does not become economic democracy at all, is not full democracy. 
Many people want to hide themselves under this cloak of political 
democracy, and prevent other kinds of progress. When we speak of 
political democracy we should remember that adult .suffrage is a very 
recent development even in the Western countries. The argument that 
political democracy was in favour of vested interests, while quite true 
when the franchise was small and restricted, does not apply with the 
same force when there is adult suffrage in a country. 
"The problem that we really have to face is whether the changes 
we want to make in the economic domain can be effected peacefully by 
the democratic method or not. If democracy does not function in tho 
political plane properly, then there is no way to bring about a change 
except by some kind of pressure, violence or revolution. But where 
this peaceful method is available, and where there is adult suffrage, 
there the " question of trying to change things by violence is absurd 
and wholly wrong. To щу thinking, it means that a small number of 
people are trying to impose their will, by means of violence, on a 
much larger number, having failed to change their opinions by the 
normal method of reasoning or argument. That, certainly, is not 
democracy, political or economic or any other. Therefore, the problem 
before us is to have democracy - and ve have it politically - and to 
extend it in the economic field." 
(2) Speech at the Asian Legal Consultative Committee meeting, New 
Delhi, April-18, 1957. Nehru's Speeches, vol. 3, pp. 508-513. 
"Today ve see certain tendencies of the revival of holy alliances. 
They are not called by that name, but certain groups of nations function 
more or less on the basis of the holy alliance idea. They consider 
themselves the centre of the world and expect other countries to fall 
in line. This may have some justification, but it does put.these 
other countries in an embarrassing position. Either one joins.the 
holy alliance or one is outside the pale of international law, in a 
sense. The emergence of Asian and African countries as independent 
nations and this return to the holy alliance idea make it important 
that concepts of international law should be examined closely. 
"Let us take the United Nations. ' I think it was supposed to be 
an international organization inclusive of all the independent nations 
of the world. There is a tendency, however, to regard it as something 
less than that - a tendency, which, I suppose, emanates from the holy 
alliance idea. This in turn has affected other problems also. 
Politicians and statesmen who discuss such problems are naturally 
influenced by their political approach, and so we do not get what might 
be called a scholarly, objective estimate. Further, it so happens, 
that what we generally get is the non-Asian or non-African side. I 
respect that side, but it is possible that the scholars of that 
persuasion might not bear in mind some aspects which would be obvious 
to Asian scholars and jurists. Therefore, it is desirable that the 
various aspects of international law should be considered objectively and 
in a scholarly manner by the eminent lawyers and jurists of Asia and 
Africa. " 
"Nowadays many words and phrases are used the dictionary meaning 
and significance of which have changed completely in the hands of 
politicians, that is, people of my tribe. We used to know, for 
example, what 1 belligerency1 was. Belligerency, I believe, is defined 
as waging a regular and recognized war. It must be regular and it 
must be recognized; otherwise, I suppose, it is guerilla fighting, 
which Is not belligerency. And in so far as States or rulers are ' 
concerned, the opposite of belligerency used to be neutrality, that 1в, 
not siding with a power which is belligerent or which is waging an 
active and recognized war. -Yet, delegates here must know how vaguely 
the word 'neutrality', or 'neutralism', as it is sometimes called, is 
used now - sometimes as a term of abuse, sometimes in a different way, 
but mostly in a manner which does not describe what is meant exqctly. 
As I understand the terms, belligerency and neutrality, in relation 
to Powers, refer to a state of war or to countries not Joining a war. 
But as everyone knows, these words are used even when there is no 
active war. If a country is supposed to be neutral today, then 
presumably some other' country vhich is not neutral should bo described 
as belligerent. And yet that would be a wrong description, because 
the other country is not engaged in regular or recognized warfare. 
I do not quite know how international law or jurists of repute would 
define what is called cold war, which is presumably some kind of 
suspended belligerency." 
»As I said, we find today a return, to some extent, to the idea 
of the old holy alliance, backed by military pacts and economic • 
measures. I should say that there is more than ono holy alliance. 
Behind all this lies enormous danger to the world in case of war. I 
take it that international law is meant primarily to prevent war. Its 
purpose is to settle problems and disputes by mothods other than war. 
War is an absence of law. It-is true that so far international law 
does not have behind it the same strength that domestic law does. But 
its main purpose is' the avoidance of war. Almost everybody in the 
wide world 'dislikes the idea of war today Ъесаизе it is so dangerous. 
How can jurists and lawyers help in the avoidance of war? They cannot, 
I suppose, Help directly in political developments but they can at least 
help in clear thinking. Such clarity is needed because the concept 
of new holy alliances to which I referred, and the concept of cold war 
and the peculiar interpretation given to neutrality, confuse our • 
thinking and our actions. " I hope you will help us by analysing these 
-concepts so that we.may not be led away by the slogans of politicians 
and statesmen.n 
T 
nIou have referred, Mr. Attorney-General, to Panch3heel, the 
Five Principles which have been accepted by a number of countries of 
-Asia and some countries outside Asia. I claim no special virtue"for 
them. They are only some simple principles which, if adopted by nations 
in regard to international relationships, will not only lead us away 
from war but will establish healthy relationships. They are really 
3imple and I do not see how anyone anywhere can object to any of them -
tho recognition of sovereignty, non-aggression^ non-interference in 
internal affairs. When a country does not conform to these principles 
it is misbehaving, interfering. It is not acting according to the 
real basis of international law, which consists of non-aggression, 
non-interference, recognition of sovereignty, mutual respect, all these 
leading up to peaceful co-existence. Peaceful coexistence means 
coexistence of countries which differ in their policies. There is 
no point in saying that two persons or two countries who agree should 
exist peacefully. They do. There is no point in my saying that I 
should be tolerant towards ray neighbour if he and I have no reason to 
differ. Tho question of my tolerating my neighbour, and his tolerating 
me, «irises only when we differ. The question of peaceful coexistence 
therefore comes in only when countries differ in their policies, 
provided always that they do not interfere with each other, either 
internally or externally. If they do, then that is a breach. Therefore, 
I submit that these Five Principles which are sometimes called Panchsheel, 
are a healthy basis for international relations, and I would further 
say in all humility that there is no other basis unless you accept the 
basis which leads to conflict, which of course is not our objective. 
Surely international law should not encourage any attempt to compel 
or coerce a country to do something against its will, or to fall in 
line with something that will bring conflicts." 
" I cannot suggest that you should find remedies for the world's 
ills tut I do hope that you will' show us some way of clear thinking 
which will lead to right action." 
(c) From reply to debate on International Affairs, Lok Sabha, November 
20, 1956. Nehru's Speeches, vol. 3, pp. 4Л-46; 
"We sometimes venture to express our opinion. Why? For two 
reasons: first, we think that.it is the right of every country, as of 
-every individual, to express its opinion; and out of tho welter of ideas 
truth sometimes emerges. 'Secondly, we are so placed - and that is a 
virtue which we possess - that we are not consumed with hatred of this 
country or that. If a country is consumed with hatred and fear, then 
its mind is clogged. It cannot think straight. I say with all respect 
that in the United States there is no clear thinking about Russia just 
as there is no clear thinking in Russia about the United States, because 
the minds of both are clogged with indignation, with fear and hatred of 
each other. I have not the shadow of a doubt that" if they come to know 
each other more - it does not matter whether they agree or not and they 
probably will not agree about many things - hatred and misconceptions 
will go and they will realize one thing more than anything else, namely, 
that the other country, whatever it is, however wrong it may be in its 
opinion, is a living entity,.a growing entity, has something new and 
worthwhile that has.to be studied. That is the important thing. That 
is why we have always sought to encourage contacts and mutual understanding.1" 
"Now, I claim this as a virtue for us, for our country, for this 
Parliament and for our people. We are not obsessed ty fear. We are 
not obsessed by hatred of any country. We are not obsossed even ty 
the dislike of any other country. Our minds are a little more receptive 
than those of others - communists, anti~communiats or socialists. I 
do think that is a virtue in us and it is in the good democratic 
tradition. When that goes, it is bad for the world." 
Appendix A. 
Fresidont Tito and Jugoslav Neutralise: 
There is no need for*a lengthy justification of the choice of Tito 
as the prime spokesman for Jugoslav neutralism.!*. As Head of State, 
Commander-in-Chief, Head of Government, and General Secretary of the 
Parly, Tito is a real life Yugoslav 1Poo-bah'j and though Kardelj and 
Rankovic (and, prior to his 'disgrace1, Djilas) reputedly take major 
parts in the formulation and execution of Yugoslav policies, there is 
no doubt that these are supporting roles to the central figure of Tito. 
It is essential to an understanding of Yugoslav neutralism to 
remember that it vas the direct product of the clash between Stalin and 
Tito which came to a head in June 1948 with tho expulsion of Yugoslavia 
from the Cominform} and that, as an international doctrine, it was not 
the cause but the product of the Soviet bloc's campaign against Yugoslavia. 
This explains the eminently practical bent of Yugoslav neutralist doctrine, 
its.extremely pragmatic, expedient, and often apparently contradictory 
character. For, ty and large, Yugoslav neutralist doctrine, just as 
Yugoslav policy, has been shaped ty a negative consideration - namely, 
opposition to all things'Stalinist,' and consequently the tone and 
expression of the doctrine depends on the state of Soviet-Yugoslav 
relations at any particular time. 
Yet it would be wrong to give the impression that doctrine is 
unimportant to-Tito. For he is himself a Moscow trained Marxist-Leninist, 
anxious to assert the truth and relevance for Jugoslavia of tho well known 
Marxist principle of tho unity «of theory and practice. - .Tito has always 
claimed to be a legitimate heir of Marx and Lenin, and has rehuttod 
accusations that Yugoslav communists are guilty of 
as other 
communists often charge. . In a speech at Zagreb in December 1959, Tito 
said that Yugoslavs were revising "bad practice" - i.e. Stalinist-type 
practice - and. not communist theory. He claimed that Yugoslavs remained 
pupils of Marx and Lenin but they did not accept thoir teachings dogmatically 
because neither "Marx nor Engels nor Lenin knew that today rockets would 
bo flying ,to the moon, that the atomic bomb would be invented and that 
new relations in the world would bo created." Consistent with his 
claim that he is interpreting Marxist-Leninism dialcctically and undogmatic-
ally, Tito denies that the Russians can rightly claim to expound the sole, 
universally valid, orthodoay, and ho further denies that there is ату real 
meaning to such terms as "Titoism" or "national Communism." 5» \ . 
1. The Yugoslavs dislike the term 'neutralism* which they say Implies 
passivity or indifference. They prefer "peaceful and active coexistence." 
Tito spoke on this question of terminology during a speech made to the 
Yugoslav National Assembly in Bolgrade on 7 March 1956. See report in 
The Times» 9 March 1956. 
2. See Tito's »authorised1 biography - "Tito Speaks" by Vladimir Dedijer 
(London 1953), esp. pp. 432-3. This book also gives accounts of the 
roles of Bebior, Pijade and Popovic. 
3. For the main vicissitudes of Soviet-Jugoslav relations, see above^ fp. /77V?C> 
4. Quoted in The Times» 14 Decembor 1959« 
5. See Eedijcr, op. cit. pp. 446-450. 
Indeed, it is probably only since tho 'Second1 Soviet-Jugoslav 
dispute became public in November 1957 that the Ideological differences 
between the two countries have become fully articulated and the subject 
of public debate between the two sides. The »first' dispute of 1948 had 
clearly been prompted by Stalin's brutal handling of Soviet-Jugoslav 
national and party relations. An ideological structure was hastily 
erected by Stalin to cover tho chief substance of the struggle - sheer 
power considerations and Stalin's own dictatorial attitude. And it was 
not until the sixth Yugoslav Communist Party Congress in November 1952 
that Tito and his leading*supporters succeeded in fitting their very-
tentative new ideas and their various ad hoc experiments into some form 
of a coherent ideology. In consequence, the 'Second' Soviet-Jugoslav 
dispute assumed the character of a serious ideological conflict, 
inadvertently reviving, to some extent, the exchange of views on contro-
versial matters which had been completely dormant under Stalin's arbitrary 
dogmatism. 
Nevertheless, while Yugoslav doctrine does vary with the changing 
condition of Soviet-Yugoslav relations, such oscillations as do occur 
are between two not vastly different stands, andreither of theso stand-
points appears incompatible with the expressed Soviet view over a 
large ränge of specific issues (e.g. Disarmament and recognition of 
Communist China.) 
During the time of greatest Soviet-Jugoslav tension the Jugoslavs 
produced a number of propositions challenging Stalinist precepts - the 
view that Stalin's policies were partly responsible for the onset and 
continuation of tho Cold WarJ tho doctrine that there are several roads 
to Socialism, i.e. Communism,' the belief that war is not inevitable J > 
and the suggestion that peaceful means can be used to overthrow capitalism. 
At times of considerable Soviet-Yugoslav amity (summer 1955 to summer 1956, 
for example) Yugoslav doctrine is virtually identical with "proletarian 
internationalism" and entails full support for the foreign policies of 
the Soviet bloc. All that remains of Tito's rejection of. tho Soviet 
doctrine of two camps - the Soviet camp, or rather 'community', of peace 
and the Western imperialist camp of war - in world affairs is simply the 
rejection of an outright military alliance. The responsibility of 
Stalin for a large part of the Cold War strife, whilst not denied, is 
played down, and there is a marked tendency to assert that the chief 
danger to peace springs from Western policies. 
The excerpts given below are from an article which was written for 
a well known American Journal at a time when relations between Yugoslavia 
and the Soviet Union and its satellites were worsening but before the 
Yugoslav representatives refused to sign the Moscow Declaration of the 
Conference of Representatives of Communist and Worker's Parties of the 
Socialist Countries in late October 1957. 
Josip Broz-Tito - ON CERTAIN CURRENT INTERNATIONAL QUESTIONS. 
Foreign Affairs, October 1957, pp. 68-77. 
"When I vas asked to express my views on developments in the sphere 
of present-day international relations, I was sure that I was not expected 
to write something in which I did not believe merely for the sake of giving 
pleasure to anyone. I must say what I really have in nind and what I 
think the American public might usefully be acquainted vith. Naturally 
I can make no pretense at giving an exhaustive analysis of current 
international problems or of providing a blueprint for their solution. 
I think I can, however, lay, some claim to not having been mistaken as 
regards the causes of many of today's difficulties and of the adverse 
trends which it now is essential to do away with. At the sane tine 
new mistakes must be avoided and thus even more dangerous consoquencos 
prevented from arising. The main point I wish to emphasize is that it 
would be unforgivable if responsible statesmen neglected to learn from 
past experience and failed to take bold stops to establish the kind of 
international relations which mankind requires at the present stage of 
history - relations based on comprehensive cooperation and a determination 
to settle all outstanding problems by peaceful теапз." 
( 
"Tho origin of the tensions plaguing the world today may be traced 
back to the time of Tehran, Yalta and tho other international conferences 
and .to the mistaken views of tho protagonists at those conferences on 
certain International problems such as the division of the world into 
spheres of influence. For them, tho world consisted of three Great 
Powers; all the.other nations were looked upon аз wards and their 
aspirations and Interests were ignored. < ' 
"It was precisely through this division of the world into spheres 
of influence that the strivings of both large and small nations towards 
genuine independence were to be thwarted, both in principle and in 
practice. Today certain countries In the West frequently invoke tho 
principle of independence for propaganda purposes, while their actual 
practice гипз In quite the opposite direction. This, however, does 
not prevent them from accusing others of violating tho principle of 
independence. Until the principle of independence is adopted in 
practice by all states, and particularly by the Great Powers, this 
issue will be a constant element of conflict." 
"The causes of existing tensions are also to be sought in the 
erroneous foreign policy of Stalin and in the rigidity of Molotov, 
whose offensive and aggressive attitudes in postwar international 
affairs aroused a growing measure of suspicion and apprehension 
regarding the intentions of the Soviot Union." 
"It ia difficult, however, to understand that even now, four years 
after Stalin's death, this mistrust not only persists but actually is 
increasing in certain circles in the West, regardless of the efforts 
which are being made by the precent-day Soviet leaders to correct 
Stalin's mistakes. Why is every move on the part of the Soviet leaders 
looked upon even now with suspicion? Has not the time come for the 
steps vhich the Soviet Government is taking towards an alleviation of 
international tension to be viewed with more realism and with greater 
confidence?" T 
"The Soviet leaders look upon this, rightly in ny opinion, as a 
policy of encirclement, a threat of war and an aggressive attempt to 
isolate the Soviet Union." 
"If tho setting up of НАТО did have some justification at the tiiae, 
there can bo no Justification'today for the continuing existence, 
development and extension of the Alliance, which undoubtedly contributes 
to the widening rift and the growing lack of confidence between East 
and West." 
"The changes which have occurred in a number of countries of Eastern 
Europe in the aftermath of the war, and which resulted in the replacement 
of the previous Fascist or capitalist forms of social organization ty 
socialist forms of organization, cannot be reversed ty anyone; and it 
would of course be a mistake even to consider any such possibility. 
A new social system has struck deep roots in practically all these 
countries. A social process creating a system of tremendous vitality 
is now making headway regardless of temporary weaknesses of either a 
subjective or objective n a t u r e . Interference from outside can only 
fetter and retard the development of the democratic fores of tho system 
without in any way changing the system itself. I therefore consider 
that propaganda conducted from abroad, and with foreign aid, ty persons 
who have fled their own countries can only food international tension. 
There is no prospect of restoring the former system: it is merely an 
attempt to turn the clock back, and it will not work. 
"What then? Is there to be war in order to bring discarded forms 
back into being? The answer of the people, clearly and naturally, 
can only be no. To engage in an armaments race in order to be able 
to negotiate from positions of force for tho restoration of old and 
obsolete forms or organization is both senseless and useless. I am 
convinced that not one of the countries involved would permit this to 
happen; they would resist any such attempt. It seems to me, therefore, 
that all such harmful propaganda against the countries of socialism, as 
well as against my own country, should c e a s e i n tho interest of 
decreasing international tension, in the Interest of promoting peace 
and international cooperation, in the interest of establishing sincere 
confidence between states and nations. Responsible statesmen the world 
around should, I feel, approaoh all these questions with a greater 
measure of realism. They should take things as they are, seeking to 
establish such relations among nations as would permit people to live 
without fear for their future. 
"What then remains, if we reject war as a method of settling 
international differences? The only alternative is, of courae, co-
existence among states and nations irrespective of their different 
social systems. There are two main and distinctive systems in tho 
world today, the socialist and tho capitalist. Within each there 
exist certain nuances.- Should the countries with different social 
systems decide to settle by war .'which of the two systems is to triumph, 
in other words, attempt to impose their system on others by force? That 
would be absurd and would bring a new catastrophe to the whole of mankind. 
The internal social system of any country is a matter for the people of 
that country to decide; they hove the right to shape their own destiny 
and no one is entitled to interfere in this from outside. At tho present 
stage of human history,'problems between countries cannot be solved through 
war, and this method should therofore bo discarded. • The only alternative 
is peaceful and active coexistence among states and nations*n 
* 
"The question is frequently asked in the West: Whore does Jugoslavia 
now stand, and where will she stand in the future? Various conjectures 
are Indulged in. This speculation stems from the fact that Jugoslavia 
is a socialist country and is biildicg socialism; hence it is supposed 
that hor goal is the same as that of the Soviet Union and of tho other 
Eastern European countries. This is how Western thinking runs. Yes, 
it, is qui to true that our goal is the same, although we differ with 
regard to certain questions of internal development, i.e. with regard to 
our respective methods of building socialism. We also differ at certain 
points in our interpretation of the science of Marxism-Leninism, in 
assessing the correctness of our respective roads to socialism. All 
these are not such weighty matters that they should lead to tension In 
our mutual relations. The future will provide the be3t answer, I think, 
as to who was more nearly correct and who was less so. The one who is 
proved lose correct will bo tho one to suffer and will have only himself 
to blame. 
"The Belgrade and Moscow Declarations of June 1955 and July 1956 
contain the principles upon which the relations and the cooperation 
between the Soviet Union and Jugoslavia should be based. Considerable 
progress has been achieved, I feel, in improving our relations. This 
gives us assurance that the principles set forth in the Declarations will 
be put even more speedily into effect in our mutual relations in the 
future." 
"We have never given anybody reason to hope that we would join the 
Western*bloc, or any'other bloc for that matter. To do so would be 
contrary to.the principles on which our foreign policy rests. Our 
foreign policy is based on the clearly expressed principle of coexistence, 
on peaceful and equal cooperation with, all countries, email or large. 
If one takes the trouble to examine the line to which our foreign policy 
has adhered hitherto it will be realised that it is only natural for us 
to seek to have as good relations as possible with the Soviet Union and 
with the other people's depocracies, and not only with the Western 
countries." ^ • 
f ^ "We have learned that it is not advisable to conduct a too one-sided 
policy in a world where a growing number of elements of common interest 
are at work - particularly elements making for economic integration and 
HnH"g the world more and more into a whole. The process continues 
notwithstanding the powerful resistance offered'ty certain subjective 
factors. It is interesting, though hardly comforting, to note that 
people have the most difficulty in porceiving tho Importance of the 
very social laws of which, they are themselves creating the elements 
and in the development of which they aro themselves participating." 
v ."The reason is that wo consider that our cooperation with the West 
on questions of common interest is extremely advantageous for our 
country and that in addition it contributes both to the easing of 
international tensions and to tho strengthening of peace." 
FURTHER REFERENCES CONCERNING YUGOSLAV NEUTRALISM: 
(1) The Soviet-Yugoslav Dispute (London, R.I.I.A. 1948) which contains 
the public correspondence conducted try the Russian and Yugoslav communist 
parties during the 'first* dispute. 
t 
Two collections covering a wider span aret-
(2) Jugoslavia and tho Soviot Union 1948-1956. An Analysis with 
Documents, edited and introduced by Barry Farrell (The Shoestring 
Press 1956), and 
(3) The Soviet-Yugoslav Controversy 1948-1958. A Documentary Record. 
Edited by Robert Bass and Elizabeth Marberry (New York, 1959) - particular 
attention should »be paid to the Report of Marshall Tito to tho Fifth Party 
Congress in 1948, the Report on Yugoslav Foreign Polity by Edvard Kardelj 
at the Sixth Congress of the Yugoslav Communist Party in November 1952j 
the lecture on "Socialist Democracy in Yugoslavia" delivered by Kardelj 
in Oslo, Norway, in September 1955, and the addresses given by Tito on 
Foreign Relations at Belgrade on 25 October 1954 and at Karlovac on 
27 July 1955. 
The 'November 1957 Moscow Declaration of Communist Parties and the highly 
controversial programme of the League of Communists in Yugoslavia 
(adopted by the 7th Party Congress at Ljubljana in April 1958) are given in: 
(4) The Second Soviet-Yugoslav Dispute. Full Text of Main Documents 
April - June 1958 with an introductory analysis. Slavic and East 
European Series, vol. 14, (Indiana University Press, 1959» pp. xiii. 272). 
Edited by Vaclav L. Benes, R. F. Byrnes and Nicholas Spulber. v 
Articles on international relations, by Yugoslav writers, may be read 
in the English language edition of1-
(5) Review of International Affairs. Belgrade. 
Marshall Tito's complete works (to the end of 1957) have been published 
in Serbo-Croat 
(6) Govori I . Clanci. 12 vols, by Joeip Broz Tito. Zagreb, Naprijed, 
1959. - , 
Appendix 5 . 
•President Nasser and Pan-Arab 
Neutralism. 
Arab neutralism, 'positive neutral ity ' , 'Cold War non-
belligerency ' , i s Just a part, t'hough an important part, of 
contemporary pan-Arab nationalism. According to one leading 
authority, W. Z. Laqueur, the three basic concepts of Arab 
nationalism are independence, unity and neutralism. 1* 
Laqueur further maintains that the anti-'.7estem theme is 
dominant 'in the rArab concept of neutralism, and that 
"practical neutralism" preceded the doctrine, which evolved 
because the West had ."pushed the Arabs into Russian arms" -
though-he says that Arab nationalists maintain that neutralism 
7/ould have, prevailed anyway because it was their logical and 
natural orientation. 
Of course, the Arabs do not speak with one voice, but i t 
seems clear that since 1955 President Nasser has become the 
chief spokesman for Arab nationalism, and so the foremost 
proponent of pan-Arab neutralism. Several scholarly 
comnentators have stressed the hybrid quality of Nasser 's 
political thinking, and one of them has described it as: 
"borrowed from a variety of ideologies, ancient and modern; 
it presents a mixture of Fascism, Communism, racialism and 
Kemalism, topped off with some ideas from the Qu'ran. I n 
the sphere of Arab nationalism it only repeats and amplifies, 
by giving them an expression apt to f latter and excite the 
crowd, themes that were^announoed at the beginning of this 
century by an elite, of Arab patriots in revolt against the 
yoke of the Ottoman Empire. Considered as an ideology of 
the revolution, Nasser contributes no new element and contains 
very l i tt le that i s o r i g i n a l . " 2 . 
The obvious source to quote from would seem to be 
Nasser 's "The Philosophy of the.Revolution" , f irst published 
in Cairo in 1953 . But the styie is too. rambling to be 
1 . See 7/alter Z. Laqueur - The Soviet Union and the Middle* 
East (London, 1959)» PP* 317 et seq. 
2 . Quoted from Jean Vigneau - "The Ideology of the Egyptian 
Revolution" in The Middle K a B t in Transition, ed. by 
W. Z. Laqueur (London, 1950 ) , pp. 12Ö-144. See also 
Hazem Zaki Nuseibeht - The Ideas of Arab Nationalism 
(Ithaoa, 1 956 ) . 
тя\ 
quoted iri short excerpts here. Instead, two other examples 
of Nasser 's thinking are given. The_first i s from an 
article 7/hich he wrote for a leading American journal 
published in January 1955. The second i s from a recorded 
conversation between Nasser and an English Arabphil which 
took place in the cummer of 1957 and contains in a more 
terBe form most of the central propositions of "The 
Philosophy of "the Revolution. " 1 . I have added some 
explanatory footnotes. 
lhe other excerpt is .an English translation of a 
lecture given by tho then Syrian Foreign Minister, Salah el 
B i t a r , t o the Young Arab Club in Damascus.3. It i s felt 
that this lecture i s worth repeating in entirety because 
it is interesting to read something which was designed not 
for a foreign but for a domestic audience, and it putв 
very clearly the major concerns and interpretation of world 
trends of a leading Arab politician and intellectual. 
1 . Hasser - The Philosophy of the Revolution, with an 
introduction by John S. Badeau & biographical sketch by 
John Gunther (Economica Books, Buffalo, 1959) . 
2 . Salah el Bitar, b o m 1912. Educated Damasous & Sorbonne. 
Teacher of science in Damascus secondary schools 1935 -
1942. Took part in 1941 revolt in^Iraq against British. 
-Helped to build up the Baath (pan-Arab socialist) Party 
organization & became secretary-general. Resigned 
teaching post in 1942, ostensibly in protest against 
French influence in Syrian system of.education. Exiled 
by French in 1945, returned in 1946 & founded a news-
paper for the purty called Baath "resurrection." Was 
suspected of plotting against Shishakly government in 
1952 & escaped to Lebanon, to return in October .1953. 
M .P . in 1955 , & representative of Syria at the Bandung 
Conference. Syrian Foreign Minister June 1956 to Feb. 
1953. Minister of Culture & National'Guidance in the 
United Arab Republic March 1958, until his resignation, 
with other Syrian Baathist leaders, at the end of Dec. 
1959. 
3 . My thanks are due to a Jordanian friend, Khaled el Shair, 
for giving me the printed Arabic version of the lecture 
& for making the translation. 
(1) Gamal Abdel Nasser - The Egyptian Revolution (Foreign Äff airs. 
January 1955, pp. 199-211). 
"For a century and a half the Arab world has been following a 
negative policy. It has known what it wanted to do away with, but it 
has not known what it wanted to build. The Western conquest of the 
Kiddle East was mental no less than physical. Overwhelmed and unsettled, 
Eastern minds lost almost all national values, yet could not absorb 
Western values. Misapplication of Western patterns of government brought 
a confused mixture of political systems and philosophies. Democracy was 
only a veil for dictatorship. Constitutions framed in the interest of 
tho people of the Middle East became instruments for their exploitation 
and domination. 
"Egypt18 story in these years centers upon the off ort to free the 
country from a foreign yoke and to find a policy capable of eradicating 
the evils accumulated by feudalism and compounded by misuse of governmental 
power. It was a long and painful search. Egyptians hoped for loaders 
to champion their cause and defend their interests, but politicians and 
factions for the most part made themselves subservient to the forces 
that were ravaging the country - British rulers, corrupt monarchs, feudal 
overlords, a non-Egyptian ruling class and its Egyptian satellites." 
"The problems confronting the Egyptian nation have thus for a long 
period seemed to fall into two partsi a struggle between the nation 
and its rulers on one hand, and a struggle between the nation and foreign 
intervention on the other." 
"And so' tho Egyptian nation carried on tho battle to find con-
stitutional stability, along with a second battle for sovereignly and 
self-government. One aspect of this was the struggle for autonony in 
financial matters, and beyond that for an increase in individual and 
national incomes and a lifting of cultural and social standards. The 
problem was to restore human dignity in Egypt. 
"Throughout tho period national struggle assumed different forms, 
some pacific and some revolutionary. The first was based on argument and 
logic, giving rise to the formation of political parties and the founding 
of newspapers and magazines to enlighton public opinion. But whenever 
the nation understood that peaceful methods would not avail, recourse 
was had to force. So Egypt had to pass through three revolutions: the 
Arabl revolution, the revolution of 1919 and the revolution of July 1952. 
Any revolution which fails to realize its basic objectives inevitably 
lays the seeds for a subsequent uprising. Our national struggle was 
therefore one continual and unremitting battle, despite intermittent 
weaknesses. Always there were the two great objectives - to check 
despotism and make the nation itself the source of powers, and to put 
an end to foreign intervention and the usurpation of Egypt's resources. 
"In 1936, a treaty provided for tho ending of British occupation, 
but it also required a permanent agreement between Egypt and Britain -
a provision very likely to mean permanent occupation. After 1936 the 
British took the opportunity of party frictions to renew.their inter-
vention in Egyptian affairs. The thirst of party leaders after power 
was also utilized by King Farouk to realize personal ambitions at the 
expense of the vital interests of the people. He claimed exemptions 
from taxation and got control of thousands of acres of state property 
and entailed land. Merit was no criterion for rewards, nor was there 
any equality of opportunity; privileges were reserved for relatives 
and favorites of ministers in power. Tho results were nepotism and 
corruption. Egypt had a working constitution, but it veiled arbitrary 
rule* 
"When Arab countries felt the enthusiasm to rescue Palestine, the 
Egyptian Government was ill-prepared for the task. Mismanagement and 
corruption by the King's clique, which included trading in defective 
arms, rondered fruitless the bitter sacrifices made by the Eqyptian 
Army vhich would otherwise have secured victory. Tho war revealed the 
extent of evils vhich pervaded the court and government, and stirred tho 
nation to protest. An attempt was made to divert the attention of the 
masses to external issues - the key to the abolition of tho 1936 treaty. 
Its abolition vas certainly consonant with the national desire, and 
would have been a genuinely national achievement had the government 
taken the necessary measures of reform'afterward. . It did not. Jlence 
the formation of "liberation commando squads." But while those operated 
in the Canal Zone, there cane the shamelessly contrived burning of Cairo 
on January 26, 1952. The commanidos were paralyzed and tho gap between 
the government and tho governed widened. 
"Revolution was the only way out. And it came in 1952, led by 
the army and backed by the nation. In the pr©-revolutionary period 
.the amy was an instrument in the hand of despotic rulers who used it 
against the nationalist movements. How it understood its position and 
joined the ranks of the people to head the movement for national liberation. 
"This revolution, it will be understood, has been markedly bloodless 
in character because it is in essence the expression of a sentiment long 
suppressed but harbored in the heart of tho nation. It was jairely 
national with no international intervention. Conscious of the trond 
of events to follow, it realized its objectives within a shorter time 
than expected. The nation had sworn allegiance to Mohammed Ali in the 
attempt to overthrow the rule of the Mamelukes, but Mohammed Ali and his 
descendants unfortunately forfeited this loyalty, embarking on despotic 
enterprises and usurping the rights of the people. Thus it was an 
unconditional imperative that the revolution should overthrow the ruling 
dynasty, reclaim its birthright and restore the lost national prestige. 
So it deposed the Monarch, abolished monarchy, and established the 
Egyptian Republic." 
"As a major concern of the revolution was the realization of state 
sovereignty, it was iaperative that the British forces should be evacuated 
entirely." 
"A closing word about Egypt's foreign relations: despite all 
reports to the contrary by enemies of the Arab world, the Arab League 
is a reality. There are social and economic differences between one 
Arab nation and another, Just as there are, for example, among the nations 
of the Western European Union, but by the same token we have more in 
common than the various European nations which hope to work together, 
Tho nations of the Arab League believe that they can unite in a force 
that contributes to the cause of world peace. 
"Efforts to unite have been blocked, to some extent, ty local 
differences and dynastic rivalries, and to a greater extent by outside 
forces conspiring against us. But the League can be made tho instrument 
through which a greater unity can be achieved among the Arab nations in 
eveiy field of activity. Its member states can form an effective force 
for the defense of this area. Throughout the negotiations for the 
evacuation of British troops from the Suez Canal, the Government of Egypt 
has pointed out that this evacuation will not create a military "vacuum" 
in the Middle East but will pave the way for strengthening the area's 
defenses. 
( "The defense of the Middle East must rest primarily with the 
inhabitants of the area. No outside forces can defend this soil as 
effectively as tho people who live hore. That is why Egypt has made 
every effort to strengthen the Arab League's Collective Security Pact. 
It is the best possible system to defend our part of tho world against 
any possible aggression. 
"Over a century ago, Egypt, with less than half her present population, 
had an army of more than 200,000. There Is no reason why the 70,000,000 
Arabs could not build up an army of several divisions for the defense of 
their lands. Our countries possess great potential wealth, not to. spe&k 
of the oil for which our deserts are famous. Those of our Arab brethren 
who have been given the chance of education have proved to be no less 
capable than any other people in tho world. We still lack development, 
but industrialization will increase our capabilities, 
"In the meantime, we believe that all those more developed Powers 
who believe in peace should and will help us to strengthen ourselves 
against aggression. Starting with the Collective Security Pact as the 
basis for our own defense, we can consider - once it has been adequately 
Implemented - coordinating our defense р1апз with .those of any other 
nation interested in defense against aggression In .this area. 
The objection has often been made that if the Arabs were to receive 
military assistance they would immediately attack Israel. Egyptians feel 
that a great Injustice was committed against the Arabs generally, and 
especially against the million or more Palestinian Arabs who are now 
refugees. Israel's policy is aggressive and oxpansionist, and Israel 
will continue her attempts to prevent any strengthening of the area. 
However, we do not want to start any conflict. War has no place in the 
constructive policy which we have designed to improve the lot of our 
people. Wo have much to do in Egypt, and tho rost of the Arab world has 
much to do. ;A war. would cause us to lose, rather than gain, much of 
what we seek to achieve. 
"In other quarters there has been talk of "Communist infiltration" 
in the various Arab and African nationalist movements. It would be 
unwise for tho United States to take that view of nationalist activities, 
led by sincere patriots whoso only desire is to seo their nations free 
from foreign domination. Americans recognize this to bo the inalienable 
right of every man, yet balk at supporting these nationalists for fear 
of annoying some colonial Power that has refused to move with the times. 
It is this procrastination that gives the Communists the chance to take 
over what usually start astgenuinely patriotic movements. Such was 
the case of Indo-China. 
"There would not be any Communist infiltration in any part of the 
Middle East and Africa if the United States could develop a courageous 
policy - and the only morally correct, one - of supporting those vho are 
anxious to get rid of foreign domination and exploitation. Real 
independence would be the greatest defense against Communist - or any 
other type - of infiltration or aggression. Free men are the most 
fanatical dofenders of their liberty, nor do they lightly forget those 
who have championed their struggle for Independence." 
(2) Young Egypt by Desmond Stewart (London, 1958) pp. i84-188. 
Report of a conversation between Stewart and Nasser in tho summer 
of 1957. 
"S. Were you influenced by any writers? 
N. Yes, by many. From 193Л I read the works of Mustafa Kamil;1* 
I read his biography; I read all tho articles by. him which 
had appeared in the newspapors. To do this I went to the 
public library and asked for their files. Then I read Towfik 
al-IIakim 2. and Taha Russein.3* Of course, I was particularly 
interested in tho history of Egypt in the nineteenth century. 
Again, it was a combination; a combination of novels and 
biographies; newspaper articles and poetry. Above all, I 
. was Interested to read about the French Revolution. I read 
their lives, the revolutionaries, again and again. 
S. Which of them did you admire? Danton? Robespierre? 
N. None of them really. I admired Voltaire. Because he was 
a calm man, not cruel. . The other leaders were too blood-
shedding.' They all killed each other. Everyone died by-
violence. Do you know one who did not? I read the novel 
of Dickens. You have read it? A Tale of Two Cities? I 
read that several times. I learnt from it something - not 
* to be bloodshedding. If we started with blood, we would not 
stop. We would go on, and others would imitate из. That 
I learnt from CharleB Dickens. 
1. .The Egyptian nationalist, not the Turkish dictator. 
2. See Wilfred С ant we 11 Smith - Islam in Modern History (Mentor Books,. 
New York, 1959), p. 68-9. 
3. Ibid. pp. 69, 71. 
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S. Napoleon - what do you think of him? 
N. I was against Napoleon, because he invaded Egypt. He put his 
guns on the Moqattam hil.ls and shelled Cairo - so of course I was 
against hin, as a schoolboy. Now? Veil, it wa3 tho policy of 
force. Believe me, although I am a soldier, and a revolutionary, 
I hate war, I hate violence. Revolution must go side by side 
with principle and character. It is not the heroic actions 
which matter - though they get spoken of in tho newspapers - but 
heroic principles. For example, tho Turkish Revolution: I do 
not like -Ataturk's brutality. He was cold, not sentimental, and 
he signed the death mandato of his best friend, his closest friend, 
without being affected. What good is a revolution if it does not 
паке the individual free? If it is ju3t by force? I also 
admire George Washington. He was a gentle man, not a cruel man. 
• г- • 
S. But your dislike of violence, your diseipleship of Gandhi - in a 
way your choice of a career, as an officer, goes against this? 
N. It may soem so, but not really. In countries like Egypt the 
army is a force of education. The role of an аэту can differ 
from one country to another. But did you know, at the start of 
the Revolution I was personally against having a big апцу? I 
was peaceful, even towards Israel. It was other officers who 
insisted on the dangers. All this changed when the Gaza raid 
happened. It all changed in one night: February 28th, 1955. 
Then we had to have arms, to defend ourselves. You know, I saw 
the refugees; and I was terrified to see Egyptians become as 
refugees. ' So we asked tho West for aros, and they refused us. 
So we took them without conditions from Czechoslovakia. 
S. Returning to Arab nationalism, who for you is an Arab? 
N. Anyone who speaks Arabic, as his mother-tongue. 
S. You don't go for the theories which make Egyptians Pharaonic, 
the Lebanese Phoenicians, and so on? 
N. No, it is all rubbish, but rubbish intentionally exploited. 
S. In what sense are those who speak Arabic a nation? In the sense 
that the Germans are a nation already, even though divided? Or 
in the sense that the Europeans may one day become a nation. 
N. The Arabs are a people united by speaking the same language, which 
you do not do in Europe; but more important, they also have 
similar reactions to events and incidents. If something happens 
to one section of them, it concerns all of them, from end to end. 
They have in the last hundred years all been victims of tho same 
imperialism. 
S. Who has.done most for the Arab cause in the last century? 
N. The Arab people as a wholo. 
S. And who did most to retard the cause? 
N. A combination of foreigners - you will excuse me saying this? -
with Arab political leaders working for their own selfish interests. 
S. Do you think that mon like Cromer were sincere? That they really 
believod that what they did was for the benefit of the people? 
N. I think Cromer was a sincere Imperialist - that is, he sincerely, 
wanted to dominate the Egyptians for tho advantages of his own 
country. 
Arab nationalism means Arab independence and Arab co-operation. 
We cannot say more than that. We are trying not to interfere in 
other countries - whatever some people say. But in ay speeches', 
when I speak about reforms which we have made - for example, when 
I say in Parliament that for the last two years we have built an 
average of two new schools every three days - this is listened 
to abroad, not only in Egypt. ^ Naturally in Arab countries where 
there have not yet been reforms people become hungry for them. 
That is natural. People can draw their own implications. We 
spend money on factories, oh electrification, on education, on 
health, not on palaces or presents. 
Arab nationalism arose as a political concept, for me, at the 
Staff College when we studied problems of thetMediterranean and 
the Middle East. I mean, strategy. I had read our Arab history, 
and I knew that when we cooperated, all the Arab countries, we 
were able to defeat the invaders, from the time of the. Tartars 
to the Crusades. • But whenever the Arabs let themselves be split 
up, they were subject to defeat and foreign domination. That was 
my mental background to our discussions at the Staff College. 
In tho light of all the horriblo new weapons of war, we were 
discussing strategy: how to defend Egypt. At once it became 
evident that taken alone Egypt cannot be defended. But in co-
operation with other Arab states, Egypt can be defended. And 
the same was true of the other Arab states: each one was in-
defensible if it stood alone. But all could stand against aqyone, 
if all stood together. Why? Because the theatre of operations 
would be spread - it would not be just where the attacker chose - • 
it would be over a great area. And in this wide area there was 
an even wider extent of interests. And because throughout the 
Arab world an extent of public opinion would exist too: to fight 
together. 
S. When did these discussions take place? 
N. The year before tho Revolution, 1951. And another thing, Egypt's 
greatest weakness had all along been its strategic position. 1« 
1. c.f. The Philosophy of the Revolution (Economics Books) pp. 49 & 60. 
lit 
After all, it was for its strategic position that it had been 
occupied, by the Turks in 1517, because it commanded the route 
to the East, by Napoleon in 1798, and by the British in 1882.. 
My idea was to turn this disadvantage into our biggest advantage: 
not to attack other countries, but to defend our own. Again, 
ve had studied the wealth of the Arabsj the oil in particular. 
In tho Palestine war, for example, every Arab country was frightened 
for its wealth, for its oil. Again, wo would turn this to the 
Arabs' advantage. We would use the threat to oil against 
invaders. Again, not to attack, but in self-defence. Thi3 was 
not to cut the throat of Europe. Cn the contrary. It was to 
force the West to co-operate with us, аз equals, not dominate over 
из.' We wanted a new relationship. The same thing with the Canal. 
When it was built, the Khedive thought it would be of use to Egypt. 
In the result, it served all the world: but Egypt - it served 
only as an excuse for our"occupation. 
So the'strategy of Arab nationalism took shape: as a strategy 
By it, we can defend Egypt and the Arab countries. l,re can win 
respect from the world; wo can feel an important and useful' member 
of tho world, not just peoplo whom orders are given to. Our 
dignity is safe. But I repeat again, Arab nationalism is something 
practical, not sentimental. 
2 о 
S. Were you influenced by Abdu, * or hie master Afghani? Does 
Fanislamism play a part? 
N. Our idea is that if wo mix religion and politics, politics will 
dominate over religion, and in this way kill roligion. Never 
forget, we are trying to escape from six hundred years of the 
domination by the Turks, and then by tho British. To escape from 
this, I had to look for support, for a base of strength, frcm which 
to act/' I.mentioned this in my book, The Philosophy of the 
Revolution.^* But it led to two misunderstandings in foreign • 
countries. I found Egypt at the centre of three circles: circles 
of force. First, the Arabs: we aro at the centre of the Arab 
world, half-way between Morocco and Iraq. What happens to us 
will affect all the Arabs. .Second, we are Moslems: л wo are at 
the centre of the Islamic world. What happens to us will be 
felt by all Moslems. And third, we are in Africa.' . We are an 
^African country. Tho peoplo .of Africa will not regard us-as. 
"strangers. What happens hero affects all Africa." 
1. c.f. ibid. pp. 71-2. 
2. Shäykh Muhammad 'Abdu (?18Д9 - 1905). See W. Cantwell Smith, op. cit. 
pp. 62, 72, 81. 
3. Jamalu-d-Din Afghani" (1839-97). See ibid. pp. 54-8. 
4. In Economica Books edition, 1959, pp. 59-62. See also 78. 
(3 ) Salah el Bltar - Pacts in the Atom Age (lecture to 
the Young Arab Club in Damasous, 30th March, 1956. 
' Printed in Cairo in Arabic) . ч 
"The Middle East i s a meeting point - by reason of 
geography and strategy - of East and West. Poreigners 
cannot but look on the Middle East except in terms of 
tangible advantages - porta, aerodromes, etc. We, the 
peoples of the Middle East, look at it from the other way 
as bringing benefits for ourselves. There must be a 
difference between these ways of thinking and also in the 
evaluation of things. 
" ( 1 ) In what age do we live ПОТУ? 
"International relations are conditioned by power 
politics . Hence the importance of possession, and then 
the kind of arms. The relevance of nuclear weapons to 
power status can be seen by considering the bombing of 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945. The dropping of these 
two bombs on Japan served two purposes other than the 
winning of the war: (a) it made Russians aware of U . S . 
strength and'showed U .S . /Great Britain solidarity, (b) it 
forwarded the creation of the Western camp and the contain-
ment of Communism both in Europe and in Asia. 
"Soon afterwards East/tfest conditions became frozen. 
But the contending powers did not solve their problems or 
reach en agreement which they were hoping to arrive at . 
So began the Cold War, the Russian development of the atomic 
bomb andHhe ensuing atomic bomb race. As a reaiilt of 
(and .during) this atomic Cold War and arms race we ( i . e . 
the Arab peoples) began to measure the strength of either 
camp by the number of atomic"bombs held at a certain time 
and/or by what was held in-conventional weapons. The 
atomic age began to condition our way of thinking, but 
people did not realise that it was only to be a short age 
unlike the Iron Age. For in 1952 the atomic age ended and 
a new age began - the age of the hydrogen bomb. The 
hydrogen bomb is infinitely more destructive than the 
atomic bomb. Purthermore, this i s not a 'secret but known 
to a l l . 
"As a result of this common knowledge, people began to 
have oomplexes and fear . Even the responsible politicians 
of the world, when they talked about the coming of the 
hydrogen bomb, described it as completely destructive and 
ruinous. History shows that the invention of any new 
weapon tends to-produce i ts defensive-opposite '{Biß, sword -
shield; cannon - castle) , but the hydrogen bomb has no 
defensive opposite. I conclude that (a) there i s no 
defence against the hydrogen bomb, and (b) that i ts cost 
of production i s less than the cost of building up similar 
strength by conventional weapons. 
,"Аз we have not the material power to protect ourselves 
against this all destructive weapon, we must appeal to the 
spiritual and ethical forces in humanity and put our hope 
in the human conscience which may become stronger and 
persuade the people who possess this terrible weapon not to 
use i t , and what i s more, not to manufacture i t ; and, 
further, to prevent these powers from having tests as a 
preliminary step to preventing manufacture. 
» 
" ( 2 ) In What direction i s history going, towards peace 
or war? 
"In the coming war, i f thex'e i s a war, there would be 
no place for courage or feelings of triumph, and there would 
be no heroism of defenoe; 'War today differs also'from 
previous wars iri that it i s not restricted merely to„the 
fighting men but extends to the whole population. Although 
there have been many instances in the past when war could 
not be localised and had to include many nations, or even' 
the whole world, yet the battlefields were localised. 
The new weapons will lead to a new way of thinking about 
international relations which are not conditioned by ideals 
only btit also by the necessities of l i f e . In the past, 
war has been an instrument of coercion used by one side or 
both.sides to come to a settlement. Now there can never 
be such a settlement dictated by one side on the other. 
In the past, the usual slogan was "Peace or vYar"«but today 
the current slogan i s "Peace or Death" because war can never 
lead to one side 's victory over the other but only to death 
for both sides. 
•"Thus an'tand er standing of peace and co-existence has 
been transformed with the atomic age from being the produc t 
of wisdom and idealism to a human necessity for the 
continuing existence of man and society. 
"The direction of history i s towards peace and peaceful 
co-existence and away from war. Wisdom and pure logic in 
dealing with international probleme in the nuclear age i s 
the logic of peace and not the logic of war. 
"The. nuclear age and its evil inventions has produced 
both on psychological and social levels the„two following 
effects which are necessitious for the existence of human 
l i f e : -
" ( i ) that all the peoples of the world are fully convinced 
that the two major,camps have enough arms,whether atomic or 
nuclear, to destroy the whole earth.. 
" ( i i ) that the peoples.of the world have realised the 
gr.eaV benefit which they will get i f the atomic and nuolear 
powers are used for peaceful.purposes. The nuolear powers 
could get rid of poverty and make l i fe luxurious. Änd I will 
mention only as one example the British White.Paper issued 
recently on the peaoeful .uses of atomic energy. The VThite 
Paper predicts that by 1975 a quarter of the. British electrical 
power will derive from atomic or nuclear power. These plans, 
which aim at producing electric power by atomic means, will 
be a starting point of a now industrial revolution more 
magnificent than that which*came to a climax in the 19th 
century and which depended on coal. 
" ( 3 ) ?<hat i s the relation of the Arab peoples to the 
military pacts and what positive policies should 
they follow? 
"This idea .of peaceful coexistence, although it has 
become a human necessity, i s still only a mere hope if . it 
does not take a*form through which it will realise i t s e l f , and 
i f it does not become a powerful .current which will take the 
peoples of the world with i t . And also i f i t . does not become 
a positive policy of governments which would make it a 
standard of international relations. , 
"I want to tell you how the idea of co-existence and 
positive neutralism progressed until it became a definite 
policy of i ts own. 
"The hope of the peoples of the world that the last war 
would be the last war of all from which all the victorious 
powers would draw the lesson of eradicating the policy of 
power and control (Nazi) and what results from i t : inter-
national injustice; and also the lesson of following a just 
policy which would realise the freedom add equality of all 
the peoples of the world. That hope ended the moment the war 
ended, and in less than one year, after the victory of the 
Communist/capitalist camp over the Nazi and the Fascist , in 
less than а убаг, the world was divided into two camps East 
and West, and they began their quarrel on the ideological, 
political and military levels . 
3ot 
"At this"point liberals from every country in Europe and 
Asia, and some popular movements, such as in the Arab countries 
(and some from both groups, such as India, Burma, Yugoslavia) 
all these peoples who became free of either the capitalist 
or the communist system, those people who did not find in 
either camp the real, positive solution to the problems of 
nations, individuals, or societies, thought of the necessity 
of leaving both camps and the politics..of those camps. They 
took a special standpoint called-neutrail am, which is not a 
status of neutrality which was known traditionally, it is 
not a neutrality which is based on isolation or running away 
from war, because that neutrality did not materialise for 
those countries which adopted it and which tried to keep it , 
when the last war occurred, merely with its conventional 
warfare and limited destruction. How could ainy nation in 
this atomic "and nuclear age guarantee its neutrality while 
it knows that the atömic radiation must reach her even if 
she escaped destruction? This kind of neutrality - neutrality 
during war, or neutrality in the atmosphere of war - ia how 
the opportunists try to describe our neutralism. This is 
not the positive neutralism which we advocate as a policy of 
peace in the nuclear age. 
"Positive neutralism is the policy of peace adopted by 
some independent states (independent of either the Eastern 
or Western camp) whioh is a manifestation of the»feelings of 
hundreds of millions of human beings who belong to all the 
nations who want the establishment of international peace: 
a peace which is based on justioe, freedom and equality for 
all the peoples of the world by peaceful co-existenoe. This 
will begin by decreasing international tension through a 
policy of non-alignment with either camp and then by dis-
solving the system-of camps and opening the ways of contact 
between the peoples of the world so thatideas, philosophies 
and codes will fuse together to produce a more just, and 
better social system. 
"The evolution of neutralism has produced in the big 
camps a suspicion of the small nations and this is producing 
disintegration in the blocs. This disintegration, together 
with the human necessity of peaceful co-existence, are the 
fundamental factors which have so far decreased tension 
between the two camps, although slowly. Äs a result, the 
world is certainly moving towards peace, although there have 
been a few small wars here and there, in spite of the increase 
in the production of nuclear.weapons. 
ЪО-Ь 
•"At a first glance it seems that there is no dis-
integration and that both camps are trying to strengthen_ 
their'position by making pacts such as N .A .T .O . and S.E.Ä.T.O, 
and the programmes for S.E. Asia and the Middle East. Yet 
if we go deeper we can notice three things:-
* 
" ( i ) that those pacts are not static but change 
according to circumstances. ' They started like the Marshall > 
Plan in Western Europe and then were transformed into defence 
systems at the4start .of the Cold War. Even now the Western 
countries differ as to the forms and purposes of those pacts. 
" ( i i ) that those pacts started before the production • 
of the hydrogen bomb, and in this sense the existence of 
these pacts oould be considered as a continuation of the 
outlook which existed before the hydrogen-'bomb age - that 
war is certainly coming. 
" ( i i i ) that the form of those pacts remains substantially 
the same, but the idea behind them has changed. They are 
no longer conceived of i.s a grouping for armaments or a 
preparation for war, but each camp attempts to convince 
the other that it has more states on its side, believing 
in its social, political and economic system, and anxious 
to make thoeecountries a defence against the propaganda 
devices of the opposite camp and in favour of their own 
system. 
"In other words, the pacts which started with a military 
implication do not have that implication now and are' evolving 
towards peace end an atmosphere of peace. 
• "Lastly) I wish to make one important point about the 
material side of this»neutralism which is being led in our 
da^- by the Indian Prime Minister, fir. Nehru. Pandit Nehru 
has wained us repeatedly that positive neutralism is not 
to be taken to mean the formation of a third bloc by the 
countries which believe in it because neutralism is essent- • 
ially against the policy^ of camps, and that policy can never 
lead to one of the main aims of neutralism, namely, the 
disintegration of camps. Such a third camp would involve 
this camp in the power politics of the two otheroamps and 
would involve it in military organisation just like any 
other camp. The relation between the-countries who believe 
in neutralism should be based on the five Principles^ agreed 
on between Nehru anä Tito (called the Nehru-Tito Five 
Principles)':-
"1 . Recognition of independence and sovereignty. 
2 . Internal unity of each country. 
3 . Non-aggression. 
4 . Non-interference' in the internal affairs of any 
other country. 
5 . Co-existence on an international level . ' 
"I shall put my case for the Arab countries on the 
assumption that there, will be peace arid not war. I f there 
i s to be a war it will not come now but some time in the 
future, and i f it comes,, the pacts and'the defensive alliances 
which the VTest i s trying to impose on us would be, quite useless. 
"The main problem of the Arab peoples i s that .their • "* 
homeland is divided and dominated, in some parts by Western 
imperialism and Zionism. Therefore, our job in this period 
of our history^is freedom from imperialism and Zionism, and 
Arab unity . 
"Zionism is being protected by imperialism and the two 
are a l l ies and wil l remain al l ies until the imperialists 
realise that by protecting Israel they wil l get only enmity 
from the Arabs, and this moans that any view which says that 
we can getrid of Israel by co-operation with imperialism i s 
a misleading policy. 
"The Arab peoples as a nation are trying to rid themselves 
of all fo'rms of domination from outside, whether economic or 
pol it ical . As a nation they want a just peace based on 
equality betv/een all the peoples of the world, and therefore 
they cannot have any benefit except by working with the 
nations that have common aims and which adopt -for themselves 
a policy of non-alignment to any of the camps and positive 
neutralism. Therefore, we must refuse any policy, from 
either camp, that aims at including us with any of them. My 
answer for those who fear the Communist threat i s that all the 
preparations which were taken by the Western camp have changed 
into peaceful negotiations since the hydrogen bomb was invented. 
From the Communist point of view, as well as the Western 
point of view, a destructive war cannot be avoided but by 
peaceful co-existence. 
"25y answer to those who fear the Communists from the 
inside i s that such a threat, if it exists at all", i s ' certainly 
due to imperialism from outside, and from eoonomic and 
political domination in order to maintain reactionary con-
ditions inside the Arab, homeland. The only way of removing 
such a Communist threat i s by decreasing the gap between rich 
and poor and increasing the equality of opportunity for all 
people. 
. ЗоГ 
"The Arab countries are not entirely free of Western 
domination and its influence is still evident in Iraq, 
Libya, the Aden protectorates arid Algeria, г Now Western • 
domination tries to mask .itself by the excuse of defence 
against the Communist threat. For its only aim is to 
spread their dominance by. some form or other. When the 
West looks at the Middle East they think of that area as a 
strategic region, irrespective of what it contains in 
different nationalities, history, social and psychological 
conditions, and irrespective of the great problem which they 
themselves have created, namely, Israel. We can say that 
the Middle East is fomed of the Arab countries, Persia, * 
Pakistan, Turkey and Israel. Some of these states did not 
resist going into pacts, and some of them have resisted and 
et ill resist. 
"For Turkey, her own good is to be on the side of the 
West becäuse it borders the Soviet Union which will always 
constitute a threat to its national sovereignty, especially 
when the Soviet Union demands an influence in the'Straits 
and some Eastern provinces of Turkey. That national factor 
has persuaded Turkey to enter a pact with the West. 
"As to Pakistan, it has a national question with India 
(Kashmir). And because of the tension between Pakistan 
and India, Pakistan sought the Baghdad Pact,as a'means of 
support in her policytover Kashmir. What about Israel? 
Her government knows quite well that after occupying Arab 
land and establishing the Israel state she could not exist 
without the help of the West. 
"We come to the conclusion that all these countries, 
have entered-into the Western pacts against .Communist 
aggression for purely •nationalist purpose's, and Communism 
itself has nothing to do with it . But there arises a 
further question. Since-vthe alignment of such countries . 
was for purely nationalist reasons, why could not the Arabs 
do the same and try to implement their nationalist aims by 
entering such pacts? < Thatcis a very serious question and 
I must answer it frankly. 
"The first question to answer is 7"what is the 
nationalist aim of the Arabs which could be implemented 
through the Western treaty organizations? Our nationalist 
aims are summarised in the following: evacuation of foreign 
armies, the ending of treaties, the solution of the question 
of Israel and Arab unity. 
"Do the Western pacts realise these aims? Firstly, it 
is said that the Arab countries will be on the same footing 
as the .Western countries in those pacta. .That certainly 
looks very nice. But this equality between the contracting 
countries could never exist even if it is written into>tthe 
treaty1. For one reason - and that is t!hat our countries 
are^economically, militarily.and'politically backward, and 
between our countries and the ,.Vestern powers is such a great 
difference in strength tKat a contract could only be one 
'between the strong and the 'weak. A treaty between the 
Unite'd States and Great Britain could be said to be one of 
equality, arid it could be said that the U .S . bases in Great 
Britain do not affect the freedom and 'independenc e of the 
jlatter country*. For example, the Amerioan aircraft in 
.Great Britain a!re not allowed to leave their bases except 
by permission,from the British government. 
"While the oil companies, according to the terras of 
their agreements, should be supervised by the government of 
the oil well bearing countrie's, even"**sothose governments, 
Ьул reason of their present backward nature, cannot supervise 
the administrative machinery of the oil company. 
4 I 
# "Secondly, i f our countries are filled with bases and 
military missions,' the Arab armies will be* looked upon by 
the Western leadership as an instrument for one ригрове. 
That is," exclusively, against the Communist threat. Thus, 
after losing our military independence, we would also lose 
some" of our economic and political independence. 
"Thirdly, Israel will certainly join military pacts 
which will help her to realise tier essential aim - peace with 
the Arabs. Moreover, the West will arm Israel much more 
than all the Arab countries put together, and the West will 
always be careful when arming the Arab armies either not to 
arm them effectively, or to retain effective control of those 
arms. 
"Fourthly, the essential aim of the Arab's - Arab unity -
is certainly contradictory to'the policy of the West and 
could-never be.realised by-military pacts."-
Appendix 6. 
President Sukarno of Indonesia. 
Achmed Sukarno^' was born in Java in 1901. After taking 
part in-the unsuccessful revolt agüinst the Butch in 1926, he 
fused the native parties of the Netherlands East Indies into 
one nationalist organization modelled on the Indian Congress 
Party. Between 1929 and 1942 he spent'eleven years in Dutch 
j a i l s . ".Then the Japanese invaded the East Indies in 1942 
Sukarno ostensibly collaborated with them, though with the 
purpose of building up the force of Indonesian nationalism. 
After the Japanese surrender in August 1945» the Dutch fought 
for four years to restore their former control, and Sukarno 
was arrested again. He was released in July 1949 and became 
President of the new, independent republic, of Indonesia in 
the following Deoembor, which office he has held ever~8ince.' 
Since 1949 Sukarno's flamboyant charismatic leadership has 
been virtually the only political force making for unity in 
a state wracked by centrifugal forces. In view of his 
experiences,гit i s not surprising that h is thinking about 
international politics should be dominated by nationalism and 
anti-colonialism. His cast of thought i s authoritarian, 
rather thamdemocratic, and it has been said^that his thinking 
expresses "the syncretism which is a feature of the Indonesian 
and particularly the Javanese intellectual and religious 
tradition, the cast of thinking which emphasizes an ultimate 
mystical and aesthetic unity of things"underlying what appear 
as material oonflicts and logical incompatibilities. 
1 . There i s no adequate biography of Sukaino in English. 
These notes have been gleaned from "Profile: Sukarno," in 
The Observer. 2 ^arch 1958, & G. M. Kahin - Nationalism 
and Revolution in Indonesia (Cornell J . P . 1952 ) . T~ 
2 . Herbert Feith, ' Indonesia' in G. McT. Kahin ( ed . ) -
Governments and Politics of Southeast Asiaг(Cornell U . P . , 
1959 ) , P. 192 . 
(1) Address to_the Congress of the United States by 
President Aohraed Sukarno of Indonesia, 17th.May, 
, 1956 (published in Indonesian'Information, Summer-
* Autumn, 1956 ) . 
"Over half the world the burning words which fired the 
American War of Independence have been closely studied as a 
source of inspiration and a plan of action. Yes, 'this 
period i s the period of Asian and African resurgence. 
" If we could see the passage of history as yesterday I 
saw-your country from the windows of an aeroplane, we could 
have no doubt„that the world i s passing through the period 
of Asian and African nationalism. 
+ 
, "I hesitate at using that word "nationalism," for I 
know that in many countries and in many nations nationalism 
is an out-of-date politiqal doctrine. Please remember, Mr. 
Speaker, that for us of Asia and Africa nationalism is a 
young' and progressive creed. We do not equate nationalism 
with chauvinism, and we do not interpret nationalism as 
meaning the superiority of our peoples over others. No! 
For us , nationalism means the rebuilding of our nations; it 
means the effort to provide equal esteem for ,our peoples; it 
means the determination to take the future into our own hands. 
For us , nationalism is the love of country and the deter-
mination to improve it which, not so very long ago, illumined 
the actions of the founders of your nation. Nationalism 
may be^.an öut-of-date doctrine for many in this world; for 
us of Asia and Africa, it i s the mainspring of our efforts . 
Understand that, and you have the key to much of post7war 
history. Fail to understand i t , end no amount of thinking, 
no torrent of words, and no"Niagara of dollars will produce 
anything but bitterness and disillusionment. 
_ "We who are living injAsia and Africa during this period 
of Asian and African nationalism, and particularly those of 
us who have been called upon to guide the destiny of nations, 
we ask that the rest of the world should show understanding 
and sympathy. After a l l , for what do we struggle? Not for 
fame; not for conquests; not for territorial aggrandisement; 
not for domination over other peoples. Our efforts and the 
sacrifices we have made have been, for the release of our „ 
people from a.colonial tyranny lasting for generations and 
centuries. It has been a struggle - it i s still a struggle -
for the simple human demands which the rest of the world has 
long taken for granted. 
Зоч 
"We ask you to understand our national struggle, and we 
ask you to sympathize with i t . We ask you to understand 
and sympathize with*"the fact that'our national struggle i s , 
still incomplete. How^an it be complete^wheri millions of 
our people in Asia, and Africa are still under colonial 
domination, are still not free? How can the national 
struggle in Indonesia be complete when>part of our own 
country and part of our own nation are stil l unfree? 
4 n 
"I recall with the very greatest pleasure that shortly 
after the f irst Asian-Afrioan Conference, last year, this 
Congress unanimously'approved a resolution reaffirming 
America's traditional anti-colonial attitude. f That.Con-
ference' in ' Bandung, in which the leaders of twenty-nine States 
took part, and, which represented'far more than half the 
population of ' the world, was a clear indication of history 's 
direction. Practically all shades of the political spectrum 
were represented there, and almost all were but recently 
emancipated from colonialism. They were united by many 
things, but chiefly by their abhorrence of colonialism. 
They produced a Declaration'which explicitly stated their 
continuing opposition to colonialism in all i t s forms. „ This 
Congress, noting that Conference,and its Declaration, then 
unanimously re-stated, for all the world to know, itв own 
long-standing opposition to colonialism. By that action, 
this Congrese demonstrated its sympathy with our efforts . 
In the scales of history, your weight was placed resoundingly 
onto the side of the future. J 
^ " I t T i s now almost eleven years since, on the 17th,of 
August 1945., thexIndoriesian people proclaimed themselves 
independent. Kote! I said the Indonesian people. Not 
those of Java alone, nor Sumatra'alone,^nor Celebes alone, 
but all of them, from the north of Sumatra to the southern-
most corner of West .Nev/ Guinea, fcwhi с h we call Irian Ba'rat." 
' u > . 
"The return of West Irian i s for us the remaining part 
,of our national political aspiration. I t i s the f inal 
^installment on the colonial debt. We see our brothers still 
in chains,' who joined with us in proclaiming our common 
independence,' and so our own freedom i s not yet complete. 
The salt "of liberty cannot have its fu l l savour for us until 
all of Indonesia , is again united under the freedom which i s 
jthfc' birthright of all>men." 
1 v • . — 
** "We"are anti-colonialists, for the sweat of our labor* 
has been extorted by other*nations, leaving us poverty-
stricken with the sorrow of-,our hearts. We are nationalists . 
for it i s our right to win back the worthy place in the 
family of nations torn from our forefathers three and'a half 
centuries ago. In all of this , we do not claim to have 
discovered novel principles. No, but like your forefathers, 
we regard our findings as universal values, as the common 
property of all mankind." 
t 
"Indonesia i s indeed grateful for the technical assistance 
she has received to date from America,~:and in acknowledging 
my gratitude I want to express myself-with the frankness of 
ak.f r i e n d . . . . ?or the furtherance of their function ав 
defenders of freedom, America and Indonesia need to realize 
how to obtain lasting results, and these depend upon the 
specific conditions of Asian countries and the development of 
the national aspirations of the Asian people, which, indeed, 
America cannot be expected immediately to know, or to under-: 
stand. The approach to 'the question of foreign aid should 
be based upon different principles in different countries. 
Without adequate knowledge of those countries, and even ' i f 
your motives in .granting aid were solely the stability of 
this region, the results could be adverse, and the flow'of 
bill ions of dollars could lead only to strained relations. 
Certainly military aid i s no substitute for Asian stability . 
I t will only serve to make countries accepting it more 
dependent upon America^ and their worth as genuine partners 
in the universal struggle for liberty , peace and prosperity 
wi l l consequently decline. The main aim should be for the 
people of Asia , like the 7/estern nations, to become .economic-
ally stable but also politically stable, and thue be able to 
defend their freedom against all assaults. Political stabilitj 
comes only with the stability of the -political heart.' And 
this heart of ours i s now still an unsatisfied heart. /The 
Asian people'must soon be brought to the stage of development 
where they are capable of cherishing their hard-won freedom." 
( 2 ) Address at the Opening Meeting of the Ministers of the. 
Colombo Plan countries in Jogjakarta (Central Java) .by 
President : Sukamo, 11th November, 1953 (published in 
Indonesian Information, Summer-Autumn, 1959 ) . 
с 
"Indonesia i s the only nation which has won itв 
independence against physical opposition and yet has retained 
its u n i t y . . . . . Our greatest achievement is that we survived. 
Yes, we have survived as a 'nation . We have survived as a 
unified and independent state for fourteen years. That has 
so far been the greatest achievement of our nation. That has 
so far been the greatest achievement of Indonesia . " 
"In all things,.colonialism, which is*an unmitigatedly 
evil vthing, stunts, /binds and Inhibits men. In all things -
with but one exception. That exception is the opposition 
to colonialism. J n that opposition, that growth of national-
ism ,and patriotism, there .springs .the finest fruit, of human 
effort. \And that tree. of nationalism, that tree of liberty, 
that tree of self-respect and self-dignity, gives shelter and 
shade to the customs and traditions of..its people. When 
the day of liberation comes, those customs and traditions 
themselves bear fruit, and themselves begin to'inspire and 
guid e the•nat ion." 
"First, I must enter a caveat against aipplying the. 
adjective "under-developed" or "undeveloped" to countries 
like Indonesia. Under-developed we certainly are, and so is 
every nation in the world, for nowhere is man's potential 
developed and used to the full. So our countries are not 
alone in our under-developed condition. We object to the 
description of ourselves as under-developed. . Qualify the 
expression! Call it 'economically under-developed, or 
technically, unci er-developed, and, with some reservations, I 
would agree. But spiritually, mentally, culturally, I 
disagree wholly and 'completely. 
"Development, I have said,- and I repeat it with-insistence 
is inter-dependent, with all its aspects and facets closely 
linked. It follows then, as night follows day, that 
economic development must be'linked with, must be geared to, , 
and must be concurrent with, changes in all other fields . " 
"Do not think that assistance will produce a nation in 
your own image. Do not think that what applies in other 
countries will necessarily apply here. The Indonesian nation 
is an ancient nation, a nation with proud memories, but a 
nation whose natural course of growth has been bent and 
distorted. That has left its marks, and one of our tasks 
has had to be the application of the surgeon's knife to end 
this cripple, and to remove these scars. The Indonesian 
nation has its own traditions. It will develop in accordance 
with those traditions. The injection of new technical 
knowledge and new skills will produce a synthesis, and that 
synthesis, too, will be Indonesian, not a reflection of others." 
"It has been said that all schemes of aid originating in 
the West are only an attempt to redeem the evils of the past 
by a cash payment in the present, while hoping for a further 
dividend in the future. It has also been said that they are 
ъ\ь 
the present payment of conscience money for past sins, with 
the hope of absolution in the future. 
"To me, they are neither. Certainly, they are a sign 
of humanity's awakening conscience. But more than that, they 
can be a sign of mankind's growing maturity." 
FURTHER REFERENCES CONCERNING INDONESIAN NEUTRALISM: 
(1 ) There is no single collection in English of President 
Sukarno's speeches, though most of the important ones 
. are printed soon after they are delivered in -
Indonesian Information, published by the Information 
Department of the Indonesian Embassy in London. 
also in -
Indonesian Review, issued twice a year by the Ministry 
of Information, Djakarta. 
(2 ) There i s a study of Indonesian diplomacy in -
(a) R. H. Russell Fifield - The Diplomacy of South East 
Asia, 1945-1958, chapter 5 . See also the excellent 
bibliography, pp. 544-548. 
(b) Justus van der Kroef - Indonesia in the Modem World, 
Part 2 , (Bandung, 1956) chapter 10 . 
Appendix 7» 
S. W. R.* Bandaranaike of 'Ceylon* 
The late Mr. Bandaranaike** was the Prime4Minister öf 
Ceylon^from 1956 until he was murdered in September 1 9 5 9 . л 
His career has been sketched in a l ittle more detail than 
some of the others in these appendices in order to outline 
the career of at least one Asian neutralist-nationalist leader 
from4a small country. He was b o m into a wealthy "Sinhalese 
noble family of large landowners. He was educated at 'Oxford, 
where he was Secretary of the Union, and where he developed 
a strong attachment to Sinhalese nationalism and became an 
impaseioned advocate of self-government for Ceylon. After 
being called to the Bar, he returned to Ceylon and lived the" 
l i fe of a wealthy young barrister. •But> before long he 
resigned his practice,' gave up his former "English" hobbies 
of tennis and riding, learned the Sinhalese language thoroughly 
and identified himself with Sinhalese, as opposed 'to British 
culture. The ideals of Gandhi made a powerful appeal to 
him: he learned to use. the spinning wheel and customarily 
wore home-spun clothes. . Helrenounced Christianity and 
became a Buddhist. 
Entering political l i fe as an exponent of Sinhalese 
language and customs, he became Secretary to the Ceylon 
National Congress, but BOOn broke away to form his own 
organization, .the Sinhala Maha Sabha. This party won a 
number of seats in t h e ' f i r s t ' r e a l parliamentary election held 
in Ceylon, and Bandaranaike became Minister of Health and 
Local Government, and led the Ceylonese delegation to the 
Asian Relations Conference in Delhi during March-April 1947 . 
Before long he broke with his colleagues, and just before 
the 1952 elections he formed a new group, the Sri Lanka 
Freedom Party, and by 1956 what seemed to be a growing feeling 
that Bandaranaike•s moderate Socialism and strong Sinhalese 
nationalism were stabilising factors of great value in 
Ceylonese politics , swept him back into power - this time as 
Prime Minister - in the elections of 1956 . His government 
was described as being completely different from that of i ts 
predecessor as it was one of "intellectual n a t i o n a l i s t s . " 2 . 
1 . The details given here are drawn frpm Howard Wriggins -
Ceylon: Dilemmas of a New Nation (Princeton UtP-, 196D) ; 
also^The Times, 6 Oct. 1950, 23 Sept. 1959 & 12 Jan. i960 . 
2. Quoted from The Economist, 9 June 1956 , p. 1004. 
He воon showed his intention of breaking completely with his 
predecessor*s'pro-Westem foreign policy by negotiating with 
Britain for the withdrawal of British naval.and a ir forces 
from Ceylon; by cultivating close relations with Mr. Nehru -
whose disciple he claimed to be - and by adopting for Ceylon 
an avowed neutralist outlook in the Cold 7for. 
Though he secured the gradual rendition of the British 
bases to Ceylon sovereignty, and although he was at pains to 
identify himself primarily with a specifically Asian view 
of international politics,- Ceylon's relations with Britain 
remained cordial. In his domestic policies Mr. Bandaranaike 
was far. less successful. * , In particular, friction with the 
Tamil minority and a growing bellicosity on the part of the 
Buddhist priesthood, inflamed communal tensions and led to 
his own assassination. Some months after his death his 
widow became his successor as Ceylon's Prime Minister, and 
inherited all the major problems which had previously troubled 
her husband. .These were Bix basically: Buddhist and 
Singhalese revivalism, Singhalese-Tamil, communalism, the 
lack of stable political parties, the d i f f icult ies of economic 
development in a plural * society faced by mounting population 
pressures, isolation from the rest of the people of the 
Westernized political e l i te , andLthe search f o r a settled 
foreign policy. 
1 . See The Foreign Policy of Ceylon, a collection of 
Bandaranaike's speeches from which the following excerpts 
.are. taken;4 
Three Extracts from Statements by the Prime Minister 
of Ceylon, S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike, printed in -
The Foreign Policy of Ceylon (Ceylon Government Press, 
1957 ) . 
(1 ) Statement in the House of-Representatives, 2 August, 
1956 , pp. 1-2. 
c "I think the House will agree with me that the "foreign 
affairs of this country, have taken a more positive" turn today 
than before. Earlier," we did not know where we were. There 
was talk of 'non-aligning',, 'power, blocs'', 'preserving an 
.attitude of neutralism' , though, in fact , their (the previous 
government) actions were quite different . We have altered 
that now. 
"What do we mean by this word "neutralism"? ' I do not 
like that word. ь I n , this period of world history, when a 
good many of( our Asian countries have once again regained 
their freedom, and .the world i tself i s in a state of change, 
i s it wrong for us to look about - we do not want to look 
either to the capitalism'of the West or the conmunism'of the 
East - t i l l we find the precise form of society that we think 
i s most suited to ^our country? I s it wrong, in'pursuance of 
that view, that we do .'not range ourselves on the side of one 
or *the. other of those power blocs but would like to be friendlj 
with all? I s'siy, in this world today of a system which i s 
changing but not yet completely disappeared - where the world 
i s still in doubt in the case , of various countries of .the 
world, as to what particular thing it would like to have in 
place' of the old - 'in that state of affairs , naturally, 
various conflicts emerge - ideological conflicts^ conflicts 
arising out of the resurgence of nationalism here, there and 
everywhere, various types of conflicts in the world; the 
wise course obviously i s that which i s summed up by the 
rather ugly phrase 'co-existence. ' ' 
r « 
"We have just to make up our minds to avoid any serious 
danger of a general flare-up of war. 'The potentialities, of 
oorae of the weapons that have be*en discovered are very vaguely 
known by ordinary laymen.. There i s in them something more 
terrible than what even the most imaginative writer can 
fportray. They are so terrible in their results. We there-
fore want peace and we have to aohieve peace under very 
d i f f icult circumstances t9day, amiddt so many conflicts all 
over, while preserving fundamentally'the things for which we 
stand. We have'to work out some scheme of living and letting 
others live if, we are to prevent humanity from generally 
going down. That is the minimum - the philosophy, of 
:neutralism.for. which I. stand." 
(2 ) Address to the U .N . .General Assembly, 22 November, 1956, 
PP. 3-7. 
"'«Ye of Asia who have suffered under imperialistic 
colonial rule for many centuries are, naturally, extremely 
(sensitive towards anything approaching a resurgence.of the 
spirit of imperialism and coloniallem. I hope we are wrong, 
but we feel strongly that the happenings in Egypt, and perhaps 
the echo of .those happenings in Hungary, are a manifestation 
«once again of a certain resurgence of the spirit of colonialism, 
rthe desire of a strong power to achieve i t s purposes,and to 
impose its w i l l , even by force, on a weaker power." 
"That is aiphilOBophy behind the doctrine of co-existence. 
We have to build up a new society for ourselves, as I have 
said, which best suits the.genius of our country. We should 
?like to get some ideas and some principles from this side, 
land some from the other,, until a cbherent form of society is 
made-up that .suits our own people in the\context of the 
'changing world of today. That "is why we do not range our-
Iselves on the side'of. this Power-bloc or'that Power-bloc. 
iThat i s the philosophy of neutralism.' It i s not something 
dishonest. It i s not a matter of. sitting on the fence to 
see whether ^we can get the best of both w o r l d s . I t i s a 
position that is inexorably thrust upon us by the circum-
Btance.s of the case. It i s a position that will be of great 
help in the world situation today, for we do provide a bridge 
over the gulf between the two oppoBing factions. 
"We are supposed to be the 'uncommitted1 nations. I 
etrongly object to that/jword. We are committed up to the 
h i lt . We are committed to preserve decency in dealings 
between nations, we are committed to the cause of justice 
and freedom as much as anyone i s . That, briefly is our 
position in Asia. I trust it will not be misunderstood." 
"My country is a small one, a weak one and a poor one, 
but I venture to think that today, particularly in an 
Organisation euch as thie, the service that a country can 
render - that a member can render - is not to be measured 
alone by the size of that country, its population, i ts power 
з П 
or its strength. This is an Organisation which expresses 
itself, most effectively by bringing to bear a oertain moral 
force - the collective moral force and decency of human beings. 
That is a task in which the weak as well .as the strong can 
render a useful'service, and I give the Assembly the assurance, 
on behalf of my country, that as-far as we are concerned 
every endeavour that we can make in all sincerity to assist 
in the achievement of tliose noble ideals "for which this 
Organisation stands will always be forthcoming in the fullest 
measure." 
(3) Address to the Commonwealth Press Association, 5 July, 
'1956, pp. 8-9. 
"Our attitude, the attitude of-my own country, i s an 
attitude of neutralism and is one which some in the West do 
not understand, perhaps do not'wish to understand. It i s 
not a sign of cowardice; it is not a desire to have the best 
of both worlds. It is something much more than a negative 
and passive-attitude; something very positive. " 
"Now I feel that in pursuing this ideal of peace, for us 
it is best that we do not align ourselves with these military 
blocs, - either of the "West or of the East; that we preserve 
friendship with all and try perhaps to provide a bridge 
between the two radically opposed points of view. Neutralism, 
but dynamic neutralism, is in the interest not only of our 
own countries but of mankind as a whole. I am glad thatr 
there i s more evidence of understanding, even in countries 
wHich,-understandably, do not quite appreciate our»point of 
view. " 
Appendix 8 . 
Burmese Neutralism 
* 
Burma has consistently pursued a neutralist course^* 
since independence in 1948 ; and U Nu ,2« who haB been Burma's 
Prime Minister (apart-from one-or two brief interruptions ) , 
has been the ' leading .exponent of Burmese neutralism to the 
outside world.! Besides being a national leader , U Nu i s 
a devout Buddhist, a leading religious scholar, an author 
and a playwright. His l iterary work includes a study of 
"Burma under the Japanese" , ' various plays, and translations 
of Karl Marx ' s "Das Kapital " and of Dale Carnegie 's "How to 
Win Friends and Influence People" into Burmese. His play, 
"The People Win Through", a dramatic acoount of Burma'в 
f ight against Communist insurrection and subversion, has 
been produced in America. A l l of U N u ' в speeches^» and 
writ ings on foreign p'olioy are of interest to the student 
of neutralism, but besides the excerpt given below, two 
other brief quotations seemed so relevant to the points 
made about ' independence' and ' synthesis ' in Chapter I I above, 
that they are included here. 
F i r s t l y , in h is remarkably frank and unf latter ing 
account of h i s Second World War experiences as a Min ister 
in the Japanese-puppet government of Burma, U Nu writes -
n . . i t was really good for me to meet the Japanese. For 
then one had to recognise the 'Made in Japan' stamp on one 's 
forehead. Otherwise with f lattery on every side , one might 
easily have mistaken our pine-wood independence f o r real 
solid t e a k . " 4 . 
1 . See Hugh Tinker - The Union of Burma (2nd e d . , London, 
1959 ) esp. ch. 12 ; also John Seabury Thomson - "Burmese 
Neutralism" in The P o l i t i c a l Science Quarterly, June 1957» 
, pp. 261-233. 
2 . See Hugh Tinker - "Nu, the Serene Statesman" in Pac i f ic 
A f f a i r s , June 1957« 
3 . See esp. the following collections : Towards Peace & 
Democracy ( 1 949 ) ; From Peace to Stability ( 1 951 ) ; Towards 
a Welfare State ( 1 9 5 2 ) ; Forward with the People ( 1 9 5 5 ) ; 
Resurgence: Premier U Nu at Bandung (1955)» 
4 . See Thakin Nu - Burma Under the Japanese (London, 1 9 5 4 ) , 
P . 77 . 
Secondly, iri his presidential address to the Anti-
Pascist Peoples Freedom League U Nu said: "Largely on 
hearsay and cursory reading, we at one time impetuously and 
loudly claimed that Marxism was the same as Buddhism. We 
are very remorseful for having made such ill-considered and 
unfounded claims."1» 
The second excerpt given below gives a clear account 
of the central conceptions of Burmese neutralism as seen by 
the leading Burmese career diplomat, James Barrington. 
1 . Quoted in The Times, 30 Jan. 1958. 
(1) From the.Translation of a Speech Delivered by the 
Burmese Prime Minister, U. Nu, in the Chamber of 
»Deputies on 27th September, 1957, PP. 31-2 (issued 
by the Burmese Embassy in London, no date.or place-
of publication given). 
T 
( "Our foreign policy is directed^towards: 
( i ) securing a'world peace baeed on international 
justice and,morality, 
( l i ) establishing and maintaining friendly relations 
with all other nations and co-operating with .them 
for our mutual benefit, but at the same,time 
avoiding any entanglements which might entail the 
loss of our freedom of action in foreign affairs . 
1 ь ' 
"The principal obstacle to world peace has been, and is , 
the oold war. We therefore refuse to take part in the cold 
war. . Besides, joining-one side would "mean making enemies 
of the other, and, in addition, compromising our independent 
foreign policy, .This refusal to take Bides does not however 
mean that we have taken a purely negative attitude towards 
the cold war or that we behaved like the proverbial ostrioh 
stioking its head in the Band. We could not afford to 
assume such a posture, even,if,we were tempted to do so, 
because, as I have already explained the cold war was too 
close to us for us to be able to ignore i t . We know only 
too well that.another war would mean an end not only, to those 
who are.directly involved, but also, to those who are not. 
Not that there was any danger of someone deliberately » 
starting a war in the Hitlerian manner. But the principal, 
parties in the cold war had drifted so far apart, and had 
become so suspicious of each other, that there was ever 
present the danger that, some distant spark might_ set off the 
conflagration in a world more heavily armed .-than it was at 
any time..in its past history. » I know that.many in thie 
country feel that we should concentrate on our own internal 
business, and not get involved in the major international 
.issues of. the 'day. They point to the United States of 
America .which for over a hundred .years,, steered clear of 
involvementI in the strife and struggles of the then world, 
and -concentrated, on building up the nation.. It is certainly 
tempting to take this view but, I find no comfort in it " 
whatsoever. In fact, I regard it as a most dangerous 
doctrine, completely out of line with the current situation 
in the world. The United States could stay out of the 
nineteenth century struggles because of the facts of 
geography. Throughout the nineteenth century, the Atlantic 
and Pacific oceans acted as sure shields behind which the 
United States could concentrate on the essential tasks of 
nation-building. The fact that not a single German or 
Japanese warship or bomber waB able to reach the American 
mainland all through the Second World:War i s eloquent 
tribute to the effectiveness of this double-sided shield. 
But things have changed since the end ,of the World War I I , 
although that war came to an end only twelve years ago. 
In this short space of time, distance has been annihilated, 
and our concepts of geography have undergone a revolution. 
The development of long range jet bombers and now of long 
range guided missiles, both capable of carrying atomic and 
thermonuclear weapons, means that geography 1в no longer a 
factor on which a nation can count for i ts defence. It i s 
this which has forced the'United States completely to abandon 
her policy of isolationism, and'to begin to take an active 
part in the affaire of the world. And what applies to the 
United States applies even more strongly to the Union of 
Burma. I would like to recall that Burma became a battle-
field in tyorld War I I even though she was at that time f ar 
f ar away from the starting point of the war . ' Judging from 
.this, can anyone really doubt what our fate would be should 
another major war break out? I s it not certain_that we 
would be engulfed regardless of our feelings? And if this i s 
certain, i s there anyone who would still maintain that the 
Union of Burma should seek safety in isolation? I s the 
Government not under a duty to their people to do ,a l l in their 
power to prevent the ultimate catastrophe? But there are 
some others who вау what can a small, weak country like v 
Burma do when the giant States of today seem bent on mutual 
suicide? To this my answer ie. that rather than wait supinely 
for what nay sometimes seem inevitable, the small and weak 
States must exert all the normal pressure at their command 
on their big powerful brethren in a supreme effort to avert 
total disaster. This has been one of the principal reasons 
for my v is its to China, the Soviet Union, the United States 
and the United Kingdom in recent years. In making these 
v is i ts , my purpose was not only to promote better under-
standing between xKK^afxihHrocxrxKrHxjOTxayiiaKiK^BnxiiJix 
ourselves and the peoples of these countries, but also to 
try to promote better understanding between such of them as 
are in opposing camps in the cold war. Our well recognised 
position of neutrality in the cold war made it possible for 
us to speak with complete candour to both s ides . " 
(2) From an,Article entitled "The Concept of Neutralism. 
What Lies Behind Burma's Foreign Policy" , by James 
Barrington* in the Special Burma Supplement of The 
Atlantic Monthly in 1958, pp. 23-30. 
"Unfortunately for the Union of Burma, her emergence as 
an independent state coincided with the onset of that product 
of the nuclear age, ' the cold war. Since the cold war has 
dominated the international scene, either by drawing other 
international iss*ues into i ts orbit so completely as to make 
them lose their original identity, or by reducing them to 
relative insignificance, it i s not surprising that Burma's 
foreign policy, l ike that of every other State, should today 
tend to be judged by its .attitude towards the cold war. 
Applying the terminology of war to the cold war, the States 
which, like Burma, refuse to take sides in the cold war have 
come to be known as the "neutrals . " Later , when it became 
clear that the terminology of war did not quite f i t the 
circumstances of the cold war, attempts were made to find a 
more apt description. Hence the evolution of the terms 
"uncommitted" and "unaligned". But these are only slight 
refinements of the original term "neutral . " None of them 
provides a completely accurate description of the foreign 
policy of the Union of Burma - which i s f ar more than a mere 
attitude, or a series of unrelated reactions to successive 
international i ssues . " 
"Genuine independence in Burmese minds i s synonymous 
with an independent foreign policy. The reason for this, is 
quite simple. To the great credit of the British, it must 
be admitted that they gave JBurma progressive doses of "home 
r u l e , " c u l m i n a t i n g in full internal autonomy in 1937 . But 
right t i l l the end, the British Government retained control 
of Burma's foreign af fairs , with which was linked external 
defense. Thus the ability of a nation to make i t s own 
foreign policy, decisions, without outside domination or 
pressure, became in the eyes of the Burmese people the test 
of independence. It remains so today. Any suspicion that 
* James Barrington has been Permanent Secretary of the Foreign 
Office of the Union of Burma since 1948, except for a five-
year period when he served as Ambaesador to the United 
States and the United Nations. An Anglo-Burman, he was 
born in Moulmein in 1911» educated at Rangoon and Oxford, 
and^then entered the -Indian Civil Service, which administered 
^before independence. 
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the Government had accepted 'the dictation of another country 
or group of countries, or that 'it had succumbed to pressure, 
would immediately put the Government in trouble. This i s 
one reason why the Union of Burma steadfastly refuses to join 
either bloc ' in the cold w a r . " 
"This determination to follow an independent policy does 
not mean that Burma adopts an attitude of blind neutrality 
"toward all international issues except those in which she has 
a direct interest. She realizes that isolationism, which was 
the basis of nineteenth-century neutralism, no longer provides 
a safe refuge for any nation in the circumstances of today, 
and that there i s no running away from the problems of the 
world. If proof were needed of this , it i s provided by the-
fact that-the first major move of the Union of Burma in the 
international f ield was to join the United Nations. There i s 
thus all the difference between Burma's brand of neutrality, 
and the neutrality of the Nineteenth century.. Since there 
i s no getting-away from the w o r l d , we'have decided that the 
best course for us to adopt i s to maintain "friendly relations 
with all other nations, to interest ourselves in the problems 
which beset this planet, and to help f ind solutions to them 
from our>position of'independence which we believe enables us 
best to judge each issue strictly on i ts merits. Thus Burma's 
neutrality i s not neutrality as between right and wrong. I t 
i s neutrality in*the sense that in an extended conflict in 
which neither side i s absolutely right nor absolutely wrong, 
she refuses to line up absolutely with either side. Thiis, 
her policy of judging each individual issue as it arises 
strictly on i ts merits causes her to vote sometimes with one 
side and sometimes with the other, or to abstain where the 
issue i s not a clear-cut one. This i s very f a r from the 
"plague on both your houses" attitude which we are sometimes 
accused of adopting toward the t#o blocs in the cold war. 
."Independence, then,' i s the driving force behind Burma's 
foreign- policy. It furnishes the explanation for most of the 
attitudes which Burma has adopted on international issues. 
Prom it stems her strong opposition to colonialism in any form. 
We realize however that to remain independent Burma must build 
up her strength. Unless she does so, independence would 
become nothing but an empty slogan. The most urgent need i s 
for her to strengthen her economic and social foundations. 
And in order that she may do thio the Union needs peace above 
all e l s e . n 
"Together with most of the countries of Asia, Africa, and 
South America, Burma was passed over by the industrial 
revolution. Before she has had a chance to catch up with 
them, the more advanced countries of the worlt? are already 
moving into the era of .the atomic revolution, threatening to 
widen the gap which already exists between them arid the under-
developed countries. I f independence i s to have any meaning 
for Burma, it is 'absolutely imperative :that she should be able 
rapidly to narrow this gap, bringing to her people an increasing 
measure of the benefits-"which modern science can provide. I f 
true peace is to be established on ' this earth, it i s equal ly 
imperative that the other-underdeveloped countries should do 
the same. Y/e all realize that-we canrfot- do this by ourselves 
within the time that our people are prepared to wait . To 
meet the deadline, we need all the assistance we can get from 
outside, particularly from the technically advanced countries. 
Burma therefore welcomes all_ such a!soistance, subject only to 
one condition: the acceptance of assistance' must not in any 
way compromise our independent foreign 'policy . Provided'this 
condition i s ' s a t i s f i e d , we are prepared to accept assistance 
from any quarter; and in token of our gratitude we would like 
to make repayment, now or in the future, f o r all such assistance 
to the extent that "our resources will permit. We know however 
that there i s a direct relation between the availability of 
such assistance and the state of tension-in the world. An 
outright" shooting war would^probably mean'the end of everything. 
It i s for this reason that it has become unthinkable. But -
from the viewpoint of progress, it i s not enough to be able 
to prevent a shooting war. As long as the major powers 
continue to set aside more than half of their national budgets 
for defense purposes, it would be unrealistic to expect them 
to make available the kind and volume of assistance we all 
need. And as long as world tensions remain as high as they 
are, we cannot expect any substantial reduction in expenditure 
on armaments. Therefore Burma's own interests require that 
world tensions should be reduced." 
"The main objective of our foreign policy i s simply to 
preserve our independence. ?or this we need peace, and we 
need co-operation among all nations. In other words, we 
recognize clearly that there i e a close link between independ-




Prince Sihanauk of Cambodia 
Whether off icially Premier or indulging one of his 
periodic 'spells of resignation from off ice , Prince Sihanauk 
has been the effective ruler of Cambodia1* since 1954 . 
Though he "is not the^first Prime Minister to regularly 
receive 99$ majorities in national referenda, he i's certainly 
the f i rst v to carry out the Shavian idea of abdicating the 
ihrone in order to become^hlE country's elected leader. 
Sihanauk's undoubted ascendancy*in Cambodia-dates from the 
time when^he held up the signing of the Geneva agreements 
of 1954"by refusing any suggestion that the Vietminh dominated 
Khmer Issarak should continue in control 'of any part of 
Cambodian soil . He won his point* and perhaps saved his 
country from a c iv i l war. His neutralist foreign policy 
has brought Cambodia f inancial aid' from the Soviet Union, 
China, the U . S . A . and France. In an interview with Le Monde, 
13 June, 1956 , Sihanauk emphasised"that Cambodia's neutrality 
did not derive "from any ideology . . . i t i s of a practical 
kind because it seems' to us,the' b e s t . . . Cambodian neutrality 
which i s comparable to that of India , i s an obligatory 
consequence of the Indo-China War . " 
1'. See lMartin F. Herz - A Short History of Cambodia (London, 
1958 ) ; Saul. Rose - Socialism in Southern Asia (London, 
1 959 ) , ch. 10; V. M. Reddy - "A Study of flambodia's 
Neutralism" in International Studies, October i 9 6 0 , pp. 
190-205. - " 
The following i s from an article written by 
Prince Norodom Sihanouk in Foreign Affairs , July 
1 958 , 4 pp . 582-586, entitled - Cambodia Neutral . 
The Dictate of Necessity. 
"In our foreign relations .we have favoured neutrality, 
which in the United states i s a i l too often confused with, 
'neutralism' , although it i s fundamentally different . We are 
neutral in the way Switzerland and Sweden are neutral - not * 
neutralist l ike Egypt or Indonesia. "Let anyone examine our 
votes in the United Nations; they are not often 'aligned ' 
with'those of the 'bloc ' of 'neutralist ' nation's. . 
t- < 
"Our neutrality has been imposed on us by necessity. A 
glance at the map in our part of the world will show that we 
are wedged in between two medium-7sized nations of the Western 
bloc and only thinly screened by Laos from the scrutiny of 
two countries of the Eastern bloc, - North Vietnam and the. ^ 
vast People 's RepubliCjOf China. - What choice have we but to 
try 'to maintain an equal balance between the ' b l o c s . ' " 
"The fact i s , I abdicated.in 1955 to save the monarchy -
not to abandon i t . " 
t . 
p " If I^have no particular l iking for Communism, neither 
have I any cause or means to join a crusade - even a moral 
one - against the nations that have adopted .that ideology., and 
which since 1954 have not given my country sufficient grounds 
for complaint. It would be absurd to suppose that a tiny 
oountry like mine, geographically situated as-it i s , would, 
risk provoking the Chinese and Soviet colossi now that planes 
f l y so, fast and rockets so far . . , ( . 
с ? ' l 
"We are not a 'breach' in the Western bloc merely because 
we cannot be a 'rampart' . L In the event of a world conflict , 
we might very wellчbecome one of the f i r s t victims of a harsh 
occupation". In that case, the ( ' free world ' would have other 
things to do besides undertaking our liberation - or rather 
the liberation of what remained of u s . 
"Are we self ish or 'wrong-minded* in thinking as we do? 
I maintain that we are merely being real ist ic . By practising 
a genuine neutrality which eliminates any pretext we have a 
chance of not bringing down a storm'on our heads; arid a 
storm' can be dangerous where there i s no lightning-conductor." 
3z7 
Appendix 10 . 
President Nkruraah and Ghanaian/Pan-African 
Neutralism. 
. In 1951. Dr . Nkrumah was released from prison and became 
in 1958 the f i r s t , o f . t h e modern nationalist leaders of sub-
tropical Africa to head a new state, and to actively sponsor 
pan-Africanism from a place of power. Like Nehru, the best 
sources for an understanding of Nkrumah's neutralism are 
his Autobiography1* and his published speeches . 2 . Like 
Nasser, there i s an ambivalence in Nkrumah's nationalist 
claims - for just as Naseer i s both an Egyptian and an Arab 
nationalist , so Nkrumah i s both a Ghanaian and an African 
nationalist . Nkrumah espouses what might be called a 
Trotsky view of national revolution. For he has always 
urged the need-for a double revolution; one at home to 
convert a 'colonial type' of economy into a modern Socialist 
society; the other to secure the genuine (as opposed to 
"sham") independence of the whole of Africa . 
- » . 
Nkrumah claims to see forces at work in Africa which 
w i l l make political union inevitable . He sees progress in „ 
the fact thatrthere were twenty-eight independent states by 
early 1961 , but i s disturbed because nine of them have 
populations of less than, three million. "Can we seriously 
believe that the colonial Powers meant these countries to 
be independent, viable states?" he says. 
He sees other signs of 'neo-colonialism' in that many of 
the new states have their economies geared to Europe 's . He 
believes that„the ultimate breaking of colonial power and the 
development of A fr ica ' s wealth demands the planning of the 
continent's economic development as a whole; The d i f f iculty 
i s that not one of the political leaders heading a new state 
in West Africa shows signs of willingness to sacrifice his 
own authority in the interests of pan-African ideals . , 
1 . See Ghana. The Autobiography of Kwame Nkrumah, (Nelson, 
London, 1 957 ) . ~ 
2 . See Kwame Nkrumah - I Speak of Freedom (Heinemann, -London, 
1961 ) . 
5 . See Charles Janson - "Which kind of African socialism: 
Dr . Nkrumah or Prof e s s o r Pot ekhin" in 'The Listener . 15 
June 1961 , pp. 1029-50. 
ъгЪ 
The following i s from the text of,President Nkrumah's 
statement to the National Assembly of Ghana on 15th 
July, 1958 (reported in the Daily Graphic, Accra, 
16th July, 1958) . 
"The aim of the Government since the independence of 
Ghana has been to follow an independent foreign policy, that 
i s , a policy'that i s not committed ideological or aligned 
with any particular power or political bloc. 
HAs I have stated elsewhere, this policy i s one of 
positive,neutralism and non-alignment and we have interpreted 
this to imply that Government would act as it sees best at 
any particular time in the light of the country's obligation 
under the United Nations Charter, our position in relation to 
the African Continent, f our adherence to the principles 
enunciated at the Accra and the Bandung Conferences and our 
desire to safeguard our independence sovereignty and 
territorial integr ity . " 
' 4 • 
" It i s generally agreed that, small nation though we be, 
we have the chance, through.the United Nations, of making a 
positive contribution to international peace and goodwill 
and it i s our"intention to live up to the expectations which 
other nations have in u s . " ' 
"The,only hope of а email nation l ike ours i s to ensure 
that the United Nations becomes an effective instrument for 
world peabe and that through the United Nations the interests 
of all peoples and nations will be safeguarded. 
"Furthermore, Ghana has emerged in the world scene at 
a significant period in t h e h i s t o r y of the African continent, 
a period which i s pregnant with developments of a far-
reaching nature, a period of the re-awakening of African 
nationalism and patriotism. 
" It i s in the context that the significance of Ghana's 
independence should be viewed. 
"Our becoming independent at this time casts us in a 
role unique among the truly independent African nations in 
i f r ica . 
"We have attained our freedom from colonial rule and 
servitude by a path which many others stil l under foreign 
domination may aspire to tread. 
З г * 
"We must not only make our independence a success in 
terms of the economic and social well-being of our people 
and the positive part we play in international affairs, but 
we, in co-operation with other independent states in Africa, 
should give a lead to our brethren who are still struggling 
to be free. 
"Our success and our action are consequently of_great 
significance to the future course of the history of Africa. 
"It is the intention of the Government to do everything 
within its power to give encouragement to all nationalists 
movements in any part of Africa that are dedicated to the 
emancipation of colonial people and to the welfare and 
prosperity of their peoples. 
"It is to that end that we hope to welcome in Ghana a 
conference of leaders of nationalist movements in all the 
dependent territories of Africa. We hope, through this 
conference, a blue-print can be worked, out for the total 
liberation of other dependent territories in Africa. 
» 
"We are aware that nationalism in Africa today presents 
a challenge not only to us who belong to the continent, but 
to all those countries that have interests in Africa. ' 
"If the colonial powers are prepared to co-operate with 
this newly invigorated spirit of nationalism, the result might 
well be beneficial to them as it will be to us in Africa. 
But^make no mistake, the struggle for freedom and independence 
in Africa is on the move and cannot be stayed. • 
"This leads me to my final major thought on the role of 
Ghana in international affairs. It is in Africa that 
Ghana's foreign policy really lies. 
"The conference of independent African states has 
established a fundamental unity of outlook on foreign policy 
which is of deep significance to the role of the African 
natione in international affairs . " 
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Neutrality and the Emergence of the 
Concept of Neutralism 
Peter Lyon 
RE C E N T L Y , Mr. Nehru, in one of his more censorious moods, complained of the manner in which words lose their mean-
ing in cold war terminology.1 Such a complaint might well 
have provoked the reply that Mr. Nehru is as much a sinner as 
sinned against, and that the varying descriptions of India's foreign 
policy2 display a degree of slipperiness equal with that of "free 
world," "peace," and "democracy" — the "masked words"3 he 
mentioned. Ironically, it was the cold war which engendered the 
connotations that have given neutralism its chameleon cloak. And 
while popular usage readily applies the term to India, Indian 
spokesmen4 provide implicit support for the firm contention of 
those who insist that neutralism is essentially " a subjective term."® 
No doubt Indian equivocation, which is far from unique, is easily 
explicable. For a language attuned to the compulsions and con-
tingencies of political life is often unavoidably ambiguous; and the 
1 The Times December 9, 1958. 
2 Mr. Nehru's latest biographer reports that "the term to describe Indian 
foreign policy has undergone frequent change. It began with 'neutrality' or 
'dynamic neutrality,' later became 'neutralism' and then 'non-alignment' Nehru 
prefers the phrase 'positive policy for peace,' he told the author in New Delhi 
on 13 June 1956." Michael Brecher, Nehru. A Political Biography (London, 
1959), p. 563, footnote 2. Mr. Nehru's testimonies on other occasions have 
been somewhat different: "I do not like the word neutralism which is com-
monly used in wartime. In peacetime it indicates a sort of war mentality. 
India's neutralism meant simply that they had an independent policy and 
judged questions on their merits." Mr. Nehru reported in The Times, July 7, 
1956. Cf. Mr. Nehru's speech in Lok Sabha Debates, March 29, 1956, cols. 
3729-3730. 
8 "Yes; and words, if they are not watched will do deadly work sometimes. 
There are masked words droning and skulking about us . . . there are masked 
words abroad, I say, which nobody understands, but which everybody uses . . . 
for such words wear chameleon cloaks." John Ruskin (1893) in Sesame and 
Lilies (London, 1899), pp. 22-23. 
4 Cf. Krishna Menon: "Neutralism is an inept word used during a war. 
You are not belligerent in peacetime. The word has no meaning." New York 
Times, July 16, 1956. But an editorial in The Hindu (Madras), December 20, 
1955, spoke otherwise: "What the Western Powers have to realize is that neu-
tralism is a force that is worthy of the greatest respect even in these days of 
nuclear warfare." 
» Economist, March 10, 1956, p. 574. 
political "isms," which so proliferate today, seem to act as semantic 
vortices, blurring and engrossing the meaning of words of more 
ancient lineage. 
The concept of neutralism has come to dprote a whole gamut 
of policies, attitudes and sentiments expressing dissociation from 
the contemporary cold war. Such a broad embrace contains a 
host of proximate equivalents, euphemisms or circumlocutions — 
"non-alignment," "peaceful and active co-existence," "active for-
mal neutralism," "positive neutralism," "isolationism" are but 
some. Undoubtedly, however, it is neutrality which is most often 
used interchangeably® with neutralism and whose meaning most 
overlaps the more expansive term. 
Neutralism shares with its nearest congener the same Latin 
root, but the purist in etymology might charge that neutralism is 
a hybrid, because of its Greek suffix, whereas neutrality, with its 
Latin suffix is admirably thoroughbred. The terms neutral and 
neutrality date back as far as the fourteenth century where they 
are to be discovered in diplomatic correspondence and in treaties 
used in the sense of nonparticipation in an armed conflict between 
princes.7 From the Oxford English Dictionary it appears that 
neutrality8 — the state or condition of being on neither side or 
inclined neither way —• emerged in English language during the 
fifteenth century in an ecclesiastical context, while neutralism9 
was first used a century later meaning an attitude of indifference, 
apathy, or passivity. The same source shows that neutralist was 
used in the seventeenth century to denote one who maintains a 
neutral attitude, and referred especially to matters of religion. 
0 Oxford English Dictionary, Vol. VII (Oxford, 1908), p. 110. "Neutralism 
—maintenance of neutrality." Funk and Wagnalls, New Standard Dictionary 
of the English Language, (New York, 1949), p. 1670. "Neutralism—the spirit 
and practice of neutrality." The two words are used coterminously in J . C. 
Kundra, Neutrality in the Past and Present (New Delhi, 1957), p. 2; in Hans 
J. Mergenthau, "Neutrality and Neutralism" in Dilemmas of Politics (Chicago 
1958), pp. 185-209; and in L. Modjoryan "Neutrality," New Times (Moscow), 
February 16, 1956, p. 12. 
T Lothar Kotzch, The Concept of War in Contemporary History and Inter-
national Law (Geneva, 1956), pp. 128-146. 
'Neutrality. In 1480 Caxton wrote: "The threefold governance in the 
chirche that is to quotes of Eugenye, of the Counseyll and of the neutralyte" 
in the Oxford English Dictionary, (Oxford, 1908). VI, pt. 2, 110, "neutralism 
—the maintenance of neutrality." 
9 Neutralism 1579. W. Wilkinson. Confut. Familye of Love. "Our owne 
Neutralisme and lukewarmnes shall utterly condemnes us." 
EMERGENCE OF CONCEPT OF NEUTRALITY 257 
Neutrality has a strictly legal10 as well as a general diplomatic 
or political11 connotation. This'is what' distinguishes neutrality 
most-sharply from neutralism, for no 'one has suggested that the 
latter should'be construed as a. legal12 as well as a political term. 
Yet this distinction is not very helpful today as the recognition of 
legal neutrality depends on differentiating clearly between peace 
and war as two distinct situations defined by international law. 
Given the present fuzzy status mixtus of war and peace which we 
call cold war, legal neutrality-today can only have reference to 
limited wars of the Korean or Suez type. 
As political terms neutrality and neutralism are virtually exact 
synonyms, the' only difference being that neutralism seems to 
'draw forth a greater multiplicity of meanings than its older counter-
part, and'to imply a greater profusion of theory and practice.' It 
is not paradoxical to suggest that both concepts are much older 
than the words themselves, certainly much older than neutralism 
which is a political neologism. For' there is no clear dividing line 
between the history of neutrality,13 its theory and practice,J and 
the present condition of neutralism with all the problems .and 
controversies that surround it. Some knowledge of the vicissitudes 
of neutrality is indispensable in an appreciation of the emergence 
of -neutralism. 
I 
The practice of diplomatic neutrality, can be traced back to 
very' ancient times and is historically prior to .the recognition of 
neutrality as a legal status. For "instance, a s'ui generis conception 
was well known in India in Mauryan times (fourth to second 
centuries B.C.) , 1 4 and the recognition of neutrality was an im-
1 0 Definitions of legal neutrality are legion. Some representative references 
are cited in T. Komarnicki, "The Place of Neutrality in the Modern System of 
International Law." Recueil des Cours, Academie de droit international de Id 
Hayei( 1952), I. i . > ( . t . • • 
1 1 Diplomatic or political neutrality connotes a state of fact, two parties in 
conflict and a third adopting a policy or attitude of being ön neither side.'. 
1 2 C. G. Fenwick,', "The legal aspects of neutralism," American Journal of 
International Law (hereafter AJIL), Jan. 1957, p. 71-74. 
is F o r detailed treatment see Philip S. Jessup (ed.), Neutrality: its History, 
Economics and Law,'A vols/ (New York,' 1935-6); N..Politis, Neutrality and 
Peace, (Washington, 1935); and Nils Orvik, The Decline of Neutrality, 1914-41 
(Oslo, 1953). . . . 
' 1 1 К. K. R. Sastry, "A Note'on Udasina: Neutrality, in .Ancient .India,'?, 
Indian Yearbook of International Affairs (1954), pp. 131-134. * ' 
portant factor in the mitigation of conflict in ancient Greece,15 
where factious war between the independent Hellenic states was 
endemic. The anarchy, individualism, and license of interstate 
relations in ancient Greece contrasted sharply with the order, con-
formity, and discipline that the Roman Empire imposed on its 
world. Under the Roman Empire application of the dogma that 
those who were not for her were against her, that there was no 
middle ground between ally and enemy,16 meant that there could 
be no recognition of neutrality. Only fleetingly, when dictates of 
expediency ran roughshod over dogma, did neutrality enjoy a pre-
carious existence.17 
Throughout the Middle Ages neutrality in any positive sense 
was virtually unknown. Feudal ties, the universal sway of the 
Roman Empire, and tacit acceptance of the unity of the Christen-
dom were strong obstacles to the adoption of such a concept in 
law or in practice. As the strength of the Empire waned, the im-
perial bonds loosened and new states sprang up in the void left 
by the weakening giant. These new states found that there were 
few external restraints to inhibit their freedom of action. It was 
in this setting, contemporaneous with the birth of the modern law 
of nations, that neutrality as a legal concept was born. 
Gradually, with the passing of the Middle Ages, the notion 
of neutrality developed from its embryonic character as a political 
concept into that of a recognized legal status under international 
law. During this early formative period more was heard of neutral 
rights than of neutral duties, except when the latter were 
specifically entailed in particular treaties. For some time even the 
right of neutrality was limited by the survival of the mediaeval 
doctrine of the just war, whereby a state wishing to be impartial 
in a conflict should not hinder the belligerent whose cause was 
just nor help the belligerent whose cause was unjust. So while the 
legal rights of a neutral were but vaguely understood, it was natu-
ral for governments to seek precision in written undertakings, and 
it was in this way that the law of neutrality was formed and be-
came explicit during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. 
Even so, neutrality was not recognized or respected by such 
is " i f yOU prefer to be neutral. . . receive both sides in peace, but neither 
for the purpose of war." Jowett, Thucydides (Oxford, 1881) , I, 142. 
1 6 Livy, X X X I I , 21. 
1 T C . Phillipson, International Law and Customs of Ancient Greece and 
Rome (London, 1911) , II , 301-312. 
warrior kings as Gustavus Adolphus or Frederick the Great. In 
1630 the Elector of Brandenburg pleaded the right to remain 
neutral in the war between the Emperor and his brother-in-law, 
the king of Sweden. Gustavus Adolphus' reply was: "What kind 
of a thing is that? Neutrality — I don't understand it. It is noth-
ing to me." 1 8 And he compelled the unwilling Elector to become 
his ally." No wonder .it was not until well on in the eighteenth 
century that "neutrality" became a term of general use. From then 
onwards, up to the First World War, the development of inter-
national law was greatly influenced by the concept of neutrality 
which became its finest, and most fragile, flower. 
.II 
The French Revolutionary-Napoleonic wars clearly empha-
sized the broad lesson- of international history that if a state lacks 
the strength to defend its neutrality, that neutrality will be violated 
whenever a belligerent can use-the argument of military necessity. 
The resemblance between the Napoleonic and the Roman Empire, 
an analogy pursued entertainingly by H. A. L. Fisher,19 was 
certainly paralleled inasmuch as neutrality was neither respected 
nor regarded under either regime. Even when", after the Act of 
Mediation of 1803, Napoleon compelled the Swiss to accept the 
position of "absolute" neutrality, he was capable of saying on the 
outbreak of the Austrian war in 1809: "If I have need to march 
into Switzerland I shall do it. I can always find a pretext — the 
most insignificant pamphlet aimed at me will serve my purpose."?0 
Meanwhile, the leaders of the infant United States republic 
had added to the concept of neutrality the. notion of neutral duties 
commensurate with neutral rights. This was inaugurated by 
Washington's brief and simple neutrality proclamation of April 
22, 1793, which does not even mention the word neutrality, and 
was elaborated — notably by Hamilton and Jefferson — in a 
number of policy pronouncements carefully designed to keep the 
country out of current wars.21 While insisting on the distinction 
w Sir Geofffrey Butler & S. Maccoby, The Development of International Law 
(London, 1928), p. 231. ' • 
1 9 H. A. L. Fisher, Napoleon (London, 1950), pp. 135-137. 
2 0 Butler & Maccoby, op. cit., p. 239. ' 
2 1 Charles S. Hyneman, The First American Neutrality (Urbana 1934) and 
Charles M. Thomas, American Neutrality in 1793 (New York, 1931) . ! 
between the acts of individuals and those of the neutral state, the 
new American neutrality stressed, for the first time, impartiality 
as one of the main duties of a neutral. This American version of 
neutrality was not based on legal precedents. Nevertheless, it was 
quickly accepted by the European powers; while the prudent and 
specific policies of the Founding Fathers soon became shrouded in 
the mythology of American national history and interpreted as 
dogma. Henceforward the United States was to have a potent 
influence on the future shape and fortunes of the concept of neu-
trality — and of neutralism.22 
In the century following the Napoleonic wars neutrality en-
joyed a generally placid, prosperous, career. In historical retro-
spect, and in light of the present day threat of thermonuclear ex-
tinction, the period between 1815 and 1914 seems like a golden 
age for the theory and practice of neutrality — a brief spell of un-
usually favorable weather, reflecting the coincidence of a multiple 
balance of power, a general respect for international law, and the 
absence of any widespread and prolonged international conflict. 
This period found its apogee in the Hague Conference of 1899 
and 1907; for the law of neutrality as proclaimed in the Hague 
Conventions was based upon three centuries of practice, upon 
hundreds of decisions of prize courts and upon many important 
treaties. Even so, the fragility of the structure was beginning to 
be apparent at the tum of the century. The Schlieffen Plan of 
the German General Staff was made in 1897, and at the very 
time that the lawyers were talking at the Hague, the soldiers and 
diplomats of Europe suspected that it was Germany's intention 
in the next war to violate the neutrality of Belgium. 
I l l 
While the concept and practice of neutrality were enjoying 
22 Even if we grant Professor Northrop's firm contention that the policies 
of the Founding Fathers are the true analogues for present-day neutralism 
(F. S. C. Northrop, "Neutralism and United States Foreign Policy," Annals 
of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences [July 1957, 42-68]), 
it is as well to remember that United States neutrality — more usually described 
as isolationism — invariably tended to be more a question of unilateral deci-
sion and of domestic enactment than of conforming with the prevailing inter-
national law and practice of neutrality. The spate of U. S. neutrality legisla-
tion in the 1930's was but the continuation of a practice begun in 1794. The 
U. S. was one of the three signatory states that did not ratify the Hague Con-
ventions of 1907 and to date it has not ratified the Geneva Conventions of 
1949. 
their heyday, neutralism was a term' still apparently little used. 
Iri 1861, when Matthew Arnold wrote of neutralism in his "Popu-
lar Education of Holland,"23 he was using the term somewhat 
ironically, for Arnold was a staunch'supporter of the Established 
Church as preferable to the fanaticism and vain pretensions of so 
many religions,' especially the religions of dissent against which he 
tilted so' deftly in his "Culture and Anarchy." It may be that neu-
tralism was soon made redundant by the coining of a stronger, 
more positive word by Arnold's friend, Т. H.' Huxley. For 
agnosticism ; — meaning riot' passivity or indifference but the more 
positive assertion that nothing is known, or is likely to be known, 
of anything beyond material phenomena — was invented at the 
beginning of the eighteen seventies and, with its able propagation 
by Huxley and his disciples, neutralism fell into1 limbo in English 
until it re-emerged from France between 1947 and 1950, now in 
political language. • 1 ' • " ; 
Neutralism was to break into political vocabulary first, though 
briefly, in Italy where the word was applied to a vital, though 
purely domestic," debate of whether or not the country ought to 
intervene in the war which had "broken out in Europe iri'the 
summer of 1914.- Alone among'the European great powers Italy 
entered the war as a result of' deliberate bargaining. Neutral at 
the outset, she negotiated actively with both sides to obtain the 
maximum advantage 'for intervention and obtained it from the 
Entente Powers, who agreed'to satisfy Italian irredentist claims, 
mainly at the "expense of - her' former ally,'Austria-Hungary.24 
Within Italy during 1914, the terms neutralist'and interventionist 
came into vogue. The application of these terms revealed the 
fluidity of Italian -political life, for the neutralists'comprised a 
heterogeneous' collection, of ' Clericals, iriost j of the' Conservatives, 
the official Socialists and the Syndicalists, whilst the interven-
;« • , J \ • "л » \ .„'••' 
2 3 " I t is not unreasonable to ask of those 'Religions of the Future' which 
the present day so' prodigally announces that they will equip themselves with 
a substantial shape, with a worship, a ministry and a flock before we legislate 
for popular education in accordance with their exigencies.' But when we have 
done this, this neutralism'will be at an'end, denominationalism will have made 
them prisoners; the denominationalism of Groningen or Tiibingen, instead of 
that of Utrecht or Geneva." Matthew Arnold, Popular Education on the 
Continent (Londori'1861), pp. 221-222.'" A y e a r earlier "Walter Bagehot'had 
used the'word "indifferentisn3"'in'a roughly equivalent sense.'' See Bagehot's 
essay on Gladstone in biographical Studies (London) 1895) , p.' 95.' ' ' ' 
M A. J . P. Taylor, The Struggle for Mastery in Europe 1848-1918 (Oxford, 
1954) , pp. 544-548. 
tionists were made up of the Nationalists, some Conservatives, the 
Liberals, the Radicals, the Republicans and the Reformist Social-
ists. The country was torn by increasingly violent polemics; the 
record of this conflict can best be followed in the contemporary 
press.25 The struggle did not finally end in 1915, but was renewed 
from 1919 to 1922. Neutralism now became opposition to the 
state as such, and the neutralists became the object of repression 
and proselytism by those erstwhile interventionists who had evolved 
into Fascists.26 When in October, 1922, the Fascists took control 
of the Italian state, even the stoutest advocates of neutralism were 
silenced. 
In Britain at this time the domestic debate was briefer, less 
important, less bitter, and conducted in time honored idiom. The 
political capital of Cobdenism and of Gladstonism was not quite 
exhausted, and Norman Angell's Neutrality League27 attracted 
favorable support from such names as C. P. Scott, John Morley,28 
Charles Trevelyan, and Ramsay MacDonald. But the days of "the 
free hand" and of easy security had gone, and with the British 
declaration of war on August 4, 1914, the country was committed, 
in the view of the German Chancellor, "Just for a word, neutrality, 
just for a scrap of paper."29 The events of that day also put a 
sudden end to the British Neutrality League. The country seemed 
purged of "neutralism," whileMneutralist7 a term used freely in 
British newspapers from 1915,3 0 was reserved exclusively for re-
porting Italian politics. By 1928 the coauthors of a standard text-
book of International Law could write of "the strong neutralist 
sentiment which was such a feature of the 19th century."31 During 
2 5 A convenient source is the British General Staff publication, Daily Re-
view of the Foreign Press, Allied Press Supplement (London 1916-19) in 6 vols. 
2 6 Aldo Garosci, "Neutralism" in European Integration, ed. by C. Grove 
Haines (Baltimore, 1951), p. 198. 
27After All: The Autobiography of Norman Angell (London 1951), pp. 
181-183. 
2 8 See Lord Moriey's Memorandum on Resignation (London 1915), an 
eloquent statement of the Cobdenite viewpoint; see also the editorials of the 
Economist, a faithful mouthpiece of Cobdenism, prior to August 4, 1914. Cf. 
The Political Writings of Richard Cobden (London 1903), I., 33-34, and II, 
462-536, especially 533. 
2 9 Reported by Sir E. Goschen (British Ambassador in Berlin) to Sir Ed-
ward Grey, British Diplomatic Correspondence (London 1915), No. 160. 
8 8 Some representative examples may be found in: The Times, March 1, 
1915, and March 3, 1916; Morning Post, February I, 1915; Glasgow Herald, 
May 26, 1920. 
« Butler & Maccoby, op. cit., p. 240. 
the interwar period at least three members of the Commonwealth 
— Ireland, South Africa and Canada32 — seem to have antici-
pated what would today be called neutralism. . ( 
In the America of August, 1914, there; was virtually no debate 
about what appeared essentially as a European affair. Woodrow 
Wilson's proclamation of American neutrality on August 4, 1914, 
was so much in accord with the predilections of the President and 
the nation, and in tune, with the national tradition of' aloofness 
from European struggles, that anything other than American 
neutrality was impossible at that time. Wilson's plea to his country-
men, fourteen days later, to be "impartial in thought as well as 
in action" seems, in retrospect, rather to have anticipated the 
National Socialist prescription of neutrality33 than, as some have 
maintained, to have drawn its inspiration from the traditions 
founded by Washington and Jefferson.34 Such an aberration 
probably sprang from Wilson's lack of acquaintance with foreign 
politics and his genuine uncertainty and doubts, at'first, about the 
issues involved in the war and of their significance. for America. 
By October of the following year he was declaring in public: 
"Neutrality is a negative word.* It does not express what America 
ought to feel."35 Yet it was another eighteen months before Wilson 
put his war message before Congress when he said "neutrality is 
no longer feasible or desirable. . . . We have seen the last of neu-
trality."36 Less than three years later, as Wilson faded from the 
political scene, America returned to what was somewhat mislead-
ingly called "normalcy." The obsessive American isolationism of 
the nineteen twenties and thirties prefigured many of the pre-
occupations of Europe's present-day neutralists,37 while the Pan-
American Union possessed, in. Argentina, an early anticipation of 
South and South-East Asia's type of neutralism.38 '' 
32 N. Mansergh, Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs 1931-1939 (Lon-
don 1952). ' ' • • 
33 See the account and severe criticism of National Socialist doctrines of 
neutrality by Edvard Hambro, "Ideological Neutrality" in Nordisk Tidsskrift for 
international ret. Acta Scandinaoica juris gentium, 1939 (X, n. 2-3), 109-117. 
3*HarIey Notter, The Origins of the Foreign Policy of Woodrow 'Wilson 
(Baltimore, 1937), pp. 317-319; & F. S. C. Northrop, loc. cit. 
3 5 Quoted in Orvik, op. cit., p. 87. • ' • . . , 
3« Ibid., p. 114. . » 
87McGeorge Bundy, "Isolationists & Neutralists: A sketch in Similarities," 
Confluence (June, 1952), p. 70-78. . , ' ! 
™ The Memoirs of Cordell Hull. 2 (London, 1948).- 1,^23-25, and II„«99. 
IV 
Two world wars completely shattered the whole fabric of 
legal neutrality as it stood in 1907. The First World War re-
taught, and the Second World War re-emphasized the lesson of 
the French Revolutionary-Napoleonic wars, that in any wide-
spread and prolonged war the rights of neutrals will be little 
regarded. 
The twentieth-century invention of institutionalized collective 
security provisions firmly prevented any possibility of restoring 
legal neutrality to its 1907 position. Before the creation of the 
League of Nations international law had no alternative but to 
accept war as legitimate, quite apart from the justice or injustice 
of its cause. The League Covenant, the abortive Kellogg-Pact, and 
the United Nations more particularly, formally restricted the con-
ditions under which war was lawful, thus, by implication, re-
viving the mediaeval distinction between just and unjust wars. 
"No doubt in strict logic collective security and neutrality are in-
compatible, "the more there is of the one the less there is of the 
other,"39 but in fact the two are seldom entirely opposed and 
may often coexist. The League Council openly recognized such 
a situation in 1920 when Switzerland was invited to become a 
League member,40 and, as Nils örvik has shown, neutrality existed 
in fact and in law throughout the life of the League.41 
Of all the states which took refuge in neutrality during the 
Second World War, few found safety in it. The first stage of the 
war provided a number of illustrations of the general low regard 
for and virtual abandonment of impartial neutrality. With that 
delicate recourse to circumlocution which is a favorite camouflage 
of statesmen, Italy, Turkey, Spain, Egypt, and Argentina immedi-
ately described their positions as "non-belligerency."42 When in 
1940 and 1941 the United States clearly departed from the con-
ventional nineteenth-century rules of strict, impartial neutrality, 
she invoked the argument, among others, that with the general 
renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy, the right 
•9 H. Lauterpacht, "Neutrality and Collective Security," Politico (1936) , 
149. 
«»David Hunter Miller, The Drafting of the Covenant (New York, 1928), 
II, pp. 437-438. 
4 1 Orvik, op. cit., pp. 183-187. 
4 2 Robert R. Wilson — "Non-belligerency in relation to the terminology of 
neutrality," A.J.I.L. (January 1941), 121. 
asserted- by the founders of international law to discriminate 
against the aggressors was fully restored.43 : All these "non-bel-
ligerent" states were asserting that there could be an intermediate 
position between impartial neutrality and belligerency. In prac-
tice the degree of partiality shown .by these states varied .consider-
ably at different stages of the. war. Essentially the relations be-
tween belligerents and non-belligerents were, governed not by 
legal formulas but by political considerations. 
Even the most cursory glance at the fate of some of the states 
which adopted a neutrality policy can -suggest reasons'why, in 
the minds of many, the concept and even the word became further 
discredited and disregarded. National Socialist Germany bettered 
the example of Imperial Germany and invaded not only neutral 
Belgium, but also Holland, Denmark, and Norway. Japan oc-
cupied the Portuguese-half of the island of Timor, while Switzer-
land and Ireland were among the several neutrals which experi-
enced the "unintended" effects of someone else's bombs. Clearly 
the lot of most neutrals, as traditionally defined in textbooks of 
international law, was not a happy one. • 4 
When in 1945 the United Nations Charter was drafted at San 
Francisco neutrality was generally, regarded with disfavor.44 After 
1945 the question whether the Charter could be interpreted as 
permitting or excluding neutrality seemed to have only a theoretical 
interest,45 as so many of its provisions were clearly inoperative, 
given the lack of the presupposed agreement of the great powers: 
Yet, irrespective of'the United Nations' political or constitutional 
weaknesses, neutrality-soon was insinuated • again in the-law of 
nations. The Geneva Conventions of August 1949 definitely pre-
scribe neutrality. In the Korean War the Neutral Nations Super-, 
visory Commission was composed, apart from Switzerland, entirely 
of members of the United Nations; and in April, 1955, Austria' 
was recognized as a permanently neutral state. Eight months later 
she was admitted as a member of the United Nations.46 
« Cordell Hull, op. cit. И, 671-916. 
** Documents of the United Nations Conference, on International Organi-
zation (San Francisco, 1945) VI , 459; VII , 327. 
4 5 Hans Kelsen has argued that neutrality was possible even if the Charter 
worked as was intended by its makers. H. Kelsen, The Law of the United Na-
tions (London, 1950) , pp. 94 and 108. • " •< ,r " 
Josef L. Kunz, "Austria's.Permanent Neutrality," A.J.I.L. (April, 1956), 
418 ; and Alfred Verdross, "Austria's Permanent Neutrality and the United 
Nations," A.J.I.L. (January, 1956) , 61-68. 
One influential writer has claimed that "the law of neutrality 
is not visibly more obsolete in the mid-twentieth century than it 
was in the Ш-fated League of Nations."47 Certainly, the law of 
neutrality is no less ambiguous today than it was in the days of 
the League. Legal neutrality in the modern world seems to mean 
little more than trying to avoid involvement in a shooting war, 
regardless of the "rights" that may be overlooked or the "duties" 
that may be ignored. However, it may be unwise to claim that 
the law of neutrality is now dead, or even dying, for throughout 
the last four hundred years there has been evident a phoenix-like 
quality just when funeral orations seemed most apt. There is 
much to be said for a Marxist claim, "Neutrality is an historically 
developed concept, and like all such concepts it denotes different 
things at different times."48 
Today, neutrality and neutralism as political concepts can 
each denote different things in different places at the same time. 
Some recent attempts by scholars49 to distinguish them as illustrat-
ing the difference between policy and attitude are vitiated by the 
fact that the history of neutrality alone shows that the distinction 
can be extremely tenuous, while in contemporary usage neutralism 
embraces both policies and attitudes. The distinction between 
policy and attitude might be applicable when the neutralist is 
not responsible for his country's foreign policy, as in the cases of 
Etienne Gilson and Claude Bourdet; but when the neutralist is 
Nehru, who combines the offices of Prime Minister and Minister 
of External Affairs, and Bandaranaike, who also combined them, 
the distinction between their neutralism and India's or Ceylon's 
foreign policy respectively becomes rather nice, to say the least. 
As the fact of neutrality seems to be of perennial occurrence 
whereas neutralism, so called, has only sprung to light during the 
world's present predicament, the most helpful distinction of the 
two concepts today — though it is by no means a generally ac-
cepted one — would be that neutrality means keeping aloof from 
shooting wars whereas neutralism means dissociation from the 
4 7 Julius Stone, Legal Controls of International Conflict (London, 1954), 
p. 382. 
1 8 L . Modjoryan, "Neutrality," New Times (Moscow), February 16, 1956, 
p. 17. 
4 9 Denis Healey, Neutralism (London, 1955), p. 11; Coral Bell in Survey 
of International Affairs, 1954. Royal Institute of International Affairs (Lon-
don, 1957), p. 283; and Harry L. Roberts, Russia and America: Dangers and 
Prospects (London, 1956) , p. 127. 
cold war while, perhaps, involving efforts to remove or, at leastj 
mitigate some of the harshness of the cold war struggle. 
V 
It was perhaps appropriate, as Alexander Werth5 0 has sug-
gested, that with the onset of the cold war it was from France 
that neutralism came into ф р political vocabulary, after the period 
of French mediation between the superpowere had passed.51 
fitienne Gilson and Hubert Beuve-Mery in Le Monde and Claude 
Bourdet in Combat and later in L'Observateur, soon became widely 
regarded as the exponents of neutralism;52 though Gilson soon 
made clear that for him, at least, the difference between neutralism 
and neutrality was "only unfortunately over words."53 Indeed, 
the term neutralism was not embraced readily by the so-called 
proponents of the doctrine, and in a letter to the editor of Le 
Figaro Litteraire Gilson strongly denied that he was a "champion 
of neutralism."54 His denial provoked the counter comment from 
the editor, Pierre Brisson, that Gilson "having launched the idea 
refuses to accept the word."5 5 Gilson's refusal was not unique. 
Support for neutralism in France seemed to be far greater than the 
liking for the label. Bourdet's ironical formula " I 'm not a neutral-
ist, but — " aptly described the mood of an immense number of 
Frenchmen. 
In the summer of 1958 Bourdet, in the new journal of his 
British counterparts, described the genesis of this rather unwel-
comed term as it emerged during 1947-8: " I t was unpopular at 
that time to be a 'neutralist.' The name, which we did not choose, 
was picked for us by our opponents and by the pressmen. Rather 
than deny the title, which was not a particularly fortunate choice 
because of the aura of sit-back-and-do-nothing that surrounded it, 
we preferred to .take it up and try to popularize it. 'Neutralism' 
very quickly had people worried:"56 
Bourdet describes how the stigma attached to neutralism began 
5° Alexander Werth, France 1940-1955 (London, 1956) , p. 361. 
5 1 Dorothy Pickles, French Politics (London, 1953) , pp. 186-191. 
5 2 John Marcus, "Neutralism in France," Review of Politics (July, 1955) . 
6 3 fitienne Gilson, "Querelles de Mots," Le Monde, August 31, 1950. 
54 Le Figaro Litteredre, February 17, 1951. 
«Ibid. 
5 6 Claude Bourdet, "The Way to European Independence" The New Rea-
soner (Summer, 1958) , 12-13. 
to diminish among "serious-thinking people" ( s i c ) as India and 
Yugoslavia became popularly identified as neutralist states. As if 
to acknowledge the expansiveness of neutralism and with an ap-
propriate Humpty-Dumpty-like insouciance towards the meaning 
of words, Bourdet claims that by 1958 both sides in the cold war 
"seemed prepared to agree that active neutrality, or disengage-
ment — the name is unimportant — was not such a bad thing . . . 
as long as it did not spread within their own ranks. The growth 
in the acceptance of these ideas has been astonishing when one 
remembers that it has taken place over a period of only ten 
years."5 7 
Neutralism has undoubtedly emerged, but, like Proteus, can 
assume many forms. Si definitionem requiris, circumspice. 
51 Ibid. 
